

BAND I
HISTORICAL SURVEY OF CENTRAL TRACING
ACTIVITY IN GERMANY
1945 - 1951





17 120 1: Bd. 1

Historical survey of Central Tracing
Activity in Germany
1945 - 1951

I. THE TRACING OF MISSING PERSONS IN
GERMANY ON AN INTERNATIONAL SCALE
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE PROBLEM
OF UNRRA

page: 1 - 49

Study prepared by UNRRA Administration
-the author mentions on page 43 the date
of 1.6.1946- "for the personal information
of the Chief of Operations for Germany".

II. HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRACING SERVICE
1945 - 1951
(contents page 51/52)

page: 50 - 300

Study prepared by IRO Administration between
the end of May 1950 and the middle of September
1951. The study is based on the instructions
given to Mr. THUDICHUM by IRO Director Liaison
and Planning Office, 25.5.1950 ("What we need, and
what we hope you will be able to let us have, is
the complete story of ITS, related as closely as
possible to the appropriate basic documents
on which your policies and activities have been based.
Copies of such documents should also be attached").
Mr. THUDICHUM is obviously the author of the bulk
of the historical survey. Only the studies concerning
Child Tracing have been written by other IRO
representatives; one, dated 11.9.1950 by Mr. Herbert
MEYER, Chief Child Search Branch, and one, dated
28.9.1951 by Miss Vera SAMSONOFF, then Chief
Information Division.

Mr. THUDICHUM had finished the major part of his
historical work on 24. January 1951 (see letter to
Geneva, page 316) and was able to dispatch to
Higher Headquarters his last chapter concerning the
History of US Zone Division on 13. September 1951
(see respective letter, page 329).

III. CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THE STUDY OF IRO
ADMINISTRATION

page: 301 - 330

Historical Society of Central Florida

Volume 10, No. 1

January 1950

The purpose of this journal is to provide a forum for the publication of historical research and information concerning the history of Central Florida.

It is hoped that this journal will be a valuable source of information for those interested in the history of Central Florida.

Editor: [Name]

The following articles are included in this issue:

- [Article Title]
- [Article Title]
- [Article Title]

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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL TRACING SERVICE
BRIEF REVIEW OF ITS HISTORY AND ACTIVITIES

submitted by the Director General IRO in
the seventh session of the General Council,
Geneva 16.3.1951 (compare collection of
General Council documents).

This review is obviously based on Mr. THUDICHUM's
study.

1.)	English version	page: 331 - 341
2.)	French version	page: 342 - 355

V. FEATURE STORY HICOG INFORMATION BULLETIN

This article has probably been written at
the begin of HICOG period. page: 356 - 365

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10/15/2001 BY SP-6 [REDACTED]

REASON: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, PARAGRAPH 1, (1)

DATE 10/15/2001 BY SP-6 [REDACTED]

REASON: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, PARAGRAPH 1, (1)

DATE 10/15/2001 BY SP-6 [REDACTED]

REASON: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12958, PARAGRAPH 1, (1)

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of the Chief of Operations for Germany".

page: 1 - 49

THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION
HAS APPROVED THE FOLLOWING
RESOLUTIONS:

RESOLUTION NO. 1000
APPROVED AND ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BANKING CORPORATION THIS 15TH DAY OF MARCH 1960.

HINWEIS-BLATT

KT : Historical Survey Ggstd. & Nr. : folder 1

Betrifft die Akte Nr. : 1ff

Datum : 6.3.1959

Erklärungen des Sachbearbeiters :

Compare study of the same title under "Succession of UNRRA I"
folder 36

Mr. [Name] [Address]

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THE TRACING OF MISSING PERSONS IN GERMANY ON AN

INTERNATIONAL SCALE

WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE

PROBLEM OF U.N.R.R.A.

PREPARED FOR THE PERSONAL

INFORMATION OF THE CHIEF

OF OPERATIONS FOR GERMANY

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THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY

RESOLVED THAT

THE FOLLOWING BE THE

MEMBERS OF THE BOARD

FOR THE YEAR

ENDING ON THE

THIRTIETH DAY OF

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INTRODUCTION

A. Object of the Paper

The object of this paper is to examine comprehensively all aspects of the social problem generally known as the "tracing of Missing Persons" with a view to:

- a. Providing factual information on the problem for distribution to interested agencies and individuals;
- b. Presenting a sound framework on which plans for the further prosecution of the work may be based;
- c. Indicating courses of action for executing that part of the task which UNRRA is unable to undertake.

B. Summary of Conclusions

1. The long-range humanitarian, legal, and social ramifications of the tracing of missing persons are of such a magnitude as to necessitate the continuation of a tracing service within Germany.
2. The problem of tracing missing German nationals is of primary importance for the Occupying Powers as a pre-requisite for the settling of the population necessary for any basic social or industrial re-organization. It must therefore be considered as a part of the overall tracing problem.
3. The tracing of missing United Nations' nationals was accepted from the beginning of UNRRA as a legitimate and essential part of its program.
4. UNRRA proposals for the institution of a tracing service in 1944 to assist displaced persons under its care were not implemented.
5. The service for tracing United Nations' displaced persons in Germany, of which the UNRRA Central Tracing Bureau is by origin and development a part, was organized and directed as a military operation under SHAEF and CDEK using UNRRA personnel without reference to the UNRRA proposals of 1944.
6. The Standing Technical Sub-Committee on Displaced persons for Europe "took note" apparently without dissent) of

A REPORT Concerning the SHAEF Tracing Unit, (given independent status as the UNRRA Central Tracing Bureau on 1 October 1945) which stated that it "is probably destined to become a central displaced persons record bureau for Germany for handling all enquiries, whether official or private, concerning persons who were displaced in that country".

7. On 16 November 1945, the Chief of Operations for Germany, with the explicit authorisation of the European Regional Office, placed the UNRRA Central Tracing Bureau and associated Records Office at the disposal of the Allied Control Authority to be operated by UNRRA under policies and directives issued by the Central Tracing Policy Board as outlined in CORC/P(45)54.

8. The Central Tracing Service outlined in CORC/P(45)54 provides for a decentralised organisation consisting of independent bureaux on national and zonal levels with a central bureau to offer a measure of centralisation.

9. The Central Tracing Bureau functions as a central clearing house between the zonal and national bureaux with definitely specified responsibilities (1) for the processing and transmission of records of mixed nationalities and the preservation of those which, owing to their nature, can not be decentralised(2), and for the transmission of individual enquiries to the zones and the performance of other search functions.

10. Authorised agencies for the tracing of missing German nationals exist in Hamburg, Munich and Berlin, but there is no significant integration of effort. Although a centralised bureau is regarded as of value for the more efficient prosecution of the activity and for assistance in the tracing of missing Allied nationals, no such bureau has been created.

(1) To eliminate the Central Tracing Bureau from the search work leaving its "clearing house" functions to the national bureaux and the direction of search activities to the zonal bureaux.
(2) The retention of a small central bureau as an agency for dealing with the stateless and those of undetermined nationality and for conducting a search for those not otherwise located in the zones.

11. The official UNRRA policy for tracing accepts responsibility for tracing only persons falling under the definitions of the Council Resolution as eligible for UNRRA care. Enquiries for tracing German relatives of United Nations' nationals are transmitted to German tracing agencies.

12. The UNRRA policy statement assigned to E.R.C. the responsibility for co-ordinating UNRRA policy with the policy of the National Tracing Bureau in so far as it concerns those eligible for UNRRA care. The Central Tracing Policy Board retained the responsibility for maintaining liaison between the Central Tracing Service and any organisation in or outside Germany. There has arisen a certain confusion as a result of these claims, which should be resolved by the establishment of a formula through negotiation.

13. UNRRA's responsibility to establish, stabilize and maintain the process of tracing missing persons has been interpreted to include a fundamental redistribution of functions between the national, zonal and central tracing bureaux. Such a re-organisation of the service is not recommended until basic decisions have been made as to the final disposition of the activities of the Central Tracing Bureau.

14. A Re-registration of displaced persons remaining under UNRRA care on the completion of repatriation is necessary for an adequate tracing of their whereabouts.

15. The transfer of the tracing activities performed by the Central Tracing Bureau to a terminal legatee at UNRRA's dissolution is a responsibility of UNRRA. There are at least four alternative courses of action:

- (1) To eliminate the Central Tracing Bureau from the system transferring its "Clearing House" functions to the national bureaux and its direction of search activities to the zonal bureau.
- (2) The retention of a small central bureau as an agency for dealing with the stateless and those of undetermined nationality and for conducting a search for those not otherwise located in the zones.

II. THE SCOPE OF THE BUREAU'S FUNCTIONS.

- (3) A continuation of the bureau under the direction of the Allied Control Council.
- (4) The continuation of its co-ordinating and centralizing functions under a strong international body.

The Bureau is to be a permanent institution, to be established in the form of a bureau of the Allied Control Council, and to be located in London.

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(C) A committee of the Senate shall be appointed

of the House of Representatives

(4) The committee shall have the honor of the

of the House of Representatives

II. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE TRACING PROBLEM.

A. The Problem of Tracing Allied Nationals

Tracing may be defined as the process of determining the location of persons whose present whereabouts, alive or dead, are being sought by their relatives, friends or governments.

Although the tracing of missing persons has been long recognized as a civil problem which has been handled by various national welfare agencies, its implications on an international scale received scant attention until the vast displacement of population during the recent war forced it on the Allied Governments. Even then its full import was only gradually realized.

During its first phase, the problem was viewed largely as a humanitarian one. The reunion of deported families, the return of children to their parents, and the re-establishment of contacts disrupted by years of occupation and war were viewed as a necessary prerequisite for any sound program of repatriation or resettlement. In a larger sense, social reconstruction could not be attempted in any major sense until the basic human relationships had been restored. At this time the problem of a tracing agency was largely to serve as a link for bringing interested persons into communication with each other. Complicated as that task was by difficulties of communication in a war torn society, its problems were essentially straightforward and simple. Once the interested parties have established contacts with each other, the problem is solved. This aspect of tracing although still of importance, has been reduced through repatriation on a large scale and through the gradual restoration of normal communication facilities.

It was only gradually that other aspects such as the re-establishment of legal processes, the settling of estates and inheritances, the determination of marital status,

the verification of claims for the purpose and purposes, were
 recognized as having considerable importance.

It might be argued that these are not technical
 might be raised here. This argument, however, does not
 solve the fundamental question of the method, for many people
 refuse to accept any but technical evidence. Even, of course,
 does it solve the legal question, although many governments
 have notified their laws authorizing the recording of
 death, the Governor is concerned with the and involved are.
 The identification of the dead and the preservation of identity
 acceptable evidence is a consequence of great importance here
 to individuals and governments. These questions often depend
 for their solution on international action and are suggested by
 other means than the technical identification of identity.
 Although the full extent of the existing problem
 has not been stated until the Allied Government came to
 realize the importance and necessity of such a study, agencies
 existed in the various countries. The problem of identifying the dead
 and establishing the facts of their lives was found alive
 has come to the surface in which many national governments,
 especially those in Western Europe, are particularly interested
 in an earlier person's history in Germany and elsewhere. These
 long range political, legal and social implications of the
 problem are of such magnitude as to necessitate a careful
 consulting and adjustment of the objectives of any study
 and to solve the problem of identity, however, certain aspects
 of the problem, the technical identification of individuals must
 be emphasized as the basis for the identification of persons
 and documents.

The Problem of Identity in the War Zone

On the latter aspect, the problem of identity during
 persons cannot be limited to the study of displaced persons
 nations' policies. The movement and conditions sustained by

the verification of claims for insurance and pensions, were recognised as having considerable importance.

It might be argued that those who have not returned might be assumed dead. This assumption, however, does not solve the humanitarian aspect of the problem, for many people refuse to accept any but definite evidence. Nor, of course, does it solve the legal aspects. Although many governments have modified their laws establishing the presumption of death, the process is of necessity a long and involved one. The identification of the dead and the presentation of legally acceptable evidence is consequently of great importance both to individuals and governments. These questions often depend for their solution on information which can be supplied by no other means than an effective international tracing service.

Consequently the full extent of the tracing problem did not present itself until the Allied Governments came to realise the thoroughness and brutality with which Fascist agencies extirpated their enemies. The problem of identifying the dead and establishing the fate of those who cannot be found alive has come to be the purpose in which many national governments, particularly those in Western Europe, are primarily interested in so far as persons missing in Germany are concerned. These long range political, legal, and social ramifications of the problem are of such magnitude as to necessitate a careful scrutiny and adjustment of the objectives of any agency attempting to solve the problem of missing persons. On this second phase of the problem, the actual search for individuals must be subordinated to the search for and exploitation of records and documents.

B. The Problem of Tracing German Nationals.

On its larger aspect, the problem of tracing missing persons cannot be limited to the tracing of displaced United Nations' nationals. The movement and casualties sustained by

A. The Problem of International Relations

It is not only the process of international relations, but the process of international relations, which is the subject of this study. It is not only the process of international relations, but the process of international relations, which is the subject of this study.

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the German population have been so heavy that without adequate provision for tracing them it will be well nigh impossible for persons outside Germany to obtain information about their German friends or relatives. Likewise, as displaced persons lose the privilege of their present status, as many are bound to do, the present clear demarcation between German and displaced persons will become increasingly less distinct.

There is no doubt among those closest to the German problem, that the tracing of German nationals is of primary importance for the Occupying Powers. Thousands, many not aware of the names of their next of kin, are wandering from place to place and creating added difficulties in the economic life of the country. No real program of social or industrial re-organization can be carried through until the population is definitely settled. An effective tracing service for the German population is essential for obtaining this objective. None but the most short-sighted can deny that the problem of tracing German nationals is closely connected with that of tracing in general, and as such is of major concern for the Occupying Powers.

C. The Extent of the Tracing Problem

During the recent war, the mass movements of population on a hitherto unprecedented scale were effected in all the countries overrun by the German armies as well as within Germany itself during its invasion. Since the termination of hostilities most of these persons have returned to their homes or have been reunited with their families. There remain, however, a vast number whose fate remains unknown either to the governments or to their closest relatives. As of 30 May 1946 there are more than 3,585,000 Allied nationals still missing, distributed among the United Nations as follows :-

Belgium	21,000
Czechoslovakia	200,000
France	200,000
Greece	100,000
Luxembourg	4,000

The German population have been so long that...

There is a great deal of information in the...

The subject of the...

100,000	...
200,000	...
300,000	...
400,000	...
500,000	...

The Netherlands	60,000
Poland	3,000,000

This estimate does not include a large number of Italians, many Scandinavians, and a few South Americans. Nor does it include the vast number of relations and families, who, although not strictly speaking missing persons, have become the object of search of citizens of the United Nations, particularly of the United Kingdom and the United States.

The bulk of these missing persons fall into a number of categories, each of which presents special tracing problems.

1. Forced or Voluntary Laborers. By far the greater number of this group have been repatriated or their whereabouts are known. Those who have not returned either (a) have died in Germany through natural causes, brutal treatment in labour camps, or Allied bombings, or (b) do not wish to return home for political or personal reasons.
2. Compulsory Conscription into the German Army. The greater number of these were killed in action and no notification of their deaths reached their families; others are still prisoners of war in Allied, principally Russian, hands.
3. Allied Prisoners of War. The missing within this category have mostly died whilst in German hands and their deaths have not been notified to their country of origin.
4. Political Prisoners. Practically all political deportees were confined in prisons or concentration camps. Except some eastern nationals, nearly all have now returned. Practically all those who are still missing have died as a result of execution or ill treatment. Their fate can be established only through an extensive exploitation of the records of concentration camps, cemeteries, prisons, and a thorough examination of various Marches de la Mort.
5. Jews and Racial Deportees. Jews and various categories of racial deportees were exterminated in such large numbers, often without record, that it will be possible to establish their fate only through a most careful sm examination of all available documents.

6. Unaccompanied Children. In addition to thousands of unaccompanied children in UNRRA Assembly Centers, an indeterminate number of non-German children have been absorbed into German homes and institutions. Special arrangements are necessary for their training, screening, care and repatriation.
7. Other Groups. Other classes, which cannot properly be called missing persons, are being sought by "anxious" relatives and friends. They include relatives and friends well established, for the most part outside Germany, who are being sought after by displaced persons in Germany, and German nationals, both persecuted and not, who are being sought by their relatives who are United Nations' nationals.

Summary Report on Organization Between Displaced Persons and Their Families (UNRRA(48)108.) "As a basis for the displaced persons division proceeding in consultation with the military authorities, the International Red Cross and the other agencies concerned, with the working out of a co-ordinated plan for assisting displaced persons to get in touch with their families and friends, and for dealing with inquiries from families and friends about displaced persons". (Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, Working Technical Sub-Committee on Displaced Persons for Europe, 15 June 1948, para. 5.)

Although this report recommended the use and extension of existing training facilities, such as provided by the International Red Cross Committee, National authorities, and the Civil Affairs Branch of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (UNRRA(48) 108 (Rev. 2), 15 June 1948, Section 4(a), (b); 5; 9). It further recognized the necessity of supplementing their services. (Ibid., Section 5). For this purpose it proposed the creation of an international training service comprising National Training Centers, local

3. Unaccompanied Children. In the event of the arrival of unaccompanied children in the United States, the Department of Homeland Security will coordinate with the Department of State to ensure that appropriate arrangements are made for their care, custody, and transportation.

4. Other Children. Other children, when a court order is issued, will be transported to the United States and placed in the custody of a parent or guardian. The Department will coordinate with the Department of State to ensure that appropriate arrangements are made for their care, custody, and transportation.

5. Children in Custody. The Department will coordinate with the Department of State to ensure that appropriate arrangements are made for the care, custody, and transportation of children in custody.

III. UNRRA PROPOSALS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRACING SYSTEM

From its inception, UNRRA accepted the tracing of missing persons as one of the legitimate and essential parts of its program.

The basis of authority upon which UNRRA accepted this responsibility rests on the inclusion of technical services necessary for maintaining records of displaced persons (1) within the framework of welfare services⁽²⁾ recognized as one of the essential services for the relief of victims of war⁽³⁾.

The necessity for carrying out a program of tracing as a most important phase of the welfare of victims of war was adopted by the Standing Technical Sub-Committee on Displaced Persons for Europe at its Fifth Meeting held on 30 June 1944. The Committee approved a Preliminary Report on Communication Between Displaced Persons and Their Families (TDP/E(44)18.) "as a basis for the Displaced Persons Division proceeding in consultation with the military authorities, the International Red Cross and the other agencies concerned, with the working out of a co-ordinated plan for enabling displaced persons to get in touch with their families and friends, and for dealing with enquiries from families and friends about displaced persons". (Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, Standing Technical Sub-Committee on Displaced Persons for Europe, 30 June 1944, Para. 5.).

Although this report recommended the use and extension of existing tracing machinery, such as provided by the International Red Cross Committee, Vatican authorities, and the Civil Affairs Branch of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (TDP/E(44) 18 (Revised) 22 August 1944, Sections 4(a), (b); 8; 9), it further recognized the necessity of supplementing their services. (Ibid., Section 6). For this purpose it proposed the creation of an international tracing service comprising National Tracing Bureaux, Local

Tracing Offices, and a Central Bureau for Europe. The national tracing bureaux were to be set up in each of the European United Nations to serve as a clearing house for all matters concerning the tracing of its own nationals (Ibid., Section 7; 10 (a).) (4) The local offices to be opened at the earliest possible moment in liberated territory, were proposed as feeders to and to work in close co-operation with their respective national bureaux. The Central Bureau for Europe was to serve as the connecting link between the various national bureaux and to direct the answering of enquiries which could not be dealt with otherwise. It is clearly implied in this report (Sections 3 (b), ii; 4 (a); 6; 7; 8) and definitely stated in a supplementary statement, Suggestions on Functions of the Central Tracing Bureau for Europe (U.N.c. 82, Section 1) "that the basic conception is that the headquarters office of the International Red Cross Committee should be invited to undertake the functions of the Central Tracing Bureau for Europe".

The part UNRRA was to play in this system was clearly limited to that of "an administrative link to get the scheme started"; it was proposed that it should not be "in any way responsible for operating it". Although it is clearly stated that "UNRRA would undertake the role of co-ordinator in respect of the displaced persons under its care"; it was in no way implied that the European Regional Office would assume responsibility for maintaining liaison between the National Tracing Bureaux or would dictate the policies or procedures of the Central Tracing Bureau for Europe.(5).

Despite UNRRA's clear acceptance of the tracing of missing persons as a legitimate and essential part of its program, there is no evidence that these suggestions were implemented. The Local Tracing Offices were never created, and there is little substantiation for the claim that the development of the National Tracing Bureaux, as now constituted, was stimulated by these proposals, (see below V, B). Negotiations were evidently

initiated with the International Red Cross Committee, but, whatever their results, its Headquarters Office did not assume the functions of the Central Tracing Bureau for Europe.

(1) "The supplies and services of which the Administration will seek to insure the provision fall under four heads :

2. Relief Services: such as health and welfare; assistance in caring for, and maintaining records of, persons found in any areas under the control of any of the United Nations who by reason of war have been displaced from their homes and, in agreement with the appropriate governments, military authorities or other agencies in securing their repatriation or return; and such technical services as may be necessary for these purposes." (Resolution I, Part II, Section 2.)

(2) "Within the framework of its total program the Administration should make specific provision for welfare services for victims of war" (Resolution 9, Section 4).

(3) "2..... The purposes and functions of the Administration shall be as follows: (a) To plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other essential services." (Agreement for United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Article I, Section 2(a)).

(4) UNRRA, Displaced Persons Branch, Communication Between Displaced Persons and Their Families, suggestions Regarding the Functions of the National Tracing Bureaux and the Local Tracing Offices, U.N.c. 83, Sections 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, contains suggestions for the functions of the proposed National Tracing Bureau. Sections 4, 5, 6 deal with the proposed Local Tracing Offices.

(5) For a statement of the policy of the Standing Technical Sub-Committee on the SHAEF Tracing Unit, see below C.

initiated with the International ...
whatever their results, the ...
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(1) The ...
will look to ...
in ...
any ...
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL TRACING SERVICE FOR GERMANY

A. Tracing as a Military Operation (1939-1944)

With the opening of hostilities in 1939 the need for special arrangements for tracing prisoners of war and civilians who had been cut off from their relatives became apparent. In most countries this task was assumed by the various national Red Cross organizations with the International Red Cross Committee acting as intermediary between the belligerents.

The full extent of the problem of missing persons and the necessity of creating a central service for tracing their whereabouts became fully apparent only as the Allied armies liberated increasingly large areas of enemy occupied territory. Initially the problem was viewed as a military one, largely concerned with prisoners of war, for which the machinery for transmitting messages set up by the International Red Cross Committee under the Geneva Convention was adequate.

B. The Creation of the Central Tracing Service

1. The SHAEF Tracing Unit. As a result of the progress of the Allied armies in Germany early in 1945, an increasing number of enquiries for tracing United Nations Displaced Persons and relatives in Germany of United Nations nationals were received by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) for the handling of which no facilities existed. (SHAEF/G-5/DP/281613, 27 April 1945, Para. 1).[✓] To meet this need the Supreme Commander provided for the processing of such enquiries through normal military channels (Ibid., Para. 2). The service thus provided contained in embryo the essential features which characterized subsequent developments in that theater:

(1) SHAEF's assumption of the functions of a central agency for receiving enquiries from outside Germany and for distributing

A. Treaty as a Political Act

With the treaty of 1793, the United States entered upon a new era in its foreign relations. The treaty was a political act, and it was a political act which had far-reaching consequences. It was a political act which was a political act which was a political act.

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them to appropriate channels (Ibid., Para 2);

(2) the delegation of the responsibility for field search to local Military Detachment Commanders who were authorized to use non-military personnel, (such as Red Cross, UNRRA, etc.) in conducting an investigation and to exploit available records of the local German authorities. (Ibid., Para 3 a, b.).

As the magnitude of the problem increased, the service was further crystallized by the organization of a SHAEF Tracing and Location Unit to establish and systematize a tracing procedure adequate for handling it. The procedure thus organized divided the function of the Unit into two distinct but closely related operations : (1) the collection of documents and records, and (2) the processing of enquiries for tracing individuals.

The Unit was to collect nominal rolls of concentration camp inmates and Displaced Persons' Registration Cards (SHAEF 185/24, 24 May 1945, Para 2 A, B) ✓ forwarded to the Headquarters in accordance with military directives (SHAEF Administrative Memorandum No.39 - Revised 16 April 1945, ✓ Para. 31 (c), and SHAEF Signal S-85927, 23 April 1945) and to disseminate the information contained therein to the various national tracing bureaux. (SHAEF 185/24, 24 May 1945, Para 2B) ✓ The processing of enquiries provided for classification into priority categories screening against available nominal rolls and index of enquiries received. (Ibid., Para 3B), and dispatch for tracing either to appropriate military government officials or to the various national tracing bureaux. The system also provided for the maintenance of a Central Registry of non-repatriables by UNRRA and the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees (Ibid., Para. 2C) and for the use of standard enquiry and reply forms to facilitate the process (SHAEF/G-5/DF/2816/1, 28 May 1945). ✓

Central Tracing Bureau (Ibid., Para. 5, et. seq.) The primary responsibility of the latter was "the processing of the handling of a national tracing bureau in each country to which all enquiries originating in that country will in the first instance

2. The CDPX Central Tracing Bureau. With the establishment of the Combined Displaced Persons Executive, G-5 Division, USFEP, representatives of the various elements of the Control Commission turned their attention to perfecting the tracing procedure as a permanent feature of military government in occupied Germany. Numerous proposals were made for the establishment of tracing agencies in the four zones, and for incorporating the SHAEF tracing unit as a section of the executive. Leadership in this project was undertaken by the British and the United States elements, both of which submitted proposals at a meeting held in Frankfurt-am-Main on 17 July 1945. The British proposal provided in general for the extension of their Missing Personnel Search Bureau of the P.W. Branch established as early as April 1945, to include Displaced Persons as well as prisoners of war⁶. (See below V, C, 1.). The American proposal was largely an extension of the tracing service already in operation under the direction of SHAEF⁷. The agreements reached during the summer of 1945 set forth "the general policy and the broad lines of a system whereby the fullest measure of decentralization would be used consonant with overall co-ordination by the Central Tracing Bureau in order to ensure the most efficient and economical organization". (GE-CDPX, 383, 7 (4.33), 18 August 1945, Para 3).

The proposal as outlined in the basic agreement (GE-CDPX, 383.7, 24 July 1945) provided for a Central Records Office and a Central Tracing Bureau (Ibid., Para. 1). The former was responsible for locating, safeguarding, analysing and determining the disposition of all records in Germany concerned with displaced persons. Records of interest to Allied governments were to be turned over to the National Tracing Bureaux concerned, and all others to be kept centrally for use by the Central Tracing Bureau (Ibid., Para. 2, c). The primary responsibility of the latter was "the promoting of the development of a National Tracing Bureau in each country to which all inquiries originating in that country will in the first instance

be directed." (Ibid., Para. 3a) its immediate functional operation was the sifting of enquiries received from the National Tracing Bureaux and passing on those judged suitable and those which could not be answered from the records in the Central Records Office to the appropriate zone. Provisions were made for handling enquiries concerning both displaced persons and ex-enemy nationals who are relatives of United Nations' nationals. (Ibid., Para 3b). As the system expanded it included also plans for tracing relatives of displaced persons at Assembly Centers in Germany (GE-CDPX, 383.7-4.31), 10 August 1945), plans for utilizing the facilities of radio and the press and proposals for conducting specialized search for the relatives of unaccompanied children. This proposal contained every essential feature of the Central Tracing Service later established by the Allied Control Authority as the recognized tracing agency for United Nations' nationals missing within Germany. It developed independently as a military operation under military supervision; it was, however, implemented from the beginning with UNRRA personnel, and for that reason was the basis upon which the UNRRA Central Tracing Bureau was developed.

(6). Proposals for the tracing of missing persons and for the operation of the Missing Personnel Search Bureau of the P.W. Branch, British Control Commission for Germany (British Element) submitted at a meeting held at C.D.P.X., Frankfurt, on 17 July 1945.

(7). Recommendations concerning the establishment of a Central Tracing Service for United Nations' Missing in Occupied Germany. Also: CDPX 383.7 (4.33), 15 July 1945.

be directed." (1944, para. 1a) for the functional operation was the lifting of an earlier ban from the National Training Bureau and passed on those subjects and those which could not be answered from the records in the Central Records Office in the appropriate year. Regulations were made for handling enquiries concerning both classified persons and ex-convicts and the relative of those National Institute. (1944, para. 1a) In the latter regard is included also those for handling relatives of ex-convicts persons at present present in Britain (1944, para. 1b). (1944, para. 1c) also for obtaining the facilities of staff and the group and proposals for ex-convict registration for the relative of unconvicted persons. It is proposed to amend the relative of the former law of handling their relatives by the Allied Control Authority as the proposed arrangements for their return to a normal status. In cases of independence a normal status is required. It was proposed to amend the law of handling their relatives by the Allied Control Authority and the law of handling their relatives by the Allied Control Authority was amended.

(c) Proposals for the removal of classified persons and the operation of the Special Assistance Scheme (1944, para. 1d) T. M. Smith, British Council, London for the purpose of the present, submitted as a working draft on 12 July 1944.

(d) Proposals for the removal of classified persons and the operation of the Special Assistance Scheme (1944, para. 1e) T. M. Smith, British Council, London for the purpose of the present, submitted as a working draft on 12 July 1944.

3. The UNRRA Central Tracing Bureau. The Combined Displaced Persons Executive, in view of its temporary nature, at no time envisaged its responsibility for developing and directing the tracing service as a permanent one. As early as 28 June 1945, officers of SHAEF, G-5(DP) and the U.S. Group Control Council (DP) had communicated to UNRRA officials their desire to turn over the tracing activity to UNRRA. (Letter to DP Division, UNRRA, ERO, 584/R/49, 29 June 1945, Para 1.). This had been included in United States' Recommendation Concerning the Establishment of a Central Tracing Service (Para. 4) and had been suggested on a somewhat more limited basis in the British proposals of 17 July (Para. 3). The basic CDPX Agreement therefore, included the provision that the executive would in due course hand over the responsibility to UNRRA by agreement with all interested organizations (GE-CDPX 383.7, 24 July 1945, Para. 4b).

The reasons underlying this decision were complicated. The four Occupying Powers were evidently unable to agree to charge one of themselves with the task of operating a Central Tracing Bureau and Records Office which would co-ordinate the activities in each zone of occupation and serve as their contact with national bureaux. It was therefore necessary for them to find an independent agency. The most suitable existing agency was, of course, the International Red Cross Committee, whose experience with prisoners of war was extensive, and who possessed a trained staff, and mechanical equipment. Because of its national character, however, this body was not acceptable to all of the four powers for political reasons. The most suitable alternative was UNRRA, the international character of which was satisfactory to all the powers, and which had already been working in close conjunction with SHAEF and CDPX in implementing their tracing program.

The willingness of the European Regional Office of UNRRA to undertake this means of fulfilling its recognized responsibility, was indicated early in July. At its Twenty-Third meeting on 5 July 1945, the Standing Technical Sub-

Committee on Displaced Persons for Europe apparently changed its views on the limitations of UNRRA's obligation for tracing as stated in Section 10(d) of the report it had approved during preliminary negotiations in the preceding year. (See above III B). The Committee "took note" (apparently without dissent) of a report on the SHAEF Tracing Unit which clearly contemplated UNRRA's acceptance of an operational function. On referring to the SHAEF Tracing Unit, the Report states:

"Since it has been contemplated from the early stages of this work that this would ultimately become one of the tasks of UNRRA, this Unit has been built up with UNRRA personnel. It is being developed by UNRRA, with the assistance of the military, and is probably destined to become a central displaced persons record bureau for Germany, for handling all enquiries, whether official or private, concerning persons who were displaced in that country".

The SHAEF Unit with which the Report dealt had grown up in response to an urgent military necessity. From the institution of the tracing service early in April it had been supervised by a representative of the UNRRA liaison staff. At the transfer of SHAEF from Versailles to Frankfurt, the UNRRA staff had increased to five, and requirements for a staff of twenty-one were submitted to the Chief Liaison Officer (Report to Chief UNRRA Liaison Officer, 26 June 1945). Proposals were made for expanding it adequately to meet the widening responsibility imposed by the military, stating detailed personnel requirements of an extensive nature; physical equipment including Watson Business Machines, duplicating equipment, and transport. (UNRRA, Central Records Office in Germany, Report No.6., 12 July 1945.) An initial reconnaissance for a suitable location of the bureau was also undertaken (UNRRA, Central Records Office, Report No.7., 16 July 1945.) It appeared, therefore, that UNRRA was preparing itself to undertake the

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full responsibility for tracing at the dissolution of CDEK on 1 October 1945.

During the months which followed, however, progress was painfully slow. Requirements for a strengthened staff and adequate equipment were constantly submitted (Central Records Office, Report No.7, 16 July 1945; Appraisal of the Condition of Health of the Central Tracing Bureau, 4 August 1945; Progress Bulletin of the Central Tracing Bureau, 27 August 1945.), but at no time did UNRRA provide adequate facilities for the task. On 26 June 1945 there were five members of the staff; to this number six were added 3 July, four from 4 July to 20 August, and eleven on 23 August. Although it had been clearly requested that a staff of 89 would be necessary before 1 October 1945 when UNRRA was to assume the entire responsibility for the operation, only 34 UNRRA employees were available at that time, assisted by six Class II employees and 18 displaced persons.

During the first three months of its operation, the same conditions prevailed. Space and equipment of all kinds were provided with reluctance, and staff additions fell far below requirements. During October 18 staff members were added, and during November 76. It was not until the transfer of the Bureau to Arolsen on 3 January 1946, that space, equipment, and staff were in any measure adequate to cope with the influx of work.

C. The ACA/UNRRA Agreements

1. The ACA Proposal. With the institution of the Allied Control Authority as the responsible agent for Military Government in Germany, it became necessary to establish the Central Tracing Service on the widest possible basis. The essential problem was this: to provide co-ordination for tracing programs carried out by autonomous agencies operating independently under the complete jurisdiction of the four Zone Commanders and to establish a centralized channel within the framework of that organization through which contact could

be maintained with the various national tracing agencies. The proposals adopted by the four Occupying Powers as the Charter of the Central Tracing Service extended and expanded the implications of the CDFX Agreement reached by the Occupying Powers in July. It was submitted by the Working Group on the Central Tracing Service to the Directorate of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons, was approved, and was forwarded to the Co-ordinating Committee of the Allied Control Authority for its consideration on 10 September 1945 (DPOW/M(45)3, 12 September 1945, Para 18). The Co-ordinating Committee approved the document as CORC/P(45)54 at its Eighth Meeting (CORC/M(45)8, 17 September 1945, Para. 105), and referred it to the PW & DP Directorate for implementation with instructions to open direct negotiations with UNRRA (DPOW/Misc/2, 21 September 1945, Para. 2(a-)).

At its Fourth Meeting, the PW & DP Directorate ordered that UNRRA should be asked to establish its bureau in the area of Hersfeld as soon as the Policy Board had carried out a reconnaissance and had determined the exact location. The target date for this operation was 15 October 1945 (DPOW/M(45) 4, 21 September 1945, Para. 33c).

Despite this injunction, the issuance of the invitation was delayed for a month. At the Third Meeting of the Central Tracing Policy Board (12 October 1945) in answer to charges of unnecessary delay, the UNRRA representative pointed out that no official invitation had been received. The Board consequently recorded with regret that, owing to a misunderstanding, the invitation had not yet been extended, and requested the Duty Secretary to extend it without delay. (DPOW/CTPB/M(45)3, October 1945). The official invitation for UNRRA to put its Central Tracing Bureau and associated Central Records Office at the Council's disposal, to be operated by UNRRA under policies and directives issued by the Central Tracing Policy Board as outlined in CORC/P(45)54, was despatched on 13 October, 1945.

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2. UNRRA's Acceptance. On the day following its arrival, the invitation was referred to the Personal Representative to the Director General, UNRRA, European Regional Office, by the Chief of Operations for Germany, for instructions, and the PW & DP Directorate was advised of this action.

In the light of subsequent developments, it is important to note that in recommending its acceptance, the Chief of Operations clearly pointed out that the implications of the proposal were considerable and that it would entail an extension of UNRRA's original intentions.

"The implications of such acceptance have yet to be worked out but it can immediately be said that there will be entailed a very considerable increase in expenditure by UNRRA both on account of personnel and equipment, but I suggest that this should constitute no obstacle to the assumption of this task which, in my opinion, eminently belongs to UNRRA".

After a considerable delay marked by increasing impatience on the part of the PW & DP Directorate and the Central Tracing Policy Board⁽⁸⁾, a further exchange of correspondence followed in response to which the Chief of Operations for Germany reiterated his opinion that the operation of a Central Tracing Bureau was definitely an UNRRA task and that the acceptance was dependent on the approval of the European Regional Office (OMGUS, 584/EK/100; 9 November 1945).

On 12 November 1945 the Personal Representative to the Director General, UNRRA, European Regional Office, replied:

- (1) That the official invitation had been delayed in transmission.
- (2) That the Chief of Operations for Germany is authorized to proceed and to carry out the task which the Allied Control Commission has asked UNRRA to undertake.

It is significant to point out that he acknowledged in particular the implications of the proposal and instructed the Chief of Operations for Germany to provide for its

2. WEAVER'S RECOMMENDATION

On 12 November 1945 the General Inspector of the British Army, Sir John Dill, advised the Chief of Operations for Germany that the proposal was considerable and that it would result in an extension of WEAVER's original intention.

In the light of subsequent developments, it is important to note that in recommending the extension, the Chief of Operations already pointed out that the original proposal was considerable and that it would result in an extension of WEAVER's original intention.

The inclusion of such a large number of personnel in the task force was not considered to be essential for the success of the operation. It was felt that there would be a number of personnel and equipment, but I suggest that this should constitute an element of the assumption of this task force, in an effort to ensure that the task force is self-sufficient.

After a considerable delay caused by the fact of the 1st Airborne Division's departure for the front, a further subject of discussion followed in response to which the Chief of Operations for Germany advised the General Inspector of the British Army that the task force should be self-sufficient and that the assumption of this task force should be approved of the Joint and National Chiefs of Staff, 27 November 1945.

On 12 November 1945 the General Inspector of the British Army, Sir John Dill, advised the Chief of Operations for Germany that the proposal was considerable and that it would result in an extension of WEAVER's original intention.

- (1) That the official investigation had been delayed in transmission.
 - (2) That the Chief of Operations for Germany is authorized to proceed and to carry out the task which the Allied Control Commission has asked WEAVER to undertake.
- It is significant to point out that the original proposal was approved of the Joint and National Chiefs of Staff, 27 November 1945.

implementation :

"You point out that this function will entail increased expenditure for both personnel and equipment. No doubt you will bear this in mind in submitting a revised budget for the UNRRA Central Headquarters for Germany or a supplementary budget to provide for the necessary expansion of the Tracing Bureau."

Following the receipt of his authorization to proceed, the Chief of Operations for Germany accepted the proposal as outlined in CORC/F(45)54 on three conditions:

- (a) That the German Civil Administration be ordered to afford the Tracing Service and in particular the Zonal Bureau all possible assistance; this includes the use of the German postal and police services.
- (b) That any tracing organization operating on behalf of the Germans be ordered to co-ordinate its activities with the United Nations Tracing Service and to afford the latter all the assistance in its power.
- (c) That the Central Tracing Bureau be given the right to inspect and advise on the method of operation in those Zonal Bureaux which are an UNRRA responsibility and staffed by UNRRA personnel.

(UNRRA Chief of Operations for Germany to the Duty Secretary, Allied Control Authority, Berlin, 16 November 1945.)

3. Confirmation of the Acceptance. After a further delay⁽⁹⁾, the Central Tracing Policy Board at its Eleventh Meeting on 6th December 1945 agreed (1) to consider the copy of the letter of the Chief of Operations for Germany as the official reply to the offer; (2) that the conditions set forth in the letter could be met; (3) to recommend to the FW & DP Directorate that it reply to the Chief of Operations that the operation of the Central Tracing Bureau and Records Office by UNRRA is now considered official. (DFOW/CTPB/M(45)11, 7 December 1945, Para. 7c).

The confirmation authorized by the Directorate (DFOW/M(45)11, 13 December 1945, Para. 87 (b).) contained clarifications concerning the implications of the agreement which are important for an understanding of its operation:

- (1) The first two conditions on which the acceptance was made could be met (DFOW/Misc/P(45)2, 14 January 1946, Para.2).

The report of the Committee on the
Investment Commission for the
United States, to which the
United States Government has
submitted a report on the
necessity of a study of the
implications of the proposed
amendment.

Following the receipt of the
report, the Chief of Operations
proposed as follows:

(a) That the United States
Government should be authorized
to enter into a contract with
the United States Government
to study the implications of the
proposed amendment.

(b) That the United States
Government should be authorized
to enter into a contract with
the United States Government
to study the implications of the
proposed amendment.

(c) That the United States
Government should be authorized
to enter into a contract with
the United States Government
to study the implications of the
proposed amendment.

United States Government, Office of the
Chief of Operations, Report on the
Implications of the Proposed Amendment.

1. Summary of the Report

The report of the Committee on the
Investment Commission for the
United States, to which the
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implications of the proposed
amendment.

The Committee on the
Investment Commission for the
United States, to which the
United States Government has
submitted a report on the
necessity of a study of the
implications of the proposed
amendment.

(1) The first two conditions of the
proposed amendment are that the
United States Government should
be authorized to enter into a
contract with the United States
Government to study the
implications of the proposed
amendment.

which are important for the
United States Government to
study the implications of the
proposed amendment.

(2) The first two conditions of the
proposed amendment are that the
United States Government should
be authorized to enter into a
contract with the United States
Government to study the
implications of the proposed
amendment.

- (2) The third question was a matter of internal policy concerning UNRRA alone (Ibid., Para 3).
- (3) Necessary staff and equipment, the requirements of which should not be underestimated, were to be provided by UNRRA, (Ibid., Para. 5, 6, 7).
- (4) "In order to avoid all future misunderstandings concerning the power given to each, we permit ourselves to draw most particularly your attention to the fact that in conformity with the Charter of the Central Tracing Service, as defined by the Allied Control Authority in the abovementioned document, the Central Tracing Bureau in Germany is answerable to the ACA acting through the Directorate of P.W.'s and Displaced Persons and the CTFB." (Ibid., Para. 8).
- (5) "We also consider it useful to point out that it is the task of our Directorate and the CTFB to organize any liaisons judged necessary between the Central Tracing Service and any other organization in or outside Germany." (Ibid., para.10.)
- (6) "It remains, of course, understood that all these operations will only take place in close liaison with the Central Tracing Bureau, and its Director, who assists in a consultative capacity, at the meetings of the CTFB." (Ibid., Para. 11).

After four months of negotiation UNRRA, acting through its authorized representatives, had accepted the responsibility through which it could effectively discharge the obligations which the Administration assumed in its basic Agreement.

(8). DPOW/M(45)7, 20 October 1945, Para. 54(a);
DPOW/M(45)8, 30 October 1945, Para. 61(a); DPOW/CTFB/M(45)
4, 5, 6.

(9). The original of the letter of acceptance was either lost in transmission or on receipt by the Duty Secretary of the PW & DP Div. ACA.

(1) The first meeting on the subject of international relations was held in London, 1944.

(2) The second meeting was held in Washington, D.C., 1945.

(3) The third meeting was held in London, 1946. It was the first time that the United States and the United Kingdom met together to discuss international relations.

(4) The fourth meeting was held in Washington, D.C., 1947. It was the first time that the United States and the United Kingdom met together to discuss international relations.

(5) The fifth meeting was held in London, 1948. It was the first time that the United States and the United Kingdom met together to discuss international relations.

(6) The sixth meeting was held in Washington, D.C., 1949. It was the first time that the United States and the United Kingdom met together to discuss international relations.

(7) The seventh meeting was held in London, 1950. It was the first time that the United States and the United Kingdom met together to discuss international relations.

(8) The eighth meeting was held in Washington, D.C., 1951. It was the first time that the United States and the United Kingdom met together to discuss international relations.

V. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL TRACING SERVICE

A. Methods of Procedure

1. "The Meeting of Cards Principle". The most widely used means of tracing missing persons employed by a number of agencies including the International Red Cross, the German Bureaux and the Central Location Index, is known as the "meeting of cards" or "encounter" system. According to this method, when "A" enquires after "B" their names are carded into an index where they wait until "B" or possibly "C" enquires after "A". As the names of "A", "B" and "C" are added to the index a considerable body of information is accumulated against which to screen subsequent enquiries. Nevertheless, there can be no known locations, i.e., persons found, until there is a junction or "meeting" of "A" with "B" or "C". Consequently, many enquiries are never answered, and, in any event, except in the rare case, a great lapse of time occurs before any answer is forthcoming.

This system operates with reasonable efficiency when homogeneous groups, such as nationality groups are concerned; and when both parties are living and desire to communicate with each other. In handling large groups of mixed nationalities, however, operational difficulties preclude a high rate of efficiency. In addition, and this is its most serious disadvantage, it provides no basis for locating victims of war and persecution, who have died. This system alone is not adequate for meeting the problem which has developed in Germany as a result of the war.

2. "The Search Principle". A system of tracing based on the "search principle", includes "the meeting of cards" as its first step. Those who are not located, instead of remaining inert in an index, are actively investigated. All available records are closely examined. Local authorities at the place of last known residence, and every tracing agency

1. Methods of Investigation

1. Theoretical - This method involves the use of logical reasoning to derive conclusions from premises.

2. Experimental - This method involves the use of controlled conditions to test hypotheses and observe the results.

3. Observational - This method involves the use of direct observation to collect data on natural phenomena.

4. Case Studies - This method involves the in-depth examination of individual cases to identify patterns and characteristics.

5. Survey - This method involves the use of questionnaires or interviews to collect data from a large number of subjects.

6. Content Analysis - This method involves the systematic analysis of written or recorded communication to identify themes and patterns.

7. Focus Groups - This method involves the use of small groups of people to discuss and explore a topic in depth.

8. Interviews - This method involves the use of one-on-one conversations to gather information and insights from participants.

9. Discourse Analysis - This method involves the analysis of language use in context to understand communication processes.

10. Historical Research - This method involves the use of archival records and historical documents to study past events and trends.

11. Comparative Research - This method involves the comparison of different cultures, societies, or systems to identify similarities and differences.

12. Qualitative Research - This method involves the use of non-numerical data to explore meanings and experiences.

13. Quantitative Research - This method involves the use of numerical data and statistical analysis to test hypotheses.

14. Mixed Methods - This method involves the combination of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

15. Participatory Action Research - This method involves the active participation of research subjects in the research process.

16. Ethnography - This method involves the study of cultures and social behaviors through immersion and observation.

17. Phenomenology - This method involves the study of the nature and structure of human experience.

18. Grounded Theory - This method involves the development of theories through the analysis of data.

19. Discourse Analysis - This method involves the analysis of language use in context to understand communication processes.

20. Case Studies - This method involves the in-depth examination of individual cases to identify patterns and characteristics.

likely to have pertinent information are contacted. Finally, an individual investigation is conducted including personal visits, interviews with acquaintances, and any other means which will locate the missing person. This system is the only one adequate for solving current tracing problems.

3. A Consolidated Tracing Service. The tracing operation may be conducted through a single consolidated agency which brings together all available records and information, and in turn receives all enquiries. It implies the maintenance of a gigantic index of information concerning each person known to have been displaced or to have perished as a result of persecution. It also implies a wide network of investigators to carry out field work, or an interlocking system of agencies which will provide that service under centralized direction.

Such a centralized bureau offers many advantages, but its operation is a gigantic undertaking presenting almost insurmountable difficulties. It would require a large international staff familiar with the languages and the internal problems of each nation, as well as a great number of Archivists and technical experts qualified to handle documents of great variety and complexity. It would entail the expenditure of huge appropriations such as no international organization now existing would be willing to make available.

4. A Decentralized Tracing Service. An alternative procedure is to delegate the responsibility to agencies especially created and particularly qualified for discharging specialized aspects of the problem. This is the system which was adopted for the Central Tracing Service. It consists of agencies operating on three levels :-

- (1) A National Tracing Bureau within each nation to receive initial inquiries concerning the missing of its own

nationality, to serve as a repository for official records of their displaced or deceased missing nationals, and to conduct investigation on a national level.

(CORE/P(45)54, Para. 2, 6, 7).

(2) A Zonal Tracing Bureau within each zone of occupied Germany operating under the complete jurisdiction of its own Zone Commander to institute searches referred to it for investigation and to collect and pass on all available records uncovered in the zone. (Ibid., Para. 3, 5, 6, 7.)

(3) The Central Tracing Bureau to operate as a central clearing house between the Zonal and National Bureaux, to ensure the transfer of pertinent records and information to appropriate national bureaux, and to retain in its Central Records Office those records which, owing to their nature, cannot be decentralized (Ibid., Para. 4, 6, 7.).

B. The National Tracing Bureaux.

The conduct of tracing on a national level is entrusted to officially recognized National Tracing Bureaux, the nature and organization of which varies from country to country. In general, however, the bureaux of the Western Countries developed from Ministries or other repatriation agencies organized by the Allied governments in London before liberation. Those in the East, were, for the most part, organized at a later date, specifically to deal with the enormous problems of their displaced population.

(1) The following National Bureaux are working in closest liaison with the Central Tracing System:-

- (a) France. The national bureau for France is the Bureau National Francais des Recherches, attached to the Ministère Anciens Combattants et Victimes de la Guerre. This bureau was originally a part of the Ministere des Prisonniers de Guerre, Déportés et Réfugiés which developed from the

nationality, to give as a reason for the
 records of their affairs or business being conducted
 and to conduct investigations on a national level.
 (1) A local trading business which is not of national
 character operating under the national jurisdiction of the
 home Government to conduct business abroad is not
 investigation and in effect and for all practical
 purposes in the same way as a national business
 (2) The General Trading Business is a business
 operating between the local and national levels
 across the frontier of national boundaries and is
 operated national business and is treated as a
 national business which, being in the
 same as a national business.

The National Trading Business

The object of trading on a national level
 is to obtain a national business which is
 the same as a national business of the home
 country in general, however the object of the
 business is to obtain a national business which is
 a national business of the home country and is
 operated in the same way as a national business
 across the frontier of their national boundaries.
 (1) The National Trading Business is a business
 which is the same as a national business
 which is the same as a national business
 to the National Trading Business which is
 in the same way as a national business
 of the National Trading Business which is
 operated in the same way as a national business

Comité des Repatriés created by General de Gaulle to handle repatriation. It was the first of the national bureaux to be created in the West.

- (b) Belgium. The Service d'Identification et de Recherches is a part of the Commissariat Belge au Repatriement. The Commissariat was created by the decree-law of 27 June 1944 (Article 2) for the purpose of organizing the repatriation of Belgium nationals. As the problem of repatriation became less pressing towards the end of June 1945, the Commissariat turned its attention to the problem of the missing. On 29 September 1945, a concerted effort was undertaken to conduct a census of all who had not returned, on the basis of which a systematic examination of the problem was made. The Belgian bureau, like the French, is a continuation of repatriation activities set up in London to handle the problem immediately after liberation.
- (c) The Netherlands. The Informatiebureau Van het Nederlandsche Rood Kruis, a private agency, was designated by the Netherlands government to function as an official bureau on 12 September 1945. The problem of tracing in the Netherlands was complicated from the start by the existence of many tracing agencies maintained by such organizations as Les Bureaux de l'Ancien Mouvement de la Résistance, Les Bureaux d'Information Néerlandais pour Ouvriers en Allemagne, and La Commission Juive de Coordination à Eindhoven. It was not until the creation of the Central Tracing Bureau that a unification of the various agencies was effected.

to be the first of the national movement to be created in the East.

(b) Belgium. The Belgian movement of the

emerged in a series of the Belgian

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- (d) Luxembourg. The national tracing bureau for Luxembourg is a section of the Commissariat au Repatriement, created by decree on 2 August 1944. As in France and Belgium the service was a development of repatriation and did not receive primary attention until that problem approached solution.
- (e) Poland. The officially recognized bureau in Poland is the Biuro Informacyjne (Information Bureau) of the Polish Red Cross. It was organized in 1918 for tracing persons missing during World War I; it maintained a small staff after the war for tracing missing civilians, and in 1939 was augmented to meet the problem arising from World War II. Its files were completely destroyed at the destruction of Warsaw in 1944, but its services were continued in outlying districts. In April 1945 the decentralized records were brought together and a unified service reinstated in Warsaw.

In addition to the officially recognized national bureau in Warsaw, extensive records of Polish displaced persons in Germany compiled by the London Polish Red Cross and maintained at Lemförde have been of great value in locating missing Polish nationals, by all odds, the largest of the national problems.

- (f) The United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The problems of tracing in these nations is fundamentally different from those of the Continent. They are not as much concerned with problems of population displacement as of tracing the relatives in Europe of their own nationals. The British Red Cross Society has been appointed as the official

(a) Section 101 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 102 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 103 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 104 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 105 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 106 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 107 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 108 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 109 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 110 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 111 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 112 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 113 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 114 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 115 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 116 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 117 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 118 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 119 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...
Section 120 - The purpose of this section is to provide for the...

bureau for the United Kingdom. The Central Location Index, a voluntary agency composed of eleven welfare societies, performs that function for the United States.

(g) In addition to these bodies, the Central Bureau utilizes the facilities of recognized groups throughout the world. They vary in nature from the national Red Cross Societies, as in Greece and Italy, to official governmental agencies, as those of Norway and Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. By means of these agencies the Central Tracing Service, acting through the Central Tracing Bureau, is truly international in character.

(2) The Coordination of National Bureaux. The necessity of coordinating the tracing program on a national level presented itself urgently to the national bureaux first when the lessening of repatriation revealed the full extent of the tracing problem. On the invitation of the Belgian government representatives of the Western countries, the Central Tracing Bureau, and the Directorate of Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons of the Allied Control Authority, together with observers from the Eastern nations, met in Brussels on 8, 9, and 10 December 1945, to examine the implications of the problem⁽¹⁰⁾. At this meeting it was decided that cooperation on an international level was essential, and that it could best be effected by the establishment at the Central Tracing Bureau of a Coordinating Committee made up of technicians representing their bureaux. (Résolutions de la Conférence Internationale pour l'organisation des recherches, tenue à Bruxelles les 8, 9 et 10 Décembre 1945). This Committee held its first meeting at the Central Tracing Bureau on 15th December 1945.

3. The United States Zone Bureau of Documents and Tracing.

C. The Zonal Tracing Bureau.

The four Zonal Bureaux operate under the complete jurisdiction of their own Zone Commander subject only to the general policies of the Allied Control Council and the Central Tracing Policy Board (CORC/P(45)54, Para. 3(b)). They may maintain search parties, and admit Liaison Officers as the Zone Commander considers it necessary (Ibid., para. 5). They are responsible for instituting searches in their own Zone including those which the Central Bureau is unable to answer from its records (Ibid., Para. 3 (a), 6 (d)). They search systematically for records and make available all information uncovered in the Zone to the Central Bureau (Ibid., Para. 7(a)). Although each of the Zonal Bureaux performs the same function, their organization and method operation varies.

1. The British Search Bureau. The first of the zonal bureaux to be organized was the Missing Personnel Search Bureau of the PW Branch, British Control Commission for Germany, which was set up early in 1945 to assist in the movement of prisoners of war. When the organization of the Central Tracing Service made necessary the establishment of a zonal bureau, its activities, already greatly enlarged, were expanded to include the tracing of displaced persons. The British bureau operated from the beginning on a definite "search principle" (see above V, A, 2), and is largely responsible for the use of that method in the Central Tracing Service.

2. The French Zone. Tracing in the French Zone of Occupation is organized under the Direction des Personnes Déplacées, a part of Gouvernement Militaire de la Zone Francaise d'Occupation. It is consequently a military operation using military personnel, and was organized to conduct search activities for persons and records when the French Military Government was organized.

The Joint Training Bureau operates under the complete jurisdiction of their own Joint Government and is the general policy of the Allied Central Council and the Central Training Policy Board (COUNCIL) (see para. 1). They may maintain search parties, and shall maintain officers as the Joint Government considers it necessary (para. 2). They are responsible for investigating personnel in their own area including those within the Central Bureau in order to know from its records (para. 3 (a), (b), (c)). They shall systematically for records and shall maintain all information uncovered in the Joint to the Central Bureau (para. 4). Although each of the Joint member parties has the same function, their organization and method operation varies.

1. The British Search Bureau. The first of the Joint Bureau to be organized was the British (see para. 1). It was formed of the 14 Branch, British Central Council for Germany, which was set up early in 1945 as a result of the success of operations of war. When the organization of the Central Training Bureau was necessary the establishment of a local Bureau, its activities, already partially assigned, were expanded to include the training of captured personnel. The British Bureau operated from the beginning as a full-time "search party" (see above, para. 1, 2) and its primary responsibility for the use of that method in the Central Training Bureau.

2. The French Bureau. Training in the French zone of occupation is organized under the Direction des Services de Liaison, a part of Government Ministère de la Guerre (see above, para. 1). It is comparatively a military organization being military personnel, and was organized to conduct search activities for persons and records when the French Military Government was organized.

3. The United States Zone Bureau of Documents and Tracing

The United States Zonal Bureau is the only one operated with UNRRA personnel. Although it began limited operations with the organization of the service, it was not finally established until January 1946. Its organizational pattern coincides with the German administrative political sub-division lines, and it functions through a tracing and a documents division roughly comparable to those of the Central Tracing Bureau (see below V D.). Its operational procedures within the zone are set forth in UNRRA, U.S. Zone Headquarters, Administrative Order No.56, 30 April 1946, and its relations with the Central Bureau are specified in UNRRA, Central Headquarters, D.P. Operations, Germany, Order No.42, 24 May 1946.

4. U.S.S.R. Zone. Little is known of the organizational structure or operational methods of the U.S.S.R. Zonal Bureau. It is located in Berlin and operates as a part of Headquarters Soviet Control Council, Berlin.

(10). Officials of the French National Bureau had earlier consulted on the same problem with representatives of UNRRA, E.R.O. As far as is known no action was taken beyond the exchange of information. (Summary Account of a Meeting held on 11 August 1945 at the E.R.O. of UNRRA.)

Germany may inaugurate searches for their relatives and to which enquiries for those of doubtful or indeterminate nationality should be addressed (Ibid., Para 5 (b)).

In addition to the Executive and Administrative Staffs, the Central Bureau is organized into two divisions corresponding to its dual functions.

1. The Records Division is organized to perform the first function of the Tracing Bureau. Its duties fall under three headings:

3. The United States Army Bureau of Inspection
and Training

The United States Army Bureau of Inspection
and Training

operated with USAID personnel. Although it began limited

operations with the organization of the service, it was

not finally established until January 1952. The organization

pattern overlaps with the German administrative structure

and is located along the same lines as the German

army division roughly corresponds to that of the United

States Army (see below, p. 2). The organization is

within the zone and has been in USAID, USAID, USAID, USAID

Administrative Order No. 52, 10 April 1952, and was in the

with the Central Bureau and operates in USAID, USAID, USAID

USAID, USAID, USAID, USAID, USAID, USAID, USAID, USAID, USAID

4. U.S.A.R. Zone. United States Army

organizational structure or operational structure of the

U.S.A.R. Zone. It is located in the zone of the

as a part of headquarters Soviet Central Command.

(20) Officials of the French National Bureau of

concerned on the same problem with representatives of the

U.S.A. as far as its known to date and is the result of

change of information. (Summary report of a meeting held
11 August 1952 at the U.S.O. of USAID.)

D. The Central Tracing Bureau.

As defined in the basic agreements under which it operates (see above IV, C, 3) the Central Tracing Bureau functions as a central clearing house between the zonal and national bureaux and not as an executive body (CORC/P(45)54, Para. 4,6.). In general, it performs two functions. First, it is the channel through which the zonal bureaux make available to the national bureaux all documents and other information uncovered in the zones (Ibid., Para. 7(a)), and through which the various national bureaux make available to each other such records as may be of interest to them (Ibid., 7(b)). The Central Bureau retains in its Central Records Office only those records which, owing to their nature, cannot be decentralized, breaking down and processing those of a mixed nature for despatch to the national tracing bureaux concerned (Ibid., Para. 7 (d)). Second, the Central Tracing Bureau acts as the agency through which enquiries for tracing individuals are transmitted to the zonal bureaux for search in the field. If the national bureau is unable to answer the enquiry as a result of its investigation, the national agency forwards it to the Central Bureau, from where, if search still fails, it is transmitted to the appropriate zonal bureau, (Ibid., Para 6.). Likewise, the Central Tracing Bureau is the official channel through which displaced persons in Germany may inaugurate searches for their relatives and to which enquiries for those of doubtful or indeterminate nationality should be addressed (Ibid., Para 6 (b)).

In addition to the Executive and Administrative Staffs, the Central Bureau is organized into two divisions corresponding to its dual function.

1. The Records Division is organized to perform the first function of the Tracing Bureau. Its duties fall under three headings :-

The Records Processing Section prepares material analyzed by the Registration Unit, for the use of the national

The Central Funding Bureau

As defined in the basic agreement under which it

operates (see above II, B, 3) the Central Funding Bureau
functions as a central clearing house between the local and
national banks and not as an executive body (XIX(4)2).
Para. 4.6. In general, it provides the functions. First,
it is the channel through which the local banks raise

available to the national banks all deposits and other
information received in the form of (1) (a) (i) and
through which the national banks receive all information
and other such records as may be required by the

(2) (a) The Central Bureau retains in its possession
only those records which, owing to their nature,
cannot be destroyed, including those and documents which are
required for deposit to the national banks, and the

(3) (a) (i) - Second, the Bureau shall, at the request
of the agency through which deposits are raised,
transmit to the local banks all information and other
records which are required for the local banks to

function as a result of the investigation, the Central
Bureau is to the Central Bureau, the local banks shall
transmit to the agency through which deposits are raised,
it is transmitted to the agency through which

(4) (a) (i) - Third, the Central Bureau shall
the official channel through which the local banks shall
bring any information received from the local banks
which requires for those of interest or information
nationality should be addressed (XIX(4)2), para. 4.6.

In addition to the functions and administrative
duties, the Central Bureau is operating under the direction
corresponding to its functions.

1. The Central Bureau is organized as follows:
the first function of the Central Bureau. The Central Bureau
under three headings:

- (1) The location of documents and maintenance of a catalogue of all documentary evidence regarding missing persons.
- (2) The despatch of records received at the Central Tracing Bureau to appropriate agencies.
- (3) The preservation of records concerning stateless persons and those of undetermined nationality.

The functions of the Records Division are of two types: the accumulation and analysis of data which result in publishable studies to be used as a source of information; and the mechanical processing, by sorting, breakdown, and reproduction, of documents clearing through or retained by the division so that the information contained therein may be disseminated. Although some overlapping is unavoidable, in general the first function is performed by the Documents Intelligence Section, and the second is the responsibility of the Processing Section.

- (a) The Documents Intelligence Section collects documents and information concerning them, maintains a catalogue of available documents wherever deposited, and distributes information to interested bodies. Its primary purpose is to provide a central clearing house for information and research preliminary to the actual procurement of documentary information. It maintains an index of documents for which a search is underway and of those known to have been destroyed, and integrates available knowledge regarding concentration camps, transports, and death marches. It likewise collates for circulation information regarding documentary material in the possession of the national bureaux and studies the resources of such document collections as the Ministerial Collecting Center and the U.S. Documents Center in Berlin.
- (b) The Records Processing Section prepares material analyzed by the Registration Unit, for the use of the national

- (1) The location of documents and materials of a category of all documents available to existing persons.
 - (2) The location of records reported at the Central Training Bureau to appropriate agencies.
 - (3) The preservation of records concerning such persons and those of individual nationality.
- The functions of the various divisions are of two types: the accumulation and analysis of data and records in particular fields to be used as a source of information and the mechanical processing by means of a computer and reproduction of documents directly through or through the division so that the information appears immediately as illustrated. Although some operating is automatic as general the first function is performed by the personnel Intelligence Section, and the second is the responsibility of the Training Section.
- (a) The Intelligence Section will be concerned with information concerning their activities, a category of available documents which are deposited and distributed information to interested parties. The primary purpose is to provide a central clearing house for information and research pertaining to the field processing of documentary information. It maintains an index of those cases for which a search is relatively easy to find cases to have been assigned, and registers available information regarding communications, reports, transcripts, and death records. It issues releases for circulation information regarding documentary records in the possession of the national power and studies the resources of such content collections as the Historical Collecting Center and the U.S. Document Center in Berlin.
 - (b) The Records Processing Section prepares material analyzed by the Registration Unit, for the use of the national

tracing bureaux, and the Tracing Division of the Central Tracing Bureau. Three functions are involved:

- (1) Sending original material to national bureaux concerned.
- (2) Breaking down and/or reproducing mixed lists to facilitate distribution.
- (3) Preparing for the index of the Tracing Division records to be retained by the Central Tracing Bureau.

2. The Tracing Division. This division performs the second function of the Central Tracing Bureau, i.e., the actual tracing of individuals in response to enquiries. Four types of investigation are conducted:

- (1) Individual tracing of cases where sufficient information is available to make possible a field investigation.
- (2) Direct enquiries through postal facilities of
 - (a) individuals for whom a specific last known address is provided, and
 - (b) requests which by their nature can be most expeditiously handled through direct contact with burgermeisters and other local German officials.
- (3) Mass tracing where so few facts are available as to preclude individual search, or where such individual investigation has failed, and
- (4) The tracing of missing unaccompanied children and their parents or relatives.
 - (a) The Processing Section processes all individual searches for despatch by the Correspondence Section. This processing involves clerical work such as transcription of illegible enquiries, registration, map location, and

of the latter makes an abbreviation of the German tracing services imperative (see above II. 3.).

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 ... These ... are ...
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2. The ...
 ... of the ...
 ... of individuals in ...
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(1) ...
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(3) ...
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(4) The ...
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filing. In addition all incoming enquiries are checked against the Central Tracing Bureau index. This index is not a list of known locations of all missing persons in Europe, but contains three types of information only:

- (1) A record of all cases accepted for action at the Central Tracing Bureau and sent by it to the zonal or national bureaux for search.
 - (ii) known locations discovered as a result of such search, and
 - (iii) known locations and death records for stateless persons and for persons of undetermined nationality.
- (b) The Correspondence Section, handles the actual tracing of individuals through correspondence, which involves not only despatch of inquiries and replies but decisions as to the type of communication to be sent, selection of other means of investigation, or forwarding replies in the most expeditious manner. This action is the responsible agent through which the search to the zones is directed.
- (c) Besides the Processing and Correspondence Sections, the Tracing Division contains the Mass Tracing Section, which arranges for broadcast and publication of names and distributes camp-rosters; the Special Section which deals with enquiries for prominent people, missing secret agents, etc., and the Child Tracing Section which deals with ^{all} enquiries for missing unaccompanied children or for their relatives.

E. Organization for the Tracing of German Nationals

Although the tracing of missing German nationals does not fall within the province of the Central Tracing Service, the interdependence of the two problems and the vast importance of the latter makes an examination of the German tracing services imperative (see above II, B.).

In addition all known persons are checked against the Central Trading Index. This index is not a list of known persons but contains names of persons in Europe, and contains names of persons in (1) A record of all cases reported for action at the Central Trading Index and sent by it to the units of national police for action.

(2) Cases involving persons who have been identified and their names are in the persons list for persons of international interest.

(3) The International Bureau, besides the list of trading of persons through correspondence, which includes not only reports of persons and their names as in the type of communication to be sent, but also other items of investigation, or information, which is the most important matter. This list is the persons' names through which the names of the persons are directed.

(4) Besides the processing and forwarding system, the Trading Division handles the Central Trading Index which contains the names and addresses of persons who are reported for investigation and information of cases and identified persons. The Central Trading Index also contains reports for persons' names, which are reported, and the Central Trading Index with this information for persons' names, which are reported to their relatives.

2. Organization for the Trading of Persons

Although the trading of persons is a serious problem does not fall within the province of the Central Trading Index, the importance of the problem and the vast importance of the latter, when an examination of the Central Trading Index is made (see above II, B.).

1. The German "Bureaux". There are operating in Germany at the present time a multiplicity of unauthorized bureaux which hopelessly confuse the situation. Many of them are unscrupulous in their intent and methods; others are well intentioned but ineffective because of the decentralization of information and the duplication of efforts. Search services conducted under the auspices of various religious organizations are widely distributed, but for the most part the "bureaux" are local in nature and extremely limited in their operation.

(a) The Hamburg Bureaux.

The importance of an authorized German tracing bureau was first realised by British officials under whose auspices a system was set up in September 1945, whereby German prisoners of war in Allied hands could communicate with their families. As many undelivered letters accumulated in the Dead Letter Office, it was thought wise for civilians to communicate with the Office; when the enquiries were received, a "meeting of cards" resulted. In October 1945 the service was extended from the British Zone of Occupation to the whole of Germany. This bureau, known as the Central Postal Enquiry Bureau, is under the supervision of the British Army of the Rhine.

A second authorized bureau is the German Zonal Search Bureau (Such-Dienst-Rates Kreuz-Zentrale Hamburg) operated by the German Red Cross under the supervision of 3, Miscellaneous Agencies Detachment of British Military Government. The bureau operates largely on the "meeting of cards" principle, but has supplemented that service by the use of the radio, records, and a restricted field search. It limits its activities to the North-Eastern part of Germany, and the northern part of the French Zone, of Occupation, but works in close co-operation with the

1. The German "Bureau" They are operating in

Germany at the present time a multiplicity of unaffiliated
bureaus which hopelessly confuse the situation. Many of them
are investigations in their nature and method; others are well
intentioned but ineffective because of the demoralization of
information and the duplication of effort. Several services
conducted under the auspices of various religious organizations
are widely distributed, but for the most part the "Bureau"
are local in nature and extremely limited in their operations.

(a) The Hamburg Bureau.

The importance of an efficient bureau during
war was first realized by British officials in 1914
whose success a system was set up in Hamburg, 1915,
whereby German prisoners of war in Allied hands could
communicate with their families. As they were returned
to their countries in the last few years it was
thought wise for divisions in connection with the
United States when the operations were started. A "bureau of
order" was formed. In October 1915 the service was
extended from the British zone of occupation to the
state of Germany. This bureau, known as the Hamburg
Postal Agency Bureau, is under the supervision of the
British Army of the Rhine.

A second attempt was made in the German zone
South Bureau (South-Atlantic-Telegraph-Bureau)
operated by the German "Bureau" after the acquisition of
Netherlands Agencies (Netherlands Agency of
Government. The bureau operates largely on the basis
of order, but has organized the service by
the use of the radio, wireless, and other means.
It limits its activities to the North-Atlantic
part of Germany, and the western part of the French zone.
of occupation, but works in close cooperation with the

Bavarian Red Cross, which operates in the South.

(b) The Munich Bureau.

The German Search Service in Munich is a branch of the Bavarian Red Cross, operating under the supervision of the Public Welfare Branch, Office of Military Government for Bavaria. Like the bureau in Hamburg it operates on the "meeting of cards" principle, but has augmented its service by field searches for special cases through investigation of police and burgermeisters' records, churches, the Red Cross, and other welfare agencies. This bureau operates in close co-operation with the German Zonal Search Bureau in Hamburg, together with which coverage is extended throughout Germany.

(c) The Berlin Bureau.

An authorized bureau known as the German Search Service was set up on 1 March 1946 under the authority of the Internal Affairs and Communications Division, Public Welfare Branch, of OMGUS. This bureau likewise operates on the "meeting of cards" principle, and since it is of recent origin, it is not likely to perform a useful service within the near future. Its greatest value would seem to be in its operation as a local agency for the Berlin area working together with the more firmly established Munich and Hamburg bureaux.

2. A Central German Tracing Bureau. The question of the advisability of establishing a centralized tracing service for the German population was first brought to the attention of the Allied Control Authority Directorate of Internal Affairs and Communications on 14 September 1945. At its request the Civil Administration Committee set up a group to study the organization of such a service (DIAC/CAC/M(45)4, 18 September 1945, Para. 14 b), and in due time a proposal was advanced

Bavarian Red Cross, which operates in the South.

(b) The Bavarian Red Cross

The Bavarian Red Cross operates in a branch of the Bavarian Red Cross, operating under the supervision of the Public Health Service, Office of Military Government for Bavaria. Like the Bureau in Berlin it operates on the "voluntary basis" principle, but has appointed its service by their activities and special needs through investigation of public and organizational resources, and the Red Cross and other voluntary agencies. The Bureau operates in close cooperation with the German Social Service Bureau in Munich, together with which coverage is provided throughout Germany.

(c) The Bavarian Red Cross

An authorized German agency in the German Red Cross was set up on 1 March 1945 under the authority of the Federal Office for Administration, Bavaria. Public Health Service, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, on the basis of "voluntary" principle, and was set up to provide coverage of its own kind in Bavaria. Such service includes the Red Cross, the German Red Cross, and the Red Cross of the German People. The German Red Cross was to be in the position as a local agency for the Red Cross and working together with the new Red Cross established in Bavaria and Germany.

The Bavarian Red Cross

of the responsibility of the following a special service for the German population was first proposed to the attention of the Allied Control Authority, Bavaria, Office of Military Government for Bavaria, on 12 December 1945. It was agreed that the Allied Control Authority should set up a group to study the organization of such a service (1945-1946). In December 1945, the Red Cross, and in the first proposal was amended.

(DIAC/P(45)42, 18 October 1945). Because of difficulties in administration and finance, this proposal was not implemented. The problem, however, continued to receive the attention of the Missing Persons Bureau Sub-Committee of the Civil Administration Committee (DIAC/CAC/MPBSC/P(45) 1), and further proposals were entertained by the IA & C Directorate at its Seventeenth Meeting on 10 January 1946. The matter was again referred to the Directorate's Committee for further consideration (DIAC/Memorandum (46) 9.). The German Planning Staff have started preparatory work under a (provisional) Director in an attempt to solve administrative problems which have delayed the acceptance of the proposal.

Whatever may be said of the merits of establishing the centralized bureau under discussion, from the point of view of the tracing problem as a whole the creation of such a service is of utmost importance. It would not only facilitate immeasurably the work of tracing certain categories of missing displaced persons, but would provide also an effective agency for tracing the German relatives of United Nations' nationals, a service determined necessary as early as General Eisenhower's original SHAEF order of April 1945.

(RECAPITULATED IN ORDER TO BE REPRODUCED IN THE
 IN ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE, THIS REPORT WAS NOT
 IMPROVED. THE FINANCIAL RECORDS, CONTAINED IN VARIOUS
 THE ATTENTION OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND MEMBERS
 OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC) AND THE BOARD OF
 AND FINANCIAL RECORDS WITH REFERENCE TO THE CIVIL SERVICE
 AND AS THE GOVERNMENT INVESTING IN FINANCIAL RECORDS. THE BOARD
 HAS BEEN REFERRED TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION FOR FURTHER
 CONSIDERATION (CSC) AND THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND MEMBERS
 HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND MEMBERS
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VI. UNRRA'S RESPONSIBILITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL TRACING AGENT

When UNRRA accepted the invitation to place its tracing bureau at the disposal of the Allied Control Authority, there was no clear-out statement of UNRRA tracing policy except that discussed above (See III; IV: B.3). Following the acceptance of the Allied Control Authority Agreement, however, the European Regional Office turned its attention to the clarification of its policy. A technical representative from the London Office visited the Central Tracing Bureau and the United States Zonal Bureau during February 1946 to make a careful study of the tracing machinery ¹. In collaboration with Members of the staff of the Central Bureau a series of recommendations were made on the basis of which an official statement of policy was issued by the Administrative Council.

This statement, containing the following provisions, has given rise to a number of considerations of great importance to the future of international tracing services in general and to the question of UNRRA's participation in them.

1. U.N.R.R.A. can accept responsibility for tracing persons falling under the definitions of the Council Resolutions as eligible for U.N.R.R.A. care. This includes persons at present receiving care from U.N.R.R.A. in Germany, persons eligible for but not in receipt of such care but now dead.

2. U.N.R.R.A. cannot accept responsibility for tracing any Germans except victims of Nazi persecution.

3. Pending establishment of direct channels to appropriate agencies, U.N.R.R.A. can accept responsibility for routing enquiries regarding persons who may not be eligible.

4. The Chief of Operations in Germany is responsible for negotiations with the Allied Control Authority regarding U.N.R.R.A. functions for tracing and their relationship to the total activities for tracing in Germany.

5. The E.R.O. is responsible for coordinating U.N.R.R.A. policy with the policy of National Tracing Bureaux, in so far as it concerns those persons eligible for U.N.R.R.A. care ².

When U.S. National Training Service is placed in training pursuant to the decision of the Allied Control Authority, there was no clear-cut statement of U.S. National Training Service policy except that discussed above (see U.S. N.T.S. following the acceptance of the Allied Control Authority agreement. However, the European Regional Office stated the attention to the classification of its policy, a certain, non-ambivalent from the London Office stated the attention to be given to the United States National Training Service. It is to note a careful study of the training activities in collaboration with members of the staff of the Central Bureau of U.S. National Training Service were made on the basis of such an official statement of policy was issued by the Administrative Council.

This statement, covering the following provisions, has given rise to a number of questions which are being referred to the Office of International Trade Relations in the U.S. National Training Service.

1. U.S. N.T.S. can accept responsibility for training persons falling under the definition of the National Training Service as eligible for U.S. N.T.S. service. The National Training Service is not to be considered as a U.S. N.T.S. service, persons receiving service from U.S. N.T.S. are not to be considered eligible for but not to be treated as U.S. N.T.S. service.

2. U.S. N.T.S. cannot accept responsibility for training any persons except those in the U.S. N.T.S. service.

3. Training responsibilities of U.S. N.T.S. service to U.S. N.T.S. service, U.S. N.T.S. can accept responsibility for training activities regarding persons who may not be eligible.

4. The Chief of Operations in Germany is responsible for negotiations with the Allied Control Authority regarding U.S. N.T.S. functions for training and their relationship to the total activities for training in Germany.

5. The U.S. N.T.S. is responsible for coordinating U.S. N.T.S. policy with the policy of National Training Service, in so far as it concerns those persons eligible for U.S. N.T.S. service.

FOOTNOTES:

1. The results of this study were embodied in two statements prepared by the representative of E.R.O. and members of the staff of the Central Tracing Bureau.
"Factors in an U.N.R.R.A. Policy on the Central Tracing Bureau" (21st February 1946) is a general statement of Policy; "Central Tracing Bureau Operational Policies and Procedures" (27th February 1946) is a study of the implementation of policy.
2. The following statement was accepted on 22nd February, as being a correct interpretation of paragraph No. 5; "E.R.O. is responsible for the coordination of tracing policy throughout its sphere of influence, including Germany; in Germany it will discharge that responsibility through the Central Tracing Bureau. On tracing problems regarding Germany, the C.T.B. will deal directly with the N.T.B.'s under the policies established by E.R.O."

A. THE LIMITATION OF U.N.R.R.A.'s RESPONSIBILITY

The limitation of U.N.R.R.A.'s responsibility in tracing to those "eligible for U.N.R.R.A. care" as defined in paragraphs one and two of the policy statement raised but one serious problem¹. From its inception, the SHAEF Tracing Unit as continued through the CDPX Central Tracing Bureau to the U.N.R.R.A. bureau had specifically included the tracing of German relatives of United Nations nationals within its programme. (SHAEF/G-5/DF/2816/3, 27th April 1945, Para. 1; GE-CDPX, 383.7, 24 July 1945, Para. 3b).

At no time, however, was the question of performing a tracing service for enquiries from German nationals ever contemplated².

This difference was resolved in a statement issued by the Central Tracing Policy Board on 15th February 1946 listing by category the priority with which enquiries were to be dealt (DPOW/P(46)26, 15 February 1946, Para. 22). According to this analysis, categories four and seven, individual requests originating with nationals of the United Nations, neutral and ex-enemy countries or stateless persons concerning their German kin, were not to be accorded the search facilities of the central service, but should be transmitted to

Nevertheless, this category has been the source of considerable confusion. It also behind certain budgetary difficulties which have hampered U.N.R.R.A.'s adequate imple-

1. The results of this study were included in two statements prepared by the Commission on U.S.C. and members of the staff of the Central Intelligence Agency.
2. The following statements were reported in the January, 1954 issue of the Central Intelligence Agency Review: "Central Intelligence Agency Operations and Activities" (1954 January issue) as a study of the organization of policy.
3. The following statements were reported in the January, 1954 issue of the Central Intelligence Agency Review: "Central Intelligence Agency Operations and Activities" (1954 January issue) as a study of the organization of policy.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The importance of the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States is often stated in terms of its role in the national security. It is often stated that the Central Intelligence Agency is the only agency in the United States that is authorized to collect and analyze intelligence information from foreign sources. This is true, but it is also true that the Central Intelligence Agency is not the only agency in the United States that is authorized to collect and analyze intelligence information from foreign sources. Other agencies, such as the State Department, the Defense Department, and the Atomic Energy Commission, also have the authority to collect and analyze intelligence information from foreign sources. The Central Intelligence Agency's role is to provide a comprehensive and coordinated view of the intelligence information collected by these various agencies. This is done through the Central Intelligence Agency's various departments and offices, which are organized to provide a comprehensive and coordinated view of the intelligence information collected by these various agencies. This is done through the Central Intelligence Agency's various departments and offices, which are organized to provide a comprehensive and coordinated view of the intelligence information collected by these various agencies.

German tracing agencies. (DPOW/P(46)31, 28th February 1946, Para. 38). Since 1st February 1946 all such enquiries were so transmitted. (Monthly Report for February 1946, Central Tracing Bureau, IV, B, 1 c(1)). This procedure is clearly in accord with paragraph three of the London policy statement since the entire question of a German Tracing Agency has as yet (1st June 1946) not been finally clarified.

Although the immediate procedural difficulty was resolved, the implications of the limitation as it touches other aspects of the Allied Control Authority Agreement have never been clearly defined. The basic point at issue is the conflict between two conceptions of U.N.R.R.A.'s responsibility. The one, as clearly enunciated in the London policy statement, is that U.N.R.R.A. is the representative of displaced persons under its care or those technically eligible for such care either dead or alive. According to this point of view, U.N.R.R.A.'s tracing bureaux are simply agencies representing its interest in displaced persons in Germany and are only parts of the various services devised for their welfare. The other point of view is implied in the obligations which U.N.R.R.A. has assumed is that its responsibilities go beyond those of the German Operation in its narrowest sense to include a large place in the solution of an international problem of greatest magnitude. It should be pointed out, however, that the divergence between these points of view is not as great as appears on the surface for, in its last analysis, the problem as it concerns Germany is essentially one of displaced persons. The issue is one of emphasis. Put simply, it is whether U.N.R.R.A.'s efforts should be directed solely to the immediate problem in Germany or whether it should assist in the co-ordination of national and international agencies in the ultimate solution of the problem.

Nevertheless, this dicotomy has been the source of considerable confusion. It lies behind certain budgetary difficulties which have hampered U.N.R.R.A.'s adequate imple-

German trading agencies. (HOWARD, 1948 February 19, Paris, France)
 Since the February 1948 all such agencies were no longer
 listed. (Monthly Report for February 1948, Central Trading
 Bureau, IV, B, 1 (1)). This procedure is clearly in accord
 with paragraph three of the London Policy Agreement since the
 entire question of a German Trading Agency has as yet (Jan 1948)
 not been finally clarified.

Although the immediate procedure of this nature was
 required, the implications of the London Policy Agreement in other
 aspects of the Allied Control Authority Agreement have never been
 clearly defined. The basic point at issue is the conflict
 between two conceptions of U.S.R.A.'s responsibility.
 The one, as clearly stated in the London Policy Agreement,
 is that U.S.R.A. is the representative of displaced persons
 under the care of those countries which have such care
 either total or partial, according to the point of view.
 U.S.R.A.'s trading partners are simply agencies representing
 the interests in displaced persons in Germany and are only
 parties of the various services desired for their welfare.
 The other point of view is implied in the London Policy Agreement.
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 persons of the German Operation in the movement seems to justify
 a large place in the solution of an international problem of
 greatest magnitude. It should be pointed out, however, that
 the divergence between these points of view is not as great
 as appears on the surface for, in the last analysis, the problem
 as it concerns Germany is essentially one of displaced persons.
 The issue is one of expediency, for clearly it is whether
 U.S.R.A.'s efforts should be directed solely to the immediate
 problem in Germany or whether it should extend to the co-ordi-
 nation of national and international agencies in the ultimate
 solution of the problem.

Nevertheless, this theory has been the source of
 considerable confusion. It has defined certain budgetary
 alternatives which have hampered U.S.R.A.'s adequate imple-

mentation of the programme; it is the basis for questioning the function of the Coordinating Committee of representatives of national tracing bureaux at the Central Tracing Bureau. Most important, it underlies two basic problems concerning the ultimate disposition of the tracing bureau and the selection of a terminal legatee to carry on the functions of the U.N.R.R.A. bureaux at its dissolution.

B. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIAISON AND COORDINATION.

The first of these problems is the extent to which U.N.R.R.A. is responsible for the maintenance of Liaison and for the coordination of tracing activities on an international level.

The position of the Allied Control Authority in regard to the responsibility for liaison and coordination within the service is stated in the Central Tracing Policy Board's confirmation of U.N.R.R.A.'s acceptance. It is clear that the responsibility for maintaining liaison between the Central Tracing Service, of which by agreement the U.N.R.R.A. Central Tracing Bureau had become a part, and any other organization in or outside of Germany is the province of the Central Tracing Policy Board. The agreement further specified that this responsibility should be discharged in close cooperation with the Director of the Central Tracing Bureau³.

Paragraph five of the London Policy statement, on the other hand, assigned that responsibility in so far as it concerns persons eligible for U.N.R.R.A. care to the European Regional Office of U.N.R.R.A.

Footnotes:

1. The question was first raised by the Director General of UNRRA by Cable (103 Frankfurt, Repeated London 10409) to the Director of the Central Tracing Bureau, in late January 1946.

2. The extension of the principle of forwarding to other agencies enquiries for those not eligible for UNRRA care to include both the enquirer and the enquiree has also been suggested. (Draft on Statement of Policy, Tracing of Missing Persons, UNRRA, European Regional Office, A, (3)). This extension would completely undermine any tracing activity, for only rarely are both parties eligible for UNRRA care.

G. IBERA's Long Term Responsibilities

Within the limitation expressed, it cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the extent to which this responsibility touches upon the larger issue of the co-ordination of activities of the national bodies, their relation with each other, and the rights of calling international conferences dealing with tracing problems can be questioned as falling outside the limitations of the policy statement. At the best, it raises issues which must be clarified on the highest levels between the parties to the agreement.

... obligation is defined to be "to establish, stabilize and maintain the process of tracing missing persons and of collecting and distributing records concerning them within the limits of its agreement with the Allied Control Authority, and to insure the transfer of that process to a terminal legatee upon its dissolution" (Para A, 5.)

Footnote: Stabilization of the Tracing Process

3. A similar position between the Director of the Central Tracing Bureau and E.R.O. in regard to tracing problems in Germany is implied in the interpretation of Paragraph five of the London Statement. (See above VI, note 2).

There is some question, however, as to the extent to which the stabilization of that process should be interpreted to include a widespread reorganization of the service on the eve of its transfer to a terminal legatee. That procedure should be adjusted constantly to new situations and simplified as much as possible is beyond question, but any considerable reorganization of the system which would entail extensive re-negotiations should be viewed with respect until basic decisions as to the final disposition of the activity have been made. This is particularly true as it affects the position of the Central Tracing Bureau. A fundamental re-distribution of functions between it and the National and Local Bureaux would only disrupt the service unnecessarily.

Within the limitations expressed, it cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the extent to which this responsibility focuses upon the larger sense of the co-ordination of activities of the national bodies, their relation with each other, and the rights of calling international conferences dealing with trading goods, is less and less questioned as further details of the execution of the policy statement. At the same time, it is clear that which must be directed on the highest levels, which is related to the agreement.

Conclusion

It is a matter of fact that the Government of the Central Trading Bureau and I.R.O. in regard to trading policies in Germany is similar in the implementation of paragraph five of the London Statement. (See also VI, para 1).

C. UNRRA's Long Term Responsibilities

The second of these problems deals specifically with the ultimate disposition of UNRRA's installations for tracing. In Factors in an UNRRA Policy on the Central Tracing Bureau (see above VI, note) it is clearly recognised that in view of its emergency and temporary character, UNRRA cannot discharge all of the extensive long-range ramifications of the tracing problem and should anticipate the transfer to a more permanent body of a residual load and a demonstrated experience (A, 2, 3). Specifically this obligation is defined to be "to establish, stabilize and maintain the process of tracing missing persons and of collecting and distributing records concerning them within the limits of its agreement with the Allied Control Authority, and to insure the transfer of that process to a terminal legatee upon its dissolution" (Para A, 6.)

1. The Stabilization of the Tracing Process

(a) Proposals for the Reorganisation of the Service.

There is no question of UNRRA's having discharged its responsibility to establish and maintain a tracing service. There is some question, however, as to the extent to which the stabilization of that process should be interpreted to include a widespread reorganisation of the service on the eve of its transfer to a terminal legatee. That procedures should be adjusted constantly to new situations and simplified as much as possible is beyond question, but any considerable reorganisation of the system which would entail extensive re-negotiations should be viewed with suspect until basic decisions as to the final disposition of the activity have been made. This is particularly true as it affects the position of the Central Tracing Bureau. A fundamental re-distribution of functions between it and the National and Zonal Bureaux would only disrupt the service unnecessarily

activities on a restricted basis, lack the wider outlook necessary for the efficient administration of an international system. Duplication of effort is bound to result, and with it

1. THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

The scope of these problems deals specifically with the various divisions of the Bureau's organization for training. In Federal Bureau of Investigation (see above VI, note) it is clearly recognized that in view of the diversity and category character, various elements all of the extensive law-enforcement nature of the training problem and should anticipate the transfer to a more permanent body of a national level and a decentralized approach (see V, 3). Specifically this obligation is defined to be "to establish, maintain and maintain the process of training, research and of collecting and distributing records concerning them within the limits of the agreement with the Allied Control Authority and to insure the training of that process in a national

2. The Organization of the Training Bureau

(a) Proposals for the Organization of the Service

There is no question of the Bureau's being organized its responsibility to establish and maintain a training service. There is some question, however, as to the extent to which the establishment of that service should be interpreted to include a widespread organization of the service on the eve of its transfer to a national agency. The procedures should be adjusted consistently to new situations and simplified as far as possible in regard to detail, but any considerable reorganization of the system which would entail extensive re-negotiations should be viewed with great suspicion. So far as the final disposition of the service has been made. This is particularly true as to efforts for position of the Central Training Bureau. A fundamental re-orientation of function between it and the National and local bureaus would only stress the service unnecessarily

without obviating the necessity of fundamental re-negotiations at the time of its transfer.

(b) The Re-registration of Displaced Persons. One major task, which clearly falls within the responsibility of UNRRA to stabilize the tracing process before its transfer is the re-registration of displaced persons under its care. This problem is an extensive one touching on many aspects of UNRRA's activities, but it is one which is of greatest importance for tracing the whereabouts of displaced persons who will remain in Germany as the "hard core" of the non-repatriables. It is imperative that the task be completed before UNRRA transfers its responsibility to other agencies.

2. The Selection of Terminal Legatee.

A number of alternative solutions to the problem of selecting a terminal legatee to carry on UNRRA's function in tracing at its dissolution present themselves.

(a) The Abolition of the Central Tracing Bureau. The first is to eliminate the Central Tracing Bureau from the system, transferring its "clearing house" function to the National Bureaux and its direction of search activities to the Zonal Bureaux. The National and Zonal Bureau, then, would communicate directly with each other without a common channel. The effectiveness of such complete decentralization is to be questioned. The transfer of added responsibilities to the Zonal Bureaux, weakened as many of them are by reductions in personnel, is not likely to be welcomed on all sides, nor is the operation of a system without any measure of coordination viewed with pleasure by the National Bureaux most concerned.

The Zonal Bureaux, occupied largely with search activities on a restricted basis, lack the wider outlook necessary for the efficient administration of an international system. Duplication of effort is bound to result, and with it

without obtaining the necessary information from the
 negotiations at the time of its transfer.

(b) The No-Registration of Disposed Assets. One
 major task, which clearly falls within the responsibility
 of IREDA to establish the records, is to ensure that the
 transfer is the responsibility of the donor of the assets under
 the laws. This problem is not a simple one, as it depends on
 many aspects of IREDA's activities, including the nature of the
 of greatest importance for the donor is the nature of the
 disposed persons and all means of their disposal. It is the
 work of the non-registered. It is the donor's duty that the
 task be completed before IREDA is able to assume the responsibility
 to other agencies.

2. The Selection of Assets for Disposal

A major of importance is the selection of the problem
 of selecting a certain number of assets for disposal. IREDA's function
 is to ensure that the disposal is carried out in a systematic
 manner.

(a) The Selection of Assets for Disposal. The
 first is to eliminate the assets that are not needed from the
 system, transferring the assets to the donor of the assets for the
 National Bureau and the donor of the assets. The donor of the
 the National Bureau. The donor of the assets is the donor of the
 would communicate with the donor of the assets without a system
 channel. The effectiveness of such a system depends on the
 is to be questioned. The transfer of such responsibilities
 to the donor, however, is not a simple one, as it depends on all
 reductions in personnel. It is not likely to be reduced on all
 sides, nor is the operation of a system without any means
 of coordination with the donor of the assets by the National Bureau
 most concerned.

The National Bureau, equipped largely with search
 activities on a restricted basis, lack the wider outlook
 necessary for the efficient administration of an international
 system. Duplication of effort is bound to result, and with it

increased inefficiency. Nor does such a scheme provide for the proper disposition of records concerning the Stateless and those of undetermined nationality or for the handling of enquiries which can not be despatched satisfactorily to a specific zonal bureau.

(b) A Central Tracing Bureau for those of Determined Nationality. A second solution would be to limit the functions of the central bureau to that of an agency dealing only with the Stateless and those of undetermined nationality. According to this system the central bureau would receive from the zonal bureaux records which cannot be disposed of otherwise and would limit its search to an exploitation of such records at its disposal. The central bureau would, therefore, operate on the same level as the zonal bureau and would deal only with enquiries which could not be answered by the other bureaux. This system, however, would not answer the objections to one operating without some measure of centralized control.

(c) A Combined Central Bureau under Military Government. A third solution is the transfer of the responsibility for tracing missing Allied nationals in Germany to the Internal Affairs & Communications Division of the Allied Control Authority where it would become a part of a merged tracing service for all persons missing in Germany. This solution recognises the problem as a German one and as such an internal problem to be solved by German agencies operating under the direction of Military Government. There is much to be said for this course of action. It would transfer the responsibility for solving the problem, where many believe it rightfully belongs, to the German people who created it. Much of the work could be performed by German labour, which is the most economical way, and given proper Allied supervision could be done effectively. On the other hand, it does not recognise the problem basically as an international one, and many fear

increased efficiency. For some with a system providing for the proper disposition of responsibilities of the States and those of undoubted authority or for the handling of matters which can not be described satisfactorily to a specific local board.

(b) A Central Training Bureau for State of

Determined Nationality. A second solution which is to limit the functions of the central board to the training of the States only with the States and those of undoubted authority. According to this system, the States would receive from the local boards a list of persons disposed of otherwise and with their own funds for the organization of such records as the States and those of undoubted authority, therefore, reports on the States and those of undoubted authority and would deal only with the States and those of undoubted authority. The other boards, therefore, would not be answered by the other boards, but would not answer the objectives of the States and those of undoubted authority of centralized control.

(c) A Central Training Bureau for State of

Government. A third solution is to limit the responsibility for training matters to the States and those of undoubted authority of the States. Central authority should be given to the States and those of undoubted authority for all persons and matters. This solution recognizes the problem of the States and those of undoubted authority to be solved by the States and those of undoubted authority. The direction of the States and those of undoubted authority to be with for this course of action, and the States and those of undoubted authority for solving the problem, there may believe it rightly belongs to the States and those of undoubted authority. The work could be performed by general labor, which is the most economical way, and given proper skilled supervision could be done effectively. On the other hand, it does not recognize the problem actually as an international one, and may fear

that the best interests of the nations most concerned would not be served. Moreover, it retains the entire service under quadripartite control, a feature which many believe should not be continued longer than is necessary.

(d) An International Tracing Service. Another alternative recognizes the problem basically as an international one and provides for the strengthened continuation of the coordinating and centralizing function under a strong international body. According to this proposal, the existing facilities for tracing on a zonal level would be maintained in Germany, but the larger aspects of the problem would be under the supervision of such a body as the International Refugee Organization or the United Nations Organization. In view of the long range aspects of the problem, such a solution merits careful consideration. It provides a large measure of coordination of effort, and within a single framework allows for the wide decentralization necessary for the operation of tracing on an international level.

that the best interests of the nation would be served, however, it is the duty of the citizen to be prepared to sacrifice if necessary. The Government should not be so timid as to allow itself to be intimidated.

(2) International Relations - Another

essential responsibility of the citizen is to be alert to the needs of the nation in its relations with other nations. The citizen should be prepared to sacrifice if necessary. The Government should not be so timid as to allow itself to be intimidated. In view of the fact that the interests of the nation are at stake, it is the duty of the citizen to be prepared to sacrifice if necessary. The Government should not be so timid as to allow itself to be intimidated.



