

PART ONE

The International Organization

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I. Formation

1. THE AGREEMENT

ON 9 NOVEMBER 1943, seven months before the Anglo-American landings on Northwest Continental Europe and a year and a half before the surrender of Germany but about a year after the victories at El Alamein and Stalingrad had given clear indication of the ultimate victory of the United Nations, President Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed these words to "my friends, on this historic occasion":

Here in the White House, seated about a table in the historic East Room, are representatives of forty-four nations—United Nations and those associated with them . . .

Representatives of these forty-four nations—you gentlemen here—have just signed an agreement creating the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration—commonly known by a simpler word as UNRRA . . .

All of the United Nations agree to coöperate and share in the work of UNRRA—each nation according to its own individual resources—and to provide relief and help in rehabilitation for the victims of German and Japanese barbarism . . .

So it will be the task of UNRRA to operate in these areas of food shortages until the resumption of peaceful occupations enables the liberated peoples once more to assume the full burden of their own support. It will be for UNRRA, first to assure a fair distribution of available supplies among all of the liberated peoples, and, second, to ward off death by starvation or exposure among these peoples . . .

When victory comes there can certainly be no secure peace until there is a return of law and order in the oppressed countries, until the peoples of these countries have been restored to a normal, healthy, and self-sustaining existence. This means that the more quickly and effectually we apply measures of relief and rehabilitation, the more quickly will our own boys overseas be able to come home . . .

As in most of the difficult and complex things in life, nations will learn to work together only by actually working together. Why not? The nations have common objectives. It is, therefore, with a lift of hope, that we look on the signing of this agreement by all of the United Nations as a means of joining them together still more firmly.¹

¹ *Journal*, First Council, pp. 1-2.

Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, French Committee of National Liberation, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia were the forty-four nations to whose representatives the President spoke. As allies and associates in the war against the Axis they had just signed an agreement, to which Denmark,² the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR,³ and Turkey⁴ later adhered, expressing their determination that, immediately upon the liberation of any area, the population thereof should receive "aid and relief from their sufferings, food, clothing and shelter"; and "aid in the prevention of pestilence and in the recovery of the health of the people"; and that preparation and arrangements should be made for "the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes," and "assistance in the resumption of urgently needed agricultural and industrial production and the restoration of essential services."⁵

To achieve these aims they were establishing an international organization—the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA)—which was to:

Plan, coördinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other essential services.⁶

The Agreement provided for a Council, which was to be the policy-making body and was to consist of one representative of each member government or authority; a Central Committee to make policy decisions of an emergency nature between sessions of the Council and to consist of representatives of China, USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States;⁷ a Committee on Supplies, regional committees, other special committees; and a Director General who was to have full powers and authority for carrying out the relief operations contemplated in the Agreement.

² Resolution 62, August 1945.

⁴ Resolution 84, March 1946.

⁶ Article I, 2.

³ Resolution 63, August 1945.

⁵ Agreement, Preamble.

⁷ Article III, 3.

The Council was to be convened in regular session not less than twice a year by the Central Committee and might be convened in special session whenever the Central Committee should deem necessary or within thirty days after a request therefor by one third of the Council members.⁸ It was to choose its own chairman, to determine its own rules of procedure except that, unless otherwise provided in the Agreement or by its own action, it was to vote by simple majority.⁹

The Central Committee was to invite the participation of the chairman of the Committee on Supplies at those of its meetings at which policies affecting the provision of supplies were discussed.¹⁰ Between sessions of the Council it was, when necessary, to make policy decisions of an emergency nature, which were to be recorded and communicated to member governments and to be open to reconsideration by the Council.

There were to be at least two regional committees, one for Europe (which was to replace the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements)¹¹ and the other for the Far East, which were to recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies with respect to relief and rehabilitation within their respective areas.¹² The Committee on Supplies was to recommend to the Council and the Central Committee policies designed to assure the provision of supplies.¹³

The Director General was to be appointed by the Council on the nomination by unanimous vote of the Central Committee.¹⁴ He was accorded full power and authority to carry out the operations contemplated by the Agreement, limited only by availability of resources and the broad policies determined by the Council or its Central Committee.¹⁵ In arranging for the procurement, transportation, and distribution of supplies, he was to consult and collaborate with the appropriate authorities of the United Nations and, wherever practicable, to use the facilities made available by such authorities.¹⁶ Without his consent and acceptance of his regulations foreign relief agencies were not to work in any area receiving aid from the Administration.¹⁷ He was to appoint all necessary personnel including deputy directors general who might be assigned special functions within a region and who,

⁸ Article III, 2.

⁹ Article III, 1.

¹⁰ Article III, 3.

¹¹ Miscalled the "Inter-Allied Committee on European Post-War Relief" in the Agreement.

¹² Article III, 5.

¹³ Article III, 4.

¹⁴ Article IV, 1.

¹⁵ Article IV, 2.

¹⁶ Article IV, 2.

¹⁷ Article IV, 2.

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if so assigned, were to attend meetings of the regional standing committees.¹⁸ The Director General was also to make periodic reports to the Central Committee and the Council on the activities of the Administration, including those within each region.¹⁹

The Agreement made quite clear that, while hostilities or other military necessities existed in any area, the Administration was not to undertake activities therein without the consent of the military command of that area and unless subject to such control as the command might find necessary. The determination that such hostilities or military necessities existed was to be made by the military commander.²⁰ It was equally emphatic that the form of activities of the Administration within territories of a member government "shall be determined . . . with the consent of the member government."²¹

On the other hand, the Agreement was somewhat vague regarding the financial aspects of the proposed operations. On authorization of their appropriate constitutional bodies and in amounts to be determined by these bodies, member governments were to contribute to the support of the Administration.²² The Director General was to keep in review the supplies and resources made available and to initiate action with a view to assuring such additional supplies as might be required. Member governments, during the war, were to make purchases outside their own territories for relief and rehabilitation purposes only after consultation with the Director General.²³ The Director General was to submit to the Council an annual budget covering necessary administrative expenses. The total amount approved, in proportions to be determined by the Council, was to be allocated to the member governments, which were, subject to conditions of their appropriate constitutional bodies, to contribute promptly.²⁴

Finally, the Agreement made provision for amendments²⁵ and for the withdrawal of members.²⁶

This Agreement marked the culmination of consultations between the signatory governments which, particularly between the Governments of China, USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States, had covered nearly two years. These discussions, in turn, had developed from various and diverse trends and plans within these countries. The nature of these plans and the conditions under which they were formu-

¹⁸ Article IV, 4.

²¹ Article I, 2a.

²⁴ Article VI.

¹⁹ Article IV, 5.

²² Article V, 1, 2.

²⁵ Article VIII.

²⁰ Article VII.

²³ Article V, 3.

²⁶ Article X.

lated determined the principal aspects of the Agreement. The establishment of an international organization to bring aid and relief to stricken nations was, of course, fundamental. Other notable aspects were: (1) the concentration of authority to determine policy in the Council which was to decide matters by a simple majority vote; (2) the small size of the Central Committee, its theoretically restricted authority, and the limitation of the requirement of unanimity to the choice of the Director General and a few other minor matters; (3) the relative insignificance of the regional committees; (4) the strong administrative control granted the Director General; (5) the vagueness of the financial aspects and the definition of the scope of the work to be done; and (6) the high protection assured to national sovereignty. These are of interest because the framers of the Agreement were aware that it might well set a precedent for the organization of other international bodies.

2. THE BACKGROUND

Though international organizations had existed before, one created specifically to bring aid and relief to peoples and countries devastated by the enemies of the United Nations was obviously born of the war and was designed as a partial answer to some of the inevitable consequences thereof: devastation, famine, pestilence, disease, and—this, perhaps, a modern addition to the age-old effects—the exhaustion of foreign exchange resources in afflicted areas, which would prevent them, on resumption of peace, from importing the needed supplies.

The major public suggestion that the work which was to be UNRRA's should be performed was made by Winston Churchill, although he did not suggest that an international organization should be created for the purpose. On 21 August 1940, in a speech on the war situation to the House of Commons, his uncompromising refusal to allow supplies through the blockade was softened by a suggestion of better things to come:

Let Hitler bear his responsibilities to the full, and let the people of Europe who groan beneath his yoke aid in every way the coming of the day when that yoke will be broken. Meanwhile we can and we will arrange in advance for the speedy entry of food into any part of the enslaved area, when this part has been wholly cleared of German forces and has genuinely regained its freedom. We shall do our utmost to encourage the building up of reserves of food all over the world, so that there will always be held

up before the peoples of Europe including—I say deliberately—the German and Austrian peoples, the certainty that the shattering of the Nazi power will bring them all immediate food, freedom and peace.²⁷

The United Kingdom Government began immediately to prepare for the validation of this pledge. Export surpluses thought to be accumulating in British possessions and Latin America as a result of the 1939 blockades appeared as potential resources. In its appeal to the United States for coöperation in dealing with the surplus problem as a whole the United Kingdom proposed postwar relief measures as a way of utilizing world surpluses. As early as September 1940 it raised questions about arrangements for the storage of existing surplus commodities to provide reserves for the relief of Europe after liberation.²⁸

At the same time, a ministerial and an interdepartmental committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, Chief Economic Adviser to the Government, were established.²⁹

To mitigate the present embarrassments of oversea producers deprived by the war of many of their normal markets, as well as to prepare in advance for the relief, at the earliest possible moment after their liberation, of the plundered countries whose resources are being so ruthlessly drained for the benefit of the Nazi war machine.³⁰

Similar recognition of the inevitable economic consequences of the war and need for postwar relief led to other public and private preparations. Among these the memorandum of agreement regarding the control of the production, export, and stockpiling of wheat³¹ negotiated in Washington at the instigation of the United States during 1941 and 1942 was to have a direct connection with the work of UNRRA. Hereby, representatives of Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States established an International Wheat Council in June 1942 which in addition to many duties was to administer a wheat pool set up for intergovernmental relief in war-stricken countries where the member governments considered such relief prac-

²⁷ *Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates*, CCCLXIV (21 August 1940), 55.

²⁸ United States Department of State (State) (Hawkins' Papers), memo, 18 September 1940, presented by the Marquess of Lothian (British Ambassador to the United States) to Cordell Hull (United States Secretary of State), 23 September 1940.

²⁹ State (840.48/4989, 3/4), memo appended to note of 11 July 1941 from Kenneth Bewley (Principal Assistant Secretary, United Kingdom Treasury) to Dean Acheson (United States Assistant Secretary of State).

³⁰ *The Times* (London), 3 December 1940, p. 5.

³¹ *Wheat* (United States Department of State Publication 2140 [Washington, D.C., 1944]).

licable. For this pool specific contributions in bushels of wheat or their equivalent in flour were required of each producing country, while the United Kingdom undertook to furnish the transportation of relief wheat as its share. The Council was further empowered to arrange for the distribution of relief wheat through such an intergovernmental body as might be set up and given general responsibility for the distribution of relief.³² Here was the first official international effort to implement freedom from want. It forecast an intergovernmental relief organization and made provision for some resources.

In the meantime, various governments in exile, such as the Netherlands, for example, began to take steps to accumulate supplies for use after liberation. As such action was bound to increase competitive buying, it was a cause of certain apprehension to the United Kingdom and other governments.³³ Partly spurred to action by this situation, the United Kingdom Government convened a meeting of the representatives of fifteen governments fighting Germany, at St. James's Palace on 24 September 1941, for the purpose of establishing machinery to deal with the preliminary questions related to postwar relief in Europe. The United States Government had been consulted in advance regarding the plans³⁴ and had sent a message of encouragement.³⁵ Anthony Eden presided and formally presented the following resolution, which had already been communicated to the governments concerned:

The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia, and the representatives of General de Gaulle, leader of Free Frenchmen, agree:—

(1) That it is their common aim to secure that supplies of food, raw materials and articles of prime necessity should be made available for the post-war needs of the countries liberated from Nazi oppression.

(2) That, while each of the Allied Governments and authorities will be primarily responsible for making provision for the economic needs of its own peoples, their respective plans should be coordinated, in a spirit of inter-allied collaboration, for the successful achievement of the common aim.

³² *Ibid.*, Article VI, pp. 9–10.

³³ United Kingdom Command 6315, *Report of Proceedings, Inter-Allied Meeting, 24 September 1941*, p. 19.

³⁴ State (840.48/4988, 1/2), cable, Winant to Secretary of State 2887, 7 July 1941.

³⁵ United Kingdom Command 6315, *Report of Proceedings, Inter-Allied Meeting, 24 September 1941*, p. 22.

(3) That they welcome the preparatory measures which have already been undertaken for this purpose and express their readiness to collaborate to the fullest extent of their power in pursuing the action required.

(4) That, accordingly, each of the Allied Governments and authorities should prepare estimates of the kinds and amounts of foodstuffs, raw materials and articles of prime necessity required, and indicate the order of priority in which it would desire supplies to be delivered.

(5) That the reprovisioning of Europe will require the most efficient employment after the war of the shipping resources controlled by each Government and of Allied resources as a whole as well as of those belonging to other European countries, and that plans to this end should be worked out as soon as possible between the Allied Governments and authorities, in consultation as and when appropriate with other Governments concerned.

(6) That, as a first step, a bureau should be established by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, with which the Allied Governments and authorities would collaborate in framing estimates of their requirements, and which, after collating and coordinating these estimates, would present proposals to a Committee of Allied representatives under the chairmanship of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross.³⁶

The Netherlands Government wanted assurance that this resolution would not preclude action by individual governments to assist their own people. Eden gave such assurance and added: "I wish to make it clear that our idea is that responsibility rests, in the first place, with the individual governments to help their own people. But we shall also do our best to help one another."

The USSR Government alone was unable to accept the resolution in its entirety; it considered that the Bureau, which the resolution envisaged, should itself be built on the basis of equal representation of all the governments concerned. It proposed that detailed plans concerning the scope and form and methods of work of the Bureau should be submitted for preliminary consideration to the Allied Governments so that a final decision could be approved at the next inter-Allied conference, and reserved the right to put forward, at a later date, certain fresh proposals concerning that part of the resolution which covered the constitution of the Bureau.³⁷

Pending the receipt of these proposals the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements (popularly called the Leith-Ross Committee), to which the USSR Government did not send a representative nor submit estimates, met once. Nevertheless, the Allied Post-War Re-

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-31.

quirements Bureau, staffed entirely by British Government officials, and eventually a network of forty-four international committees, sub-committees, and panels were established³⁸ to prepare estimates of the needs of nine European countries.³⁹ Their conclusions were ultimately presented to the governments concerned in June 1943.⁴⁰

The USSR proposals⁴¹ were submitted in January 1942 to the governments which had actively participated in the St. James's Palace Conference and, at the suggestion of the United Kingdom Government,⁴² to the Government of the United States,⁴³ which by that time had entered the war and had attached a representative to the Inter-Allied Committee. The principal suggestion was for the establishment of an international organization in place of the British-dominated Post-War Requirements Bureau to deal with some of the problems concerning the economic life of postwar Europe.

Formal answer to these proposals was postponed until the United Kingdom and United States Governments had had an opportunity to study them and to confer.⁴⁴ The Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau, in response, made recommendations⁴⁵ which the United Kingdom Government, although it did not put them forward officially, considered a workable plan.⁴⁶ These were submitted to the United States Government in February 1942.⁴⁷

The two proposals were, in turn, considered by the United States Government, which made known its suggestions in May.⁴⁸ It further

³⁸ Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, *Report to Allied Governments* (1943), Appendix I.

³⁹ Those attending the St. James's Palace Conference, except the USSR and the United Kingdom.

⁴⁰ Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, *Report to Allied Governments*.

⁴¹ See State, *Handbook, United States Delegation* (First Session of the Council, Atlantic City, N.J., 1943), Section A, Document V, Supplement b.

⁴² United Kingdom Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau (W419/17), Aide Mémoire, 8 May 1942.

⁴³ State (Hawkins' Papers), memo, Acheson to Hull, 23 June 1942; cable, United States Embassy, London, to Secretary of State 327, 22 January 1942.

⁴⁴ United Kingdom Foreign Office, E.S. (o) (42), 14, 21; State (Hawkins' Papers), cable, United States Embassy, London, to Secretary of State 1223, 14 March 1942.

⁴⁵ State, *Handbook, United States Delegation*, Section A, Document V, Supplement g.

⁴⁶ State (UNRRA Docs.), memo, Ray Atherton (Chief, Division of European Affairs, Department of State) to Acheson, 14 March 1942.

⁴⁷ State (UNRRA Docs.), Enclosure I to dispatch, United States Embassy, London, to Secretary of State 2954, 26 February 1942.

⁴⁸ State (Hawkins' Papers), memo, Acheson to Hull, 23 June 1942; (840.48/52/13), cable, Hull to United States Embassy, London, 1995, 7 May 1942.

proposed that conferences should be held in Washington between representatives of the Chinese, USSR, United Kingdom, and United States Governments to discuss these proposals, after which there should be held a conference of all the interested nations.

Accordingly, Leith-Ross was sent by the United Kingdom Government to Washington in June. Though the terms in which his memorandum of February had been drawn up were wide and provided the basis for an ambitious approach to relief problems, he left London with no plenipotentiary power to negotiate an agreement for the establishment of a relief organization. On the contrary, he was given discretion to deal with the organizational aspects of the problem in whatever manner seemed to him most likely to reconcile the divergent views of the governments concerned, but his powers to commit his government on how the supplies and materials could be made available to the organization and what contribution the United Kingdom Government could make were strictly limited.⁴⁹ The United States Government was fully aware of the limitations of his instructions.⁵⁰

As a basis for discussion with Leith-Ross the United States proposals were presented in the form of a United Nations agreement creating a relief administration—a paper written by Harry Hawkins⁵¹ (Chief, Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements, United States Department of State), in line with suggestions by Dean Acheson⁵² (Assistant Secretary of State). When amended by Acheson and the Subcommittee on Economic Reconstruction of the Department of State,⁵³ this was known as the Acheson draft.⁵⁴ It also had no official sanction. Conferences under the able direction of Acheson continued into the summer.⁵⁵ Although representatives from China and the USSR were not present at these meetings their ambassadors in Washington were kept fully informed regarding the progress of the discussions.⁵⁶

⁴⁹ Monograph, R. Miller, "The United Kingdom Approach to UNRRA," p. 24.

⁵⁰ State (UNRRA Docs.), memo, conversation, Acheson and R. Opie (British Embassy), 27 June 1942.

⁵¹ State (Hawkins' Papers), memos, Hawkins to Acheson, 8, 9 June 1942.

⁵² State (Hawkins' Papers), memo, Acheson to Sumner Welles (Under Secretary of State), enclosing suggestion for draft agreement, 6 June 1942.

⁵³ State (UNRRA Docs.), Acheson to Secretary of State, 23 June 1943.

⁵⁴ State (UNRRA Docs.), Acheson draft of 15 June 1942.

⁵⁵ State (Hawkins' Papers), minutes, first four meetings, 2, 3, 7, 10 July 1943. Later minutes are missing.

⁵⁶ State (840.50/464), memo, conversation, Soviet Ambassador, Chinese Ambassador, and Acheson, 1 July 1942; (840.50/571), memo, conversation, Chinese Ambassador and

By August the negotiators had adopted a revised text for an agreement establishing a United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. When amended to include a suggestion of the United States military authorities which became Article VII,⁵⁷ this was approved by the United States Secretary of State and by the President as a basis for discussion. The draft⁵⁸ was submitted to the Governments of China, USSR, and the United Kingdom. It was decided at that time,⁵⁹ however, not to call a wider international conference to consider it, since the war situation hardly seemed favorable (Tobruk had recently fallen; the Germans were still advancing in southern USSR; and the counter-attack against Japan had not yet started).

Further discussions proceeded very slowly. In November, however, the United States Government asked for immediate comments.⁶⁰ This soon brought forth further suggestions.⁶¹ Negotiations were resumed in January 1943, this time by representatives of the four Governments meeting with Acheson in the Department of State. By then the war situation had taken an emphatic turn for the better (El Alamein, the landings on North Africa, Stalingrad, and the offensive against the Japanese). Furthermore, the other Allies were growing restless and anxious to push their own relief buying. The renewed discussions were continued until May when the representatives of the Four Powers produced a draft agreement that was, with the President's approval, released to the other forty Allied and associated governments.⁶² Criticisms from these countries and from members of the United States Senate

Acheson, 14 July 1942; (840.50/572), memo, conversation, Soviet Ambassador and Acheson, 14 July 1942; (UNRRA Docs.), letter, Leith-Ross to Acheson, 14 July 1942.

⁵⁷ State (UNRRA Docs.), letter, R. P. Patterson (Under Secretary of War), to Acheson, 20 August 1942.

⁵⁸ See State, *Handbook, United States Delegation*, Section A, Document V, Supplement e.

⁵⁹ State (UNRRA Docs.), memo, "UNRRA Program" (prepared for Secretary's conference with the Vice-President, 4 November 1942).

⁶⁰ State (840.50/830 A), cables: Hull to United States Embassy, London 5695, 12 November 1942; (840.50/527 H), Hull to United States Embassy, Chungking, 13 November 1942; (840.50/830 B), Hull to United States Embassy, Kuibyshev, 13 November 1942.

⁶¹ State (840.50/1064), memo, Acheson to Hull, 6 January 1943, enclosing memo, "Points Raised by British, Russian, and Chinese Governments regarding the Draft Agreement for UNRRA."

⁶² State (840.50/7039 A), letter, Hull to the President, 7 June 1943; State (840.50/2929 M), cable, Acheson to United States Embassy, London 2779, 5 June 1943; (840.50/2034 B), circular telegram to chiefs of United States missions, 9 June 1943.

during the coming summer⁶³ led to the revision of 20 September,⁶⁴ the third major draft. This was released to the Allied and associated powers 23 September 1943 and to the press the following day.⁶⁵ It became the text of the Agreement, which was formally adopted at the meeting held on 9 November 1943.

3. THE AGREEMENT DISCUSSED

During the months that followed the St. James's Palace Conference three important, separate proposals for the formation of an international relief organization were advanced: the USSR proposals of January 1942; the Allied Post-War Requirements Bureau (the Leith-Ross) proposals of February 1942; and the United States proposals of May 1942. There were likewise three major draft versions of an agreement to establish such an organization: the first draft of August 1942, prepared by the United Kingdom and United States Governments; the second draft of May 1943, prepared by representatives of the Governments of China, USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and the third and final draft (which was officially adopted in November 1943) of September 1943, prepared by representatives of the same four Governments after receiving the views of the other governments concerned.

Necessarily, these proposals and drafts, though containing much in common, differed one from another. Certain matters were constant in all: relief work (not, however, precisely defined and limited) was to be performed in liberated countries; this work was to be performed by an international organization; and the supreme body of this organization was to be a body consisting of one representative of each member state. Certain other matters were not settled, even in the final and accepted version of the Agreement, and were officially left for decision to the first meeting of the Council of the organization: the financial arrangements; and the exact scope of the work to be performed. Still other matters, regarding which different views had been advanced from

⁶³ State (UNRRA Docs.), negotiations after 9 June presentation, not including Four Powers; (UNRRA Docs.), memos of Four Power discussions in Acheson's office, 21 July, 19 August 1943; (840.50/2482 A, B, and C), cables: State to American ambassadors, Chungking 381, London 3093, Moscow 236, 27 August 1943.

⁶⁴ State (UNRRA Docs.), Draft Agreement of 20 September 1943.

⁶⁵ State (840.50/2567 A), United States circular telegram to chiefs of missions, 21 September 1943; (840.50/2627, 2624), State Press Releases 394, 395, 23 September 1943.

time to time, were settled in the final draft: the size, authority, and voting procedure of the Central (or Executive, as it was at first called) Committee; and the nature of the organization.

The first recommendation for a strong, policy-making, but small committee appeared in the United States proposals of May 1942,⁶⁶ in which it was suggested that there should be an Executive Committee, consisting of representatives of the four big Powers "to provide for the required centralization of responsibility and authority as concerns both the formulation and execution of policy." It was further stated that careful consideration would have to be given, among other subjects, to: the extent to which other countries should be represented on this committee; the principles under which it should function; and the extent of its powers. It was precisely these three topics that involved the greatest discussions between the time the Committee was first suggested and the Agreement was adopted.

During the discussions in the summer of 1942 the United Kingdom Government recommended that the Committee be limited to four members for the sake of efficiency. Though the United States Government was concerned about the reaction of the small powers, it nevertheless accepted this view,⁶⁷ which was embodied in the draft of August 1942, where the name "Policy Committee" was used.⁶⁸ When negotiations were actively resumed in January 1943, the United Kingdom Government proposed a Policy Committee of seven members, one of which would be Canada,⁶⁹ the other two, presumably, a Continental European power and a representative of Latin America. The presence of the Allied Governments in London and the persistent claims of the Canadian Government for membership in the executive group in recognition of its position as a major potential supplier of relief goods⁷⁰ had wielded such influence that the United Kingdom then subordinated its concern about efficiency to its desire to secure the wholehearted

⁶⁶ State, *Handbook, United States Delegation*, Section A, Document V, Supplement f.

⁶⁷ State (Hawkins' Papers), interdepartmental meeting with Leith-Ross, minutes, 3 July 1942.

⁶⁸ Article III, 3. See State, *Handbook, United States Delegation*, Section A, Document V, Section e.

⁶⁹ State (UNRRA Docs.), official reply from British Embassy, Washington, 21 December 1942.

⁷⁰ Canadian Government Documents (Can. Docs.), telegram, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, to High Commissioner for Canada, London, 6 June 1942; letter, Canadian Department of External Affairs to Leith-Ross, 3 September 1942.

support of all the United Nations for the relief project.⁷¹ The Soviets and the Chinese, however, continued to adhere to the concept of a Four Power Committee.⁷² Upon news of this the Canadian Government presented its views directly to the State Department, declaring that a position proportionate to its expected importance as a source of relief supplies was necessary to convince Parliament to accept the financial burden and other sacrifices in furnishing relief goods.⁷³ Both the Canadians and the Soviets, though for different reasons, stressed the danger of establishing a precedent in the executive body of the relief organization which should not be adopted by other international bodies likely to be set up under the aegis of the United Nations. The Canadian Government wished to avoid a world directed by the Four Powers.⁷⁴ The Soviet Government argued that the obvious difficulties of selecting one minor European government for membership on the relief Executive would be negligible in comparison with the problems to be encountered if seven powers had to be chosen in succeeding international organizations to deal with more controversial matters. These differences were compromised; ⁷⁵ in the second draft (May 1943) the membership of the Committee, now called "Central," was left at four, but it was added that the chairman of a newly proposed Committee on Supplies would attend those meetings at which policies affecting the provision of supplies were discussed; ⁷⁶ and there was the definite understanding that this position would be held by a representative of the Canadian Government.⁷⁷ In the summer of 1943 other countries objected to the exclusive membership but did not push their objections

⁷¹ State (UNRRA Docs.), official reply from British Embassy, Washington, 21 December 1942.

⁷² State (UNRRA Docs.), memo from Soviet Embassy, 16 February 1943; memo, Four Power meeting, State Department, 17 February 1943.

⁷³ Can. Docs., "Departmental Memorandum concerning the Composition of the Policy Committee of UNRRA," 18 January 1943; teletypes: Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, to the Canadian Minister to the United States, 30 January 1942, 8 February 1943 giving text of memo to be submitted to Cordell Hull; State (UNRRA Docs.), conversation between Acheson and Lester B. Pearson (Minister Counselor, Canadian Legation, Washington), 26 January 1943.

⁷⁴ Can. Docs., "Departmental Memorandum concerning the Composition of the Policy Committee of UNRRA," 18 January 1943.

⁷⁵ State (UNRRA Docs.), memos, Four Power meetings at State Department, 11 January, 17 February 1943.

⁷⁶ Article III, 3.

⁷⁷ Can. Docs., letter, Secretary of State for External Affairs to Canadian Minister in the United States, 9 March 1943; letter, Canadian Minister to the United States to the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, 8 April 1943.

when others of their suggestions, involving decreases in the powers of the Central Committee, were accepted.⁷⁸

In its proposals of January 1942 the USSR Government had suggested that all decisions of the Inter-Allied Committee (the body more or less corresponding to the Council of the drafts) should be taken by the unanimous vote of all the representatives participating in the proceedings.⁷⁹ This suggestion of unanimity, not contained in the first draft, was renewed during the January–May 1943 discussions in relation to the Central Committee. The compromise of Acheson, that decision would be by majority vote except in specific instances defined in the Agreement, was accepted⁸⁰ and incorporated in the second draft. Four such instances were specified,⁸¹ and one was watered down in the final draft.⁸² The only significant instance was the choice of the Director General.

The first and second drafts assigned considerable powers to the Central Committee, the most important being contained in the provision that “between sessions of the Council it shall exercise all the powers and functions thereof.”⁸³ To these powers, coupled with the limited size of the Committee, other nations objected during the summer of 1943.⁸⁴ Changes were made to meet their views: (1) new members were to be admitted by the Council and by the Committee if it were authorized to do so by the Council (instead of by Council and Committee);⁸⁵ (2) members of committees were to be appointed by the Council, and by the Central Committee if authorized by the Council, on an emergency basis until the next Council session (instead of by the Committee, subject to ratification by the Council);⁸⁶ (3) emergency sessions of the Council could be called by the Committee or at the request of one

⁷⁸ State (UNRRA Docs.), Chart of Replies from United Nations to Draft Agreement of 15 May 1943, released 7 June 1943.

⁷⁹ See State, *Handbook, United States Delegation*, Section A, Document V, Supplement b.

⁸⁰ State (UNRRA Docs.), official memo from USSR Embassy, 29 December 1942; memo, State Department meeting, 6 January 1943.

⁸¹ Article I, 2c; Article IV, 1 (two incidents); Article VIII (Article VIII, b, of final draft).

⁸² Article VIII, b; compare with Article VIII, 15 May draft. See State, *Handbook, United States Delegation*, Section A, Document V, Supplement i.

⁸³ Article III, 3 (both drafts).

⁸⁴ State, *Handbook, United States Delegation*, Section A, Document V, Supplements i, j, and k; State (UNRRA Docs.), replies from United Nations to Draft Agreement, July–September 1943.

⁸⁵ Article II.

⁸⁶ Article III, 5, 6.

third of the Council members (instead of by the Committee or at the request of a majority of the members);⁸⁷ (4) certain amendments (those affecting Articles III and IV) were to be made only on a two-thirds vote of the Council including all the votes of the members of the Committee (instead of all amendments depending on the unanimous vote of the members of the Committee).⁸⁸ The most important change, however, was the elimination of the statement that the Committee, between Council sessions, would exercise all the powers of the Council and the substitution of the provision that between sessions it could take decisions of an emergency nature which should be communicated promptly to the member governments and which would be subject to discussion at the next Council session.⁸⁹

Concepts regarding the nature of the organization developed steadily from the time of the USSR proposals of January 1942. There it was suggested that there should be: an Inter-Allied Committee (corresponding to the Council of the Agreement); a small bureau or secretariat, of four or five persons, to handle day-to-day business; and two special commissions of experts to advise the Committee. The Committee was to determine the requirements of liberated territories, allocate supplies to them, and suggest ways to facilitate the procurement of supplies, but it was not to procure nor distribute supplies. It was not, therefore, to be an operating organization.⁹⁰

The Leith-Ross proposals of February 1942 introduced the concept of an operating organization. He proposed the establishment of a Council, and an Executive consisting of a Director General (to be a citizen of the United States, which view was thereafter accepted without further discussion) and six Directors heading subsidiary agencies. Among these were to be: a Financial Committee to investigate the financial needs of countries, to investigate methods of assisting destitute countries, and to develop a relief fund to assist such countries; and a Relief Service Agency to use the relief fund to acquire necessary supplies, to have field missions to aid in distribution, and to allocate inland transport facilities (that is, to perform a task similar to that which was, in fact, later handled by the European Central Inland Transport Organiza-

⁸⁷ Article III, 2.

⁸⁸ Article VIII, *b* (final draft), Article VIII (second draft).

⁸⁹ Article III, 3.

⁹⁰ See State, *Handbook, United States Delegation*, Section A, Document V, Supplement b.

tion).⁹¹ Here the possibility (a vital factor in UNRRA operations) of free distribution to destitute countries (those without foreign exchange resources) was clearly introduced as well as the establishment of an operating organization.

The United States proposal of May 1942 suggested the establishment of a Council, an Executive Committee, technical advisory subcommittees, and a Director General heading a Bureau which was to correspond to Leith-Ross's Executive.⁹²

The first draft agreement of August 1942⁹³ closely followed this proposal; there were to be: a Council, a Policy Committee, regional committees "to advise," and other technical committees; and a Director General, who would have authority to appoint his own staff and to carry out the relief operations and functions inherent in the powers to be vested in the Administration, such as the power "to acquire, hold and convey property." Here was provided an operating and strongly centralized organization. The important additions to the United States proposals were the regional and technical committees, which, to be sure, had been foreshadowed in the Leith-Ross and USSR proposals respectively. The former were included to satisfy Leith-Ross's inclinations toward a regional organization but limited to advisory activities to accord with the United States preference for a centralized organization.⁹⁴ In January 1943 the USSR and the United Kingdom Governments suggested that the committees' powers might be more than advisory, but they quickly accepted the United States view that that limitation be retained.⁹⁵

No changes of substance, in respect of the nature of the organization, were made either in the second or in the final draft. One sentence was, however, added in the second and retained in the final draft which, nearly meaningless in itself, yet reflected important discussions on the authority of the Director General. After the statement that he was to select his own staff, another was added, in no way limiting this power, mentioning deputy directors general to whom might be assigned special functions within a region.⁹⁶ In February 1943 the United Kingdom

⁹¹ See *ibid.*, Supplement g.

⁹² See *ibid.*, Supplement f.

⁹³ See *ibid.*, Supplement e.

⁹⁴ State (Hawkins' Papers), interdepartmental meeting, minutes, 2 July 1942.

⁹⁵ State (UNRRA Docs.), memo, replies of Chinese, USSR, and United Kingdom Governments, 6 January 1943; memo, Four Power discussion, Acheson's office, 11 January 1943.

⁹⁶ Article IV, 4.

had proposed that the selection of regional deputy directors general should be subject to the approval of the Central Committee. The USSR Government then requested that there be two such regional officials in Europe, one specifically representing the USSR Government and the other the United Kingdom Government. The United States Government, however, held to the view, which the others accepted, that the Director General's authority should not be so derogated.⁹⁷ To meet this request of the USSR Government and a similar one from the Chinese Government,⁹⁸ the four consulting powers reached the following understanding:

It was agreed that because of the interest and responsibility of the Governments represented on the Central Committee in the work of the Administration, it would be natural and desirable that in appointment of Deputy Directors General nationals of these countries would be included in their number. When Deputies are assigned responsibilities and duties in connection with the Administration's work in the European region and in the Far East, it is anticipated that among their number would be included those who are nationals of those countries represented on the Central Committee which lie within those respective regions. Other Deputies might be similarly engaged or might work on matters of a more general nature. While recognizing that all such appointments and assignments are the functions of the Director General, the powers engaged in these discussions were agreed in recommending to him such arrangements and in using their best efforts in helping to establish them.⁹⁹

Though there never was any suggestion that the proposed organization should be able to override national sovereign powers, to meet USSR fears¹⁰⁰ on this point a sentence was added in the second draft (and thereafter retained) to the article authorizing the Administration to administer the provision of relief supplies and services and to facilitate the production and transport of such supplies in countries receiving aid, making assurance doubly certain by stating that such functions

⁹⁷ State (UNRRA Docs.), letter, Roy Veatch (Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations [OFRRO]) to Acheson, 16 February 1943, transmitting suggestions of F. F. Thorold (First Secretary of British Embassy), 2 February 1943; letter, Maxim Litvinov (USSR Ambassador to the United States) to Acheson, 18 March 1943; memos, Four Power discussions, Acheson's office, 17 February, 24 March 1943.

⁹⁸ State (UNRRA Docs.), letter, Wei-Tao-Ming (Chinese Ambassador to the United States) to Acheson, 23 April 1943.

⁹⁹ State (UNRRA Docs.), memo, Four Power discussion, Acheson's office, 4 May 1943.

¹⁰⁰ State (UNRRA Docs.), memos from USSR Embassy, 29 December 1942, 16 February 1943; memos, Four Power discussions, Acheson's office, 11 January, 17 February 1943.

were to be performed only "after consultation with and with the consent of the member government."¹⁰¹

4. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

The Agreement to establish UNRRA was thus developed, but much had obviously to be determined by the Council of the new organization. After Leith-Ross's attempts, all reference to financing the proposed operations had been excluded from the proposals and drafts. The limitations of scope had likewise not been clearly defined. Before these questions had been settled, there had been three other developments which were to affect the work of the new international organization.

In July 1942 the United Kingdom Government formed the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration as successor to various separate offices. This organization thenceforth undertook to provide aid for refugees in the Middle East (principally Poles, Greeks, and Yugoslavs). This was the first operation, on a substantial scale, in the field of displaced persons¹⁰² which was later to be of considerable concern to the member governments of UNRRA and was to involve the time and energy of many UNRRA employees. The particular organization was itself merged in UNRRA in the spring of 1944.¹⁰³

A still more important development took place on 18 November 1942 when President Roosevelt delegated to the Secretary of State the responsibility for developing United States policies toward the peoples of the territories occupied by the armed forces of the United Nations.¹⁰⁴ Three days later he appointed Herbert H. Lehman, then Governor of New York, Director of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) to "undertake the work of organizing American participation in the activities of the United Nations in furnishing relief and other assistance to victims of war in areas reoccupied by the forces of the United Nations."¹⁰⁵ Thenceforth it was accepted that he would be the American who it had been generally agreed should head the coming international administration.

¹⁰¹ Article I, 2a.

¹⁰² Monograph, Elizabeth K. Simeon, "The Origins of the Balkan Mission," I, Part 1, 70-72; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter I.

¹⁰³ See Part Five, Chapter I.

¹⁰⁴ State (OFRRO Docs.), letter, Roosevelt to Hull, 18 November 1942.

¹⁰⁵ Department of State Bulletin, 21 November 1942, p. 948.

Although Lehman's office was set up within the Department of State almost immediately,¹⁰⁶ its functions were not defined until March 1943.¹⁰⁷ Even then its exact powers in relation to other agencies and departments were not clear. In September 1943 it was merged with the Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the Office of Economic Warfare (formerly the Board of Economic Warfare) to form the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA).¹⁰⁸ The former OFRRO personnel of the new administration, however, maintained, for practical purposes, separate identity, and after the formation of UNRRA many of them joined the new international organization. Governor Lehman was at the time appointed Special Assistant to the President for the purpose of perfecting the plans for the meeting of representatives of the United Nations already scheduled for 9 November 1943.¹⁰⁹

The direction of the negotiations leading to the formation of the UNRRA Agreement remained under the control of the Department of State and of Dean Acheson. Governor Lehman and his OFRRO staff kept in close touch with the progress of the negotiations and with other United States agencies interested in the international relief program. Meanwhile, in addition to conducting some field operations in North Africa,¹¹⁰ OFRRO devoted itself to the study of relief requirements in the occupied countries, the development of procedures for the procurement and handling of supplies,¹¹¹ and to plans and policies for the international organization to be.¹¹² At the invitation of the United Kingdom,¹¹³ Governor Lehman and his Special Assistant, Hugh R. Jackson, went to London in April 1943. There his conversations with Allied civilian and military authorities, including representatives of the Chinese and Soviet Governments, helped in the development of

¹⁰⁶ State (OFRRO Docs.), letter, Roosevelt to Secretary of the Treasury, 3 December 1942.

¹⁰⁷ State (OFRRO Docs.), letter, Roosevelt to Lehman, 19 March 1943.

¹⁰⁸ Executive Order of the President 9380, 25 September 1943.

¹⁰⁹ State (OFRRO Docs.), White House Press Release, 25 September 1943.

¹¹⁰ State (OFRRO Docs.), E. R. Fryer (OFRRO), "Report of Tunisian Operations, 20 May-1 July 1943"; (OFRRO Docs.), Department of State Press Release 267, 21 June 1943.

¹¹¹ State (OFRRO Docs.), "Area Commodity Programs"; "Status of the Supply Programs of the Supply and Transport Division of OFRRO for the Year 1943"; OFRRO Bulletin 1, 15 June 1943.

¹¹² State (UNRRA Docs.), conferences on UNRRA Preparations, minutes, 25, 26 June 1943; (UNRRA Docs.), memo, Veatch to Lehman and Francis B. Sayre (Deputy Director of OFRRO), 15 May 1943.

¹¹³ State (UNRRA Docs.), letter, the Earl of Halifax (British Ambassador to the United States) to the President, 19 February 1943.

mutual understanding of the preparations for the postwar relief program on both sides of the Atlantic.¹¹⁴

OFRRO's work culminated in the preparation, by twenty-four committees made up of former members of the OFRRO staff now attached to FEA and of consultants, of a collection of documents dealing with such subjects as the Agreement, the organization of the Council and its committees, the permanent rules of the Council, the personnel policies of the Administration, the scope of its activities, its relations with governments, procedures for ascertaining the needs of countries, policies with respect to health and medical care, welfare services, displaced persons, distribution—indeed, with practically all the actual problems that were to confront UNRRA.¹¹⁵ Much of this vast body of material was collected under the title *Handbook, United States Delegation*. This compilation, though not in fact adopted as the official guide of the United States Delegation, nevertheless exercised a major influence on the work of the Council in its First Session and subsequent developments within UNRRA, if not directly, at least by virtue of the fact that many of the individuals who worked on its preparation also had key positions on the various committees of the First Session and later in the Administration.

While the plans for UNRRA were being developed, the problem of relief for civilians upon liberation was being considered by various military authorities, who necessarily considered such relief an important adjunct to military operations, particularly in those liberated areas which they anticipated would have to be used as bases for further prosecution of the war against the enemy. As early as July 1942 the United Kingdom War Office established a committee to consider "in conjunction with the force commanders concerned and with other government departments at the appropriate stages, the steps necessary on military grounds to insure efficient civil administration of military territory liberated in Europe as a result of operations by forces of the United Nations."¹¹⁶ The United States War Department established a Civil Affairs Division in March 1943. The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) established a Combined Civil Affairs Committee in July 1943. In the United Kingdom it was accepted, certainly before 1943, that

¹¹⁴ Lehman and H. R. Jackson, "Journal of Mission to London," 8-23 April 1943.

¹¹⁵ State (UNRRA Docs.), working papers of the twenty-four committees; memo, "UNRRA Preparations, Committee and Staff Assignments," 7 October 1943.

¹¹⁶ State, Committee on Administration of Territories (Europe) (42) 1.

initial relief supply activities in liberated areas would be handled by the military authorities. On 10 November 1943 the President informed the Secretary of War that the Army was to assume the initial responsibility for shipping and distributing relief supplies.¹¹⁷ The period during which it was to exercise this responsibility was not precisely defined but was generally assumed to be six months.¹¹⁸

When the UNRRA Council held its First Session, it was known that, at least in the areas in which Anglo-American forces were operating, active UNRRA operations would not commence for some months after liberation and that, in order to assure continuity of policy in respect to supply operations, there would be need for close collaboration with the military authorities.

5. THE FIRST COUNCIL SESSION

This First Session was held at Atlantic City, New Jersey, from 10 November to 1 December 1943, immediately after the signing of the Agreement. As host Government the United States had provided a staff of technical advisers and assistants responsible to Governor Lehman and a secretariat to service the Session.¹¹⁹ It had prepared a draft agenda, a set of temporary rules of procedure, and suggestions for temporary *ad hoc* committees on which each government would be represented.¹²⁰ And in accordance with the "Temporary Rules"¹²¹ the President had appointed a temporary chairman, Dean Acheson, to preside at the opening meeting and until the Council elected its own chairman.

The UNRRA Council was the first public meeting¹²² of representatives of the United Nations and as such excited considerable interest. From the time of the Allied military successes in North Africa the United States Government had given wide publicity to its interest in postwar relief. The President himself had taken the lead, reaffirming

¹¹⁷ State (OFRRO Docs.), letter, Roosevelt to Secretary of War, 10 November 1943.

¹¹⁸ Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York, 1948), p. 560.

¹¹⁹ State (UNRRA Docs.), conference in Sayre's office, 25 September 1943.

¹²⁰ State (840.50/3120 B), letter, Acting Secretary of State to delegates, 4 November 1943, enclosing draft agenda and Temporary Rules of Procedure.

¹²¹ *Journal*, First Council, p. 14, Temporary Rules of Procedure, Article I.

¹²² The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, Hot Springs, Va., May 1943, was closed to the press and public.

the promises made by Churchill.¹²³ Lehman's appointment as Director of OFRRO was broadcast throughout the world.¹²⁴ Radio announcements and millions of pamphlets dropped from aircraft over occupied countries carried this news with the forecast that the job would later be undertaken jointly by the United Nations.¹²⁵ Lehman and his staff had put before the American people the goals and realities of the coming relief program. The nonpolitical nature of the operation, the doctrine of helping people to help themselves, the world-embracing approach of UNRRA, the need for public sacrifice—all had been foretold.¹²⁶ The last two drafts of the Agreement were widely publicized,¹²⁷ plans for the coming Council announced in detail,¹²⁸ and accounts of the White House ceremony followed by reports of the assembled Council had carried hope for better conditions both to oppressed and free peoples throughout the world.¹²⁹

This First Session was an impressive assembly. Many present either as part of a national delegation or as part of the secretariat were, or were to become, well known on the international scene. Among the Council members were L. B. Pearson, Canada; T. F. Tsiang, China; Jean Monnet, French Committee of National Liberation; Kyriakos Varvaressos, Greece; Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, India; P. A. Kerstens, the Netherlands; Walter Nash, New Zealand; Anders Frihagen, Norway; V. A. Sergeev, USSR; John J. Llewellyn, United Kingdom; and Dean Acheson, United States, one of the two fathers of UNRRA and

¹²³ White House Press Release, 13 November 1942.

¹²⁴ State, Office of War Information (OWI) Central Directive, 4-11 December 1942.

¹²⁵ For example, National Archives, OWI overseas broadcasts, WBOS script for Finland, 21 November 1942; Library of Congress, *L'Amerique en guerre*, 21 November 1942.

¹²⁶ State (OFRRO Docs.), for example, Lehman's speech, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, 9 January 1943; L. Gulick's speech before Friends' Peace Committee, 29 March 1943; Lehman's address at Swarthmore College commencement, 31 May 1943; Lehman, "Agriculture's Post-War Job," *Country Gentleman*, CXIII, No. 6 (June 1943), 9, 49, 51.

¹²⁷ Department of State Press Release 214, 10 June 1943; National Archives, OWI overseas broadcasts—script, OWI to British Broadcasting Corporation, England, 11 June 1943; to Finland, 11 June 1943; in German, 11 June 1943; State, OWI Central Directives, 9-15 July, 16-23 July 1943; State (OFRRO Docs.), Department of State Press Releases 394, 395, 23 September 1943.

¹²⁸ Department of State Press Release 465, October 1943.

¹²⁹ National Archives, OWI overseas broadcasts, Script W (for Europe), 11 November 1943; Library of Congress, Air Warfare pamphlets for Belgium and France, *L'Amerique en guerre*, 10, 17 November 1943, *Sternebanner* (air pamphlet for German people), 15 November 1943.

the elected chairman of the Session. Among the alternates and advisers were J. B. Brigden, Australia; Viscount Alain DuParc, Belgium; Aake Ording, Norway; A. T. Brennan, Union of South Africa; Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, the other father of UNRRA, Sir George Rendel, Oliver Franks, all of the United Kingdom; Francis B. Sayre and Thomas Parran, United States. The Secretariat included Philip C. Jessup, Abraham H. Feller, Luther Gulick, Huntington Gilchrist, and George L. Warren.¹³⁰

Though the immediate task was the establishment of the broad policies which were to guide the Administration in its practical tasks, those present earnestly hoped and indeed believed that they were also launching something very much bigger and more important: United Nations coöperation in the widest sense. This feeling shone out in many statements. At the opening meeting Varvaressos said:

The United Nations are convinced that the agreement for the establishment of the UNRRA, officially signed yesterday, and the opening of the First Session of its Council, which is taking place today, mark the beginning of a close and sincere cooperation between nations in the difficult task of facing and solving the post-war problems. This cooperation will lay the foundation for the organization of a post-war world based on freedom, independence, and mutual respect between nations . . .¹³¹

Cordell Hull sent a message to the Council stating:

At Moscow [where he had just been attending the meeting of foreign ministers] we agreed upon a broad basic program of international cooperation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states and open to membership of all such states, large and small, for the hastening of victory, the preservation of peace and the promotion of human welfare. It is gratifying to find, on my return, the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration already engaged in turning that program . . . into warm and heartening reality . . .¹³²

Tsiang, China, commented:

In speaking of UNRRA, some people have stressed the humanitarian aspect, which is of course obvious and praiseworthy. Others have emphasized the political wisdom underlying UNRRA; this is also true. Still others have seen in UNRRA a valuable military aid; nobody can deny this. A fourth group of persons think UNRRA will help to keep the world economically sound and to hasten the day of business prosperity; this is un-

¹³⁰ *Journal*, First Council, pp. 199-207.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

doubtedly true. These four views are each in their way correct, but only by putting all four together do we get the whole truth.¹³³

Frihagen, Norway, said:

My Government endeavored to buy, by our own means, the supplies for the first emergency period. We have, however, accepted the great need of a new and more far-reaching kind of international collaboration. We have restricted our free purchases, and we have bowed to the common discipline of the United Nations. However, we have done this with the understanding that this discipline will be based on truly democratic principles and will have some tangible, practical effects in achieving common ends.¹³⁴

Sergeev, USSR, said:

I wish to express my hope that the mutual understanding and the spirit of collaboration which prevailed during this session will be an indication how the United Nations will work together when our job of relief and rehabilitation actually starts.¹³⁵

Kerstens, the Netherlands, said:

Gentlemen, I believe that we have really passed an examination of the highest importance. President Roosevelt in his address to us on the 9th of November stressed the great truth so simple in its wording, but so deep and wise in its meaning, that nations who want to collaborate will have to learn by collaborating. Indeed, international cooperation, such as introduced by UNRRA, must be learned. I think we have all learned something valuable. We have all learned that we cannot have all things our own way. But we have also learned that by giving and taking we can reach unanimous decisions which are valuable for all of us. Once more in the history of human civilization, it has been proved that reason is more than instinct.¹³⁶

Even Acheson, with his background of experience in the difficulties encountered in launching such an enterprise, and with his attention centered largely on the accomplishment of the immediate tasks, said:

If it is possible to state briefly the role of this organization in that great undertaking, it is to do those things which would not be done without it, and to leave to others what they are doing and can do. The organization of supply can and must be done by the agencies which control supply. Distribution can and should be done by those responsible in the respective countries. But this organization can mobilize and present the needs, passing upon them in the light of equitable and just standards determined here by

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

agreement. It can finance purchases which cannot otherwise be made and which must be made. It can organize the care of the millions of the homeless and the exiles.

It is a great task, one worthy of a great organization. It cannot be done by any single nation or small group. The United Nations are none too strong for it, for it will require unity and resources and will. This meeting is a guarantee that those requisites exist.¹³⁷

The Session was, however, by no means devoted merely to expressions of hope for the future. Much practical work was accomplished by the four principal committees, which dealt with organization and administration; general policy; finance and supplies; and relief and rehabilitation policies, and by the subcommittees which were established to consider particular aspects of the subjects handled by the main committees. The work of all was coordinated by a Committee on *Ad Hoc* Committees. Delegates from every nation sat on these committees, and the chairmanships were widely distributed among both small and large countries.¹³⁸ The committees worked so efficiently that Acheson later testified to the remarkable beginnings in international cooperation which the First Council achieved.¹³⁹ Llewellyn, United Kingdom, summed up their accomplishments:

What are the main things that we have decided? First, we have recommended to those who have financial authority in our different countries a financial plan—a plan which is fair to all; a plan which sets a target at which we all must aim; a plan which, if governments are able to accept it, will ensure that the Administration has the wherewithal to do its work.

Secondly, we have unanimously decided that war needs come first, and that it would be wrong to do anything to impede the quickest liberation of all countries overrun by the Axis.

Thirdly, we have decided, also without question, that existing supply and allocating agencies are to be used—not only for purchasing goods, foods, and raw materials paid for by the Administration funds, but also for similar articles paid for by occupied countries which are fortunate to have funds of their own.

Fourthly, we have decided that whether countries can pay or whether they cannot, the distribution of food and materials that are in short supply will be fair to and between all occupied areas . . .

We have appointed as our Director General a man of vigor and of great experience. In handing over to him the result of our deliberations we wish him well in this great crusade—a crusade to bring food to the hungry,

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 24, 38.

¹³⁹ United States Congress, 78th, 1 and 2 Sessions, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192* (Washington, D.C., 1944), pp. 10-11.

shelter to the homeless, clothing to those who are in rags; a crusade against the spread of epidemics, which so often follow the surge of war, and to help the return to their homes of the many millions who are prisoners or who are now being treated as slaves.¹⁴⁰

The fruits of this work were expressed in forty-one resolutions, which established certain major principles:

- (1) The Administration was to help people to help themselves.¹⁴¹
- (2) The Administration was not to deplete its resources for relief of any area the government of which was in a position to pay with suitable means of foreign exchange.¹⁴²
- (3) A government was not to be required to assume the burden of an enduring foreign exchange debt for the procurement of relief and rehabilitation supplies and services.¹⁴³
- (4) Distribution was to be so conducted that all classes of the population, irrespective of their purchasing power, should receive their equitable shares of essential commodities, and that no discrimination should be made because of race, creed, or political belief; thus relief supplies should at no time be used as a political weapon.¹⁴⁴

Perhaps most important of all, the First Council also defined the scope of UNRRA.¹⁴⁵ This definition covered four significant aspects of the work: areas in which operations were to be conducted; types of work to be performed; relations with existing allocating authorities (the Combined Boards); and relations with national and military authorities.

The Administration was to conduct operations in liberated areas (that is, in territories of the United Nations) and not in enemy territories, unless specifically authorized to do so by the Council.¹⁴⁶

The Administration was to provide: relief supplies (essential consumer goods to meet immediate needs, such as food, clothing, and medical supplies); relief services (such as health and welfare); rehabilitation supplies (materials needed to enable a recipient country to produce and transport relief supplies and to restore public utilities, to

¹⁴⁰ *Journal*, First Council, pp. 175-176.

¹⁴² Resolution 14, Section 16.

¹⁴⁴ Resolution 2, paragraph 1; Resolution 7, paragraphs 1, 3; see *infra*, Part Four, Chapter III.

¹⁴⁵ Resolution 1; for further elaboration, Resolution 8, see *infra*, Part Four, Chapter II, Section 2; Resolution 10, see Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 2; Resolution 11, see Part Three, Chapter I, Section 6; Resolution 12, see Part Three, Chapter I, Section 7; and Resolution 13, see Part Three, Chapter I, Section 7.

¹⁴⁶ Resolution 1, I.

¹⁴¹ Resolution 9, paragraph 8.

¹⁴³ Resolution 14, Section 18.

the extent necessary to meet immediate needs); and rehabilitation services (such technical services as might be needed to assure the best use of rehabilitation supplies).¹⁴⁷ The Administration, therefore, was not to engage in long-range reconstruction operations; it was to be a temporary organization devoted to relief and related operations.

The activities of the Administration were not to impede the effective prosecution of the war. To ensure this and to promote fair distribution between areas with which the Administration would be concerned (that is, only those countries which would receive UNRRA supplies and not the countries which would buy their supplies nor those which would contribute supplies) and other areas, the demands of the Administration for supplies and shipping were to be coordinated with other demands "through the use of the existing intergovernmental agencies concerned with the allocation of supplies and shipping"¹⁴⁸ (that is, through the largely Anglo-American Combined Boards). By this provision the dominant influence of the large supplying nations—United States, United Kingdom, Canada—was assured, as indeed it was bound to be even without such official recognition. To soften this restriction somewhat, member governments were asked to keep the Director General fully informed of their requirements and programs of intended purchase, and it was anticipated that the Director General would be fully consulted by the intergovernmental allocating agencies when any matter touching the interests of the Administration was under discussion.¹⁴⁹ So far as relations with national and military authorities were concerned, the Council merely endorsed and emphasized what the Agreement had provided: operations could be undertaken in an area only after consultation with the appropriate authorities and only with their consent.¹⁵⁰

Though the scope of the operations of UNRRA was officially so defined by the Council, the definition had, for all practical purposes, been determined in advance during the long period of negotiations that led to the Agreement. The Soviet proposal, which had not even suggested an operating organization, had restricted the area of operation to Europe.¹⁵¹ The Leith-Ross proposal somewhat tentatively brought in Asia and had suggested a relatively wide scope.¹⁵² His

¹⁴⁷ Resolution 1, II.

¹⁴⁹ Resolution 1, III, paragraph 2.

¹⁵¹ See State, *Handbook, United States Delegation*, Section A, Document V, Supplement b.

¹⁴⁸ Resolution 1, III, paragraph 1.

¹⁵⁰ Resolution 1, IV.

¹⁵² See *ibid.*, Supplement g.

UNRRA, for example, would have performed the work later done by the Combined Boards and would have been a sort of supreme Allied Economic Council as well as an operating agency. It would have been a powerful organization with wide ramifications and considerable influence. The United States proposal insisted on a world-wide operation but was very cautious on the inclusion of what were to be the functions of the Combined Boards.¹⁵³

In the summer of 1942 both the United States and the United Kingdom made it clear that they wished to avoid all responsibility for long-range reconstruction in the relief organization.¹⁵⁴ They therefore adopted the term "rehabilitation" in the draft Agreement and decided that it should cover only the transitional measures needed to restart industrial and agricultural activities and essential services.¹⁵⁵

Though the Leith-Ross suggestion, restated and amplified in 1943,¹⁵⁶ found support in some quarters in both the United Kingdom and the United States Governments, neither it nor a modification of it, which would at least have provided that the international agency should be the sole source of supply for liberated areas,¹⁵⁷ was acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom officials made responsible for defining both the scope and financial plan of UNRRA in the early fall of 1943. The opposite view put forward by the United Kingdom supply ministries during the preceding summer proposed to limit UNRRA's work to screening free gifts of essential supplies and supervising their distribution in liberated territories, which could not otherwise acquire them.¹⁵⁸ This was also discarded.

Richard Law, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, John Maynard Keynes, and some members of the British Em-

¹⁵³ See *ibid.*, Supplement f.

¹⁵⁴ State (Hawkins' Papers), interdepartmental meeting, minutes, 10 July 1942.

¹⁵⁵ State (UNRRA Docs.), Subcommittee on Economic Reconstruction, minutes of meetings, 12, 15 June 1942; letter, Leith-Ross to Acheson, 28 July 1942.

¹⁵⁶ State (UNRRA Docs.), note prepared by Relief Department and circulated by Leith-Ross, August 1943.

¹⁵⁷ Note, conversation, Winfield Riefler (Special Assistant to Ambassador Winant) with E. G. Staley (OFRRO), 27 April 1943, reported in Staley's "Study on Combined Boards," Part III; Lehman's statement to United States Government agencies, "Policy and Method of Operation of OFRRO," 8 May 1943; State (UNRRA Docs.), J. K. Galbraith (Office of Price Administration), James G. Johnson, and David Weintraub (OFRRO), "Scope of UNRRA," September 1943; draft memo, Staley, "The Scope of UNRRA," 16 September 1943; H. Jackson, "Diary of First Council."

¹⁵⁸ State (UNRRA Docs.), Ministries of Production, Supply and Food, "Joint Note on Scope," 12 August 1943.

bassy staff reached the following agreement with Acheson and other United States representatives in Washington in October 1943 regarding the scope of UNRRA's work. It should be a temporary operation restricted to providing relief and rehabilitation supplies and services, under the aegis of the already existing allocating agencies, to nations not possessing sufficient foreign exchange resources to finance imports; observing the local distribution of these supplies and services; and attempting to secure a fair allotment of such goods and services before the Combined Boards in relation to quantities available and the just claims of competitor wealthy nations.¹⁵⁹

There was not much serious objection to this Anglo-American definition of scope on the part of the other member governments. Those that expected to pay for their relief supplies may not have liked the Combined Boards, but they preferred to take their chances with them rather than with an international organization that might try to work toward absolute equality of standards of living without consideration of long-standing and existing differences. On the other hand, the countries which expected and needed to receive supplies were far more concerned with getting the supplies than with the mechanics of allocation.¹⁶⁰

The Council, at its First Session, completed the structure that had been partially created in the Agreement. It marked the active start of the first United Nations organization and the first large operating international agency. As the Director General at the close of the Session, when the resolutions had been formally handed to him, said:

In my judgment, the work accomplished here is evidence of statesmanship of the highest order. You have established a set of policies which add flesh to the skeleton Agreement with which we started three weeks ago. You have given assurance to the peoples of all the world that the United Nations do mean business in meeting the human problems of the enslaved peoples as well as in carrying the war to a victorious conclusion. You have established a set of principles which, I believe, constitute a sound basis of working arrangements to carry out the executive tasks which must now be pursued by the Director General.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ United Kingdom memo, "Scope and Operations of UNRRA," 5 October 1943; State (840.50/3252), Edward R. Stettinius (Under Secretary of State) to the President, 20 October 1943, enclosing memo, "Representative of Thinking on Scope of UNRRA."

¹⁶⁰ Committee II, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes; *Journal*, First Council, minutes, plenary sessions and Committee II.

¹⁶¹ *Journal*, First Council, p. 177.

II. The Council

1. FORM AND METHODS

THE COUNCIL, which consisted of one representative of each member government and authority, was the policy-making body of UNRRA. It was to be convened in regular session not less than twice a year by the Central Committee and could be convened in special session whenever the Central Committee deemed necessary or at the request of one third of the members.¹ By its own decision, however, the requirement for two sessions was waived in 1944² and 1945.³

It met, in fact, on six occasions: First Session, Atlantic City, N.J., 10 November–1 December 1943; Second Session, Montreal, Canada, 15–27 September 1944; Third Session, London, England, 7–25 August 1945; Fourth Session, Atlantic City, 15–30 March 1946, and Washington, D.C., 9 May 1946; Fifth Session, Geneva, Switzerland, 5–17 August, 1946; Sixth Session, Washington, D.C., 10–14 December 1946.

The Council was to determine its own rules of procedure⁴ and did so at its First Session.⁵ To the Director General was entrusted the preparation of the provisional agenda for each session, which were to include: "(a) all items proposed by the Council at any previous session; (b) all items proposed by the Central Committee; (c) all items proposed by any member of the Council and transmitted to the Director General at least ten days in advance of the session; and (d) any items which the Director General desires to put before the Council."⁶

Although the Administration scrupulously consulted the Central Committee and the member governments, most items placed on the provisional agenda were those the Director General desired to include. A few items automatically had to be included as a result of decisions

¹ Agreement, Article III, 1, 2.

³ Resolution 81.

⁵ Resolution 40.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Rules of Procedure of the Council, Article VIII.

² Resolution 50.

⁴ Agreement, Article III, 1.

at previous Council sessions.⁷ The Central Committee seldom proposed items and, indeed, after the Third Session, took relatively little interest in the preparations for sessions.⁸ The response of member governments was also meager, and only a few submitted suggestions.⁹ These sometimes dealt with matters of general interest; sometimes, with matters of particular interest to the nation making the suggestion.¹⁰ Within the Administration the Director General usually consulted his senior officials at Headquarters,¹¹ the European Regional Office (ERO), and in the missions before making his decisions.¹²

The provisional agenda were to be submitted to member governments at least three weeks in advance of the opening of a session and suggestions received later, as soon as possible. At a Council session, the proposed items were to be considered for approval by the General Committee of the Council, one of the regular committees established by the Rules of Procedure, and were then subject to revision or addition by the Council itself.¹³ The General Committee, in fact, did often alter the provisional agenda, both in respect to the order and inclusion of items.¹⁴ Such changes were sometimes made at the re-

⁷ For example, discussion of the displaced persons operation in connection with which certain operations were authorized either for a six months' period (Resolution 71, Third Council) or until the next session (Resolution 92, Fourth Council).

⁸ Central Committee (CC) (44)4 and 5, minutes 2d meeting, 3 March 1944 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], I, 8-9); CC(44)8, minutes 3d meeting, 10 April 1944 (CC Docs., I, 13-19); CC(44)15, minutes 7th meeting, 5 September 1944 (CC Docs., I, 36-37); CC(45)4, minutes 11th meeting, 25 January 1945 (CC Docs., I, 83-84); CC(45)14, minutes 13th meeting, 27 March 1945 (CC Docs., I, 120-128); CC(45)22, minutes 15th meeting, 28 May 1945 (CC Docs., I, 151).

⁹ Notes, meetings of Director General with Acheson and Law, 1, 4 August 1944; letters, Acheson to Lehman, 1, 12 September 1944; CC(45)14, minutes 13th meeting, 27 March 1945 (CC Docs., I, 126-127); CC(45)14, Appendix II, "Summary of Views of Member Governments concerning the Third Session of the Council" (CC Docs., I, 111-114); letter, Baron Silvercruys (Belgian Ambassador to the United States) to P. W. Kuo (Deputy Director General, Secretariat), 7 February 1946; cable, The Hague to Washington unnumbered, 15 February 1946; letter, J. B. Brigden (Economic Counselor, Australian Embassy) to Kuo, 11 February 1946; letter, Carlos P. Romulo (Resident Commissioner of the Philippines to the United States) to Lehman, 19 February 1946; cable, Washington to London 10115, 9 July 1946.

¹⁰ The Colombian proposal for the Third Council is an example of the former; the Belgian for the Fourth, of the latter.

¹¹ Agenda Committee, minutes, 11 April 1945; memo, Kuo to Director General and Senior Deputy Director General, 17 January 1946.

¹² For example, cables: Washington to Rome 295; to Athens 156; to Belgrade 5, to Rome 39; to Sydney 167; to Chungking 131; to London 1068; 1 May 1945; circular 8, London to all missions, 19 January 1946.

¹³ Resolution 40, Rules of Procedure of the Council, Article VIII, 2, 3, 4.

¹⁴ For example, Council II Document 132, *Ad Hoc* General Committee

quest of, or in agreement with, representatives of the Director General.

Each session selected its own chairman and three vice-chairmen. The chairmen and the nationality of the vice-chairmen were as follows:¹⁵

TABLE I
CHAIRMEN AND VICE-CHAIRMEN OF COUNCIL SESSIONS

<i>Session</i>	<i>Chairman</i>	<i>Vice-Chairmen</i>
First	Dean Acheson, United States	Australia, Mexico, and the Netherlands
Second	Lester B. Pearson, Canada	France, Brazil, and Czechoslovakia
Third	Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, India	Yugoslavia, Mexico, and South Africa
Fourth	Tingfu F. Tsiang, China	Brazil, Ukrainian SSR, and Norway
Fifth	Anders Frihagen, Norway	Australia, Yugoslavia, and the Byelorussian SSR
Sixth	Henrik de Kauffman, Denmark	Poland, Chile, and France

The chairman did not vote, but his nation could, through his alternate, cast a vote.¹⁶ The Director General and his representatives could be present at sessions and could and did intervene in debates but could not vote.¹⁷

From the Second Session onward the Administration furnished the Secretariat of the Council. Its work,¹⁸ including the preliminary correspondence with member governments, the assembling of the provisional agenda, the drafting of the order of the day, the preparation of minutes of plenary sessions and committee meetings, the editing of the daily journal, and the registration and distribution of documents, was under the direction of P. W. Kuo, Deputy Director General in charge of the Secretariat from August 1944 to July 1947.

The precedent set by the First Council for doing most of the work in committees rather than in plenary meetings held throughout all

(*Ad Hoc/G*)6, Report on 2d meeting, 20 September 1944; Council II Document 176, *Ad Hoc/G*7, Report on 3d meeting, 22 September 1944; Council IV Document 30, *Ad Hoc/G*2, First Report of General Committee, 16 March 1946; Council IV Document 239, *Ad Hoc/G*21, minutes 5th meeting, 26 March 1946.

¹⁵ *Journals*, First-Sixth Councils.

¹⁶ Rules of Procedure of the Council, Article II, 5.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Article III.

¹⁸ For details of work of the Secretariat, see monograph, Jane Plimpton and Eleanor Merrick, "The UNRRA Council, Its Sessions and Its Secretariat," HQ, July 1947.

subsequent sessions. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure the Council elected at each session an eleven-member Committee on Nominations and established a General Committee consisting of the chairman, the three vice-chairmen, the members of the Central Committee, and four others elected by the Council.¹⁹

The Committee on Nominations submitted nominations to the Council for the officers of the session, the four elected members of the General Committee, and for appointments to other committees as might be required. All these nominations were generally agreed upon in advance at an informal meeting of the Central Committee at which the Director General presented suggestions for the membership of the lesser committees.²⁰

The General Committee, subject to the concurrence of the Council and in consultation with the Director General, determined the order of business of the Council, passed upon the provisional agenda, decided which matters were to be considered at each meeting, coördinated the work of other committees, set the date of adjournment, and otherwise facilitated the orderly dispatch of business.²¹

The Council also at each session, from the Second²² onward, created *ad hoc* Committees on Credentials, Observers, Procedure, and Policy. The most important were the latter two, which were committees of the whole, and to which, especially to the Committee on Policy, were assigned discussion of the important, controversial items. These Committees could and on occasion did appoint subcommittees to work on special aspects of the problems submitted to them.²³

A majority of members of the Council constituted a quorum, except that for any proposal to amend the Agreement, three quarters were required. Each member had one vote at plenary sessions and in committees. Except as otherwise provided in the Agreement, all decisions required an affirmative majority vote of the members present. Voting was by show of hands unless the results were in doubt, in cases required by the Agreement to have a special majority, or on the written request of five members, in which cases a record vote

¹⁹ Rules of Procedure of the Council, Article VI, 1, 2.

²⁰ Monograph, Plimpton and Merrick, "The UNRRA Council," pp. 33-34.

²¹ F. V. Pastuhov, "Council Session, Organization and Procedure, A Manual for the Secretariat" (2d ed., February 1946), p. 28; (Supplement, June 1946), pp. 29-33.

²² *Journal*, Second Council.

²³ For example, Council III Document 168, *Ad Hoc* Committee on Policy (*Ad Hoc/P*), minutes 3d meeting, 16 August 1945.

was taken.²⁴ The minutes, therefore, as a rule merely show that a certain motion was or was not adopted.

Verbatim reports were kept of plenary sessions and, from the Third Session on, of committee meetings. A journal containing nearly full minutes of the plenary sessions and summary reports of committee meetings was prepared and made public at each session.

The official language of the Council was English.²⁵

Sessions were to be public unless otherwise decided by the Council.²⁶ Plenary sessions were, in fact, always public. It was also a general policy at Council sessions to keep the press and radio informed to the fullest extent possible regarding the work of the Council and its committees. The chairman of the Council, the Director General, and senior staff members held frequent conferences with their representatives.²⁷

The First Council set a high standard for the choice of delegates, which the member governments maintained generally throughout subsequent sessions. Men in positions of major responsibility in their own governments were usually chosen to attend the Council; and in the case of the major supplying nations, staffs of qualified advisers accompanied them. It is true, however, that as the United States lost interest in the administration of relief on an international basis, its Council member, an under secretary or assistant secretary of state, delegated more and more responsibility to alternates of lesser rank in the Department of State and by the Sixth Session had been succeeded by them, so far as actual work during the Council was concerned. A similar tendency could be noted on the part of the United Kingdom member, usually of cabinet rank, who assigned increasing responsibility to able members of the British Embassy staff in Washington.

Few members or delegates attended all six sessions of the Council. Among those who did, were Magnus Sigurdsson, always the member for Iceland; Lester B. Pearson, five times member and once the alternate for Canada; and such delegates as Roger Jackling, of the British Embassy staff, George L. Warren, of the United States Department of State, and Ellen S. Woodward, of the United States Social Security Board. Others—J. B. Brigden, of Australia; José Ramon Rodriguez,

²⁴ Rules of Procedure of the Council, Article X.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Article XI.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Article I, 3.

²⁷ Council II Document 48, *Ad Hoc/G3*; General Committee, Secretary's notes, 17 September 1944; Council III Document 23, *Ad Hoc/G3*; Council IV Document 30, *Ad Hoc/G2*; Council V Document 31, *Ad Hoc/G2*; Council VI Document 27, *Ad Hoc/G3*.

of the Dominican Republic; Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, of India; and Sir George Rendel, of the United Kingdom—attended, in one capacity or another, five of the six sessions, giving further continuity to an understanding of the development of UNRRA. Many more had the experience of three or four Councils irrespective of political changes at home.

The Council could and did invite observers. These included representatives of various international organizations, varying somewhat from session to session, and, from the Fourth Council onward, representatives of nonmember nations receiving UNRRA aid: Austria and Italy (Fourth onward); Albania, Finland, and Hungary (Fifth onward).²⁸ A widely diversified group known as "visitors" were also, on request, given cards to attend public meetings. By the Fifth and Sixth Council these included representatives of nonmember governments—Sweden, Switzerland, Argentina, Portugal—and of the Vatican, and representatives of various voluntary organizations.²⁹

The cost of the Council meetings per session after the Administration assumed the responsibility for the assembly was:³⁰

TABLE 2

COST OF COUNCIL SESSIONS

<i>Council Session</i>	<i>Cost</i>
Second	\$57,669.62
Third	95,052.76
Fourth	211,088.68
Fifth	295,152.63
Sixth	29,035.46
Total	\$687,999.15

2. WORK

The work of the Council meetings fell into two parts: the debate on the Director General's Report³¹ and the formulation of new policy leading to the passage of further resolutions. When putting his paper

²⁸ Monograph, Plimpton and Merrick, "The UNRRA Council," pp. 76-87.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-89.

³⁰ Controller's Office; for details see monograph, Plimpton and Merrick, "The UNRRA Council," pp. 105-106.

³¹ Agreement, Article IV, 5.

before the Council the Director General made his major address, giving a summary of the achievements and problems of the Administration since the preceding session. Resolutions aimed at solving these problems varied greatly in importance. The seventy-four resolutions passed during the five regular sessions after the First Council ranged from such minor matters as the acceptance of the UNRRA seal³² to major decisions regarding the extension of UNRRA aid to some enemy areas³³ and the provision of a second contribution coupled with the suggestion of a time limit for UNRRA's work.³⁴

MONTREAL—SEPTEMBER 1944

The Second Council had only the planning period of UNRRA behind it. Reports by representatives of CCS and the Combined Boards supplemented that of the Director General in laying before the Council the facts of the difficult ten months since the Council first met.³⁵ Lehman declared that the gradual liberation of Europe was confirming all past fears regarding the urgent needs for relief and rehabilitation. Although the liberated countries were energetically preparing to handle their own problems, their limitations in finances, skilled manpower, and supplies, he said, would necessitate requests for outside aid. UNRRA's operations within these areas would therefore vary in accordance with such requests. He promised that supplies would be forthcoming when the need arose but predicted shortages in meats, fats, textiles, and manufactured articles. The Director General told also of UNRRA's plans for the Balkan program, the care already provided for 50,000 displaced persons then in the Middle East, and the coming establishment of two Far Eastern offices at Chungking and Sydney. He concluded with an appeal to Council members for a reaffirmation of their faith in collective effort through definite action—the supplying of necessary advice and information from some countries, and supplies, funds, and expert personnel from others.³⁶

In the debate which followed, the member governments showed perhaps an unreasonable impatience with the slight achievements of the Administration during its formative period. Both Richard Law, of the United Kingdom, and Dean Acheson, of the United States, admitted that UNRRA's work had moved slowly while advancing military

³² Resolution 49.

³⁴ Resolution 80.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-26.

³³ Resolutions 58, 59, 73, 74, 76, 98.

³⁵ *Journal*, Second Council, pp. 28-47.

success had captured public interest. Nevertheless, they conceded, the Administration had laid the groundwork for future activity. Now the time had come for it to go forward into action, "to put in demands for procurement, to prepare its people for transportation and distribution." It was up to the Council to decide the extent of UNRRA's responsibilities for displaced persons and to deal as requested with the Sanitary Conventions. Governments, they said, also had responsibilities—"to complete their contributions, make available competent personnel, and give prompt coöperation in carrying out UNRRA programs in their own territories." Each member pledged the full support of his government.³⁷

Other members spoke of specific areas or needs. Far Eastern members stressed the differences between their countries and those of Europe, asking the Director General to approach their individual governments more directly.³⁸ The member from Ecuador requested that the South American countries be more fully informed about UNRRA's work.³⁹ The Greek representative stated that in his country UNRRA was already a reality, the means through which thousands of his countrymen were being cared for in the Administration's "admirably run refugee camps in Egypt and the Middle East," and, more important, the means to which the Greek people looked for the immediate salvation of their country.⁴⁰ The final plea of the chairman, Lester B. Pearson, summed up the general desire of the Council for "a vigorous practical administration and behind it the full, steady, and understanding support of every government represented."⁴¹

In its effort to reach this goal the Second Council recommended an active program through the passage of twenty resolutions.⁴² Its major decisions were: to approve the recommendations of the Committee of the Council for Europe regarding the bases for the computation by the Director General of the over-all requirements of Europe for relief and rehabilitation;⁴³ to authorize the Administration to operate without prior approval of the Council in enemy or ex-enemy territory as well as in liberated areas in order to care for and repatriate specific groups of displaced persons;⁴⁴ to indorse the extension of

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-48, 52-56.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁴³ Resolution 55; see *infra*, Part Three, Chapter I, Section 8.

⁴⁴ Resolutions 57, 60; see *infra*, Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 4.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49, 52, 57, 58.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

⁴² Resolutions 42-61.

relief to the Dodecanese⁴⁵ and limited relief to Italy;⁴⁶ and to assume the responsibilities for administering the amended Sanitary Conventions.⁴⁷

LONDON—AUGUST 1945

Ten months later, when the Third Council assembled in London, the world picture had changed. Germany had surrendered in May. The European nations were again free. The extent of their needs was beginning to be known. On 7 August, as the Council convened, the terrors of the atom bomb were demonstrated at Hiroshima, and before the Session closed the United Nations had defeated Japan in the Far East.

The Director General's Report told more of operations than of plans. Lehman dealt at length with UNRRA's achievements and future needs when presenting it to the Council. In spite of the unavoidable delays in the Administration's supply program because of the military authorities' monopoly of supplies and transportation necessary for final victory, he could state with pride that UNRRA had shipped 1,250,000 tons by 30 June 1945. At the same time, he reported the probable limits of UNRRA's operations; only the countries in the east and south of Europe had asked for aid; there was a large task ahead in the Far East; Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway were, however, using their own resources for relief. Nevertheless, the resources granted UNRRA at Atlantic City would not be sufficient to meet the minimum needs of the countries requiring UNRRA assistance. As the program of operations which he also laid before the Council showed, the estimated requirements for 1946 were made up before the recent request of the Soviet Union for \$700 million for a twelve-month period. At least \$1,500 million would be needed in addition to the Soviet program "to bridge the gap until a minimum of foreign trade could be restored and other methods of financing provided."⁴⁸

Money, however, was not enough. It had to be translated into goods and transportation. Lehman, feeling somewhat on the defensive because of uninformed criticism during the previous months,⁴⁹ spoke

⁴⁵ Resolution 59; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter X, Section 1.

⁴⁶ Resolution 58; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter VIII, Sections 1-3.

⁴⁷ Resolution 52; see *infra*, Part Four, Chapter II, Section 2.

⁴⁸ *Journal*, Third Council, pp. 21-23.

⁴⁹ *London Daily Express*, 10 January 1945; *Kansas City (Mo.) Times*, 19 February

openly of recent disappointments when UNRRA's modest requests to supply authorities had not been granted and commitments seemingly firm had disappeared when the moment for delivery had arrived. He appealed to the governments to face the implications of any further support of UNRRA. If they were not prepared to make the necessary sacrifice of their own resources, it were better to have no pledge of support.⁵⁰

Representatives of the Combined Boards and CCS followed the Director General with reports of their work during the period of liberation, the last formal reports which these bodies were to bring before the Council. The military authorities reported that they had shipped over nine million tons of Civil Affairs supplies to the European countries within the sphere of their responsibility up to 30 June 1945. As the military relief program was then rapidly coming to a close, the authorities claimed that UNRRA and the countries themselves should take up the burden. They also reviewed the displaced persons operation under the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and commended the services furnished by UNRRA since the Agreement of November 1944 between the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force (SCAEF) and UNRRA.⁵¹

The skepticism and disappointment which had marked the attitude of many governments toward UNRRA as they assembled for the Third Council gave place after these reports to a renewed determination to make this first international effort succeed in the face of admitted difficulties. The needs of both the paying and nonpaying countries and their expectations from UNRRA were put forward in great detail—particularly those of Yugoslavia,⁵² Poland,⁵³ the USSR,⁵⁴ Greece,⁵⁵ and Norway⁵⁶—in the light of the devastation caused by the retreating German armies. A task far greater than that tentatively provided for in the Director General's program of operations had to be faced, especially in the Far East. Many were persuaded that UNRRA to date had not received the support from member states in supplies, services, and

1945; Bertha Gaster in *London News Chronicle*, 15 March 1945; *Time*, 14 May 1945; *New York Times*, 28 May 1945; Washington, D.C., *Times Herald*, 30 May 1945, 21 June 1945; *Christian Science Monitor*, 29 May 1945; *Chicago Tribune*, 1 July 1945; *Congressional Record, House*, 17 July 1945, pp. 7780-7782.

⁵⁰ *Journal*, Third Council, pp. 21-25.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-37.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 43-45.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

personnel which was needed to accomplish its ends. It was evident that the work of UNRRA, the limitations on what it was empowered to do, as well as its achievements in the midst of insuperable difficulties, were not understood by the people of most countries. The Norwegian delegate pleaded that UNRRA undertake with its program of operations a public information service which would see to it that the current misapprehensions about UNRRA were removed. With public understanding, he believed, the necessary public assistance would come.⁵⁷

Further criticism centered on the defects of the accounting arrangements of the Administration as discussed in the reports of the Committee on Financial Control (CFC) but ended with the passage of a resolution accepting the accounts and reports on condition that the remedial measures undertaken by the Administration would assure satisfactory results by a specified time.⁵⁸ The Session closed with renewed promises of support from the supplying countries. This was expressed in a resolution which recommended that each uninvaded member nation make an additional contribution to UNRRA equivalent to one per cent of its income in the year ended 30 June 1943 following the presumption that UNRRA's work should end in March 1947.⁵⁹ Through other major decisions embodied in a total of nineteen resolutions,⁶⁰ the Third Council added to the areas eligible to receive UNRRA assistance Italy,⁶¹ Austria,⁶² Korea, and Formosa;⁶³ authorized the Administration to assist certain groups of displaced persons without prior approval of the governments concerned;⁶⁴ and increased both the membership and the power of the Central Committee.⁶⁵

ATLANTIC CITY—MARCH 1946

The Fourth Council assembled in the crescendo of UNRRA's operations in March 1946. Over seven million tons of supplies had already been shipped. The Administration could claim that it had made an appreciable contribution to the restoration of Europe and the beginning of similar work in the Far East. The Council, however, faced two

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

⁵⁹ Resolution 80.

⁶¹ Resolution 73; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter VIII, Sections 4 ff.

⁶² Resolution 74; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter IX.

⁶³ Resolution 76; see *infra*, Part Six, Chapter IV, Section 2.

⁶⁴ Resolution 71; see *infra*, Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 6.

⁶⁵ Resolutions 77, 80; see *infra*, Part One, Chapter III, Sections 1, 3.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-99, 122; Resolution 78.

⁶⁰ Resolutions 62-81.

major issues: an alarming world shortage of foods; and the problem of caring for displaced persons not prepared to return to their homes. In addition, it had to accept the resignation of Governor Lehman as Director General and appoint his successor.

In presenting his Report Governor Lehman stressed the gravity of the food and displaced persons problems for UNRRA and gave his valedictory address. Although he spoke later on his resignation,⁶⁶ his most important comments on the lessons learned in UNRRA and on the work remaining to be done were made in this speech. He assumed, as did many delegates, that the end of UNRRA was in sight, although the hope lingered in the minds of some that means would be found for the Administration to finish its work. He spoke, therefore, to the United Nations as they looked toward new coöperative organizations.⁶⁷

Many delegates hastened to express gratitude for the work of Governor Lehman and for UNRRA's help to the liberated countries—help, however, still insufficient to meet the basic needs of the devastated areas.⁶⁸ This was the theme of the Council. The insufficiency of food supplies made available to the liberated countries became the text of Lehman's speech in opening the debate on the food crisis in the Committee on Policy.⁶⁹ He proposed remedies which after lengthy discussion⁷⁰ and a further report by the Administration⁷¹ led, in the end, to three resolutions which achieved a notable change in government policies and in their attitudes toward the food shortage and the allocation of food in short supply.⁷² Hereby, the Council recommended that member governments maintaining military forces in UNRRA receiving countries restrict their forces from the use of land and indigenous resources needed for the production of local relief supplies and from impeding the equitable distribution of imported and indigenous relief supplies;⁷³ it appealed to all the United Nations, even those not members of UNRRA, giving specific suggestions for the maximum production of food to meet the current emergency and the uninterrupted maintenance of facilities and services for its mobilization, shipment, and

⁶⁶ *Journal*, Fourth Council, p. 124.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-35; see *infra*, Part Two, Chapter VII.

⁶⁸ *Journal*, Fourth Council, pp. 35-38, 42-45.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 46-48; Council IV Document 50, C(46)30.

⁷⁰ *Journal*, Fourth Council, pp. 52-59, 61-68, 71-75.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-141, 143-159.

⁷² Monograph, H. E. Caustin, "Notes on the Development and Functions of the Director General's Office," pp. 28-29.

⁷³ Resolution 91; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter IX, Section 2.

distribution;⁷⁴ and it urged governments to seek a fair and equitable distribution of scarce supplies among all the United Nations according to their needs.⁷⁵

Other major decisions of the Fourth Council, which passed, in all, twelve resolutions,⁷⁶ dealt with the displaced persons problem and with the Central Committee. After laborious debates in the Policy Committee over collaborators and other obstacles to repatriation,⁷⁷ the Council authorized strenuous measures to hasten repatriation and required the Administration to make bimonthly reports on the progress and problems of this work to the Central Committee.⁷⁸ Again it extended the membership and powers of the Central Committee.⁷⁹

At its final meeting in Atlantic City the Council, after previously paying solemn tributes to Governor Lehman,⁸⁰ appointed Fiorello H. LaGuardia, former Mayor of New York, second Director General of UNRRA.⁸¹

March
1946

His opening address was a clarion call to greater international service. It showed little knowledge or appreciation of UNRRA's past, but it had the fire of an Old Testament prophet:

I cannot help repeating again: this is all so new; it is all so hopeful. Have ever before in the history of the entire world 48 nations come together to save lives? We are united to preserve life, to build, not to kill, not to destroy. There is no precedent in international law. But there is precedent for the spirit of UNRRA in the Old Scripture, in the New Scripture: to love our neighbor, to aid the needy—that is not original. It just has not been carried out. As the sun moves from place to place, there is one continuous prayer to God asking for His heavenly kingdom to come to earth. In every land, in every dialect which is spoken by man, the prayer is spoken: Give us this day our daily bread. Our task is to respond to that prayer. That is our call. That is all there is to it—to respond to that prayer. We then become a great army of mercy, a great army carrying out God Almighty's response to the call for daily bread. I refuse to be stopped by pettiness, greed or selfishness. That is the mission of UNRRA and that is the army I am willing to lead.⁸²

GENEVA—AUGUST 1946

The Fifth Council was the first international assembly to meet in the Palais des Nations in Geneva since that building had begun its new life

⁷⁴ Resolution 89; see *infra*, Part Three, Chapter IV, Section 4.

⁷⁵ Resolution 93.

⁷⁶ Resolutions 82-93.

⁷⁷ *Journal*, Fourth Council, pp. 31, 75, 81-86, 93-96.

⁷⁸ Resolution 92; see *infra*, Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 7.

⁷⁹ Resolutions 83, 84, 92.

⁸⁰ *Journal*, Fourth Council, pp. 121-123.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-128.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

under the United Nations. Again it was the setting for the knell of an international effort. The Director General in presenting his Report opened his address with the statement that UNRRA's activities were ending. No provision had been made for UNRRA for 1947. The emergency task was over. He admitted that neither the Administration nor the contributing countries thought that the needs were over. Ways would be found to meet those additional wants, and he promised that supplies to carry out UNRRA's full program would be shipped. The balance due the receiving countries then amounted to 41 per cent of UNRRA's entire commitment. He reviewed the pressing problems of the moment in Austria, China, Trieste, and the displaced persons operation, and laid before the Council the first plans for the demobilization of UNRRA. Finally, he asked to be relieved of his responsibilities as soon as the Administration had arranged for the completion of procurement.⁸³

William L. Clayton, the United States member opened the discussion on the Report. The United States fully supported the assumption that UNRRA should end. UNRRA had fulfilled its two purposes: to furnish supplies to those liberated countries which themselves lacked the foreign exchange to pay for basic necessities; and to establish an organization to procure, to ship, and to deliver such supplies. Countries which when liberated were not in a position to procure and ship supplies had become able to do so. The sooner they took over the complete responsibility for their own buying and shipping, the better it would be for them and for everybody concerned. For these reasons and because of the gradual recovery of the export trade in liberated countries as well as the additional provision for the necessary foreign exchange through loans from the United States and other sources, the United States believed that UNRRA should be brought to a close in accordance with Resolution 80 passed at the Third Session.

A country having further need for foreign exchange which could not be supplied by the International Bank or International Monetary Fund "should apply on an international basis to another country which in its opinion is able and prepared to furnish assistance." Thus bilateral arrangements were the first alternative suggested for international relief. The United States further recommended that UNRRA's work in the fields of health and social welfare should be continued through

⁸³ *Journal*, Fifth Council, pp. 19-26.

the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, and that the displaced persons operation should be carried on for a reasonable time in order that the proposed international organization might have time to make preparations for taking over.⁸⁴

Considering the fact that the United States had contributed more than 68 per cent of the funds of UNRRA, Clayton's forthright statements spelled finality for the Administration. The pleas of the receiving countries, based on the continuing gravity of their economic positions, that UNRRA should complete its tasks were of no avail. All expressed appreciation of what UNRRA had done and foretold desperate conditions if the Administration's help were withdrawn.⁸⁵ Observers from Austria, Albania, and Italy also explained the needs of their countries in 1947 and asked that UNRRA continue the help for which their people were profoundly grateful.⁸⁶

The USSR member, N. I. Feonov, pointed out that friendly criticism of UNRRA had not always been given due attention; thus, contrary to the USSR's counsel, the Korean program had been delayed; little progress had been made with the repatriation of displaced persons between the Fourth and Fifth Council Sessions; and now the Director General's Report mentioned the presence of occupation forces in Austria and some actions of Soviet occupation authorities—questions clearly within the scope of other international bodies and discussion of which, the USSR had warned, would endanger UNRRA's reputation as a nonpolitical international relief organization. Feonov regretted that such matters were laid before the Fifth Council, which had problems of its own to solve. He closed by adding to the Director General's remarks that UNRRA was unique, not only in its aims and the extent of its work, but also in the results of its work. The USSR delegation sincerely wished that the Fifth Council of UNRRA would contribute "to the successful continuation of this work for the benefit of the United Nations, for the consolidation of international coöperation, and the further strengthening of friendship among the peace loving nations."⁸⁷

The Norwegian delegate, Aake Ording, viewed the tasks of UNRRA as a common international responsibility. His delegation felt that UNRRA should cease at the agreed time only under the proviso

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-29.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-41, 43-45.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-36, 42, 46.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

that the work remaining to be done should be taken over by international bodies under the United Nations or whatever else might develop. The problem was whether this could be done in such a way that there would be no gap. Ordning foresaw a break of probably six months in the deliveries of essential food. On his personal responsibility he asked the Director General whether a third contribution of one half of one per cent of the national incomes of the contributing countries would be sufficient to prevent such a catastrophe.⁸⁸ Here was the second solution advanced for meeting the needs of some countries in 1947.

It brought no enthusiastic response from the contributing countries. Cuba maintained that UNRRA should terminate according to schedule.⁸⁹ New Zealand, which at the Fourth Council had promised it would support a further contribution,⁹⁰ regretted that UNRRA's work must end so soon and hoped that alternative arrangements would be made in which the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations might take a vital part.⁹¹ In concluding the debate the representative of the United Kingdom supported the United States point of view, thus leaving the assembly with no hope for the continuance of UNRRA.⁹²

The Council assumed the task of finding other ways of finishing the remaining work in relief and rehabilitation. Within fourteen resolutions⁹³ it urged that the Administration complete procurement and shipments against approved programs of operations by dates specified at the Third Council, making arrangements, however, for a three months' extension of the specified time in case unavoidable incidents delayed the original schedule;⁹⁴ it made provision for the orderly termination of UNRRA's operations and designated the World Health Organization (WHO, or its Interim Commission), the United Nations, the International Refugee Organization (IRO), or an appropriate interim commission, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as successor organizations qualified to carry on UNRRA's functions respectively in the fields of health,⁹⁵ social welfare,⁹⁶ dis-

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39.

⁹⁰ *Journal*, Fourth Council, p. 37.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 51-54.

⁹⁴ Resolution 101.

⁹⁵ Resolution 94; see *infra*, Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 2.

⁹⁶ Resolution 95; see *infra*, Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 4.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

⁹¹ *Journal*, Fifth Council, pp. 50-51.

⁹³ Resolutions 94-107.

placed persons,⁹⁷ and agricultural rehabilitation.⁹⁸ The Council named the United Nations as responsible for designating the agency to review the needs in 1947 for urgent imports of vital supplies after the end of the UNRRA program and to make recommendations as to the financial assistance required.⁹⁹ It also designated the United Nations to administer the functions of UNRRA in regard to the utilization of proceeds of local sale of UNRRA supplies for such relief and rehabilitation work as should be set out in relevant agreements.¹⁰⁰

WASHINGTON—DECEMBER 1946

The Sixth Session of the Council met under the assumption that it would probably be the last. The Director General treated it as such when giving his Report.¹⁰¹ Although the USSR and many receiving countries protested the idea¹⁰² and a resolution made it possible to hold another session unless decided otherwise by the unanimous vote of the Central Committee,¹⁰³ there was an air of finality about this gathering. LaGuardia's resignation followed by the election of Major General Lowell W. Rooks as Director General during the period of completion of operations and liquidation gave emphasis to this, as well as providing opportunities for reflection on UNRRA's achievements and for valedictory addresses.¹⁰⁴

De
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LaGuardia stated that 74 per cent of UNRRA's programs had been fulfilled and the Administration was bound to complete the remainder as approved by the Central Committee. He told of the transfer of UNRRA's functions and funds to other international organizations and the arrangements for the completion of the industrial rehabilitation program. Need for food assistance would continue in 1947. He hoped it would be forthcoming "without fear or favor, without prejudice, without hatred, in the original spirit of UNRRA." He pointed to the closely related problem of food allocation, even to countries which could afford to buy, and cited the work of the International Emergency Food Committee. He asked for active international support of FAO and its original plans for a world granary. And he took his farewell

⁹⁷ Resolution 99; see *infra*, Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 6.

⁹⁸ Resolution 102; see *infra*, Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 5.

⁹⁹ Resolution 100.

¹⁰⁰ Resolution 97; see *infra*, Part Four, Chapter IV, Section 4.

¹⁰¹ *Journal*, Sixth Council, p. 15.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, pp. 27-31.

¹⁰³ Resolution 115.

¹⁰⁴ *Journal*, Sixth Council, pp. 59-67.

from UNRRA with a restatement of his faith in international co-operation:

We have carried out a plan drawn up by economists and drafted by lawyers, but we did it in the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount. I hope that nothing will happen during the remaining days of UNRRA, or during the years that are to come, that will spoil that effort. We have demonstrated to the world that forty-eight nations can work in harmony, that forty-eight nations, bent upon doing good, can carry out a great mission. Let not that be lost to history.¹⁰⁵

Delegates from the receiving countries rose in turn to express deep gratitude for UNRRA's gifts and to pay tribute to LaGuardia and senior members of his staff.¹⁰⁶ In these speeches lie the Council's perorations on UNRRA, since the last meeting of the Session was devoted to the resignation of LaGuardia, the inaugural address of Rooks, and final paeans of praise for LaGuardia.¹⁰⁷

Perhaps the statement by the representative of the Byelorussian SSR represents the general feeling of the receiving countries:

There is no doubt that it is difficult to express in a few words the great historic importance of this international relief organization, but the outstanding characteristic in this appraisal, in my opinion, is in the gratitude of many millions of ordinary people in many parts of the globe for the assistance which has been given to them by this organization in the most difficult and critical period of their life. The organization existed and functioned in the name of the best human principles. It was at the people's service, and, having achieved great results, has obtained the sympathy of peoples, has written down a remarkable page in the history of friendly relations between peoples and states, for it promoted peace, and strengthened the feeling of friendship between nations.

That was the pledge of its strength and international significance. I am glad to say that the people and Government of Byelorussia approve the policy and activities of the organization and express their deep appreciation to the governments of contributing countries, especially the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Australia, and others, due to whose efforts this organization was brought into existence, and to its prominent leaders, Mr. Herbert H. Lehman and Mr. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, under whose guidance its useful activities developed.¹⁰⁸

The eight resolutions¹⁰⁹ of the Sixth Council dealt primarily with arrangements for the liquidation period. Outstanding among them

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-21.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 60-67.

¹⁰⁹ Resolutions 108-115.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-33.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

were: provisions for the Administration to take certain steps in the event that procurement and shipments against the approved program of operations were not completed by the extended dates agreed upon by the Fifth Council;¹¹⁰ the delegation of extended powers to the Central Committee leading to the assumption of final authority;¹¹¹ and the authorization for the complete official documentation of the Administration's accounts.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ Resolution 114; see *infra*, Part Three, Chapter II, Section 11.

¹¹¹ Resolutions 112, 114, 115; see *infra*, Part One, Chapter III, Section 3.

¹¹² Resolution 109.

III. The Committees

1. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE—FORM AND METHODS

4 THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE of the Council at first consisted of the representatives of China, USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with the Director General presiding without vote. The Committee was, between sessions of the Council, to make policy decisions of an emergency nature. Within the limits determined by the Council or its Central Committee, the Director General was granted full power for carrying out the relief operations contemplated in the Agreement. It was the authority to determine these limits—restricted, however, to emergency decisions between Council sessions—which set this Committee apart from all other UNRRA committees.¹

In addition to this general power the Committee had, from the beginning, certain other specific powers. It had to nominate, by unanimous vote, the Director General² (a task performed three times); it could likewise, again by unanimous vote, recommend the removal of the Director General³ (this, however, was never done). Proposals made by the Administration for action by member governments in fields related to relief operations were subject to the unanimous approval of the Committee;⁴ in practice, no such action was taken. Finally, the Committee was empowered to make appointments to various committees, such appointments to continue until the next Council session.⁵

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9 The original membership of four was increased, by the addition of Canada and France, to six at the Third Council Session (August 1945)⁶ and, by the addition of Australia, Brazil, and Yugoslavia, to nine at the Fourth (March 1946).⁷

¹ Article III, 3, 4, 5, 6; Resolutions 18-31; for a detailed study of the Central Committee, see monograph, Poeliu Dai, "Structure of UNRRA Committees with Special Reference to Certain Phases of the Activities of the Central Committee and the Committee of the Council for Europe."

² Article IV, 1.

⁴ Article I, 2c.

⁶ Resolution 77.

³ *Ibid.*

⁵ Resolutions 18, 19, 21, 24, 26.

⁷ Resolution 83.

The Committee held its first meeting on 11 November 1943, during the First Council Session, for the purpose of nominating the first Director General.⁸ At its sixty-sixth meeting, held on 24 September 1948, the Committee abolished the position of Director General as of 30 September 1948, thus marking the official end of UNRRA as an operating organization.⁹

Between these dates meetings were held¹⁰ as follows:

TABLE 3
MEETINGS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

<i>Through Session of the Council</i>	<i>Number of Members</i>	<i>Meetings</i>	<i>Meetings per Month</i>
Second (September 1944)	4	1-8	Less than one
Third (August 1945)	4	9-16	Less than one
Fourth (March 1946) ^a	6	17-27	About one and a half
Fifth (August 1946)	9	28-35	About one and a half
Sixth (December 1946)	9	36-42	About two
Thereafter (September 1948)	9	43-66	About two

^a Does not include the 9 May 1946 meeting of the Fourth Council Session; the 28th meeting of the Central Committee was, in fact, held between the 30 March meeting of the Session and the final meeting.

During the formative period, meetings were infrequent; there were more during the period of greatest activity by the Administration; and still more as these activities decreased.

After the first, all meetings were held in Washington with the exception of two held during the Fourth Council Session and two held during the Fifth Session.¹¹ Some consideration was given to holding meetings elsewhere, but by May 1944, when transfer of responsibility for the European operations to the London Office was being discussed, the Washington locale was firmly established.¹²

The Rules of Procedure contain only a brief mention of the Committee,¹³ which was left quite free to determine its own regulations

⁸ Central Committee (CC) (43)1, minutes 1st meeting, 11 November 1943 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], I, 3).

⁹ CC(48)38, minutes 66th meeting, 24 September 1948.

¹⁰ CC Docs., I-IV; CC(48)38, minutes 66th meeting, 24 September 1948.

¹¹ CC(46)42, minutes 26th meeting, 21 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 167); CC(46)46, minutes 27th meeting, 21 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 182); CC(46)95, minutes 34th meeting, 9 August 1946 (CC Docs., III, 113); CC(46)96, minutes 35th meeting, 14 August 1946 (CC Docs., III, 114).

¹² Director General's staff meeting, notes, 11 May 1944.

¹³ Resolution 40, Rules of Procedure of the Council, Article V.

and practices. Though the informality of the early meetings gradually gave way to greater regularity of procedure, the Committee was never bound by any formulated rules. Meetings were to be convened by the Director General, whenever he deemed advisable, and had to be convened within ten days after a request by any member.¹⁴ Agenda were prepared by the Director General after consultation with his own staff¹⁵ and with the members of the Committee. Since provision was always made for "other business," however, any member was always free to bring up any subject.

The Agreement provided that a unanimous vote of the Committee was required in three specific cases.¹⁶ There were no formal, recorded votes at the first eight meetings. At the ninth meeting a motion was considered carried even though the USSR member reserved his decision.¹⁷ Thereafter, it was accepted that a decision could be reached by a majority vote,¹⁸ though again it was never formally decided whether this meant a majority of those present or merely a majority of those voting. This was a real problem in but one recorded case: a motion was supported by four, with one opposed and four abstaining, and the Director General declared the motion adopted.¹⁹

In addition to the members and the Director General, there were also others who attended the meetings but did not have a vote. These included the chairman of the Committee on Supplies, who in accord with the Agreement²⁰ attended six meetings in 1944 and 1945 but none after Canada became a member of the Central Committee; alternates and advisers of the members; representatives of the Council's auditors; and members of the Administration. These last were generally few in number: the General Counsel, the Senior Deputy Director General, deputy directors general, and other senior officials, varying from time to time. In the winter of 1947 there was some increase in such attendance until the Director General limited it to those whose presence might be re-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Article V, 1.

¹⁵ Senior Deputy Director General's staff meetings, minutes, 22 December 1945; 19 December 1945; 15, 16 April 1946; 2 February, 15 May 1946; Chief Executive Officer's staff meetings, minutes, 23 July, 16, 17, 23 September, 23 October, 15 November, 3 December 1946; 22 January, 21 April, 7, 9, 14, 19, 21 May, 13, 25 June, 15, 26 August, 2, 12, 19 September 1947; 9, 23 January 1948.

¹⁶ Article I, 2c; Article IV, 1; see *supra*, Part One, Chapter I, Section 3.

¹⁷ CC(44)20, minutes 9th meeting, 11 December 1944 (CC Docs., I, 49-52).

¹⁸ Council III Document 186, General Committee (*Ad Hoc/G*)33, minutes 7th meeting, 22 August 1945.

¹⁹ CC(46)70, minutes 30th meeting, 17 June 1946 (CC Docs., III, 43).

²⁰ Article III, 3.

quired.²¹ The Agreement had also provided that the Committee should invite the participation of a representative of any member government when action of special interest to that government would be discussed.²² Such representatives were twice invited²³ but, in accordance with the decision of the First Council,²⁴ were not allowed to vote.

The meetings of the Central Committee were always private. Not once did the Committee use its power by unanimous vote²⁵ to open a session to the public. The Division of Public Information was seldom represented at these meetings and prepared the reports for the press on information given by the secretary of the Committee.²⁶ The few statements released covered only the major policy decisions of the Committee.²⁷

2. NATURE OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE DECISIONS

The Central Committee dealt with the gamut of UNRRA's problems—from minor questions such as approving the rules and regulations of the Program Subcommittee²⁸ and agreeing on dates and places of Council sessions, to major policies and practices, including emergency relief in several countries,²⁹ broad programs of operations,³⁰ displaced persons,³¹ the administrative budget,³² and the transfer of UNRRA's functions and funds to other international organizations.³³

During its first two years the Central Committee generally reached its decisions in unanimity,³⁴ much to the satisfaction of the Director

²¹ Chief Executive Officer's staff meetings, minutes, 20 February, 4 March 1947.

²² Article III, 3.

²³ CC(44)4 and 5, minutes 2d meeting, 3 March 1944 (CC Docs., I, 9); CC(47)16, minutes 45th meeting, 3 February 1947.

²⁴ Committee I, Subcommittee 2, Secretary's notes, 19 November 1943, pp. 5-7; 20 November 1943, p. 5.

²⁵ Rules of Procedure of the Council, Article V, 3.

²⁶ Senior Deputy Director General's staff meetings, minutes, 6 February 1947, 19 September 1947.

²⁷ Press Release 21, 26 February 1945; Press Release 65, 6 June 1945; Press Release 19, 12 January 1946; Press Release 291, 8 April 1946; Press Release 48, 18 November 1947.

²⁸ CC(46)4, minutes 19th meeting, 8 January 1946 (CC Docs., II, 60).

²⁹ See Part Five, Chapters XII-XIV; Part Six, Chapter IV.

³⁰ See Part Three, Chapter II, *passim*. ³¹ See Part Seven, Chapter I, *passim*.

³² CC(46)17, minutes 20th meeting, 4 February 1946 (CC Docs., II, 86-88); CC(46)38, minutes 24th meeting, 12 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 159); CC(46)41, minutes 25th meeting, 14 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 166); CC(46)85, minutes 33d meeting, 23 July 1946 (CC Docs., III, 100-101); CC(48)29, minutes 65th meeting, 2 June 1948.

³³ See Part Two, Chapter VII, *passim*.

³⁴ Council III Document 186, *Ad Hoc* G/33, minutes 7th meeting, 22 August 1945.

General and its members. When national interests began to crystallize along different lines after the Allied victory in the Far East, a cleavage among the delegates began which was to persist and develop throughout the life of UNRRA. As a result, policy decisions of certain types had to be taken on a majority vote, although in most instances the Committee continued to agree unanimously or to avoid a decision in moments of tension.

The break was first evident in the debate over a resolution introduced by the United States member in February 1946,³⁵ calling for receiving countries to furnish information concerning their trade agreements, imports, and exports. Here the USSR delegate voted against its passage, and the member for China abstained from voting.³⁶ As soon as the membership of the Committee was increased by the addition of representatives from Australia, Brazil, and Yugoslavia, the Soviet point of view in subsequent controversial issues was supported by the Yugoslav member.³⁷ The Chinese delegate was unpredictable, sometimes on one side, sometimes on the other, and he often abstained from voting. When general agreement could not be reached, the majority—usually consisting of the members from Australia, Brazil (when present), Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—established the policy which the Administration was to follow.

The controversial issues involved only a few subjects. As China, the USSR, and Yugoslavia represented the point of view of some receiving countries, they were naturally interested in getting as large programs for themselves and for their satellites as possible. Hence they opposed the increase of the Austrian program as recommended by the Program Subcommittee in July 1946, attempted to arrange for an upward revision of the Yugoslav program in the light of needs to be determined by a more accurate calculation of the harvest, opposed increasing any programs at the expense of other programs, and resisted the readjustment of the Albanian, Greek, and Yugoslav programs in consideration of the values of military goods procured prior to 1 October 1945. Supported by the abstention of France but not by China they consistently opposed the downward revision of the Czechoslovak operation. At the same meeting, buttressed by China's abstention, the Soviet and Yugoslav members refused to approve the recommendation

³⁵ CC(46)23, minutes 21st meeting, 7 February 1946 (CC Docs., II, 96).

³⁶ CC(46)41, minutes 25th meeting, 14 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 161-162).

³⁷ CC(46)61, minutes 29th meeting, 17 May 1946 (CC Docs., III, 27-28).

of the Committee on Financial Control for a supplementary administrative budget, without which, the Controller claimed, the Administration would have had to cut its staff by 50 per cent.³⁸

The Administration's policy in China during 1947 was often opposed by the Soviet and Yugoslav representatives. The former abstained from voting on the plan adopted for the financing of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA) operations in May.³⁹ Both powers rejected the Director General's proposal for the distribution of supplies in Communist areas, as well as that regarding the operation and financing of long-term rehabilitation projects.⁴⁰

The emphasis which the Soviets and Yugoslavs had always placed on the repatriation of displaced persons in German and Austrian camps naturally led to an active fight⁴¹ against the British scheme for the employment of from 60,000 to 100,000 displaced persons from the British Zones in Germany and Austria for a trial period of one year in the United Kingdom.⁴²

Some of the transfers of the Administration's funds through loans and gifts to successor organizations did not have the approval of the Slavic powers. They abstained from voting when the other seven members of the Committee approved the loan of \$2 million to the Preparatory Commission, International Refugee Organization (PCIRO) and opposed both the transfer of \$500,000 to FAO and the transfer of approximately \$1 million to PCIRO.⁴³ They supported wholeheartedly, however, the gift of \$1,500,000 to WHO and the transfer of funds and claims to the International Children's Emergency Fund⁴⁴ (ICEF) which in the end amounted to \$34,461,065.

3. GROWTH OF POWER OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The authority which the United Kingdom and the United States Governments originally proposed to grant to the Central Committee

³⁸ CC(46)85, minutes 33d meeting, 23 July 1946 (CC Docs., III, 92-101).

³⁹ CC(47)69, minutes 53d meeting, 23 May 1947.

⁴⁰ CC(47)141, minutes 62d meeting, 17 November 1947.

⁴¹ CC(47)72, letter, J. I. Krasniuk (Council member for USSR) to Rooks, 5 June 1947.

⁴² CC(47)69, minutes 53d meeting, 23 May 1947; CC(47)86, minutes 55th meeting, 16 June 1947.

⁴³ CC(47)85, minutes 54th meeting, 13 June 1947.

⁴⁴ CC(47)115, minutes 59th meeting, 15 September 1947; CC(48)38, minutes 66th meeting, 24 September 1948.

was limited in the UNRRA Agreement at the request of other governments.⁴⁵ During the life of UNRRA, however, this Committee ultimately obtained all the authority—and more—suggested in the early proposals. This growth resulted from two factors, one negative, one positive. The Committee was supposedly accorded authority to make emergency decisions, which would be subject to review by the Council. In fact, the Council seldom reviewed such decisions, which came, in practice, therefore, to be as binding as those taken by the Council itself.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Council consciously delegated authority to the Committee. It was, for example, empowered to designate an additional three members of the Committee on Supplies;⁴⁷ to approve future administrative budgets in the event that no further Council sessions should be held in 1945⁴⁸ and 1946,⁴⁹ and to make changes in the accepted budget in the light of actual conditions in 1947.⁵⁰ Ultimately, the Council delegated to the Committee all its powers,⁵¹ and, after the unanimous decision of the Committee in June 1947 that no further Council sessions should be held,⁵² the Central Committee became the “operating committee for all subjects.”⁵³

Since the Council on a few occasions restricted the authority of the Administration and then delegated to the Committee the powers withdrawn, the Committee came to exercise both greater control of the formulation of policy and greater control over the operations of the Administration than had been provided in the Agreement. The Director General was, for example, empowered by the Council at its Third Session to care for specified groups of displaced persons without obtaining prior consent of the governments of origin; his operations were, however, to be reviewed at the end of six months by the Council, by the Central Committee, or by a special committee appointed by the Central Committee.⁵⁴ The Council at its Fourth Session further required the Administration to make monthly reports to the Central Committee on the problems and progress of repatriation and to organize at the request of the Central Committee field trips to assembly

⁴⁵ See Part One, Chapter I, Section 3.

⁴⁶ For example, see Part Five, Chapters XII–XIV.

⁴⁷ Resolution 68.

⁴⁸ Resolution 81.

⁴⁹ Resolution 96.

⁵⁰ Resolution 110.

⁵¹ Resolution 115.

⁵² CC, verbatim minutes 55th meeting, 16 June 1947.

⁵³ CC, verbatim minutes 57th meeting, 5 August 1947, p. 4.

⁵⁴ Resolution 71; see *infra*, Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 6.

centers by representatives of the governments concerned about the progress of the displaced persons operation.⁵⁵ In cases of disagreement between the Administration and governments during the course of the displaced persons operation either party was directed to refer the matter to the Central Committee.⁵⁶

Furthermore, and most significant, the Council at its Third Session made the Director General's broad programs of operation—his allocation of relief funds to specific countries—dependent upon the approval of the Central Committee.⁵⁷

4. THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE ADMINISTRATION

The Director General kept the Central Committee members well informed through a monthly report on the current work of the Administration. These reports, instituted at the request of the Soviet member of the Central Committee in January 1945,⁵⁸ continued regularly until the Central Committee assumed the powers of the Council in June 1947, after which bimonthly surveys were adopted at the suggestion of the Administration.⁵⁹ Such summaries, both factual and interpretive in nature,⁶⁰ in addition to the extensive documentation supplied by the Administration in connection with the agenda sent to the Committee members before each meeting, and the informal discussions which top staff held with Committee members, left little about the Administration which the Committee did not know.

The Committee's decisions more often confirmed what the Administration proposed to do than formulated measures for solving new problems. At meetings of the Committee the Director General usually made his analysis of a problem and proposed a solution which the Committee debated, sometimes modified, and finally approved. Occasionally, as in the instance of the proposal for a grant of funds by the Administration to permit the establishment of the Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs (BOTRA) founded by the Chinese Government for the long-term operation of CNRRA-UNRRA projects, the

⁵⁵ Resolution 99.

⁵⁶ Resolution 92.

⁵⁷ Resolution 80; see *infra*, Part Three, Chapter II, Section 6.

⁵⁸ CC(45)4, minutes 11th meeting, 25 January 1945 (CC Docs., I, 84).

⁵⁹ CC(47)85, minutes 55th meeting, 16 June 1947; CC(47)96, 1 August 1947; CC(47)99, minutes 57th meeting, 5 August 1947.

⁶⁰ Reports, Director General to Central Committee, February 1945-June 1947.

Director General reported his negotiations with the Chinese Government and asked for the confirmation of the Central Committee.⁶¹ During the period of liquidation he brought administrative questions as well as matters of general policy before the Committee since the Administration had come to desire the backing of the Committee on all its major activities.⁶²

5. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES—FORMATION AND PROCEDURES

The First Council established an elaborate system of committees made up of representatives of member governments to serve as advisory bodies to the Council, the Central Committee, and the Director General. It set up regional committees for Europe⁶³ and the Far East,⁶⁴ a Committee on Supplies,⁶⁵ a Committee on Financial Control,⁶⁶ a Subcommittee of the Committee on Supplies⁶⁷ (on ability to pay), and five standing technical committees to deal with agriculture,⁶⁸ displaced persons,⁶⁹ health,⁷⁰ industrial rehabilitation,⁷¹ and welfare.⁷² Fifteen resolutions defined their membership, the scope of their strictly advisory functions,⁷³ and gave them detailed rules of procedure.⁷⁴

On 30 November 1943, before the Council adjourned, the regional committees and those concerned with supply and financial control held their initial meetings,⁷⁵ and by 17 January 1944 Governor Lehman announced the organization of all the technical committees.⁷⁶

At its first meeting each regional committee asked that subcommittees of the technical committees be established for its area as permitted by the Agreement.⁷⁷ Those for Europe, as well as additional *Ad Hoc* Food and Textile Subcommittees, were set up in London in May 1944 after disagreement among the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR, in disregard of the Rules of Procedure,⁷⁸ over the choice of

⁶¹ CC, verbatim minutes 21st meeting, 5 November 1947.

⁶² Interviews, G. E. Fox with Fred L. Chait (General Counsel), 26 January, 2 February 1947.

⁶⁵ Resolutions 21, 22.

⁶⁸ Resolutions 26, 27.

⁷¹ Resolutions 26, 30.

⁷⁴ Resolution 40, Rules of Procedure of the Council, Annex I.

⁷⁵ *Journal*, First Council, pp. 169-171.

⁷⁶ UNRRA Press Release 4, 17 January 1944.

⁷⁷ *Journal*, First Council, p. 169.

⁷⁸ Resolution 40, Rules of Procedure of the Council, Annex I, Article V, 4.

⁶³ Resolutions 18, 20.

⁶⁶ Resolutions 24, 25.

⁶⁹ Resolutions 26, 28.

⁷² Resolutions 26, 31.

⁶⁴ Resolutions 19, 20.

⁶⁷ Resolution 23.

⁷⁰ Resolutions 26, 29.

⁷³ Resolutions 18-31, 40.

nations to be granted the chairmanships;⁷⁹ and later in the fall the subcommittees for the Far East were organized in Washington.⁸⁰

Other committees were established when specific tasks made them necessary. Among these the most important were the Audit Subcommittee, set up by the Second Council to deal with the policy aspects of the audit;⁸¹ the Program Subcommittee, established 3 December 1945 by the Central Committee as a means of implementing its responsibilities defined in Resolution 80;⁸² a special subcommittee of the Central Committee, appointed⁸³ in accord with Resolution 71 to study displaced persons problems, in consultation with the governments concerned, and report to the Fourth Council Session;⁸⁴ and a Standing Committee of the Council on the Rehabilitation of Children and Adolescents set up by the Fifth Council⁸⁵ to make preparations in consultation with appropriate United Nations and voluntary agencies for the establishment of ICEF.⁸⁶ As in the case of the Council and the Central Committee the men appointed in the beginning to these standing committees and subcommittees held positions of greater importance in their national governments or professions than their successors during the most active period of UNRRA's work.

The Council prescribed⁸⁷ for all standing and technical committees the procedure for selection of members and officers and for the establishment of further subcommittees, as well as regulations for meetings, voting methods, and other practices.

The Director General prepared the provisional agenda for each meeting in consultation with the chairman of the committee. This had to include: all items proposed by the committee at any previous meet-

⁷⁹ Cables: Washington to London 96, 6 April 1944; Washington to London 127, 16 April 1944; letters: Leith-Ross to Richard Law (Minister of State, United Kingdom), 19 April 1944; Law to Leith-Ross, 25 April 1944; cable, Washington to London 169, 1 May 1944; letter, Ernest Brown (chairman, Committee of the Council for Europe) to Leith-Ross, 11 May 1944.

⁸⁰ Memos: Eugene Sergeev (Secretariat) to Eugene Staley (Far East Division), 10 October 1944; Sergeev to Frank S. Gaines (Acting Director, Southwest Pacific Area Office), 16 November 1944.

⁸¹ Resolution 44, paragraphs 8, 9.

⁸² CC(45)38, minutes 18th meeting, 29 November 1945 (CC Docs., II, 40-42); Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee (CC/P) (45)5, minutes 1st meeting, 3 December 1945.

⁸³ CC(46)16, minutes 21st meeting, 7 February 1946 (CC Docs., II, 93-98).

⁸⁴ CC(46)65, minutes 27th meeting, 21 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 182-183).

⁸⁵ Resolution 103.

⁸⁶ See Part Four, Chapter II, Section 3.

⁸⁷ Resolution 40, Rules of Procedure of the Council, Annex I.

ing; all items proposed by the Council, the Central Committee, or another standing committee of the Council; all items proposed by any member of the committee and transmitted to the Director General at least five days in advance of the meeting; and any item which the Director General desired to put before the committee. Revisions and additions could be made by the committee.⁸⁸

As in the case of the Central Committee, the Secretariat at Headquarters furnished the technical and administrative services required by the committees meeting in Washington.⁸⁹ Similar work was carried on in the Secretariat in ERO for the committees in London and by the China Office for those in the Far East after June 1946 when the Committee of the Council for the Far East began to meet regularly in China.

A majority of members constituted a quorum, and all decisions required an affirmative majority vote of the members present.

6. COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL FOR EUROPE

The Committee of the Council for Europe and the Committee of the Council for the Far East had four main advisory functions. They were set up, in line with precedents established by the Inter-Allied Committee on European Post-War Requirements, to: recommend basis or bases for over-all requirements and advise with respect to the computation of over-all requirements in conformity with the bases; advise with respect to the fair and equitable apportionment of available supplies and to assist in securing the maximum production and interchange of any surplus supplies; and receive and discuss periodic reports and advise on the organization of measures to assist displaced persons and the coördination of national action in regard to medical and other relief and rehabilitation problems.⁹⁰

The Committee of the Council for Europe, originally consisting of representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the French Committee of National Liberation, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia,⁹¹ was enlarged by the addition of representatives of Denmark, the Byelorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR,⁹² and Turkey⁹³ after those countries had become members of UNRRA.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, Article IV.

⁸⁹ Administrative Order 26, 14 September 1944.

⁹⁰ Resolution 20.

⁹¹ Resolution 18.

⁹² Resolution 66.

⁹³ CC(46)61, minutes 29th meeting, 17 May 1946 (CC Docs., III, 27-28).

In the spring of 1946 the Committee invited representatives of the Italian and Austrian Governments to attend its meetings as observers without vote, in accordance with the precedent set by the Fourth Council.⁹⁴ Even earlier, international and other appropriate organizations (the International Labor Office and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees) were also invited to send observers.⁹⁵

Four chairmen, all British, successively presided over the Committee of the Council for Europe: Colonel John J. Llewellyn, British Minister of Food,⁹⁶ Ernest Brown, M.P., Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; ⁹⁷ Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, a former Deputy Director General; ⁹⁸ and Kenneth P. Younger, M.P.⁹⁹ The Committee held thirty-eight meetings from November 1943 to April 1948. From the second meeting held in London, 14 March 1944, until the eighth meeting, 25 August 1944, the Committee and its subcommittees were primarily concerned with the study and discussion of bases of requirements for relief and rehabilitation in Europe as provided ¹⁰⁰ by the First Council. The results of this work were officially adopted at the Second Session of the Council.¹⁰¹

At the eighth meeting, the chairman pointed out ¹⁰² that the Committee had more or less completed the work arising from the first function assigned it and that consideration should be given to the tasks that might arise from the second function, that is, advising with respect to the fair and equitable apportionment of available supplies and especially assisting in securing the maximum production and interchange of surplus supplies. This led, at subsequent meetings,¹⁰³ to discussions of the role the Committee might play. These discussions ultimately centered on an Administration memorandum entitled "Production and Interchange of Relief Supplies—Analysis of the Problems Involved," ¹⁰⁴ in which it was stated that "it is for the Committee to

⁹⁴ Committee of the Council for Europe (CCE) (46)37, minutes 27th meeting, 25 April 1946.

⁹⁵ Resolution 5; CCE(44)5, minutes 2d meeting, 14 March 1944.

⁹⁶ *Journal*, First Council, minutes 1st meeting CCE, 30 November 1943, pp. 169-170.

⁹⁷ Letters: Leith-Ross to Lehman, 19 February 1944; British Embassy to Lehman, 23 February 1944.

⁹⁸ Cable, London to Washington 977, 4 May 1945.

⁹⁹ Letter, Foreign Office to LaGuardia, 1 June 1946.

¹⁰⁰ Resolutions 17, 20.

¹⁰¹ Resolution 55; *infra*, Part Three, Chapter I, Section 8.

¹⁰² CCE(44)50, statement of the chairman at the eighth meeting, 24 August 1944.

¹⁰³ CCE(44)68, minutes 9th meeting, 22 November 1944, pp. 6-7a; CCE(45)18, minutes 10th meeting, 13 February 1945, pp. 11-12; CCE(45)20, minutes 11th meeting, 19 February 1945, pp. 2-13.

¹⁰⁴ CCE(45)10.

consider whether it can usefully initiate discussions on such problems with a view to appropriate governmental or intergovernmental action, or whether it is preferable to leave their consideration to other organizations."

The United Kingdom Government considered that the problems raised fell outside the sphere of UNRRA.¹⁰⁵ The Committee decided to transmit the memorandum to its member governments and to meet within four weeks to receive reports of the progress made.¹⁰⁶ At the next meeting the United Kingdom representative indicated that his Government thought it premature to discuss the matter further, since representatives of his Government were meeting with those of the French Provisional Government, the USSR, and the United States to consider the development of machinery to deal with such matters. The USSR representative supported this view.¹⁰⁷ The effort to establish an active role for the Committee in connection with its second proposed function thus failed.

Thereafter, the Committee concentrated largely on the third function—discussion of periodic reports submitted by the Administration. These were used mostly, though not exclusively, by the Eastern European representatives as excuses for criticizing the Administration: Greece was getting too much;¹⁰⁸ deliveries to Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Republics were too slow;¹⁰⁹ Italy was getting too much;¹¹⁰ the displaced persons operations were being mis-handled.¹¹¹ Up-to-date supply figures not being available in London, since the master records were necessarily maintained in Washington, the Administration sometimes could not give the Committee complete information on the many points raised for discussion.¹¹²

After the decision at the Fifth Council Session that UNRRA would not be extended, criticism of the Administration gradually gave way to

¹⁰⁵ CCE(45)16, statement by United Kingdom representative, February 1945.

¹⁰⁶ CCE(45)20, minutes 11th meeting, 19 February 1945.

¹⁰⁷ CCE(45)33, minutes 12th meeting, 19 March 1945, p. 13.

¹⁰⁸ CCE(45)84, minutes 17th meeting, 26 June 1945.

¹⁰⁹ CCE(46)6, minutes 24th meeting, 11 January 1946; CCE(46)17, minutes 25th meeting, 15 February 1946; CCE(46)37, minutes 27th meeting, 25 April 1946; CCE(46)51, minutes 28th meeting, 6 June 1946.

¹¹⁰ CCE(46)24, 2d session, 25th meeting, 22 February 1946.

¹¹¹ CCE(46)51, minutes 28th meeting, 6 June 1946; CCE(46)47, minutes 30th meeting, 23 July 1946; CCE(46)75, minutes 31st meeting, 17 September 1946; CCE(46)86, minutes 33d meeting, 13 November 1946; CCE(47)2, minutes 34th meeting, 12 December 1946.

¹¹² For example, cable, London to Washington 609, 16 January 1946.

commendation. The Committee continued with the work of commenting on Administration reports into 1947, and at its thirty-eighth meeting on 23 March 1948 voted to dissolve.¹¹³

7. COMMITTEE OF THE COUNCIL FOR THE FAR EAST

Although the functions of the Committee of the Council for the Far East (CCFE) and the Committee of the Council for Europe were identical,¹¹⁴ their opportunities to serve UNRRA developed along very different lines, owing to political and economic differences in the areas which they represented. Starting with many handicaps, the Committee of the Council for the Far East grew steadily in influence and importance until it became a significant operating as well as policy-making body for UNRRA in China.

The original membership of the Committee of the Council for the Far East included representatives of Australia, China, the French Committee of National Liberation, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippine Commonwealth, the United Kingdom, and the United States.¹¹⁵ After the cessation of hostilities in the Far East, August 1945, the Third Council added a representative of the USSR (which had refused membership at the First Council¹¹⁶) to the Committee;¹¹⁷ Canada became a member at the final Session of the Council in December 1946.¹¹⁸ The representatives of each nation were changed frequently owing to the peripatetic meetings of the Committee. Observers from official international organizations and appropriate civic groups were invited from time to time to attend the Committee.¹¹⁹

T. F. Tsiang, China, served as chairman from the first meeting¹²⁰ until 13 November 1946, except for a few months in 1945 when the Chinese Ambassador in Washington, Wei Tao-ming, acted while Tsiang was in China.¹²¹ W. W. Yen, formerly Premier, was then

¹¹³ CCE(48)6, minutes 38th meeting, 23 March 1948.

¹¹⁴ Resolution 20.

¹¹⁵ Resolution 19.

¹¹⁶ Committee I, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 24 November 1943.

¹¹⁷ Resolution 79.

¹¹⁸ Resolution 108.

¹¹⁹ Committee of the Council for the Far East (CCFE) (44)2, minutes 3d meeting,

14 January 1944.

¹²⁰ CCFE(43)2, minutes 1st meeting, 30 November 1943.

¹²¹ CCFE(45)44, minutes 9th meeting, first session, 24 September 1945; CCFE(45)54, minutes 10th meeting, 13 December 1945; CCFE(46)1, minutes 11th meeting, 27 December 1945.

elected to the post¹²² and served until the final, thirty-eighth, meeting, 27 January 1948.¹²³

Prior to June 1946, the Committee of the Council for the Far East met nine times in Washington,¹²⁴ three at Atlantic City,¹²⁵ once in Sydney,¹²⁶ and once in London;¹²⁷ thereafter it met in China.¹²⁸

In the beginning the Committee was concerned with general plans and the bases of requirements for the Far East. It not only decided that no uniform bases were applicable for both Europe and Asia, but also, contrary to the conclusion of the Committee of the Council for Europe,¹²⁹ that no bases could be set up for the whole Far Eastern area. Each government should, therefore, present its own estimates, using whatever bases it desired.¹³⁰ The Committee also in the early days called attention to need for training personnel for relief and rehabilitation services in the Far East,¹³¹ and to the supplies which might become available for UNRRA purposes upon the liberation of territory then occupied by the enemy.¹³² The meeting held at Sydney, 15-20 February 1945,¹³³ led to an increased consciousness within the Administration of the problems of the Far East and increased awareness within the region of the existence and purposes of UNRRA.

Until the Committee began to hold regular meetings in China in the midst of developing relief operations, it could do little more than discuss bimonthly reports from the Administration on current work, and the observations of official or specialists' missions.¹³⁴

Since but two of its member governments made specific appeals to UNRRA for relief,¹³⁵ the Committee was chiefly concerned with the

¹²² CCFE(46)94, minutes 26th meeting, 13 November 1946.

¹²³ CCFE(48)22, minutes 38th meeting, 27 January 1948.

¹²⁴ 10 December 1943, 14 January, 23 February, 5 May, 12 October 1944, 21 September-3 October (three sessions), 13, 27 December 1945, 2 April 1946.

¹²⁵ 30 November 1943, 12, 22 March 1946.

¹²⁶ 15-20 February 1945.

¹²⁷ 2-21 August 1945 (six sessions).

¹²⁸ 7 June 1946 and thereafter.

¹²⁹ Part Three, Chapter I, Section 8.

¹³⁰ CCFE(43)4, minutes 2d meeting, 10 December 1943; CCFE(44)7, minutes 5th meeting, 5 May 1944; Resolution 65; *infra*, Part Three, Chapter I, Section 9.

¹³¹ CCFE(43)4, minutes 2d meeting, 10 December 1943.

¹³² CCFE(44)5, minutes 4th meeting, 23 February 1944.

¹³³ Collection of press clippings regarding 7th meeting of CCFE, 15-20 February 1945.

¹³⁴ CCFE(45)26, 28, 37, minutes 8th meeting, 2-24 August 1945; CCFE(45)44-46, minutes 9th meeting, 21 September 1945; CCFE(45)54, minutes 10th meeting, 13 October 1945; CCFE(46)1, minutes 11th meeting, 27 December 1945; CCFE(46)7, minutes 12th meeting, 20 March 1946; CCFE(46)8, minutes 13th meeting, 22 March 1946; CCFE(46)11, minutes 14th meeting, 2 April 1946.

¹³⁵ China and the Philippine Commonwealth; Korea was not a member of UNRRA.

vast and complex needs of the Chinese Republic. The emergency programs for the Philippines,¹³⁶ and that for Korea¹³⁷ which was developed on the authorization of the Third Council following the recommendation of the Committee of the Council for the Far East,¹³⁸ required little time in comparison.

The fifteenth meeting, held at Nanking on 7 June 1946, established the Committee as a force in the determination of the Administration's Far Eastern policy. The Committee, working also through subcommittees—including an especially important one on distribution¹³⁹—now became an active forum, discussing particularly such problems of the China Office as the extent of the displaced persons operation,¹⁴⁰ the need for more local currency,¹⁴¹ and the inequity in the distribution of supplies within the country.¹⁴²

The year 1947 was the crucial one for the Committee, for the major disturbances to the UNRRA operation in China growing out of the spreading civil war, the difficulties of transport, and the ever-increasing currency inflation obliged the regional committee to go beyond its advisory responsibilities. As these disturbances developed, the Central Committee not only looked to CCFE for guidance¹⁴³ in such matters as the stoppage of supplies to Communist China¹⁴⁴ but also delegated to it executive powers in conjunction with the UNRRA China Office,¹⁴⁵ particularly in regard to the use and control of funds from the sale of UNRRA cotton.¹⁴⁶ The bulk of this work was accomplished

¹³⁶ See Part Six, Chapter IV, Section 1.

¹³⁷ See *ibid.*, Section 2.

¹³⁸ CCFE (45) 28, minutes 8th meeting, second session, 6 August 1945; Resolution 76. This resolution also authorized operations in Formosa, but these were handled as part of the program for China.

¹³⁹ CCFE (46) 31.

¹⁴⁰ CCFE (46) 28, minutes 17th meeting, 8 June 1946; CCFE (46) 36, minutes 18th meeting, 8 June 1946.

¹⁴¹ CCFE (46) 38, minutes 19th meeting, 9 June 1946; CCFE (46) 33.

¹⁴² CCFE (46) 28, minutes 17th meeting, 8 June 1946; CCFE (46) 36, minutes 18th meeting, 8 June 1946.

¹⁴³ CC (47) 42, minutes 49th meeting, 4 March 1947.

¹⁴⁴ CCFE (47) 113, minutes 33d meeting, 18 July 1947; CCFE (47) 109, CC (47) 92, minutes 56th meeting, 24 July 1947; CC (47) 105, minutes 58th meeting, 20 August 1947; CCFE (47) 141, minutes 34th meeting, 24 September 1947; CC (47) 141, minutes 62d meeting, 17 November 1947.

¹⁴⁵ CC (47) 84; CC (47) 86, minutes 55th meeting, 16 June 1947; CC (47) 135, minutes 61st meeting, 5 November 1947; CC (47) 139; CC (47) 141, minutes 62d meeting, 17 November 1947.

¹⁴⁶ CC (47) 84; CC (47) 86, minutes 55th meeting, 16 June 1947; CC (47) 135, minutes 61st meeting, 5 November 1947; CC (47) 139; CC (47) 141, minutes 62d meeting, 17 November 1947.

in a Subcommittee on Financing, established in July 1947 and made up of representatives of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, CNRRA, and the Administration.¹⁴⁷

The Chinese relief officials both in Washington and Shanghai had, in 1947, viewed the Committee's increasing power with some concern as a possible infringement by an international organization on national sovereignty, and opposed its extended development and continuance.¹⁴⁸ On 27 January 1948 the Committee transferred its authority to BOTRA, which it had been active in inaugurating,¹⁴⁹ and voted its own dissolution.¹⁵⁰

8. THE COMMITTEE ON SUPPLIES

The Committee on Supplies was one of the four committees established specifically by the Agreement. Here it was indicated that this Committee should "consider, formulate and recommend policies designed to assure the provision of required supplies,"¹⁵¹ that it should consist of members "representing those member governments likely to be principal suppliers of materials for relief and rehabilitation,"¹⁵² and that its chairman should be invited to participate in those meetings of the Central Committee "at which policies affecting the provision of supplies are discussed."¹⁵³

At its First Session the Council formally established the Committee and defined its functions, which may be summarized as: to advise on general supply policies and to discuss programs for securing supplies, "as such programs affect the supplying countries"; to cooperate with the Director General and the established intergovernmental and governmental agencies in efforts to increase production and to assure the availability of required supplies; and "to consider whether there are unjustifiable differences in the valuations placed by the contributing countries upon the supplies and services purchased by or made available to the Administration."¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁷ Committee of the Council for the Far East (Subcommittee on Financing) (CCFE/SF) (47)1-(48)21.

¹⁴⁸ CCFE(47)97; CC(47)135, minutes 61st meeting, 5 November 1947.

¹⁴⁹ CCFE(47)126, 127, 128; CCFE(47)141, minutes 34th meeting, 24 September 1947; CCFE(47)152, minutes 35th meeting, 20 October 1947; CC(47)141, minutes 62d meeting, 17 November 1947; CCFE(47)173, minutes 36th meeting, 15 December 1947; CCFE(48)11, minutes 37th meeting, 15 January 1948.

¹⁵⁰ CCFE(48)22, minutes 38th meeting, 27 January 1948; CCFE(48)14.

¹⁵¹ Article III, 4.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*

¹⁵³ Article III, 3.

¹⁵⁴ Resolution 22.

To carry out these responsibilities the Council determined that representatives of eleven nations—Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States—should be members of the Committee. While it was hoped at the time that all might become contributing countries, five did not. At later sessions, representatives of India;¹⁵⁵ Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia;¹⁵⁶ Greece, the Philippines, and the Ukrainian SSR¹⁵⁷ were added; the latter two groups after the functions of the Committee had been expanded.¹⁵⁸ Of these additional nine, only two were contributing countries.

In accord with the understanding reached between the Canadian, United Kingdom, and United States Governments,¹⁵⁹ Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian representative, was elected chairman at the first meeting. On his resignation in September 1946, J. B. Brigden, Australia, was elected to succeed him,¹⁶⁰ Canada having by then become a member of the Central Committee.

During the planning period of UNRRA, that is, until the Third Council Session, the Committee on Supplies was the main forum where the Administration's supply operations were discussed. Through carefully prepared reports the Bureau of Supply laid before the Committee the Administration's negotiations with the allocating agencies¹⁶¹ and the military authorities,¹⁶² its plans for specific operations,¹⁶³ and periodic reviews of the developments in its supply program.¹⁶⁴ In general, the Committee gave the desired support to the Administration's work,¹⁶⁵ serving also as both check and goad during the growth of the supply operation. To the Second Council, it reported that "the working relationships established between the Committee on Supplies and the Executive Branch of the Administration during the last nine months have resulted in a thorough appreciation of the supply problems in-

¹⁵⁵ Resolution 45.

¹⁵⁶ Resolution 68.

¹⁵⁷ By decision of the Central Committee in fulfillment of Resolution 68, CC(46)61, minutes 29th meeting, 17 May 1946 (CC Docs., III, 26-27).

¹⁵⁸ Resolution 69.

¹⁵⁹ Part One, Chapter I, Section 3.

¹⁶⁰ Committee on Supplies (CS) (46)41, minutes 26th meeting, 26 September 1946.

¹⁶¹ CS(44)17, 21, 25, 31; CS(45)16, Appendix Two.

¹⁶² CS(44)5, letter, Lehman to Combined Chiefs of Staff, 22 December 1943; CS(44)17, 25, 31.

¹⁶³ CS(44)8, "Draft of Proposed Policies and Procedures for Procurement in Advance of Liberation by Governments of Countries Occupied by the Enemy," 27 January 1944; CS(44)15, March 1944, revised draft of same; CS(45)4, memo, "Valuation and Prices of Relief and Rehabilitation Supplies."

¹⁶⁴ CS(44)17, 21, 25, 31; CS(45)2, 6, 9, 16, 20, 25, 26, 33, 36, 42.

¹⁶⁵ CS(44)36; CS(45)29.

volved and of the procedures that need to be established to facilitate the prompt solution of these problems.”¹⁶⁶

As it became apparent that the distribution of supplies was of equal importance with their provision the Committee asked the right to consider as well the equity of any proposed policy for the distribution of relief supplies among receiving countries. This function was apparently established by Resolution 69, originally put forward by Pearson in the General Committee at the Third Council, empowering the Committee on Supplies to advise on and discuss “broad programs for securing the equitable distribution of supplies.”¹⁶⁷ The power came to little, however, since this work was largely assumed by the Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee, created as a result of another decision made at the same Council Session.¹⁶⁸

Having failed in this effort the Committee on Supplies reluctantly reverted to its original advisory function regarding the procurement of supplies.¹⁶⁹ Through the appointment of a Subcommittee on Special Supply Problems,¹⁷⁰ it played an important part in bringing the critical food shortage in the winter of 1945-1946 to the attention of member governments.¹⁷¹ Thereafter it met seldom,¹⁷² and, with the approval of all its members, the chairman agreed to its dissolution by the Central Committee in August 1947.¹⁷³

9. SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON SUPPLIES (ON ABILITY TO PAY)

The early plan to consider supplies and finance in one standing committee was discarded at the First Council. In the meeting of the Committee on *Ad Hoc* Committees on 21 November, the Belgian representative proposed a smaller committee to deal with the situation of countries without foreign exchange, arguing that much confidential material

¹⁶⁶ Council II Document 221, CS(44)36.

¹⁶⁷ Council III, General Committee, verbatim minutes 5th meeting, 17 August 1945; Council III Document 101.

¹⁶⁸ Resolution 80; *infra*, Part Three, Chapter II, Section 6.

¹⁶⁹ CS(45)41; CS(46)1, minutes 19th meeting, 12 December 1945.

¹⁷⁰ CS(46)8, minutes 20th meeting, 24 January 1946.

¹⁷¹ CS(46)13; Council IV Document 18, CS(46)25; see *infra*, Part Three, Chapter IV, Section 4.

¹⁷² Four times after 25 March 1946.

¹⁷³ CC(47)86, minutes 55th meeting, 16 June 1947; CC(47)98; CC(47)99, minutes 57th meeting, 5 August 1947.

would be involved which should not be widely circulated. Further arguments for dividing the larger committee included the difficulties of combining finances with supply matters¹⁷⁴ and the recognition that a separate committee of technical experts would be needed to deal with the problems of administrative finance.¹⁷⁵

The First Council, on the recommendation of the Committee on *Ad Hoc* Committees,¹⁷⁶ accordingly established a small subcommittee of no more than five members to deal with, and advise the Director General on, the ability to pay of countries applying for UNRRA's assistance. Appointed by the chairman of the Committee on Supplies, the majority of its members were to be drawn from that Committee and the others coöpted from the Committee on Financial Control.¹⁷⁷

The Subcommittee on Ability to Pay differed from all other UNRRA standing committees. In reality, it was a series of five committees, each in turn set up to advise the Director General on the application of one or more countries. Various factors made this desirable. The USSR, for instance, did not wish to participate in deliberations on China;¹⁷⁸ the United States was not an appropriate member to consider the case of the Philippines. Representatives of eight member governments—Brazil, Canada, France, Mexico, Norway, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States—constituted the over-all membership, thus providing the overlapping in the five groups necessary for continuity of principles. In their thirty-two meetings between 23 August 1944 and 18 September 1946 these subcommittees made twenty-two determinations normally covering periods of six months.¹⁷⁹

The Subcommittee presented its recommendations—in every instance unanimous decisions—to the Director General, who then made his determinations. From early 1945 they were revised as a standard internal paper bearing his signature. In all cases the Director General followed the Subcommittee's recommendations.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁴ Committee on *Ad Hoc* Committees, Secretary's notes, 21 November 1943.

¹⁷⁵ Part Two, Chapter III.

¹⁷⁶ Reception 239, I/F/5/No. 6, Committee on *Ad Hoc* Committees, minutes, 22 November 1943; Reception 285, I/F/5/No. 9, Report of the Committee on *Ad Hoc* Committees, 25 November 1943.

¹⁷⁷ Resolution 23.

¹⁷⁸ Memo, David Weintraub (Bureau of Supply) to Lehman, 25 October 1944.

¹⁷⁹ For details see monograph, Jacques J. Polak, "Ability to Pay," also *infra*, Part One, Chapter V, Section 3.

¹⁸⁰ Monograph, Polak, "Ability to Pay," p. 11.

10. COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL CONTROL

The major functions of the Committee on Financial Control were:

1. To review the annual budgets and any supplementary budgets of the Director General and to make reports, comments, and recommendations to the Council on these budgets.
2. To receive the quarterly reports of the Director General on Administrative expenditures and receipts and to make reports to the Council regarding them.
3. To recommend auditors to the Council and to advise the Council regarding the scope and frequency of the reports to be obtained from the auditors . . .
4. To make recommendations to the Council regarding the share of the administrative expense of the Administration to be provided by each member government . . .
5. Generally to advise the Council on all financial matters within the competency of the Administration other than those falling within the scope of the Committee on Supplies.¹⁸¹

Its membership consisted of the Council members, or their alternates, representing China, Greece, Mexico, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States.¹⁸² Four successive chairmen were elected: Dean Acheson; ¹⁸³ William L. Clayton; ¹⁸⁴ A. T. Brennan, ¹⁸⁵ the able member from South Africa who as vice-chairman had often presided during Clayton's tenure; and, after a vacancy for six meetings, Ole Colbjornsen, from Norway, also a former vice-chairman.¹⁸⁶

The power to review the annual and supplementary budgets of the Administration upon which it made recommendations to the Council or the Central Committee was taken most seriously.¹⁸⁷ By tacit agreement

¹⁸¹ Resolution 25.

¹⁸² Resolution 24.

¹⁸³ Committee on Financial Control (CFC) (43)2, minutes 1st meeting, 30 November 1943.

¹⁸⁴ CFC(45)28, minutes 19th meeting, 17 July 1945.

¹⁸⁵ CFC(46)49, minutes 33d meeting, 12 July 1946.

¹⁸⁶ CFC(47)6, minutes 41st meeting, 6 February 1947.

¹⁸⁷ CFC(44)42, minutes 10th meeting, 20 September 1944; CFC(44)43, minutes 11th meeting, 21 September 1944; CFC(44)44, minutes 12th meeting, 22 September 1944; CFC(45)3, minutes 14th meeting, 24 January 1945; CFC(45)61; CFC(46)6, minutes 26th meeting, 3 January 1946; CFC(46)9, minutes 27th meeting, 16 January 1946; CFC(46)12, minutes 28th meeting, 23 January 1946; CFC(46)35, minutes 31st meeting, 22 March 1946; CFC(46)49, minutes 33d meeting, 12 July 1946; CFC(46)60, minutes 35th meeting, 19 July 1946; CFC(46)73, minutes 36th meeting, 26 November 1946; CFC(47)15, minutes 42d meeting, 2 April 1947; CFC(47)27, minutes 43d meeting, 2 July 1947.

at the Montreal Council Session, and in accordance with the original title—Committee on Administrative Finance—the members limited their responsibility to a concern about administrative expenses, excluding all mission or “operating” expenditures.¹⁸⁸

The Committee’s power to review the Administration’s financial statements augmented by the Director General’s comments and the auditors’ reports thereon, as well as any other reports by the auditors on accounting and financial problems,¹⁸⁹ led to a general airing of the weaknesses in the financial organization of UNRRA¹⁹⁰ and their ultimate rectifications. The Committee’s responsibility for recommending the auditors led to the acceptance of the United States proposal supported by the United Kingdom that UNRRA should have an independent firm of auditors for the policy audit rather than a group of auditors chosen from several member nations under a controlling officer appointed by the Committee on Financial Control.¹⁹¹

The power to recommend the size of the administrative contributions of member governments made the Committee the body where the assessments on new members of UNRRA were considered and levied,¹⁹² where member nations wishing cuts in their allocation brought their cases,¹⁹³ and where deficits arising from the nonpayment of contributions were discussed.¹⁹⁴ The general power to advise the Council and Director General on financial matters within the com-

¹⁸⁸ CFC(44)44, minutes 12th meeting, 22 September 1944; CFC(44)45, minutes 13th meeting, 23 September 1944.

¹⁸⁹ Resolutions 25, 44.

¹⁹⁰ For example, CFC, verbatim minutes 15th meeting, 16 March 1945; 16th meeting, 23 March 1945; CFC(45)11, minutes 17th meeting, 29 March 1945; CFC(45)12, 13, 25; CFC(45)38, minutes 21st meeting, 13 August 1945; CFC(45)41, minutes 22d meeting, 14 August 1945; CFC(46)1, minutes 25th meeting, 14 December 1945; CFC(46)19, minutes 29th meeting, 15 February 1946; CFC(46)74, minutes 37th meeting, 6 December 1946; CFC(47)6, minutes 41st meeting, 6 February 1947; CFC(47)15, minutes 42d meeting, 2 April 1947; CFC(47)27, minutes 43d meeting, 2 July 1947.

¹⁹¹ CFC, verbatim minutes: 3d meeting, 13 March 1944; 4th meeting, 25 April 1944; 5th meeting, 3 May 1944; 6th meeting, 8 May 1944; 7th meeting, 15 May 1944; CFC(44)21; CFC(44)23; CFC(44)29, minutes 8th meeting, 7 August 1944.

¹⁹² CFC(45)38, minutes 21st meeting, 13 August 1945; CFC(45)41, minutes 22d meeting, 14 August 1945; CFC(45)45, minutes 23d meeting, 16 August 1945; CFC(45)49, minutes 24th meeting, 18 August 1945; CFC(46)1, minutes 25th meeting, 14 December 1945; CFC(46)6, minutes 26th meeting, 3 January 1946; CFC(46)12, minutes 28th meeting, 23 January 1946; CFC(46)13; CFC(46)49, minutes 33rd meeting, 12 July 1946; CFC(46)73, minutes 36th meeting, 26 November 1946.

¹⁹³ CFC(44)45, minutes 13th meeting, 23 September 1944.

¹⁹⁴ CFC(45)22; CFC(45)28, minutes 19th meeting, 17 July 1945; CFC(45)45, minutes 23d meeting, 16 August 1945; CFC(47)6, minutes 41st meeting, 6 February 1947; CFC(47)15, minutes 42d meeting, 2 April 1947.

petency of the Administration resulted in the Committee's discussion of insurance policies,¹⁹⁵ personnel salary scales,¹⁹⁶ accounting plans,¹⁹⁷ and the convertible currency resources and requirements of the Administration.¹⁹⁸

In spite of its limited control over the Administration's finances, the Committee served as an important check and active threat to extravagant tendencies among UNRRA's administrators both in Washington and London. Although it made its major contributions before the Audit Subcommittee began work in March 1945, the Committee's power to cut administrative budgets continued to inspire caution in the staff.¹⁹⁹ The Committee's review was, in fact, considered important enough to keep the Committee in existence throughout the liquidation of UNRRA, to receive the financial reports of the Administration, and to confer with the Board of Audit of the United Nations on audit procedures and policies.²⁰⁰

11. AUDIT SUBCOMMITTEE

The Audit Subcommittee, established by Resolution 44, was appointed by the Committee on Financial Control in January 1945. The Subcommittee was to consult with the auditors, to direct them concerning the policy aspects of the audit, and to examine and make reports and recommendations to the Committee on Financial Control on the records and accounts of the Administration. The Subcommittee, indeed, played a very active role in all questions connected with the accounts and financial reports of the Administration. It suggested organizational changes; it commented on the state and conditions of the accounts; it established standards to be met by the accounts. After considering the views of the Administration and the auditors, it made many recommendations concerning the financial aspects of the work

¹⁹⁵ CFC(45)23; CFC(45)28, minutes 19th meeting, 17 July 1945; CFC(46)1, minutes 25th meeting, 14 December 1945.

¹⁹⁶ CFC, verbatim minutes 4th meeting, 25 April 1944; CFC(45)24; CFC(45)28, minutes 19th meeting, 17 July 1945.

¹⁹⁷ CFC(43)6, minutes 2d meeting, 20 December 1943; verbatim minutes 3d meeting, 14 March 1944.

¹⁹⁸ CFC(45)45, minutes 23d meeting, 16 August 1945.

¹⁹⁹ Memo, Director General to all division and bureau heads, 11 October 1944; Senior Deputy Director General's staff meeting, minutes, 17 January 1946.

²⁰⁰ CFC(48)17, minutes 46th meeting, 21 September 1948; interview, G. E. Fox with Wilbur Morse (Secretary of the Committee), 30 November 1948.

of the Administration to the Committee on Financial Control.²⁰¹

The Subcommittee held its first meeting on 21 March 1945. The five members were nominated by Czechoslovakia, the Union of South Africa, USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It was expected that they would be chosen for special technical competence, and at first they met this requirement. The member from South Africa was succeeded by a representative nominated by Canada in the autumn of 1946, the Committee on Financial Control being empowered to invite another government to name a member in case one of the original five should be unable to supply a suitable person.²⁰² The USSR representative was changed at least five times and after July 1947 seldom attended the meetings, although he continued to receive the Committee's papers.²⁰³ A. T. Brennan, South Africa, became the first chairman, owing to his recognized knowledge of the Administration.²⁰⁴ Upon his resignation from the Committee on Financial Control in July 1946, Fred L. Preu, the United States member since November 1945, became acting and then permanent chairman of the Subcommittee.²⁰⁵

Since the Subcommittee was concerned with making recommendations based on the records and accounts of the Administration, it worked in privacy. Members of the Administration and the Council's auditors attended its meetings only on invitation,²⁰⁶ and, although its formal recommendations were given wide circulation,²⁰⁷ the brief summaries of its deliberations²⁰⁸ had in the beginning very limited distribution.²⁰⁹

12. PROGRAM SUBCOMMITTEE

The Program Subcommittee was established by the Central Committee after the Third Council to review projected supply programs for receiving countries submitted by the Administration and to recommend to the Central Committee their acceptance or revision. Each government on the Central Committee appointed a representative, and

²⁰¹ See Part Two, Chapter III.

²⁰² CFC(45)3, minutes 14th meeting, 24 January 1945.

²⁰³ Audit Subcommittee, minutes, March 1945-March 1948.

²⁰⁴ Audit Subcommittee, minutes 1st meeting, 21 March 1945.

²⁰⁵ Audit Subcommittee, minutes 14th meeting, 11 July 1946; minutes 15th meeting, 22 November 1946.

²⁰⁶ Audit Subcommittee, Brennan report, 1st meeting, 21 March 1945.

²⁰⁷ For example, Council III Document 11.

²⁰⁸ Audit Subcommittee, minutes, 19 December 1945.

²⁰⁹ Audit Subcommittee, minutes, 5-6 December 1945.

optionally an alternate, to serve on the Subcommittee.²¹⁰ It had, therefore, a membership of six until the Council at its Fourth Session enlarged the Central Committee to nine.²¹¹ As the same men usually sat on both committees the Program Subcommittee was, in effect, a replica of the Central Committee. This meant that during the most important period in the Administration's history, when the program of operations was being formulated, the major representatives of member governments were in almost daily contact with the Administration.

Because of its basic connection with all decisions regarding the size and nature of country programs, the Program Subcommittee was the most significant of UNRRA's advisory committees, and the results of its deliberations during fifty-four meetings were reflected in the allotment of supplies to each receiving country.²¹²

13. TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES

The five technical committees established by the First Council had similar functions. In their respective fields of agriculture, displaced persons, health, industrial rehabilitation, and welfare they were to advise the Council, the Central Committee, and the Director General on the nature and scope of technical problems; to review periodically the program of the Administration; to make proposals on technical policies; to appoint subcommittees at the request of, and in consultation with, the regional committees; and to advise the regional committees and the respective regional representatives of the Director General on technical problems.²¹³

Eight nations (Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yugoslavia) appointed representatives to all five committees. Twenty-four governments named experts to attend the Committee on Agriculture, sixteen for the Displaced Persons Committee, fourteen for the Health Committee, sixteen for the Industrial Rehabilitation Committee, and thirteen for the Welfare Committee. The elected chairmen of the five

²¹⁰ CC(45)38, minutes 18th meeting, 29 November 1945 (CC Docs., II, 40-43); CC(45)39 (CC Docs., II, 44-45).

²¹¹ Canada, China, France, USSR, United Kingdom, and United States; Australia, Brazil, and Yugoslavia.

²¹² See Part Three, Chapter II, Sections 6 ff.

²¹³ Resolutions 27, 28, 29, 30, 31.

bodies represented Canada, the United States, the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium.²¹⁴

On the corresponding technical subcommittees and the two additional *Ad Hoc* Subcommittees on Food and on Textiles established for Europe, the following countries were represented: Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the French Provisional Government, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the USSR, and the United Kingdom, except that the USSR was not represented on the Welfare Subcommittee. Among non-European countries, the United States was represented on all seven; Canada, on all but the Displaced Persons; Brazil and Iceland, on the Agriculture, Food, and Textile; and New Zealand, on the Agriculture and Health.²¹⁵ Three of the chairmen came from the United Kingdom, one each from Czechoslovakia, the French Provisional Government, the Netherlands, and Norway.²¹⁶

There were also five technical subcommittees appointed for the Far East. To all, Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States sent representatives. China took part in all except the Subcommittee on Displaced Persons. India appointed a member to the Subcommittee on Displaced Persons and Industrial Rehabilitation, and the Philippine Commonwealth sent representatives to the Subcommittees on Agricultural Rehabilitation and Welfare.²¹⁷ The original chairmen of these subcommittees were selected by the chairman of the Committee of the Council for the Far East in consultation with the chairman of the corresponding standing technical

²¹⁴ Standing Technical Committee on Agricultural Rehabilitation (TAG) (44)2, minutes 1st meeting, 13 January 1944; Standing Technical Committee on Displaced Persons (TDP) (44)2, minutes 1st meeting, 13 January 1944; Standing Technical Committee on Health (THE) (44)2, minutes 1st meeting, 17 January 1944; Standing Technical Committee on Industrial Rehabilitation (TIR) (44)2, minutes 1st meeting, 13 January 1944; Standing Technical Committee on Welfare (TWE) (44)2, minutes 1st meeting, 13 January 1944.

²¹⁵ CCE(44)8, 13, 20, 70.

²¹⁶ CCE(44)24, 28, and 70.

²¹⁷ Subcommittee on Agricultural Rehabilitation for the Far East (TAG/FE) (44)5, minutes 1st meeting, 29 November 1944; Subcommittee on Displaced Persons for the Far East (TDP/FE) (45)19, minutes 1st meeting, 23 January 1945; TDP/FE(45)24, minutes 3d meeting, 15 February 1945; Subcommittee on Health for the Far East (THE/FE) (44)9, minutes 1st meeting, 26 November 1944; THE/FE(45)11, minutes 3d meeting, 1 February 1945; Subcommittee on Industrial Rehabilitation for the Far East (TIR/FE) (45)1, minutes 1st meeting, 22 December 1944; TIR/FE(45)7, minutes 2d meeting, 25 January 1945; Subcommittee on Welfare for the Far East (TWE/FE) (44)4, minutes 1st meeting, 15 November 1944; TWE/FE(45)6, minutes 3d meeting, 22 January 1945.

committee.²¹⁸ Two came from China, one from India, one from the Netherlands and one from New Zealand.²¹⁹ As these men were seldom present, the subcommittees elected temporary chairmen who often varied from meeting to meeting.

These technical committees and subcommittees played, on the whole, a minor role in the development of the work of UNRRA. In three instances, however, their advice had a lasting influence on the Administration's policy. The Standing Technical Committee on Health, acting under Resolution 52 passed at the Second Council, prepared the final texts of the International Sanitary Conventions.²²⁰ Three of the European subcommittees (those on agriculture, health, and industrial rehabilitation) and the *Ad Hoc* Food and Textile Subcommittees prepared the bases used by the Director General in determining the division of UNRRA supplies among the European countries.²²¹ The Subcommittee on Welfare for Europe initiated the resolution for the provision of emergency supplies for Northwestern Europe²²² which, authorized by the Central Committee,²²³ became part of the UNRRA program.

With the end of the planning period, the need for the technical committees was generally recognized to have passed, and all but the Standing Technical Committees on Health, Displaced Persons, and Industrial Rehabilitation were dissolved by the Third Council in August 1945, with provision that *ad hoc* committees might be appointed if necessary.²²⁴ Although none of the three remaining committees met after the middle of 1946,²²⁵ they were not officially dissolved by the Central Committee until August 1947.²²⁶

²¹⁸ CCFE(44)2, minutes 3d meeting, 14 January 1944.

²¹⁹ TAG/FE(44)1; TDP/FE(45)1; THE/FE(44)1; TIR/FE(44)1; TWE/FE(44)1.

²²⁰ THE(45)1, minutes 7th meeting, 5 December 1944; THE(45)2, minutes 8th meeting, 9 December 1944; see *infra*, Part Four, Chapter II, Section 2.

²²¹ Resolution 55; *infra*, Part Three, Chapter I, *passim*.

²²² Subcommittee on Welfare for Europe (TWE/E)(45)2, TWE/E(45)3, minutes 6th meeting, 10 January 1945; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter XII.

²²³ CC(45)9, minutes 12th meeting, 26 February 1945 (CC Docs., I, 101-105); see *infra*, Appendix Four, Section III, Document 1.

²²⁴ Resolution 75.

²²⁵ THE(46)4, minutes 10th meeting, 16 July 1946; TDP(46)1, minutes 15th meeting, 20 December 1945; TIR(46)15, minutes 11th meeting, 21 May 1946.

²²⁶ CC(47)99, minutes 57th meeting, 5 August 1947.

14. *THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES AND THE ADMINISTRATION*

The elaborate provisions made for the committees were more impressive than real. Hope that committees would be important instruments in building up the good will, participation, and support of member governments in the work of UNRRA ²²⁷ gave place to the fear that advisory bodies would delay action.²²⁸ UNRRA's work was to meet emergency needs promptly. Its life was short. Operations could not be postponed by long discussions in numerous committees leading to advice on policy. Because of this the Administration discouraged committee meetings,²²⁹ and by the Second Council Session member governments advised against their multiplication.²³⁰ The dissolution of many of the technical committees by the Third Council was welcomed by members and the Administration alike.²³¹

At the same time, some committees rose to positions of significance. With the beginning of intensive operations the member governments established, at least theoretically, greater control over the Administration through an increase in the powers of the Central Committee, the creation of the Program Subcommittee, and more thorough examination of the financial aspects of the work by the Audit Subcommittee and the Committee on Financial Control. When operations in China reached their peak, the Central Committee delegated executive powers to the Committee of the Council for the Far East. These five committees—occasionally resisted by the Administration for encroaching on its authority ²³²—played an important part in molding the policy of UNRRA and in keeping the Administration's problems before the member governments. They were the major forums in which the Administration's point of view could be heard. Through them the Ad-

²²⁷ State (OFRRO Docs.), Pre-UNRRA Committee VIII, 9, memo, Hugh Jackson (Special Assistant to Lehman, OFRRO), 25 October 1943.

²²⁸ Monograph, H. E. Caustin, "Notes on the Development and Functions of the Director General's Office," first draft, p. 25; Hugh Jackson (Deputy Director General for Regional Liaison), Diary, 24 February, 26 April 1944, pp. 36-37; Director General's staff meeting, minutes, 26 April 1944.

²²⁹ Monograph, Eugene Sergeev, "Committee Division," p. 4.

²³⁰ *Journal*, Second Council, p. 55.

²³¹ Council III Document 170, Ad Hoc/G29; minutes 6th meeting, 23 August 1945; *Journal*, Third Council, pp. 95-97, 117.

²³² CFC(45)14, letter, Lehman to CFC, 26 March 1945; Director General's meeting with Roger Makins (British Embassy), notes, 10 September 1945; *Journal*, Fifth Council, p. 22.

ministration could and did appeal formally for the support and understanding necessary from member nations.

The support received represented, in general, genuine international collaboration. The committees were meeting places where national representatives were free to advance the policies of their own governments. One of the remarkable features of UNRRA was not that such representatives did occasionally advocate actions that clearly reflected national policies rather than politically unbiased practices,²³³ but that they did so infrequently. From the Council down, the national representatives tried to determine the fair method of carrying out the basic aims of UNRRA.²³⁴

²³³ See above, Section 2.

²³⁴ For example, United States support of the Yugoslav program, CC(46)97, minutes 36th meeting, 12 September 1946 (CC Docs., IV, 5-7).

IV. The Financial Plan

1. EVOLUTION OF A FINANCIAL PLAN

THE AGREEMENT for UNRRA created the organization to administer relief; the motive force for the organization was to be provided by the funds voted by each member government "in so far as its appropriate constitutional bodies shall authorize."¹

In signing the Agreement, each member government pledged itself to contribute to the resources needed to enable the Administration to accomplish the purposes for which it was established.² Provision was made in the Agreement for two separate types of contribution: administrative and operating. Administrative expenses were to be met by an annual budget drawn up by the Director General and submitted to the Council for approval; they were then to be borne by the member governments "in proportions to be determined by the Council."³ The administrative contribution was to be a definite assessment. The operating contribution, on the other hand, was to be determined both as to size and character by the member governments themselves, but the obligation to pay either the one or the other was not to become legally binding until the appropriate constitutional bodies of each government chose to make it so.

In the war period during which UNRRA was planned it was impossible to be precise regarding the financial scope of the proposed relief organization. No one could prophesy what would be the extent of the needs of the liberated countries, or what resources the governments supplying relief would have at their disposal. There were many variables, and perhaps the only constant was that relief needs would outrun the means to meet them.

In the course of the protracted discussions which were conducted between the United States and United Kingdom Governments for the financing of relief, there emerged some general principles which were recognized as essential to any financial plan to be adopted. The first was that the acceptance of relief should not result in a burden of in-

¹ Article V.

² *Ibid.*

³ Article VI.

debtedness.⁴ After World War I relief had been financed largely through loans; the United States Government alone made loans directly or indirectly for relief and rehabilitation amounting to about \$2,300 million; the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, and other governments made loans amounting to something like \$424 million.⁵ Theoretically, these loans had to be repaid; in fact, very few of them were, and they lingered on to cloud international relations. In the financial planning for UNRRA there was no question of long-term loans and credits; countries without resources would not be called upon to pay for relief. Some of the receiving countries, indeed, looked upon UNRRA relief as a right.⁶ They argued that they had been promised help and that these promises had led them to increase during the war the destruction of their resources: therefore, they had acquired a right to receive help.

The second principle accepted was that those countries which had financial resources should pay for their own relief.⁷ Liberated countries in need of relief could, in fact, be divided into two categories: those which, like Poland and Yugoslavia, would probably have no financial resources in foreign exchange and would therefore have to be provided for entirely through free contributions; and those which, like France and Belgium, were expected to have substantial resources at the end of the war. It is not certain that the effect of this division into what subsequently came to be known as "nonpaying" and "paying" countries was fully recognized until the First Council Session.⁸ Before the Session was ended, however, it had become clear that UNRRA would be actively responsible in Europe for only the East and Southeast countries which were not in a position "to pay," and that the West European countries, which had foreign exchange resources, would have direct access to

⁴ Letter, Sir Kingsley Wood (Chancellor of the Exchequer) to Lehman, 22 April 1943.

⁵ Dean Acheson (United States Department of State) in United States Congress, 78th, 1 and 2 Sessions, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192* (Washington, D.C., 1944), pp. 51, 101, 187-188, 9 and 10 December 1943.

⁶ For example, memo, Leith-Ross, conversation with Rudolf Bicanic (UNRRA Council member for Yugoslavia), 8 January 1945; memo, Oscar Schachter (General Counsel's Office, HQ) to Lehman *et al*, 9 November 1945, reporting two meetings with V. F. Teplyakov (General Counsel, Soviet Purchasing Commission); *Journal*, Fourth Council, 4th plenary meeting, 19 March 1946, speech by N. I. Feonov (USSR member), p. 36.

⁷ "Capacity to pay" concept developed in United Kingdom Treasury Files, 18642/03/1, unnumbered documents, February 1943.

⁸ Letter, Richard Law (United Kingdom Minister of State) to Acheson, 5 October 1943.

the various supply authorities and would look after their own needs.

The third principle was, from the aspect of international coöperation, an important one: all countries—those which had been overrun as well as those which had not—should contribute to the administrative expenses; in this way donor and recipient countries would all be shareholders in the organization, and all, whether giving or receiving, would be equally entitled to be heard in the councils of UNRRA.

Finally, it was agreed that, whatever financial plan was formulated, it must be one which would appeal to the United States Congress, since it was inevitable that the bulk of the resources would have to be provided by the United States.⁹

These principles were based on the assumption that the work which was to be carried out by UNRRA was to be strictly limited in scope. The early conception of UNRRA as an organization which would cover reconstruction as well as relief and rehabilitation had been abandoned.¹⁰ By the time the final plans were worked out in the summer and autumn of 1943, it was accepted that UNRRA's financial target was a fund sufficient to provide for the import of essential supplies for the emergency period into those liberated countries which had insufficient reserves of gold and foreign exchange.¹¹ The bulk of the supplies which would be needed by the liberated countries, even by those which had suffered the worst despoliation, would have to be provided by the industry of the peoples themselves. The margin to be furnished by UNRRA, irrespective of what other plans might later be developed for further rehabilitation and reconstruction, would, it was estimated, be something like 5 per cent of the total.¹² It was difficult, however, to find a realistic figure either for the funds which could be raised, or for the supplies which would be required.¹³ In this dilemma there was little possibility of matching what the contributing governments might be able to give with what might be needed.

A plan which aimed at overcoming the difficulty in estimating what contributions the major supplying countries could make to relief was worked out in the United Kingdom Treasury early in 1943. It was dis-

⁹ Conference of OFRRO staff with experts from United States Government departments, League of Nations, Carnegie Endowment, Bank of Manhattan, etc., 23-26 June 1943.

¹⁰ See Part One, Chapter I, Section 5.

¹¹ Acheson in Foreign Affairs *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192*, p. 12.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Special studies prepared for OFRRO Preparatory Committees 9 and 10, summary of conversations in London, 8-23 April 1943; interview, K. R. Miller with Harry D. White (United States Treasury), March 1948.

cussed with Lehman when he visited London, as head of OFRRO, in April 1943.¹⁴ Briefly, the plan provided for the injection of the relief program into the existing wartime supply machinery. As in the Lend-Lease/Reciprocal Aid system, payment for supplies would be required in some cases, while in others it would not. Allocation of relief supplies would be carried out by the Combined Boards. Financial settlement would be made direct between the supplying and receiving countries; a country which had sterling balances would pay for supplies received within the sterling area, while receiving supplies from the United States on Lend-Lease terms if it had no dollar resources. Subject to such financial arrangements, donor governments (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, etc.) would be designated by the Combined Boards to supply various receiving countries and would recover the cost involved where the financial resources of the receiving country permitted them to make payment. "Ability to pay" would be the criterion for deciding whether a country should pay for supplies or get them free. No special relief fund would be created, and the scheme would obviate the risk of entering into premature obligations for large global amounts of supplies before any experience, either of what was required or of what could be supplied, had been gained.¹⁵

This plan seemed both to the United Kingdom and the United States officials to have certain drawbacks. It was felt that under so fluid an arrangement it would be difficult to provide the United States Congress with the information needed to obtain the necessary appropriations.¹⁶ Lehman's doubts about whether the plan would be workable were shown by his reiterated request for information on what the United Kingdom Government considered it would be able to contribute. Accordingly, before Lehman left England, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Kingsley Wood, wrote to him setting out the types of supplies which the United Kingdom was likely to be able to make available. Regarding finance, the letter added:

Also we have estimated that where the countries which receive . . . supplies are in a position to pay for them, it will be their wish to do so. There will be some countries which will not have the resources to contribute to their own assistance. To the extent that our contributions were allocated to such countries, we should not expect to receive payment for goods or services. Our general principle would be that relief should not leave indebtedness behind.¹⁷

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Letter, Sir Kingsley Wood to Lehman, 22 April 1943.

Discussions continued in Washington during the summer. The view that a central fund would be necessary gained ground. Lehman and Harry D. White, of the United States Treasury, who had not hitherto taken part in the discussions, argued for definite levies on all countries which had not been devastated by the enemy. Such an approach would provide a predetermined income to the Administration on an equitable and businesslike basis likely to appeal to the United States Congress.¹⁸

In conversations within OFRRO in June, an operating budget for UNRRA's first year was estimated at between \$2,000 million and \$3,000 million, of which \$1,000 million was suggested as the initial United States contribution.¹⁹ These figures could not boast a statistical basis—indeed, perhaps their chief merit was that they were round—but they remained the tentative figures used in subsequent discussions and, in fact, almost acquired the status of targets.

In October 1943, a few weeks before the Agreement for UNRRA was signed, Richard Law, Minister of State in the United Kingdom Government, accompanied by Treasury officials, including J. M. (later Lord) Keynes, went to Washington for final discussions with Dean Acheson and others. At a meeting attended by Acheson, Lehman, White, and the United Kingdom representatives, White introduced a plan for financing UNRRA.²⁰

He had previously expressed himself in favor of a restricted UNRRA.²¹ He prophesied, all too truly, that its resources would never be sufficient to cover the activities which it would wish to undertake. The extent of its operations, therefore, White argued, should be predicated on the probable size of the contributions rather than on an attempt to carry out a too ambitious program of activities. He considered that contributions should be based on a formula. One of the advantages of this approach would lie in the emphasis to be placed on the fact that contributions were due, not gifts; an element of obligation not existing in the Agreement would be imported. It would be preferable, moreover, for any controversy over the financial plan to be focused on a formula rather than on the contributions themselves. He foresaw the danger that contributing governments might fight shy of con-

¹⁸ Special studies, Committees 9 and 10; Conference of Experts, 23–26 June 1943.

¹⁹ Memo, Eugene S. Staley (Technical Economic Program Expert, OFRRO), 29 May 1943.

²⁰ Special studies, Committees 9 and 10, notes on a meeting held 2 October 1943.

²¹ Notes of discussion on financial problems of UNRRA, 30 August 1943.

tributions expressed in terms of formidable tonnage of supplies.²²

The formula White proposed²³ was one per cent of one year's national income to be paid by each member government whose territory had not been overrun. The contribution would be in the form of a fund of local currency against which any supplies or services needed by UNRRA in that country would be charged. The contribution would not be an annual one, or for any stated period. It would be a contribution once and for all—or until demonstrated needs made it necessary to ask for more. To supply the free foreign exchange necessary for the Administration's operations, he proposed that each contributing country should make available a proportion (perhaps 10 per cent) of its contribution in convertible currency. This would give the Administration flexibility in its transactions and enable it to buy in the cheapest markets. The United States particularly would be able to make a contribution of foreign exchange. Indeed, it could be argued that it would be advantageous to the United States if, instead of depleting domestic stocks, some of its funds were used for offshore purchases.

The political and practical merits of the White plan were obvious to both the United States and United Kingdom negotiators who decided to adopt it as a basis for a financial plan to be presented to the First Council Session.²⁴ The one per cent of national income principle was in essence simple and straightforward; it had the attraction of being reasonably equitable and it would provide a fund of more or less the right size. That it would achieve a perfectly fair basis, neither the author of the plan nor anyone else would claim. Under the one per cent scheme, the United States would contribute about \$1,350 million; the United Kingdom, about \$320 million; Canada, about \$90 million; and other countries, proportionately smaller amounts. Thus the concept of national income, hitherto regarded as an "obscure academic plaything," became in the words of the *Economist* an "instrument of statesmanship."²⁵

²² Special studies, Committees 9 and 10, notes on a meeting held 2 October 1943; interview, Miller with White, March 1948.

²³ Memo, White to Lehman, "A Tentative Plan for Financing UNRRA," [c. 7 October 1943]; see also, United States Department of State (State), 840.50/2832 B, Confidential File PS/SMS, enclosure in letter, Edward R. Stettinius (Under Secretary of State) to the President, 20 October 1943.

²⁴ See joint memo by United Kingdom Minister of Production, President of Board of Trade, and Minister of State, 18 October 1943.

²⁵ *Economist* (London), CXLV (27 November 1943), 705.

2. THE ADOPTION OF THE ONE PER CENT BASIS

At the First Council Session responsibility for agreeing on a financial plan for UNRRA was assigned to the Committee on Finance and Supplies. There were two main questions to be settled: the amount and form in which member governments should contribute; and the basis on which "ability to pay" for relief should be determined.²⁶ The delegates had no powers to commit their governments to any definite contribution, but it was their responsibility and duty to recommend a fair basis on which contributions should be made.²⁷

Dean Acheson introduced a United States financial plan on 15 November at what was probably the most significant meeting to take place since the signature of the Agreement. He was able to report that earlier in the day President Roosevelt had sent to the United States Congress a message formally communicating the news of the signing of the UNRRA Agreement and requesting the adoption of a joint resolution authorizing the appropriation of funds to permit participation by the United States in the work of UNRRA.²⁸ The first step had been taken toward obtaining the contribution upon which the success of the relief administration was to depend.

The three main provisions of the United States plan were: that a fund should be created to provide the equivalent of foreign exchange to countries without foreign exchange; that countries able to pay for their supplies should do so; and that UNRRA, having acquired goods through the fund created, might require a country receiving goods to make available the proceeds of their sale in local currency for further relief work.²⁹ It was this plan which, although much debated, was adopted without substantial alteration by the Council as the Financial Plan for the Administration.³⁰

The main discussion concerned the basis on which contributions should be levied. The basis, as contained in the United States plan, was in accordance with the White proposal:

Section 4. *General Contributions*.—The Council recommends that each member government whose home territory has not been occupied by the

²⁶ Committee III, Secretary's notes, statement by Colonel J. J. Llewellyn (United Kingdom member), 15 November 1943.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, statement by Acheson, 15 November 1943.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*; see also *infra*, Part Four, Chapter IV.

³⁰ Resolution 14.

enemy shall make a contribution for participation in the work of the Administration (including administrative expenses of the Administration) approximately equivalent to one *per cent* of the national income of the country for the year ending June 30, 1943, as determined by the member government for this purpose. It is further recommended that this amount be made available promptly as required to meet the needs of the Administration.

Section 5. *Form of Contribution.*—The Council recommends that as much as possible, but not less than ten *per cent* of the amount contributed by each member government as recommended in Section 4 hereof, shall be in such form as can be used in areas outside of the contributing country; and that the balance thereof shall be in the form of a credit in local currency which shall be available for the purchase of supplies and services within the contributing country.

Section 6. *Governments in Special Economic Situation.*—The Council recommends that any member government which is not in a position to contribute as recommended in Sections 4 and 5 hereof, provide such amounts or contribute in such other form as it finds possible. It is further recommended that the member government discuss its contemplated action with the Director General.

In advocating the adoption of the one per cent of national income formula, Acheson pointed out that the contribution agreed upon should be enough for the needs of the Administration and should be capable of practical achievement. The formula should give each member government a yardstick by which its fair share could be measured, and should result in providing the Director General with definite, determinable funds. Acheson informed the Committee that the fund collected on the one per cent of national income basis should amount to between \$2,000 million and \$3,000 million, and, if the scope of the work were limited to emergency needs, that sum should be adequate.

The United Kingdom and Canadian members supported the United States plan, but it was challenged by the Brazilian member, Eurico Penteadó, and by Allan G. B. Fisher, New Zealand, both of whom presented plans based on alternative formulas. It was agreed that the matter should be referred to a subcommittee which would report back in a few days to the main Committee.

In the Subcommittee, which sat under the chairmanship of Dean Acheson, at least four alternative formulas were discussed.³¹ Penteadó proposed that the criterion to be used for a minimum contribution should be the percentage of the foreign trade of each contributing

³¹ Acheson in Foreign Affairs *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192*, p. 167.

country with the bloc of countries to receive assistance from UNRRA.³² It was pointed out that the burden of contributions might be absurdly disproportionate, since some contributing countries might have a very small trade with the liberated areas; moreover, the richer countries might not necessarily have the largest foreign trade. In the particular case of Brazil, the contribution under the plan proposed would be considerably higher than under the United States plan.³³ Penteadó indicated that his plan was not intended to apply to the United States or to the United Kingdom, but to the Latin American Republics. Even in their case, he agreed, there would be difficulties owing to the varying volume of trade between certain Latin American countries and potential liberated areas. It was a tentative suggestion, and he did not wish to support it strongly.³⁴ The proposal was dropped.

Fisher argued that the one per cent formula failed to distinguish between the different capacities to contribute of countries with different levels of per capita income. The capacity of a wealthy country was obviously much greater than that of a country in which the majority of the inhabitants lived near the level of subsistence.³⁵ This opinion had considerable support in the Subcommittee.³⁶ It had certainly been foreseen during the pre-UNRRA planning period, and had been regarded by the advocates of the one per cent of national income formula as one of the strongest arguments in its favor; for, if even the poor countries were asked to give one per cent of their national income, the rich ones, the United States for example, could at least do as much—it was the big contributions that were important.³⁷ Fisher's plan provided for the grouping of contributing countries into classes based on per capita income: assuming one per cent of national income to be the appropriate rate of contribution for countries in the highest class, rough justice would be done if in the lower classes the rate was scaled down accordingly. The Subcommittee recognized a degree of validity in the New Zealand plan, but it was pointed out that if an attempt were made to classify countries, imponderable questions, involving the special burdens which some countries had to carry for economic rea-

³² Reception 47, 1/F/3.2/No. 2, 15 November 1943, statement by Eurico Penteadó (Council member from Brazil).

³³ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 16 November 1943; Acheson in Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192*, p. 167.

³⁴ Interview, Miller with Acheson, April 1948.

³⁵ Reception 71, 1/F/3.1/No. 3.

³⁶ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 16 November 1943.

³⁷ Special studies, Committees 9 and 10, notes on meeting held 2 October 1943.

sons, or on account of the war, would confuse the issue. So this plan too was abandoned.

Another plan, introduced by the South African delegate, J. R. Jordaan, was a variation of the New Zealand plan and provided that each country should pay a fixed percentage of its net national income, but that the figure for net national income should be adjusted both for per capita income and per capita rate of taxation.³⁸ This plan involved the application of an algebraic formula which was beyond the comprehension of the majority of the Subcommittee. They decided that, if they did not understand it themselves, they would be at a disadvantage in explaining it to their various legislative bodies. The proposal was rejected.³⁹

None of the alternative proposals being so generally acceptable as the United States plan, the Subcommittee agreed to recommend its adoption; but to meet the wishes of those governments which considered a contribution on this basis too onerous, a clause, differing little from that proposed in the original United States plan, was included in the Subcommittee's recommendation:

The Council recognizes that there are cases in which the recommendation above [one per cent of national income] may conflict with particular demands arising from the continuance of the war and may be excessively burdensome because of peculiar situations, and therefore recognizes that the amount and character of the contribution recommended is subject to such conditions.⁴⁰

Numerous governments were later to invoke this clause. That they should do so was fully expected when the clause was written. The provision that the basis of contribution from noninvaded countries should be one per cent of the national income was made rather because it was a convenient and simple means of assessing contributions from those countries—the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada—which were potentially the largest contributors and to whom the concept of national income was familiar than because it was thought that all the contributing nations would find it the most convenient method of assessment.⁴¹ Some of the member governments had no national income in the technical sense;⁴² some governments whose per capita

³⁸ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 17 November 1943.

³⁹ Acheson in Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192*, p. 167.

⁴⁰ Resolution 14, Section 4.

⁴¹ Interview, Miller with Acheson, April 1948.

⁴² For example, Republic of Honduras, Haiti, etc.

income was disproportionately low in comparison with the national income would obviously fall below the one per cent of national income target.⁴³ These facts were not unknown, and it was fully recognized that UNRRA could not hope for much more than token contributions from some of its member governments.⁴⁴

In recommending that the one per cent of national income basis for contributions should be adopted, the Subcommittee included, with slight drafting changes, the provision that "not less than 10 per cent, of the amount contributed by each member government . . . shall be in such form of currency as can be expended in areas outside of the contributing country."⁴⁵ The balance of 90 per cent was to be in the form of a credit in local currency to be available for the purchase of supplies and services in the contributing country.

Thus the original proposal that some part of the contribution should be made available in "free funds" was carried into effect, and what was described flippantly as the "little 10 per cent jackpot" was created.⁴⁶ In practice, the term "free funds" was inaccurate: dollars, for example, may have represented free funds in the sense that they were readily convertible, but, in the sense that the Administration could use them only in consultation with the United States Government, they were not free; and there was regular clearance with the appropriate United States agencies before the commitment of United States free funds.⁴⁷ The same applied in the United Kingdom where free funds were convertible only after clearance with the Treasury, and then mainly for use within the sterling area. In numerous instances, either because the Administration found it convenient to use the whole of a country's contribution for local procurement, or because a country was without holdings of foreign exchange and therefore could not contribute free currency, the division of the contribution into local currency and convertible currency had no practical effect.⁴⁸

The recommendations included a provision that member govern-

⁴³ For example, India.

⁴⁴ Interview, Miller with Acheson, April 1948; see monograph, Cornelius Van H. Engert, "Part Played by Diplomatic Adviser's Office in Securing Contributions from Member Governments," for variant conclusions.

⁴⁵ Resolution 14, Section 5.

⁴⁶ Karl E. Mundt (Representative from South Dakota) in Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192*, p. 142.

⁴⁷ Monograph, W. L. Parks, "Evaluation of Procedures Governing Procurement and Procurement Problems Encountered in the United States," pp. 17-18.

⁴⁸ Part Three, Chapter III, Section 1.

ments could include their share of administrative expenses as part of their general one per cent contribution,⁴⁹ as it would be easier for the member governments not to have to go twice to their legislatures for funds which were basically for the same purpose. Moreover, it could be nothing but a nuisance to the Administration if separate appropriations for administrative expenses led to national legislative bodies debating in detail domestic matters relating to UNRRA's internal administrative arrangements. In practice, member governments almost invariably transmitted their administrative contributions, which were payable in dollars, independently of their operating contributions,⁵⁰ and these payments were credited against their convertible contributions.

The Agreement for UNRRA provided for the preparation of an administrative budget and for the allocation of administrative expenses to member governments "in proportions to be determined by the Council." The first administrative budget was estimated at \$10 million and, for convenience, provided for the calendar year 1944 and also for the unelapsed period of 1943. It was drawn up by the Director General during the First Council Session and referred to a Subcommittee on the Administrative Budget,⁵¹ which sat under the chairmanship of Jan Masaryk.

The criterion agreed upon for estimating administrative contributions was, as in the case of operating contributions, national income; but, since all member countries were asked to contribute to administrative expenses, the basic year adopted was 1940 instead of 1943, since that was the last year for which statistical information was available for many of the occupied countries.⁵² No attempt was made at a rigid assessment; for example, no less than fifteen member governments were assessed at .05 per cent.⁵³ Factors other than national income were taken into consideration, including changes in economic conditions since 1940 and, so far as occupied countries were concerned, the degree to which their resources had been reduced by enemy action.

In framing the schedule of allocations, the Subcommittee sought

⁴⁹ Acheson in United States Congress, 78th, 1 Session, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Testimony on a Draft Agreement for UNRRA* (Washington, D.C., 1943), p. 17.

⁵⁰ Part One, Chapter V, Section 5.

⁵¹ Committee I, Subcommittee 4.

⁵² Acheson in Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192*, pp. 91-92.

⁵³ See Resolution 38.

guidance from existing schedules used by other international bodies.⁵⁴ The League of Nations system was considered unsuitable for application to UNRRA since it did not take sufficient account of the differences in the financial position of the smaller and larger states. Under the League "unit" system, the contribution of no one state was allowed to exceed 10 per cent of the total annual budget;⁵⁵ under the system adopted for UNRRA, the United States, for instance, paid 40 per cent and the United Kingdom 15 per cent.⁵⁶ Moreover, the Subcommittee was anxious to meet the desire of the occupied territories to contribute substantially to administrative expenses,⁵⁷ with the result that the French Committee of National Liberation was allocated 4 per cent, whereas Canada, one of the largest contributing countries, was allocated only 3 per cent.⁵⁸

Operating and administrative contributions, though forming the great bulk of the fund envisaged under the United States plan, did not exhaust the sources from which it was hoped UNRRA might draw. A clause was included to allow noninvaded member governments to make contributions additional to the amount due under the one per cent scheme.⁵⁹ Provision was made for contributions from nonmember governments,⁶⁰ from liberated governments in addition to their administrative contributions, and from private individuals and institutions.⁶¹

3. CONSERVATION OF FUNDS

The pre-UNRRA decision that countries possessing the means to do so should pay for their relief and so conserve the funds available was reflected in the following clauses in the United States financial plan:

16. *Supplies and services for which governments are in a position to pay.*—It shall be the policy of the Administration not to deplete its supply resources for the relief and rehabilitation of any area whose government is in a position to pay in gold or convertible currency.

17. *Determination of whether a government is in a position to pay.*—The Director General, in consultation with the appropriate Committee

⁵⁴ Reception (273) 287, Report of Committee I, Subcommittee 4, Administrative Budget.

⁵⁵ Special studies, Committees 9 and 10, "Discussions on Financial Problems" [with former League of Nations officials, etc.], 31 August 1943.

⁵⁶ Resolution 38.

⁵⁷ Committee I, Subcommittee 4, Secretary's notes, 17 November 1943.

⁵⁸ Resolution 38.

⁵⁹ Resolution 14, Section 8.

⁶⁰ Resolution 14, Section 9.

⁶¹ Resolution 14, Section 7.

of the Council shall determine whether a government or a country is in a position to pay in gold or convertible currency for relief and rehabilitation supplies and services. Due consideration shall be given to the applicant's foreign exchange assets, its sources of foreign exchange, and its needs for foreign exchange for other purposes. The determination of the Director General shall be guided by the following policies: (1) Payment for relief and rehabilitation supplies and services shall be considered to have a high priority relative to competing needs for foreign exchange; (2) an applicant government shall not be required to assume the burden of an enduring foreign exchange debt for the procurement of relief and rehabilitation supplies and services. The Director General, from time to time, shall review such determination in the light of changing circumstances.⁶²

These proposals were severely criticized by delegates from such countries as Norway⁶³ and the Netherlands whose ability to pay for relief was likely to be near the borderline between paying and non-paying countries. The chief objections to the proposals were, first, that they were illiberal since they did not give sufficient consideration to a country's need of foreign exchange for reconstruction imports as well as for relief supplies; and, secondly, that too much authority in determining ability to pay was vested in the Director General.⁶⁴

On the first point, Ole Colbjornsen (Norway) pointed out that he regarded Norway's overseas assets (for example, the proceeds from insurance paid for losses to the Norwegian merchant navy) as pledged entirely for financial and economic reconstruction.⁶⁵ Should these assets be considered available for relief and rehabilitation rather than for reconstruction of the merchant fleet? He felt that his country should decide how much of its overseas assets should be earmarked for reconstruction. Acheson pointed out that no attempt was made in the proposals to set up specific rules which would enable the Director General to determine automatically when a country was in a position to pay; the financial position of receiving countries would be changing from time to time, and adjustments would therefore have to be made in the amount of financial assistance rendered by UNRRA.⁶⁶

On the second point, André Sobel (French Committee) stated his interpretation of Section 17 of the United States plan to be that the determination of a member government's ability to pay for relief would

⁶² "Financial Plan for UNRRA," 16 November 1943.

⁶³ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 18 November 1943.

⁶⁴ Monograph, Jacques J. Polak, "Ability to Pay," pp. 2-3.

⁶⁵ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 18 November 1943.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

take place only at the request of the member government concerned.⁶⁷ Acheson very naturally agreed—obviously, the Administration would not wish to go into the affairs of a government which itself said it was able to pay.⁶⁸ To meet the objections made to the proposal as it stood, however, the clause was redrafted, and the discretionary powers of the Director General were substantially reduced.⁶⁹

The practical result of the adoption by the Council of the ability-to-pay clause was that UNRRA's responsibilities in Europe (apart from the provision of emergency relief to some of the West European countries⁷⁰) were limited to the Balkan and Slav countries, since none of the West European countries asked to be adjudged unable to pay.

The concept of ability to pay became one of the fundamental principles of the financing of the UNRRA operation. The Director General was required to seek "the advice of the appropriate committee or subcommittee of the Council in determining whether a country was in a position to pay."⁷¹ A liberated country which wished to apply for the receipt of relief and rehabilitation supplies from UNRRA without payment submitted to the "appropriate committee," that is, to one of the Subcommittees on Ability to Pay, commonly known as the "Resolution 23 Subcommittees,"⁷² a document setting out its case.⁷³ Particulars of foreign exchange holdings, revenue from exports and from emigrants' remittances (a particularly important source of income in Greece), together with any other relevant data from which the financial

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Acheson in Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192*, p. 165.

⁶⁹ Resolution 14, Section 17, as adopted (the modifications of substance have been italicized):

Determination of whether a Government Is in a Position to Pay with Suitable Means of Foreign Exchange

When a member government considers that it is not in a position to pay as in the foregoing section, the Director General, in consultation with the member government involved and on the advice of the appropriate committee or subcommittee of the Council, shall determine whether the government or country is not in a position to pay for relief and rehabilitation supplies and services. In case of disagreement, either the member government or the Director General may refer the matter to the Council.

In making the determination the applicant's foreign exchange assets and its sources of foreign exchange shall be taken into account. Although payment for relief and rehabilitation supplies and services shall be considered to have a *strong claim* on the foreign exchange assets of the applicant country, due consideration shall be given also to its need of foreign exchange for other purposes.

⁷⁰ Part Three, Chapter II, Section 2, and Part Five, Chapter XII.

⁷¹ Resolution 14, Section 17.

⁷² Resolution 23; see also *supra*, Part One, Chapter III, Section 9.

⁷³ Monograph, Polak, "Ability to Pay," p. 6.

condition of the country could be deduced, were included.⁷⁴ In practice, the Administration often helped in the preparation of the material for submission to a Subcommittee: in one instance, at least, a submission to be adjudged unable to pay was withdrawn by the applicant country after the Administration had shown that the estimate of exports was unreasonably optimistic and might prejudice the case.⁷⁵

Applicant governments usually made available all the information which was required, and, in recognition of the disclosures made, the Administration treated the documents and discussions as confidential. The criteria for adjudgment of inability to pay were essentially the same in all cases. The Subcommittee concerned satisfied itself that, after making allowance for a certain minimum monetary reserve, the foreign exchange holdings of the country under consideration, *plus* such foreign exchange revenue as the country might be expected to receive from exports, emigrants' remittances, and similar payments, *minus* urgent requirements for nonrelief imports, would leave the country with insufficient foreign exchange to finance necessary relief imports over the coming six or twelve months.⁷⁶ Where it was clear from general information that a country was not in a position to pay, the Subcommittee did not go fully into the figures submitted.⁷⁷

The findings of the Subcommittees were always in terms of complete inability to pay; partial ability to pay was not recognized.⁷⁸ At the Third Council Session it was provided that the Subcommittees established under Resolution 23 should "keep under continuous review the financial situation of the receiving countries and the extent of their need for free assistance."⁷⁹ Subsequently, the suggestion was made that some hitherto nonpaying countries might be able to pay for some part of their relief supplies, but it came to nothing.⁸⁰ UNRRA did not apply harshly the ability-to-pay principle: shipments were not withheld pending a determination on ability to pay. For instance, substantial quantities of supplies had moved into Poland before any decision on ability to pay was reached, since it was not clear whether the Polish case was to be presented by the Polish Government in London, or by the Provisional Polish Government in Lublin.⁸¹ Further, the Central Com-

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8a.

⁷⁸ Part Three, Chapter II, Section 7.

⁸⁰ Program Subcommittee, verbatim minutes 17th meeting, remarks of Roger W. Jackling (United Kingdom member), 26 January 1946.

⁸¹ Monograph, Polak, "Ability to Pay," *passim*.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 8a-9.

⁷⁹ Resolution 80, paragraph 2.

mittee decided that the Director General could undertake emergency relief in certain cases even though the government of the area concerned had not applied to be adjudged unable to pay.⁸² This decision, taken in March 1945 in connection with the provision of emergency relief for countries in Northwest Europe, became a precedent for emergency relief programs subsequently undertaken in Finland, Hungary, Korea, and the Philippines.

It was an inherent assumption of the Financial Plan that goods supplied by UNRRA would generally be sold by the receiving governments through normal commercial channels,⁸³ and that the receiving governments would make the proceeds of sale available to the Administration for its administrative needs and for further relief and rehabilitation activities.⁸⁴ This principle was incorporated in the Financial Plan.⁸⁵ The wording of the two relevant clauses was, however, sufficiently ambiguous to provoke considerable doubt, when the time came to formalize policy in agreements and understandings with receiving countries, as to what their exact meaning was intended to be.⁸⁶

Two further points bearing on the conservation of UNRRA resources were discussed in the Committee on Finance and Supplies: one related to the taxation of UNRRA supplies; the other, to insurance. The United States representative proposed that the Committee might wish to recommend to the Council the waiver of taxation of UNRRA supplies.⁸⁷ He emphasized, however, that he did not wish to suggest the surrender by member governments of their sovereign fiscal powers. Numerous difficulties were foreseen: the Greek representative felt that the Council was not competent to make recommendations to member governments on their national financial policies and stressed the importance of indirect taxes in national revenue systems; representatives of Latin America were concerned at the prospect of serious loss of government revenue if the Administration's purchases were exempted from export taxes; the French representatives, on the other hand, advocated that no import taxes be levied on relief goods during the relief period and that all European nations should follow that policy.⁸⁸ Fi-

⁸² Central Committee (CC) (45)9, minutes 12th meeting, 14 March 1945 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee [CC Doc.], I, 100-105).

⁸³ Resolution 7.

⁸⁴ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 18 November 1943.

⁸⁵ Resolution 14, Section 20.

⁸⁶ See Part Four, Chapter IV, Section 1.

⁸⁷ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 18 November 1943.

⁸⁸ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 20 November 1943.

nally, a permissive resolution was adopted.⁸⁹ Its effect was more beneficial to the Administration than was apparent from the Committee discussions since numerous governments passed special legislation exempting their contributions to UNRRA from export duties, and import taxes were generally remitted in the receiving countries.

On the question of insurance, the Committee recognized that the two courses open to the Administration were to insure or not to insure. Each laid the Administration open to criticism: on the one hand, to the charge that UNRRA funds were being used extravagantly if the Director General decided to insure; and, on the other hand, to the charge of dereliction of duty if he omitted to protect UNRRA supplies by insurance, and losses occurred.⁹⁰ In the Committee discussions it was noted that the United Kingdom Government, which had a large volume of government-procured imports, used private insurance facilities whereas United States Government practice was self-insurance. It was finally decided that, if the Director General elected to carry his own risks, he should be permitted to do so, and a permissive resolution to this effect was adopted,⁹¹ the main argument in favor of self-insurance being that, in a condition of world shortages, if supplies were lost the loss was absolute and could not be made good by insurance cover.⁹² In line with this policy, the major risks, that is, ocean marine risks, of the Administration were self-insured.⁹³

4. THE SECOND CONTRIBUTION

It was not until the Third Council Session in August 1945 that delegates were really able to assess the size of UNRRA's task. Financially, the outlook was unpromising. It was only some five months since supply operations had started, and UNRRA was operating substantial relief and rehabilitation programs in only five countries.⁹⁴ The Director General, however, in presenting his Report, had to inform the Council that the resources provided under the resolutions adopted by the First Council Session were far from adequate to bring even a minimum of re-

⁸⁹ Resolution 16.

⁹⁰ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 20 November 1943.

⁹¹ Resolution 15.

⁹² Acheson in Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192*, p. 173.

⁹³ *Ibid.*; monograph, Ralph Boyer, "Division of Finance at Headquarters," pp.

10-11.

⁹⁴ Albania, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Yugoslavia.

lief and rehabilitation to the countries in need of UNRRA's assistance.⁹⁵ The Report revealed that over \$1,500 million of additional funds would be needed to continue operations during 1946,⁹⁶ and even that sum did not include a request from the USSR, received after the Report had been drawn up, for assistance to the extent of \$700 million for a twelve-month period. Indeed, even without allowing for this last request, unless there were an assurance of additional funds, substantial alterations would have to be made in the program of operations in Europe for 1945, as a large part of the resources remaining would have to be used in the Far East where operations were only just beginning. Even so, China would not be provided with adequate aid, and the European recipients would be left, in the words of the Director General, "without substantial assistance in the middle of a winter of dire need and suffering." He urged members of the Council to consider carefully "the implication of a further pledge of assistance to UNRRA."⁹⁷ In speeches on the adoption of the Report, William L. Clayton (United States; a newcomer to UNRRA affairs, fresh from the Potsdam Conference), Philip J. Noel-Baker (United Kingdom), and Lester B. Pearson (Canada) all indicated approval of the Director General's plea that further support be given in order to continue UNRRA's work.⁹⁸

The issue that faced UNRRA was thus whether it was to carry on, or dissolve itself, owing to lack of funds, at the end of 1945.⁹⁹ A resolution proposing a further contribution was not, however, put to the Council until the last day of the Session—when the Council had been in conference for twenty-three days and delegates were impatient to get home.

The United States representative was prepared to support a further contribution, but only on his own terms, that is to say, on terms which would be likely to be acceptable to the United States Congress.¹⁰⁰ It would have been idle for him to try to do otherwise, particularly since the second part of the first contribution from the United States was

⁹⁵ *Journal*, Third Council, Director General's Report, 3d plenary meeting, 8 August 1945, pp. 21-25.

⁹⁶ Part Three, Chapter II, Section 5.

⁹⁷ Council III Document 5, C(45)4.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*; *Journal*, Third Council, 5th plenary meeting, 10 August 1945, pp. 39-43; 6th plenary meeting, 11 August 1945, pp. 58-59.

⁹⁹ Harold E. Caustin (Special Assistant to Director General), "Notes on Third Council Session," 12 August 1945.

¹⁰⁰ William L. Clayton (United States Assistant Secretary of State) in United States Congress, 79th, 1 Session, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. R. 4649* (Washington, D.C., 1945), pp. 2-5.

not yet appropriated. The United States conditions, as they developed in the course of the Third Council Session, were: ¹⁰¹

(1) That the needs of all liberated areas not under the continuing control of the military authorities and without sufficient foreign exchange resources to purchase essential relief supplies abroad should be met through UNRRA. It was therefore proposed to seek the extension of UNRRA operations to Austria, Korea, and Formosa, and the enlargement of the Italian program.

(2) That assistance should be given to displaced persons even without the consent of their governments of origin, but that UNRRA funds should not be used to acquire basic supplies for the operations in Germany.¹⁰²

(3) That the proposed program of assistance through UNRRA to the USSR should be reduced from the \$700 million figure, suggested by the Soviet Union, to one which could be included in the UNRRA budget without serious penalty to other receiving countries.¹⁰³

(4) That it would be desirable for the Director General to have the advice and assistance of the Council, through the Central Committee, in determining the equitable distribution of UNRRA's resources among the various receiving countries.¹⁰⁴

(5) That, in order to allay the concern in some quarters that UNRRA might be undertaking rehabilitation responsibilities for a longer term than that originally envisaged, terminal dates for UNRRA operations should be established—the end of 1946 for shipments to Europe and the end of March 1947 for shipments to the Far East.¹⁰⁵

It was in the discussion on the resolutions covering a relief program for Austria and a full-scale relief program for Italy (which at the Second Council Session had been granted limited aid) that the first specific reference was made to the nature and size of the second contribution.¹⁰⁶ Clayton informed the Council that, should the program of operations adopted be satisfactory to the United States Congress, he believed it would be possible to get another appropriation on the same basis as before, namely, one per cent of national income in the fiscal year ended

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² Resolution 71, paragraph 4; see *infra*, Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 6.

¹⁰³ See Part Three, Chapter II, Section 5; Part Five, Chapter VII, Section 2; Appendix Nine, Section II, Document 2.

¹⁰⁴ See Part Three, Chapter II, Section 6.

¹⁰⁵ See Part Three, Chapter II, Section 5.

¹⁰⁶ *Journal*, Third Council, 7th plenary meeting, 14 August 1945, pp. 66-68.

30 June 1943.¹⁰⁷ Noel-Baker, in seconding the resolutions, added that the United Kingdom would also be ready to make a further contribution.¹⁰⁸ The resolutions bringing Austria and Italy within the full scope of UNRRA¹⁰⁹ were finally adopted by the Council, and at the same time a resolution covering aid to Formosa and Korea was voted.¹¹⁰

Regarding the displaced persons operation, the policy laid down by the United Kingdom and United States representatives as a condition for their support of a second contribution was, despite opposition, accepted.¹¹¹

Negotiations with the Soviet delegation concerning a relief program for the USSR took place outside the Council Session, in private discussions among the Soviet, United States, United Kingdom, and Canadian Governments on a political level, the Director General himself not being consulted.¹¹² As a result of these discussions, the amount of relief agreed upon for the USSR was reduced from \$700 million to \$250 million and confined to specific amounts for the Ukraine and Byelorussia.¹¹³

The resolution recommending a second contribution, on the same terms as the first, was introduced by Clayton and provided for increased responsibility of the Central Committee in determining the distribution of UNRRA's resources among the receiving countries through supervision by it of the Administration's program of operations.¹¹⁴ Thus the United States representative's requirement that greater responsibility should be exercised by the Central Committee in determining the distribution of UNRRA's resources was achieved. The last of the United States representative's five conditions—that relating to the termination of UNRRA's activities—was included in the preamble to Clayton's resolution. It acquired, however, the same force as if it had been incorporated in the body of the resolution, and was interpreted by the Administration as a directive.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

¹⁰⁹ Resolutions 73, 74.

¹¹⁰ Resolution 76.

¹¹¹ *Journal*, Third Council, 10th plenary meeting, 20 August 1945, pp. 87, 92; Resolution 71; see *infra*, Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 6.

¹¹² Subcommittee of the Committee on Supplies (on Ability to Pay) (CS-CFC/AP), verbatim minutes 10th meeting, 25 September 1945; see *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section II, Document 2.

¹¹³ Caustin, "Notes on Third Council Session," 21 August 1945; *infra*, Part Five, Chapter VII, Section 2; Clayton in Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. R. 4649*, p. 4.

¹¹⁴ Resolution 80, paragraphs 2, 4.

¹¹⁵ *Report of the Director General to the Council* (DGR) 7, p. 2.

The draft resolution was approved without amendment.¹¹⁶ Considering its far-reaching provisions, discussion was surprisingly brief.¹¹⁷ Some delegates doubted if their governments would be economically in a position to support the new levy; the member for Mexico complained that the resolution lacked elasticity in providing no opportunity to contribute in any proportion other than that recommended by the resolution. His views were an echo of similar opinions expressed at the First Council Session, when the one per cent of national income basis for contribution was proposed. This basis had, in fact, proved unsatisfactory so far as the Latin American countries were concerned; the same arguments applied in August 1945 as in November 1943; but the main thing was still to get the big contributions, and a contribution based on national income was satisfactory to the big contributors.

Delegates from receiving countries emphasized their need to know more specifically what supplies they could hope to get during 1945 and 1946 so that they could plan their own rehabilitation and reconstruction programs accordingly.¹¹⁸ Had their anxiety not been so real nor their fears of insufficient help so well founded, they would appear to have shown somewhat grudging appreciation of the efforts being made to help them.

The Director General, in his concluding speech, tried to reassure the receiving governments by emphasizing his desire to meet their wishes to have advance and detailed information on their supply programs. More important, he warned the Council that the funds available would be insufficient to meet the new obligations as well as those already imposed and that there would have to be a scaling down of existing programs if equitable distribution among all the receiving countries was to be achieved.¹¹⁹

5. INADEQUACY OF FUNDS TO COMPLETE UNRRA'S TASK

In August 1946, at the Fifth Council Session, it was evident that further provision would have to be made to meet the needs of the

¹¹⁶ Resolution 80.

¹¹⁷ *Journal*, Third Council, 13th plenary meeting, pp. 123-130.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, speeches by S. Jedrychowski (Poland) and R. Bicanic (Yugoslavia), pp. 128-129, 129-130.

¹¹⁹ *Journal*, Third Council, address by the Director General, p. 134.

liberated countries in 1947.¹²⁰ During this Session, however, the Council determined that no further contributions in addition to those contemplated under Resolution 80 would be recommended. Delegates from receiving governments—Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia—and the observer from the Italian Government—pleaded for the continuance of UNRRA.¹²¹ Delegates from contributing governments—the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom—while recognizing that the task of relief and rehabilitation was not finished, argued the case for the completion of UNRRA's work by other means. As at the First and Third Council Sessions the United States delegate had taken the initiative in recommending to member governments the support of UNRRA, so at the Fifth Council Session it was he who took the initiative in advocating the abandonment of UNRRA. Clayton reminded the Council that UNRRA had been organized primarily to provide essential supplies to those countries which themselves lacked the means to pay for imports; that most of the liberated countries were gradually regaining their export trade; and that, in addition to this normal method of acquiring foreign exchange to pay for imports, the United States and other governments had by loans and otherwise added enormously to the foreign exchange resources of the world¹²²—the total in loans and credits made by the United States Government alone already amounted to no less than \$20,000 million to assist in restoring and stabilizing the economies of other countries. Clayton added that he did not suggest that further assistance in obtaining foreign exchange with which to pay for essential imports would not be required.¹²³ He thus, in effect, admitted that his prophecy at the Third Council Session that a second contribution would make possible "the completion of UNRRA's great task" had not been fulfilled.¹²⁴ He added that, to the extent that assistance could not be supplied by the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the solution lay in bilateral arrangements between countries requiring assistance and those able to provide it.¹²⁵ The arguments which had been adduced three years earlier against the use of loans to

¹²⁰ *Journal*, Fifth Council, 5th plenary meeting, 7 August 1946, speech by Clayton, pp. 27-29.

¹²¹ See, for example, *ibid.*, 6th plenary meeting, 8 August 1946, speeches by Hilary Minc (Poland), X. Zolotas (Greece), Vaclav Majer (Czechoslovakia), pp. 31-34.

¹²² *Journal*, Fifth Council, pp. 28-29.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ *Journal*, Third Council, p. 124.

¹²⁵ *Journal*, Fifth Council, p. 29.

finance essential relief imports apparently, in his view, no longer applied.¹²⁶

In the course of the Council Session, however, piecemeal arrangements were made in an endeavor to alleviate the hardships which would necessarily follow the cessation of UNRRA supplies and services. These included the relaxation of the stringency of Resolution 80 by extending the final dates for the procurement and shipment of supplies to receiving countries;¹²⁷ the continuance of the displaced persons operations until 30 June 1947;¹²⁸ and, "since no organization now exists or has been designated which, after the termination of UNRRA can advise the United Nations of the means to provide further financial assistance," the recommendation that the General Assembly of the United Nations should review the needs in 1947 for financing urgent imports of the basic essentials of life after the termination of UNRRA programs.¹²⁹ Without further funds the task of relief and rehabilitation could not be finished through the mechanism of UNRRA.

¹²⁶ See above, Section 1.

¹²⁸ Resolution 99.

¹²⁷ Resolution 101.

¹²⁹ Resolution 100.

V. Contributions

1. THE FINANCIAL PLAN IN OPERATION

THE TOTAL contributions to UNRRA included operating contributions made by thirty noninvaded member governments; revenue from the six assessments made on all forty-eight member governments toward administrative expenses; operating contributions made voluntarily by eight invaded member governments in addition to their administrative contributions; contributions from five nonmember governments; and donations from nongovernmental sources.


The commodities and currencies derived from these various sources were valued as follows:

TABLE 4



CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRRA

Operating contributions from noninvaded member governments	\$3,593,957,773
Operating contributions from invaded member governments	22,014,232
Administrative contributions from member governments	44,976,450
Contributions from nonmember governments	1,905,189
Donations from nongovernmental sources	209,895,377
Total	<u>\$3,872,749,021</u>

The Administration had no powers to compel member governments to make available the contributions recommended by the Council. It had, however, a duty to insure, so far as lay within its power, that contributions were made to the full amount, that they were made in the most useful form, and that they were made promptly. The extent to which the operation was affected by a failure to carry out one or more of these conditions depended, of course, on the size of the contribution involved. Thus, if a small contributing government were dilatory in voting funds for UNRRA, the work could still go on. On the other



MAP I. COUNTRIES CONTRIBUTING TO UNRRA



hand, when the United States Government delayed its appropriations, the whole operation was placed in jeopardy.¹

The United States operating contribution amounted to 73 per cent of the total operating funds. Contributions made by the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada accounted together for 94 per cent of the total operating contributions. It might, therefore, be argued that the remaining 6 per cent was relatively unimportant. In practice, however, the small contributions attained a significance which could hardly have been anticipated when the Financial Plan was being discussed. Sources of supply for many commodities were limited. Hence it was important to the Administration to obtain, for example, contributions of cane sugar from Cuba, of nitrates from Chile, and of jute from India. In addition, since the deficiencies in essential relief and rehabilitation imports which the Administration had hoped to provide were found to be almost twice as great as it was able to meet—even if all contributing governments paid their contributions in full—every contribution became vital.²

In practice, the collection of contributions through the application of the one per cent of national income formula presented numerous difficulties. Out of the thirty noninvaded member governments which made operating contributions, only about half had an officially recognized national income.³ A few did not know what national income was. The formula was, therefore, applicable only to a limited extent.⁴ Moreover, the recognition in the Financial Plan that the basic one per cent contribution might be, in certain cases, too heavy a burden on contributing governments, was, in effect, tantamount to giving each government the right to determine the amount of its contribution as it saw fit, thereby vitiating to some extent the effectiveness of the formula.⁵ Under ideal operating conditions, contributions would have been pro-

¹ See, for example, letter, Lehman to Thomas B. McCabe (Foreign Liquidation Commissioner), 14 November 1945.

² Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee (CC/P) (45)12, "Consideration of the Procedure Followed by the Administration in the Development of Specific Country Budgets," 14 December 1945; and see *infra*, Part Three, Chapter II, Section 7.

³ *Report of the Director General to the Council* (DGR) 14, Table 2, p. 55, "Contributions of Non-invaded Member Governments as a Percent of Official National Income Estimate."

⁴ See, for example, Committee on Contributions, draft, "Latin American Contribution in Relation to National Income," 8 January 1945.

⁵ Resolution 14, Section 4.

vided by member governments in the form of (1) a credit in local currency amounting to 90 per cent of the contribution for the purchase of indigenous supplies to be selected by the Administration, and (2) a transfer of the remaining 10 per cent in foreign exchange.⁶ In fact, this seldom happened. Both the size of the contributions and the form they should take, became, therefore, a matter for negotiation by UNRRA with the government concerned.

In these circumstances, the Administration adopted the practice of arranging for small delegations to visit member governments to discuss with them how they could most usefully coöperate in UNRRA's work.⁷ This type of consultation had been contemplated in the UNRRA Agreement.⁸ In practice, however, these delegations did more than that. Frequently, it was through influence exercised by them on member governments that legislation was passed authorizing funds and supplies for UNRRA. A somewhat paradoxical position was reached wherein the Administration—the instrument created by the UNRRA Council to carry out the task of relief and rehabilitation to which it had pledged itself—became itself the instrument to bring pressure on its creators to fulfill their pledge.

The delegations were small—generally two or three persons. They had sufficient status to conduct negotiations with heads of governments, and included a member qualified to discuss technical supply problems.⁹ When a delegation was successful in agreeing with a member government on the size and character of its contribution, responsibility for carrying out the agreement was generally left to UNRRA representatives established in the country.

Responsibility for arranging these delegations rested with the Diplomatic Adviser at Headquarters,¹⁰ Francis B. Sayre, formerly Assistant Secretary of State in the United States Government, in which capacity he had been responsible for the American trade agreements program.¹¹ He personally led delegations to no less than twenty-one different countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America. His

⁶ Nathan Taflove (Office of the Controller), "Preliminary Note for Monograph."

⁷ See, for example, Committee on Supplies (CS) (45)16, "Report of the Bureau of Supply, Fourteenth Meeting of the Committee on Supplies, 21 June 1945."

⁸ Article V.

⁹ Monograph, Cornelius Van H. Engert, "Historical Sketch of the Diplomatic Adviser's Office (1 January 1944-15 March 1947)," *passim*.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Press statement by Sayre, Lisbon, 25 July 1946.

faith in the cause for which he was working and his deep sincerity were characteristics which were probably almost as valuable as his professional qualifications for this particular work.

By the time the Third Council Session was held in August 1945 the Administration had, however, achieved only moderate success in its efforts to induce member governments to make good the recommendations of the Financial Plan. Outstanding was the fact that the United States Congress had yet to appropriate \$550 million of the authorized United States contribution of \$1,350 million.¹² Many of the smaller member governments had failed to make their contributions available. In several countries only preliminary approval of a contribution had been given;¹³ some governments had authorized contributions which were not to become available until later.¹⁴

Soon after the Third Council Session, a program of operations was drawn up based on two assumptions: first, that member governments would meet in full their financial obligations to UNRRA; secondly, that the Administration would complete its shipments to receiving countries in Europe not later than the end of 1946 and to the Far East not later than the end of March 1947.¹⁵ It became all the more necessary, therefore, that contributing governments should make prompt and full payment of the second contribution and of any balances outstanding on the first so that programs could be fulfilled by the dates laid down.¹⁶ The appropriation of the outstanding portion of the first United States contribution in December 1945 and a further appropriation in the same month enabled the Administration's operations to continue,¹⁷ but the general response from member governments was still inadequate.

The urgency of UNRRA's need was recognized outside as well as within the Administration. In February 1946 the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization in London adopted a resolution establishing a committee:

(a) To consult with states signatory to the UNRRA Agreement who have not made or arranged to make the further contributions to UNRRA

¹² Council III Document 5, C(45)4, Program of Operations, July 1945, p. 5.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ "Summary Statement on Program of Operations" presented to the Central Committee by the Director General, 29 January 1946; see also *infra*, Part Three, Chapter II, Section 7.

¹⁶ For subsequent extensions to these termination dates see Part Three, Chapter II, Section 11.

¹⁷ See below, Section 2.

recommended in Council Resolution No. 80 of August 1945, and to urge upon them that they make such contributions with the least possible delay; and

(b) To urge upon Members of the United Nations who are not signatories to the UNRRA Agreement to join that organization and thereby to make their contributions to this great humanitarian task.¹⁸

The General Assembly appointed a committee consisting of representatives of eleven nations¹⁹ which, after preliminary meetings in London, met at Atlantic City during the Fourth Council Session. Under the chairmanship of Congressman Sol Bloom, Representative of the United States, it discussed with Director General LaGuardia and R. G. A. Jackson (Senior Deputy Director General) "the means by which the utmost good to the whole UNRRA program might be accomplished."²⁰ On 19 March the committee adopted a resolution authorizing the chairman:

(1) To communicate with each member of UNRRA who has not yet contributed the full amount of the contributions recommended by the UNRRA Council in order to secure the prompt availability of these contributions.

(2) To approach the members of the United Nations who are not now members of UNRRA . . . and to inform them of the manner of election to membership of UNRRA.²¹

At the time the resolution was passed, five members of the United Nations were not also members of UNRRA—Argentina, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey.²² Three days later, however, on 22 March, Turkey's application for membership was accepted by the Council, and Turkey became the forty-eighth and final member government.²³ Bloom's committee communicated with the remaining four governments. The Argentine Government's reply was that it was now too late for Argentina to become a member, but that this would not prevent her from continuing to give aid to the best of her ability. None of the other three governments elected to apply for membership. An appeal was sent to all member governments which had not at that time made the contributions recommended by the Council, urging them to do so promptly; the appeal was sent to all but three—France,

¹⁸ Report of Chairman Sol Bloom to the United Nations Committee on UNRRA.

¹⁹ Canada, China, Dominican Republic, France, Greece, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, USSR, United Kingdom, United States.

²⁰ Report of Chairman Sol Bloom to the United Nations Committee on UNRRA.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Resolution 84.

Canada, and the United Kingdom. Invaded member governments were asked to make operating contributions to the extent they were able to do so.²⁴

The Administration was itself at this time making every effort—as indeed it did throughout the existence of UNRRA—to persuade member governments to make their contributions. It is not possible, therefore, to estimate how far the response made by member governments during the spring and summer of 1946 was the result of the direct efforts of the Administration and how far it was due to the Bloom committee. Undoubtedly, the work of the latter, with the prestige of the United Nations behind it, and under a chairman who had already shown himself to be a good friend of UNRRA,²⁵ gave real support to the Administration. But perhaps the frank discussion of the food crisis at the Fourth Council Session, and the sober realization of the formidable difficulties under which the Administration was working, had more effect on member governments at that time than any campaign either within or outside the Administration. Even so, the response from member governments was, numerically, disappointing: only thirteen member governments made the second contribution recommended under Resolution 80, and some of these did not make it in full. Fortunately, among those which did were the three largest contributors.

2. OPERATING CONTRIBUTIONS FROM NONINVADED MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

THE UNITED STATES

The United States contribution was made available to UNRRA by seven public laws, passed over a period of nearly two and a half years, under which contributions recommended by the United States Congress were authorized and appropriated. These are explained in Table 5. As the United States contributions amounted to nearly three quarters of the total made to UNRRA, it was through them, more than all the other contributions put together, that UNRRA's task was accomplished. The passage of each of the bills marked a climacteric in UNRRA's affairs.

²⁴ Report of Chairman Sol Bloom to the United Nations Committee on UNRRA.

²⁵ See Sol Bloom, *Autobiography of Sol Bloom* (New York, 1948), pp. 267-268, 279-280.

Contributions

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TABLE 5
UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRRA

	<i>Public Law</i>	<i>Congress</i>	<i>Date</i>	
First one per cent authorization, \$1,350 million	267	78th	28 March 1944	
Appropriation, \$800 million	382	78th	30 June 1944	
Appropriation, \$550 million	259	79th	14 December 1945	
Second one per cent authorization, \$1,350 million	262	79th	18 December 1945	
Appropriation, \$750 million	269	79th	28 December 1945	
Appropriation, \$135 million	381	79th	27 May 1946	
Appropriation, \$465 million	521	79th	23 July 1946	5,900,000,000

On 15 November 1943 Joint Resolution 192 "to enable the United States to participate in the work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration" was introduced into the House of Representatives. It was referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which held hearings during November and December. The chief witnesses were Acheson, Leo T. Crowley (Foreign Economic Administrator), and Lehman. Sol Bloom, chairman of the Committee, has indicated some of the misconceptions about UNRRA which these witnesses tried to overcome:

One of these errors was the idea that the United States was committing itself to a vast and undefined expenditure abroad, while other nations were shirking their corresponding responsibilities for the relief of people in liberated territories; and that the countries liberated would not help to relieve their own peoples. It was soon made clear that the object of UNRRA is to help people to help themselves; that 90 per cent of the expense of relief and rehabilitation would be borne by the nations overrun by the enemy; that UNRRA would operate through governments, and not by distributing alms to individuals . . .²⁶

Lehman's testimony, which obviously had a profound effect on the Committee, included a statement in which he set forth the guiding

²⁶ Sol Bloom, *Our Heritage* (New York, 1944), p. 52.

principles and aims of UNRRA. It concluded with the following remarks:

UNRRA is . . . the first great test of the capacity of the present world partnership of the United Nations and associated governments to achieve a peacetime goal. It represents a first bold attempt of the free peoples to develop efficient habits of working together. It is now up to all of us to prove that it is not only for war and destruction but also for help and healing that nations can be united to act for the common good. Then will peace have her victory no less than war.²⁷

On 28 March 1944 the United States Government authorized the appropriation to the President of such sums "not to exceed \$1,350 million in the aggregate, as the Congress may determine from time to time to be appropriated for participation by the United States in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration."²⁸ This measure contained two reservations added to the original Joint Resolution:²⁹ (1) A section explaining the UNRRA Council resolution on the scope of rehabilitation, which specified that "the task of rehabilitation must not be considered as the beginning of reconstruction—it is coterminous with relief,"³⁰ and meant that rehabilitation "is confined only to such activities as are necessary to relief." This section was inserted on the recommendation of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which had shown some distrust of the word "coterminous" in the UNRRA resolution on industrial rehabilitation.³¹ (2) The so-called "India" clause. This amendment, which originally contemplated that India should receive benefits through UNRRA, was added in the first instance on the floor of the House and was subsequently amended by the Senate.³² The amendment, as finally incorporated in the UNRRA authorization act, contained no specific reference to India, but recommended that,

²⁷ United States Congress, 78th, 1 and 2 Sessions, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192* (Washington, D.C., 1944), p. 127.

²⁸ Public Law 267, 78th Congress, Joint Resolution to Enable the United States to Participate in the Work of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

²⁹ House Joint Resolution 192, Joint Resolution to Enable the United States to Participate in the Work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

³⁰ Resolution 12.

³¹ *Congressional Record*, 20 January 1944, p. 488.

³² Memo, Grace W. Tellier (General Counsel's Office, HQ), "Legislative History of Amendments to the Joint Resolution Authorizing United States Appropriations for UNRRA," p. 20.

in so far as funds and facilities permit, any area (except within enemy territory and while occupied by the enemy) important to the military operation of the United Nations which is stricken by famine or disease may be included in the benefits to be made available through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.³³

Neither of the reservations was found by the Council at its next Session to be incompatible with the Agreement or resolutions. However, lest there should be any doubt, confirmatory resolutions were adopted.³⁴ These had no appreciable effect on the UNRRA operation. That on rehabilitation was no more than an underscoring of the resolutions already adopted on the scope of rehabilitation.³⁵ The "India" resolution had no effect so far as the country for whose benefit it was intended was concerned; on the contrary, India became herself the sixth largest contributor to UNRRA funds.³⁶

The first appropriation of funds under the United States authorization was made three months later. On 30 June 1944 the UNRRA Participation Appropriation Act was passed, providing that \$450 million of the \$1,350 million of the authorization be made available immediately for the work of UNRRA.³⁷ Out of this total, stated sums were to be used for the procurement of domestic raw cotton and raw wool.³⁸ Provision was also made for the transfer of a further \$350 million from funds available for disposition under the Lend-Lease acts,³⁹ but this transfer was not to become effective until the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had certified that the state of the war permitted the utilization of Lend-Lease supplies or funds for UNRRA purposes.⁴⁰ This certification was not given until 27 June 1945—almost a year after the first appropriation.

In his Report to the Third Council the Director General, referring to contributions still unpaid, mentioned particularly the balance due from the United States Government.⁴¹ By the end of the Session, amounts authorized but not appropriated and amounts yet to be

³³ Public Law 267, Section 4.

³⁴ Resolutions 53, 54.

³⁵ Resolutions 12, 13.

³⁶ See Appendix Ten, Section IV, Document 2.

³⁷ Public Law 382, 78th Congress.

³⁸ *Ibid.*; Public Law 259, 79th Congress, Title II; see also *infra*, Part Three, Chapter VI, Section 6, 7.

³⁹ Act of 11 March 1941 as amended (22 U.S.C. 411-419) and acts supplementary thereto.

⁴⁰ Public Law 382, Section 202.

⁴¹ Council III Document 5, C(45)4, p. 5.

authorized by the United States Government totaled \$1,900 million (\$550 million outstanding from the first contribution and \$1,350 million to be paid on the second).

During the next few months, emphasis in the Administration's affairs was almost as much on a pressure campaign to induce the United States Congress to appropriate funds as on the provision of relief. Voluminous reports on every aspect of UNRRA's activities were prepared to answer criticism from wherever it came: elaborate data were submitted to FEA, the agency through which the Administration's case was presented to the Bureau of the Budget. Arrangements were made for the appearance of witnesses before the House Committee on Appropriations for the remaining \$550 million and before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the second authorization bill. Equally important was the active campaign carried through by the Director General and the Senior Deputy Director General to mobilize political feeling in the United States in favor of the fulfillment of the United States obligations to UNRRA.⁴² The urgency of the matter was clearly demonstrated by Lehman's testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee:

We are completely broke at the present time and we just cannot, out of the funds that are now available, make any additional purchases from American funds. . . . We have had to suspend a number of our orders for urgently needed goods merely because we needed the money that was involved in paying for those goods, to place orders intended to meet more urgent needs, such as food supplies.⁴³

He did not exaggerate. As additional funds were not forthcoming in the autumn of 1945, the Administration had to hold up the procurement of large quantities of United States military surpluses abroad in order that there might still be funds available to buy wheat.⁴⁴

The appropriation of the \$550 million remaining from the first contribution was secured by the passage of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Participation Act, 1946, on 14 December. Two amendments which had been added in the House of Representatives—the Dirksen-Brown "Free Press" Amendment, re-

⁴² Interview, Grace E. Fox and Thomas J. Mayock with Jackson, 15 May 1947; see *infra*, Part Two, Chapter VI.

⁴³ Lehman in United States Congress, 79th, 1 Session, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. R. 4649* (Washington, D.C., 1945), p. 70.

⁴⁴ Letter, Lehman to McCabe, 14 November 1945.

quiring freedom to United States journalists to enter any country receiving UNRRA assistance and to report on UNRRA relief operations; and the Hester Amendment providing for UNRRA to retain title to certain transport equipment⁴⁵—were stuck out by the Senate after an outcry in the press against UNRRA appropriations being subjected to crippling amendments;⁴⁶ and the law as finally adopted contained no restrictive clauses.⁴⁷

During the same week, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the bill authorizing the second United States appropriation of \$1,350 million,⁴⁸ and before the Congress dispersed for Christmas the bill had passed into law.⁴⁹ The first portion of the second contribution was made available by a provision for \$750 million for UNRRA⁵⁰ in the First Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1946, which was signed on 28 December 1945.

The cables from Headquarters to regional offices and missions conveying tidings of the appropriations⁵¹ and a message of gratitude from the Director General to members of the staff who were concerned with the presentation of UNRRA's case to the United States Congress bear witness to the profound relief experienced throughout the Administration that the grave risk of a break in the UNRRA supply line to the receiving countries had been averted.

There remained \$600 million still to be appropriated out of the second authorization. The Administration naturally wanted the remaining appropriation to be made quickly. The United States Department of State supported it, and on 16 April Byrnes wrote to Harold D. Smith (Director, Bureau of the Budget) requesting the appropriation of the \$600 million to complete the authorized United States contribution.⁵² He emphasized the urgent need for funds and added that UNRRA "in these most critical days of human suffering should not be put in a position of living from hand to mouth by delay in making this appropriation."⁵³ In spite of the efforts of the State De-

⁴⁵ Cable, Washington to London 6923, 15 November 1945.

⁴⁶ Memo, Alastair M. Taylor (Public Information Division, HQ) to Joseph Lilly (Director, Public Information Division, HQ), 26 June 1946.

⁴⁷ Public Law 259, 79th Congress.

⁴⁸ Cable, Washington to London 8383, 14 November 1945.

⁴⁹ Public Law 262, 79th Congress.

⁵⁰ Public Law 269, 79th Congress.

⁵¹ For example, cable, Washington to London 8476, 18 December 1945.

⁵² Letter, James F. Byrnes (Secretary of State) to Smith, 16 April 1946.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

partment and the Administration, however, the funds were provided in two appropriation bills instead of one. The amount of \$135 million was made available in May,⁵⁴ and the final appropriation of \$465 million in the Third Deficiency Appropriation Act, dated 23 July 1946.⁵⁵ The latter provided that the funds presently made available and those provided earlier could be utilized up to 30 June 1947, thereby extending by a year the previous appropriations. An echo of the Dirksen-Brown Amendment was found in the provision that none of the funds appropriated should be used for the procurement or distribution of supplies for any country which refused to allow a reasonable number of properly accredited representatives of the American press to "enter, observe and report on the distribution and utilization of relief and rehabilitation supplies and services furnished to such country." The determination of whether a country had violated this provision was placed with the Department of State, thus relieving UNRRA of responsibility. Further, the Act provided that none of the funds appropriated should be used for the transportation, delivery, or distribution of supplies for any receiving country until the Director General of UNRRA had advised the Secretary of State that that country had arranged for the prompt distribution of the supplies.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

During the war the United Kingdom Government suspended normal budgetary procedure and operated on a Vote of Credit system, under which Parliament gave the Government block appropriations for defraying war expenses.⁵⁶ The first United Kingdom Government contribution to UNRRA was made by including within the scope of the Vote of Credit presented to Parliament on 25 January 1944 a provision "for relief and rehabilitation in areas brought under the control of the United Nations." In explaining this "small but important and significant addition to the Vote of Credit," Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, informed the House of Commons that, on the best available estimates of the national income for the year ended 30 June 1943, a one per cent contribution to UNRRA would be somewhere between £75 million and £76 million, and that the Government proposed that a round figure of £80 million should be adopted as the

⁵⁴ Public Law 381, 79th Congress.

⁵⁵ Public Law 521, 79th Congress.

⁵⁶ See monograph, J. E. Lejeune, "The Use of the United Kingdom Contribution to UNRRA," pp. 8-9.

contribution of the United Kingdom. The debate which followed showed how warmly the House welcomed the proposal.⁵⁷ Such criticism as there was, concerned mainly the limitations placed on reconstruction work by the UNRRA resolutions. The Vote of Credit was adopted after a short debate, and no further legislative action was necessary.

Parliamentary approval for the second contribution also was obtained by Vote of Credit procedure which was still in operation in the autumn of 1945. As the sum of £80 million previously agreed upon had been in excess of the amount payable under the one per cent formula, the second contribution was fixed at £75 million. From 1 April 1946 the United Kingdom Government reverted to its normal budgetary procedure. As a result, the balance of the contribution which had not been taken up by the end of the preceding fiscal year was included in the Foreign Office Vote for 1946-1947 and for 1947-1948.⁵⁸

CANADA

Provision for Canadian participation in the UNRRA Agreement and resolutions was made in a measure⁵⁹ introduced into the House of Commons on 20 March 1944 by the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King. It provided for ratification of the Agreement for UNRRA and for the interim expenditure of a sum not exceeding \$10 million out of moneys provided under the War Appropriation (United Nations Mutual Aid) Act, 1943. The purpose of the preliminary financial legislation was to enable Canada to make a cash contribution at once for the administrative expenses of UNRRA and to finance any orders for supplies that might be placed in Canada before the following year's Mutual Aid appropriation was voted.⁶⁰ The bill was passed in April. In June, when the United Nations Mutual Aid bill was introduced, it contained a new element—as was the case in the Supplementary Vote of Credit introduced in the United Kingdom House of Commons—in the form of a provision for funds for UNRRA, stipulating

⁵⁷ *Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates*, CCCXCVI, 25 January 1944, 567-632.

⁵⁸ Monograph, Lejeune, "The Use of the United Kingdom Contribution to UNRRA," pp. 11-12.

⁵⁹ Bill No. 84.

⁶⁰ *Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates*, 1944, II, 17 April 1944, 2123.

that sums not exceeding 800 million dollars be granted to His Majesty for the purpose of making war supplies available to any of the United Nations other than Canada and of fulfilling any obligations arising out of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agreement.⁶¹

The national income of Canada—compiled as nearly as possible by the same method as that employed by the United States Department of Commerce in calculating the United States national income—was estimated to be \$7,615 million.⁶² On the basis of this estimate Canada proposed to authorize a contribution to UNRRA of \$77 million, including the \$10 million already voted. The Minister of Finance, J. L. Ilsley, in concluding his speech on the introduction of the Mutual Aid bill, said:

In extending our Mutual Aid to include the provision of relief supplies to our liberated allies we shall be extending the purpose for which supplies are furnished under Mutual Aid to include not only the effective prosecution of the war, but also the securing of a just and enduring peace. Already Mutual Aid has contributed and is contributing to the winning of a victory. We can look forward with hope and confidence to the role which Mutual Aid will play, through our contributions to UNRRA, in relieving the human suffering which the war has caused, and in helping by constructive measures truly to secure a just and enduring peace.⁶³

The third reading took place on 13 June 1944, and the bill passed into law.

The second Canadian contribution was authorized by legislation during the autumn of 1945, and on 22 December it was announced that a contribution of \$77 million, equal to the first, had been approved by the Government of Canada.

AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND SOUTH AFRICA

The Australian Parliament authorized in November 1944 the appropriation of £A12 million (\$38,400,000) to UNRRA. In December 1944 the Government of New Zealand passed legislation, retroactive to December 1943, approving the UNRRA Agreement and making available to UNRRA £NZ2,600,000 (\$8,476,000) out of the War Expenses Account. In both these cases the sums appropriated represented one per cent of the national income. In the spring of 1946 the Australian and New Zealand Governments authorized further amounts

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 1944, IV, 12 June 1944, 3738.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 3743.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

bringing their total contributions to the 2 per cent recommended by the UNRRA resolutions.⁶⁴

South Africa's participation in UNRRA was complicated by the requirement, under the South African constitutional system, that there should be actual expenditure on an appropriation before the close of the fiscal year, otherwise it lapsed. It was therefore originally intended by the Union Government to obtain Parliamentary approval to allocations against a total contribution as and when UNRRA required to take them up.⁶⁵ Limited allocations were made in 1944 and 1945, but the Administration's urgent need for funds led the Union Government to agree to secure Parliamentary approval to the whole of the balance in 1946. The total contribution amounted to \$18,112,500; unfortunately, owing to bad economic conditions in South Africa, caused by a severe drought, the South African Government decided not to ask Parliament for a second contribution.⁶⁶

THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS

Brazil.—Brazil's contributions ranked in size behind only those of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, and totaled nearly 2 per cent of her national income. Negotiations for a contribution from Brazil began in July 1944 when Arthur de Souza Costa, Finance Minister of Brazil, was in Washington. In company with the Brazilian Ambassador to the United States, he discussed the question of Brazil's contribution to UNRRA with the Director General.⁶⁷ De Souza Costa suggested a figure of \$30 million (more than one per cent of the national income of Brazil).⁶⁸ In mentioning so generous a sum, he belied his reputation that, "as behoves all good Ministers of Finance, he cherishes money as his favourite son and could not but regard the marriage of this well-beloved child to UNRRA as anything but a shocking misalliance."⁶⁹

It was decided that a small UNRRA mission should go to Brazil

⁶⁴ Monograph, N. O. P. Pyke, "Leading Aspects of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in the Southwest Pacific Area," Chapter IX, pp. 8, 12; "Desk Book of Statistics," Table K-4: Contributions of Noninvaded Member Governments as of 29 February 1948.

⁶⁵ Memo of meeting, Secretary for Finance (Union of South Africa) and Secretary of South African Legation with UNRRA senior officers, 3 August 1944.

⁶⁶ Memo, Engert to R. G. A. Jackson, 27 April 1946.

⁶⁷ Memo, meeting in Director General's office, 25 July 1944.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Letter to Hendrickson, 24 July 1944.

to find out the amount and kinds of supplies available and to agree upon prices. The proposed mission went to Rio de Janeiro in September, and in the same month decree laws were promulgated, providing for a contribution of the amount mentioned by the Finance Minister—600 million cruzeiros (\$30 million).⁷⁰ News of the signing of the decree laws reached Montreal, where the UNRRA Council was in session, in time to be warmly acclaimed at the final plenary meeting.⁷¹ The only unwelcome provision in the decree laws was that the contribution was to be made available in three annual installments.

A few months after the UNRRA Council had recommended a second contribution, a new government came into power in Brazil, following an election in which President Vargas was defeated by General Dutra. The new President was considered a "living symbol" of the country's desire to cooperate with the United Nations; the prospects seemed good for a second contribution.⁷²

The immediate reaction of the new President was not what the Administration had hoped; he did not think Brazil could afford to make a second contribution. He yielded, however, to persuasion when Sayre visited Brazil in March 1946,⁷³ and a decree law, published on 2 August 1946, provided for a further contribution of 200 million cruzeiros (\$10 million).⁷⁴

Other Latin American Countries.—The method by which, under decree law, Brazil made her contribution available to UNRRA was typical of that used by other Latin American Republics, and the provision in the Brazilian decree law that the contribution should be realized in installments⁷⁵ became a precedent to be followed by nearly all the Latin American Republics.⁷⁶ The Administration deplored such provisions;⁷⁷ they slowed down procurement, and, if the government changed or economic conditions deteriorated, there was a risk that contributions would not be completed.

Latin American representatives at the First Council Session had made

⁷⁰ Decree Law 6903.

⁷¹ *Journal*, Second Council, pp. 118-119.

⁷² Memo, David Weintraub (Bureau of Supply) to Sayre, 3 January 1946.

⁷³ Sayre, "Report on UNRRA Mission to Brazil, 7-25 March 1946."

⁷⁴ Decree Law 9541.

⁷⁵ Cable, Rio de Janeiro to Washington A-821 (United States State Department series), 21 August 1946.

⁷⁶ For example, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela.

⁷⁷ Council III Document 5, C(45)4, p. 5.

clear that the Financial Plan adopted for UNRRA had many disadvantages in its application to their countries.⁷⁸ In the end, nearly all the Latin American Republics had recourse to the provision that contributions might be less than one per cent of the national income if a one per cent contribution proved too burdensome. That some of them, at least, were justified in adopting this attitude was evident from the reports of the UNRRA delegations which visited them, though, on the other hand, some of them had benefited from wartime business.⁷⁹ Many of them had no indigenous supplies which could be used by the Administration. One, anxious to contribute, had no commodities to offer but bananas. The result of this state of affairs was that contributions were sought from the Latin American Republics on a more or less *ad hoc* basis, the Financial Plan being little more than a shadowy background for discussion.⁸⁰

The Administration's policy of sending delegations to discuss the form that contributions should take was followed more consistently in Latin America than in any other area. The terms of reference of the early missions to these countries were: (1) to increase knowledge and understanding of UNRRA among government officials and citizens of the Latin American Republics; (2) to develop closer relations between the Latin American Republics and UNRRA; and (3) to negotiate the amount and composition of the contributions, to institute procurement procedures, and to handle other aspects of the supply situation.⁸¹ The first two purposes of the missions were, in fact, the means of achieving the third.

The great majority of the missions to Latin American countries were under the leadership of Sayre, who visited fourteen, many of them more than once.⁸² Other missions were led by Eduardo Santos, former President of Colombia (whose appointment as a Deputy Director General in the Administration was primarily to insure that the Latin American member governments should play the largest possible part in UNRRA's activities), and by Ricardo J. Alfaro, former President of Panama.⁸³

⁷⁸ See Part One, Chapter IV, Section 2.

⁷⁹ Memo, Dimitry Varley (Bureau of Supply), "Latin American Contributions in Relation to National Income," 5 January 1945.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Committee on Contributions, HQ, minutes of meeting, June 1944.

⁸² Monograph, Engert, "Historical Sketch of the Diplomatic Adviser's Office."

⁸³ *Ibid.*

In negotiating with these countries, Sayre found it necessary to modify the provision that 90 per cent of the contribution should be realized in supplies and 10 per cent in convertible currency. Discussions were focused on the most urgent needs of the Administration in relation to the commodities or funds available. Thus the Chilean contribution was finally realized wholly in nonconvertible funds since the full amount was earmarked for the procurement of sodium nitrate.⁸⁴ Similarly, in Nicaragua⁸⁵ and Peru⁸⁶ the whole operating contribution was realized in local products. In contrast to these cases were others where the whole of a contribution was realized in convertible funds. The Honduran Government made operating contributions—generous in relation to its economic condition—wholly in United States dollars;⁸⁷ the Panamanian Government also made its operating contribution (payable in three installments) in United States currency.⁸⁸

In all, eighteen of the Latin American Republics made operating contributions. Most of them made one contribution only, but a few, including Uruguay,⁸⁹ the Dominican Republic and its neighbor Haiti, Honduras, and Guatemala, were able to respond to the recommendation of the Council for a second contribution. On the average, the contributions realized were small in relation to the recommendations of the Council resolutions, but there was real evidence of a desire to be associated with UNRRA's work, even though in numerous cases there was no simple legal or budgetary procedure through which funds could be provided. For instance, in one case an attempt was made to provide funds for UNRRA by increasing the tax on spirits. This was unsuccessful, but the Haitian Government was enabled to raise funds to make a contribution of coffee largely through the sale of a five centime (one cent) stamp, authorized by a Presidential decree of August 1944 which stipulated that the revenues thus raised were to be dedicated to the relief of victims of war.⁹⁰ The contributions of the

⁸⁴ Letter, Rooks (Director General) to Felix Nisto del Rio (Chilean Ambassador to the United States), 5 April 1947.

⁸⁵ Agreement between UNRRA and Nicaragua, July 1945 (no official document prepared).

⁸⁶ Memo, R. Torres Mazzoranna (Bureau of Supply, HQ) to Sayre, 18 October 1946.

⁸⁷ Letter, Sayre to Don Julian R. Casenas (Honduran Ambassador to the United States), 8 July 1946.

⁸⁸ Cable, Panama to Washington unnumbered, 29 January 1946.

⁸⁹ Letter, Colonel Alfred G. Katzin (Chief Executive Officer) to Mateo Manquez Castro (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Uruguay), 29 March 1947.

⁹⁰ Decree-Loi, *Le Moniteur, Journal Officiel de Gouvernement*.

Dominican Republic—proportionately among the largest from Latin America—were provided by increasing the export tax and devoting the proceeds to UNRRA.⁹¹

INDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

India's contribution to UNRRA was not based upon the one per cent formula, since no reliable statistics of national income existed,⁹² but her single contribution of eight crores of rupees—equivalent to \$24,042,072⁹³—ranked sixth among the contributions made by member governments. Provision for this sum was included in the budgetary allocations for 1945 and was approved by the Indian Legislative Assembly in May of that year. India had, however, before this time paid its first administrative contribution and, in anticipation of an operating contribution being voted by the Legislative Assembly, had agreed to put into production supplies for later delivery to UNRRA.⁹⁴

At the Third Council Session, in the discussion on the resolution recommending a second contribution, the member for India, Sir Samuel Rangahadhan, informed the Council that he would have to abstain from voting since, although India was not insensitive to the pressing needs of relief in the countries which had endured occupation by the enemy, its own internal economy had been severely strained by the war and by the help given to refugees from Burma and other countries overrun by the Japanese.⁹⁵ Against this background, he did not think the contribution of \$24 million already voted by the Indian Legislature ungenerous.

The doubts expressed by the Indian member were later confirmed by the Indian Government, when the Minister for Commerce informed the Director General finally that India could not support a further contribution to UNRRA since the Government was averting famine in India only by heavy subsidies on food imports.⁹⁶

The Egyptian contribution was a disappointment to the Administration both as to its size and the conditions on which it was finally given.

⁹¹ Sayre, "Report on Negotiations with the Dominican Republic, 16-19 December 1945."

⁹² Letter, R. K. Nehru (Government of India) to G. Stewart Mason (Bureau of Supply, HQ), 28 July 1945.

⁹³ Letter, Agent General of India to Director General, 29 May 1945.

⁹⁴ Letter, H. Trevelyan (Government of India) to Director General, 29 June 1944.

⁹⁵ *Journal*, Third Council, 13th plenary meeting, p. 126.

⁹⁶ Cable, New Delhi to Washington unnumbered (signed Chundrigav, Minister for Commerce), 17 January 1947.

There was substantial hope that UNRRA would receive full support from Egypt when, in January 1944, it was among the earliest of the supplying governments to pay its administrative contribution. This hope was appreciably diminished by the Government's contention shortly after, that, owing to the poverty of the country and the low per capita income, Egypt would be among those member governments which would have to contribute on a lower scale than that recommended by the Council resolutions.

A diplomatic mission under the leadership of Sayre visited Egypt in June 1945 for discussions with the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nokrashy Pasha, and the Minister of Finance, Makram Ebeid Pasha, on the ratification by the Egyptian Government of the UNRRA Agreement and Egypt's operating contribution. The Prime Minister agreed that the Egyptian Government would wish to help UNRRA, but that it had other obligations which it could not neglect; he referred particularly to the Moslems in Yugoslavia and Syria.⁹⁷ Eventually, however, Sayre received his assurance that Parliament would be asked to appropriate at least one million pounds. This promise was confirmed publicly two months later, at the Third Council Session, when, although the Egyptian member abstained from voting on the resolution recommending a second contribution,⁹⁸ he announced that the Egyptian Government would "present a resolution to meet its maximum contribution to the UNRRA fund at the next session of Parliament," and added: "This figure has been fixed at one million pounds sterling."⁹⁹

Parliament convened, but the appropriation was not made. In the spring of 1946 there was a change of government. In the following July the Egyptian Parliament authorized a contribution of £E350,000 (\$1,446,667), inclusive of administrative contributions. Two thirds of the balance of £E297,000 was, moreover, to be spent on new cotton purchases in Egypt. This further reduced the value of the contribution, for the Administration had hoped to offset previous sterling purchases of cotton in Egypt against the contribution, in order to release the sterling involved for other procurement in the United Kingdom.

Within two months after Turkey was admitted to membership in UNRRA, a bill was introduced in the Turkish Parliament to ratify the

⁹⁷ Cornelius Van H. Engert, "Report on UNRRA Mission to the Middle East."

⁹⁸ *Journal*, Third Council, 13th plenary meeting, 25 August 1945.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 9th plenary meeting, 17 August 1945.

UNRRA Agreement and to authorize a contribution.¹⁰⁰ The Grand National Assembly passed this bill on 8 May 1946 and appropriated six million Turkish pounds.¹⁰¹ Shortly afterwards an UNRRA mission, composed of Cornelius Van H. Engert, Assistant Diplomatic Adviser, Roscoe Herbert (Deputy Chief of Supply, ERO), and G. Stewart Mason (Bureau of Supply, Headquarters), visited Ankara to discuss the size of the contribution and the supplies in which it might be realized.¹⁰² The members of the mission were hospitably welcomed by the Turkish authorities and made guests of the Government during their visit. The Turkish Government's operating contribution was provided in the form of wheat (at a price reduced for UNRRA by 30 per cent ¹⁰³), coal, and barley, the last being substituted, at the request of the Administration, for salt which had formed part of the original offer.¹⁰⁴ The Iranian Government discharged its obligations to UNRRA by a gift of 10 million rials (\$307,600) to be realized in the form of 4,000 tons of barley.

ICELAND

Iceland can claim to have financed UNRRA's earliest activities.¹⁰⁵ Immediately after the First Council Session the Icelandic Government remitted to the Administration \$55,000 covering administrative contributions for 1943 and 1944 and an advance payment on account of its operating contribution.¹⁰⁶ Subsequent negotiations between the Icelandic Government and UNRRA resulted in the bulk of the supply portion of the contribution being provided in fish and cod-liver oil, under an arrangement by which the Administration paid 75 per cent of the price and the remainder was credited to the Icelandic contribution.¹⁰⁷ In 1946 Iceland offered a gift of wool, which was credited to it as a second contribution. Apart from the distinction of being UNRRA's first contributor, Iceland ranks with the few member gov-

¹⁰⁰ Central Committee (CC) (46)61, minutes 29th meeting, 17 May 1946 (Compilation of Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], III, 25).

¹⁰¹ Laws 4881 and 4883, published in *Official Gazette*, 10 May 1946.

¹⁰² Engert, "Report on UNRRA Mission to the Middle East," *passim*.

¹⁰³ Letter, Engert to Prime Minister of Iran, 5 July 1945.

¹⁰⁴ Memo, Karl Borders (Bureau of Supply, HQ) to Harry E. Howell (Controller), 27 December 1946.

¹⁰⁵ Letter, Thor Thors (Icelandic Legation) to Lehman, 29 December 1943; see also Section 5 below.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁷ Letter, Hendrickson to Thors, October 1944.

ernments which gave their support to an amount equaling or approaching 2 per cent of their national income.¹⁰⁸

3. OPERATING CONTRIBUTIONS FROM INVADED MEMBER GOVERNMENTS

Both in the Financial Plan and in Resolution 80 the Council urged that invaded member governments should make operating contributions in addition to their administrative contributions.¹⁰⁹ The Administration made no formal appeal to "nonpaying" member governments to respond to these recommendations. By the time the Third Council Session was held, however, Czechoslovakia had already made a contribution of sugar,¹¹⁰ and during the course of that Session the member for Czechoslovakia announced that the Czechoslovak Government was anxious to help "the great and noble work of UNRRA" by being a supplying country.¹¹¹ By the end of the UNRRA operation, the contributions of commodities made by Czechoslovakia, mostly in the form of food, amounted in value to \$4,852,000.

Poland, toward the end of 1945, made a contribution of 100,000 tons of Silesian coal—an invaluable contribution at a time when the Administration was unable to meet from other sources urgent demands from Austria and Yugoslavia.¹¹² This contribution was valued at \$900,000.

At about the same time, a request from Albania for cement, which it was unable to produce for itself owing to lack of anthracite to keep the cement works going, was met by a gift of 2,000 tons from Yugoslavia.¹¹³

Six paying governments made operating contributions: Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway. Most of these contributions were negotiated by visiting missions, constituted similarly to those which sought contributions from the smaller non-

¹⁰⁸ Letter, Icelandic Government to Director General, August 1946.

¹⁰⁹ Resolution 14, Section 7; Resolution 80, paragraph 3.

¹¹⁰ *Journal*, Third Council, 5th plenary meeting, p. 43.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 10th plenary meeting, p. 86.

¹¹² *Ibid.*; monograph, Philip Boulasse, "The History of Solid Fuel," ERO.

¹¹³ Memo, Borders to Howell, 27 December 1946; for manner of treatment of voluntary contributions of commodities in program of operations, see *infra*, Part Three, Chapter II, Section 13. For fiscal purposes this contribution was considered a direct gift to Albania; no mention, therefore, is made of it in *The Financial Report of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Ninth and Final Financial Report)* (Washington, D.C., 1949).

invaded member governments. The Diplomatic Adviser's policy in approaching these governments was to try to achieve two things: to increase the resources of the Administration by obtaining gifts of commodities of which the government had a surplus; and to help the economy of the contributing country by arranging to buy from it, with foreign exchange, commodities needed for the Administration's program of operations.¹¹⁴ The negotiations with Denmark illustrate the result of this policy. Early in February 1946 the Diplomatic Adviser, accompanied by Herbert, visited Denmark. After discussions with the Prime Minister and other members of the Government, it was agreed that Denmark would contribute 24 million kroner (\$5 million) for the purchase of 10,000 horses and a quantity of salted fish.¹¹⁵ In addition, it was agreed that a small supply mission should be established in Denmark to arrange, in coöperation with the Danish Government, for the shipment of the contributed supplies and also to buy in Denmark products which the Administration needed.¹¹⁶ Thus was the dual purpose achieved.

Somewhat similar arrangements were made shortly afterward as a result of a mission to Norway led by Roy F. Hendrickson, Deputy Director General of Supply, Headquarters. This resulted in a contribution of supplies which, with additions made later, amounted to \$4,028,821, and included fish and fish products, vegetable seeds, cod-liver oil, and miscellaneous surplus military supplies captured from the Germans.¹¹⁷

In August 1946, in response to a message from the Director General to Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Administration was invited to send a small delegation to Brussels to examine the possibilities of a contribution of commodities. Sayre and Herbert negotiated a contribution which amounted in value to \$1,042,308.¹¹⁸ This was made available mainly in heavy trucks which were sent to Czechoslovakia, and in copper wire which was needed for the China program.¹¹⁹ The amount of the contribution was rather less than the

¹¹⁴ See, for example, Sayre, "Report on UNRRA Mission to Belgium, 15-31 August 1946."

¹¹⁵ Sayre, "Report on Mission to Denmark, 6-16 February 1946."

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷ "Notice of Contribution," 30 June 1947.

¹¹⁸ See Sayre, "Report on UNRRA Mission to Belgium, 15-31 August 1946."

¹¹⁹ Memo, I. Bains (Records and Control Division, Supply Department, ERO) to J. Robbie (Accounts and Audit Division, ERO), 13 June 1946.

mission had hoped it would be, though the commodities in which it was realized were valuable. About this time, informal inquiries were made into the possibility of a contribution from Luxembourg,¹²⁰ and later in the year, at the invitation of the Prime Minister, Pierre Dupong, a small mission visited that country.¹²¹ The Grand Duchy contributed about 217 tons of foodstuffs, valued at \$159,830. Finally, France and the Netherlands, though unfortunately unable to provide commodities, were able to help UNRRA by contributions in local currency.

4. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM NONMEMBER GOVERNMENTS

In all, five nonmember governments contributed to UNRRA. Of these contributions the most important was made by the Argentine Government under the International Wheat Agreement, which provided for a relief pool of wheat to be contributed by the several signatories of the Agreement.¹²² In January 1944 the Executive Committee of the International Wheat Council passed a resolution designating UNRRA as the distributing agency for this relief pool. Thereupon it was agreed that 150,000 tons of wheat and corn (valued at \$10,778,768) contributed to the pool by the Government of Argentina should be made available to UNRRA. In addition, a gift of 100,000 tons of wheat was made by the Argentine Government to Italy.¹²³ Warehousing costs and ocean freight were borne by the Administration for both the contribution of grain to UNRRA and the outright gift to Italy.¹²⁴

Eire made a gift to UNRRA of 285 tons of bacon, valued at \$257,086. In addition, it gave 8,000 beef cattle valued at \$1,289,600 to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

The Portuguese Government made a contribution of 25 million escudos (\$1 million) for the purchase of supplies in Portugal and her colonies.¹²⁵ Since Portugal was a member of neither UNRRA nor the

¹²⁰ R. Miller, "Report on Visit to Luxembourg, 28-29 August 1946."

¹²¹ R. Herbert, "Report on UNRRA Mission to Luxembourg, 12-19 November 1946."

¹²² In *Ninth and Final Financial Report*, the Argentine contribution is recorded under "other contributors" rather than under "non-member governments."

¹²³ Resolution passed by Executive Committee of International Wheat Council, 31 January 1944; see also Council III Document 5, C(45)4, "Program of Operations."

¹²⁴ Memo, Andrew Cairns (Director of Food Division, HQ) to R. R. Boyer (Finance Division, HQ), 5 December 1946.

¹²⁵ ERO Supply Memorandum 13, 16 August 1946.

United Nations, the Administration sought the approval of the Canadian, Soviet, United Kingdom, and United States Governments before approaching the Portuguese Government. After receiving their approval, a telegram was sent to Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, President of the Portuguese Council, asking if his Government would be agreeable to UNRRA sending a mission to Lisbon. Salazar replied graciously that his Government would gladly receive an UNRRA mission "which may be assured of the goodwill of the Portuguese Government up to the limit of its powers, which are unhappily restricted."¹²⁶

In response to this invitation, a mission composed of Sayre, Herbert, and Mason went to Lisbon in July 1946. The mission reached agreement with the Portuguese Government for a contribution to be made in fish, wolfram, and cod-liver oil. The Portuguese Government expressed the wish that the Administration would direct the Portuguese supplies "to those countries with which Portugal enjoys particular sentimental and economic ties." The Administration accordingly sent the supplies to Italy.¹²⁷

Southern Rhodesia remained outside UNRRA membership but agreed to assist UNRRA, not on the basis of a contribution of a specified amount, but in certain commodities.¹²⁸ These took the form mainly of manufactured articles and amounted in value to \$582,945.

Italy, the only ex-enemy country to contribute, gave 10,000 tons of salt valued at \$65,500.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS

In accordance with the requirements of the Agreement, the Administration prepared annual budgets covering the administrative expenses. These budgets were submitted to the Committee on Financial Control and, with the recommendation of that Committee, were put before the Council for approval, or, when the Council so decided, before the Central Committee. Four annual budgets, covering the years 1944-1947, were drawn up and, in addition, a supplementary budget in 1946 and liquidation budgets in 1947 and 1948.

¹²⁶ Sayre, "Report on Mission to Portugal, 23 July-3 August 1946."

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Sayre, "Report on Negotiations with Southern Rhodesia, 29 September 1945."

TABLE 6
UNRRA ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGETS ^a

<i>Year</i>	<i>U.S. Dollars Equivalents</i>
1944	\$10,000,000
1945	7,500,000
1946	13,000,000
1946 (supplementary)	3,200,000
1947	9,500,000
1947 (supplementary)	1,000,000
1948-1949	2,000,000
1948-1949 (supplementary)	1,821,000
Transferred at suggestion of Council's auditors to operating budgets	<u>-446,000</u>
Total	\$47,575,000

^a CC (48)34, 17 September 1948.

The figure of \$10 million for the first administrative budget, which provided for the unelapsed period of 1943 as well as for 1944, was inevitably more or less arbitrary since there was no clear knowledge at the time it was compiled what would be the extent of the demand for UNRRA's services during that period.¹²⁹ The Director General was, however, anxious to keep the estimate as low as possible in relation to the potential expenditure on operations.¹³⁰ In transmitting the administrative budget to the Council, the Director General said, "I am not sure that the experience during any year of the life of UNRRA will ever be a good guide as to what may be expected in the next."¹³¹ This remark proved true in regard to administrative budgets and could, indeed, have been applied to practically every phase of the UNRRA operation. When the Council had approved the budget and the amount of the assessments, the Director General appealed to all member governments to pay without delay their apportioned share of the administrative contributions for the year 1944.¹³² The response to this request was prompt enough to enable the Director General to begin on 1 January 1944 the establishment of administrative offices and to embark upon the preparatory stages of the Administration's work,

¹²⁹ See Part One, Chapter IV, Section 2.

¹³⁰ "Memorandum on UNRRA Budget—1944."

¹³¹ *Journal*, First Council, p. 119.

¹³² Resolution 38.

financed in the first days by some half dozen administrative contributions¹³³ and by a general contribution from the Icelandic Government, which expressed itself as "happy to have been in a position to be the first country to pay a part of its contribution to UNRRA's noble and great activities."¹³⁴

At the time the first budget was drawn up, only very rough estimates of the probable administrative expenses could be made. It was not possible to say definitely either what items should properly be included or what amounts should be allocated to cover them. They were based, however, on the premise that expenditures for "personal services and related costs" in Headquarters and in the regional offices and in the field missions would all be classified as "administrative expenses."¹³⁵

During the early months the organization was largely confined to Headquarters and ERO, the activities of which were obviously administrative in character. It was only with the evolution of plans for the field missions and displaced persons camps that the proper demarcation between operating and administrative activities became clear. It was then evident that, in the camps, the whole expense was "operating" in character. Such "administrative" activities as were necessary were only by-products of the operation of the camp. The services of the field missions, like those of the camp staffs, were "operating" services. The port officers, the warehousemen, the field officers who supervised distribution, the engineers and accountants, and the chief of mission who directed their work served in the mission only for services to be rendered to the area to which they were accredited.

By the time the Second Council was held, therefore, it was possible to take into account the experience gained in the preceding nine months. The Director General accordingly drew up his second Administrative budget on the principle that all so-called "personal services" and related costs within a country served by UNRRA should be classified as "operating expenses" and that "administrative expenses" should be confined to costs incurred for the administration of Headquarters, the regional offices, and any other offices whose functions

¹³³ Committee on Financial Control (CFC) (43)6, minutes 2d meeting, 20 December 1943. Governments concerned included Belgium, Ethiopia, French Committee of National Liberation, Guatemala, Norway.

¹³⁴ Letter, Icelandic Government to UNRRA, 14 December 1943.

¹³⁵ Council II Document 51, C(44)11.

were administration and policy-forming rather than the direct relief of the peoples of the area in which they worked.¹³⁶

This budget for the year 1945 was approved by the Committee on Financial Control and by the Council.¹³⁷ The adoption of the Administration's demarcation between operating and administrative expenses meant, in practice, that the amount of the budget allotted to cover administrative expenses was henceforth much lower than it would have been if the Administration had included the administrative costs of the field missions and displaced persons camps. This did not have any appreciable effect on the supplying governments, since administrative and operating contributions were usually included in one general contribution, but it did affect the amount of the assessments made on invaded member governments.

The administrative budget for 1945 amounted to \$11,500,000, of which, after allowing for a carry-over of \$4 million from the previous administrative budget, \$7,500,000 was allocated among member governments.¹³⁸ The percentage assessments were much the same as for the 1944 budget, the most important alteration being a reduction in that made on the USSR from 14 to 10 per cent, after the Soviet Government had represented to the Administration that its assessment was beyond its means owing to the devastation it had suffered.¹³⁹

The administrative budget for 1946 was submitted to the Central Committee for approval, in accordance with the decision taken at the Third Council Session that, if no further session were held in 1945, the Central Committee should act for the Council,¹⁴⁰ subject, however, to reconsideration by the Council.¹⁴¹ This budget provided for administrative expenses for the year 1946 amounting to \$17,209,078. The report of the Committee on Financial Control recommended a reduction of \$2 million in this sum, on the grounds that the estimates were too high, particularly in their provision for staff requirements in 1946.¹⁴² After an inconclusive discussion in the Central Committee at which the Director General expressed the view that UNRRA was doing, in spite of the complexity, difficulty, and enormous range of its operations, "the cheapest relief job in history," the matter was

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Resolution 81, paragraph 4*a*, *b*.

¹⁴² CFC(46)24, "Administrative Budget for 1946," 12 March 1946.

¹³⁷ Resolution 43.

¹³⁹ *Journal*, Second Council, p. 76.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, paragraph 5.

referred to an *ad hoc* subcommittee of the Central Committee and Committee on Financial Control.¹⁴³

The Subcommittee's report was, in effect, confirmation of the recommendations of the Committee on Financial Control. It recommended the reduction of the budget from \$17,209,078 to \$15,209,078.¹⁴⁴ Of this sum, at least \$2,209,078 was expected to be available from the 1945 budget, leaving a balance of \$13 million to be allocated among member governments for 1946.¹⁴⁵ The report proposed, however, that the Committee on Financial Control should review the position in April 1946 and report to the Central Committee any modification which might be necessary, and that should a supplementary budget be required, it should be submitted by the Director General to the Central Committee for action.¹⁴⁶ Approval was given to these recommendations at a meeting of the Central Committee on 14 March.¹⁴⁷ The allocations included an assessment of 0.5 per cent of the administrative budget on Denmark, which had been admitted to membership at the Third Council Session. The recommendations by the Committee on Financial Control on the size of assessments on new members were made on the basis which governed those made on the original members.

It so happened that the Administration's first estimate of \$17,209,078, far from being excessive, was inadequate. The review of the budget occupied some three months: ¹⁴⁸ the Administration requested a supplementary budget of \$4,700,000.¹⁴⁹ The request was backed by detailed information on the activities of every branch at Headquarters, and the various administrative offices: its validity rested almost entirely on the fact that because of program delays, beyond the control of the Administration,¹⁵⁰ the peak of operations would not be reached until the third quarter of 1946 and would be maintained until the first quarter of 1947. Some 42.7 per cent of the total supply program still remained to be shipped; some \$547,300,000, or about 14 per cent of

¹⁴³ CC(46)17, minutes 20th meeting, 4 February 1946 (CC Docs., II, 84-92).

¹⁴⁴ CC(46)24, "Report of Committee on Financial Control," 12 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 149-154).

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁷ CC(46)41, minutes 25th meeting, 14 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 166).

¹⁴⁸ CFC(46)44, "Second Review of Administrative Budget for 1946," 28 May 1946;

CFC(46)48, "Third Review of Administrative Budget for 1946," 10 July 1946.

¹⁴⁹ CFC(46)53, "Third Review of Administrative Budget for 1946," 15 July 1946.

¹⁵⁰ For further details see Part Three, Chapter II, Sections 6-8.

the total operating contributions, had not yet been received. This meant that staff reductions, which it had been hoped would be possible by the latter part of 1946, could not be put into effect.¹⁵¹ The Committee on Financial Control, however, recommended the reduction of the supplementary budget to \$3,200,000, on the grounds that provision had been made in the Administration's request for some \$1,400,000 to cover unpaid portions of administrative contributions, and this shortfall could be met, under the provisions of the Financial Plan, out of general resources.¹⁵² The report of the Committee on Financial Control was considered by the Central Committee on 23 July and accepted by a majority vote, after the Controller had informed the Committee that, in the absence of an authorization for a supplementary budget, the Administration would be compelled to cut its staff on 30 September by 50 per cent.¹⁵³

The 1947 administrative budget of \$9,500,000 was approved at the Sixth Council Session. It was also decided that the Committee on Financial Control should make at least quarterly reviews of the position of the administrative budget and report to the Central Committee, which was empowered to make any modification necessary.¹⁵⁴ In preparing the 1947 administrative budget, the Administration had predicated the figures on a rundown plan which, however carefully worked out, could not be exact. Such outside factors as a maritime strike in the United States, just ended, or a coal strike, just beginning, would inevitably retard the completion of UNRRA's programs. Without allowance for these imponderable factors, the budget proposed for 1947 provided sufficient funds for an orderly liquidation under the existing forecasts of operations.¹⁵⁵ Thus, for the first time the budget exhibited characteristics of an agency in process of liquidation: average salary costs were higher since high-grade personnel tended to be retained and key positions to remain filled while the number of subordinate employees was decreased; an incentive bonus plan, to prevent employees from seeking the security of permanent employment before the need for their services had been satisfied, was in operation.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ CFC(46)51, "Status of UNRRA Accounts as of 15 May 1946," 23 May 1946.

¹⁵² Resolution 14, Section 14.

¹⁵³ CC(46)85, minutes 33d meeting, 23 July 1946 (CC Docs., II, 92-101).

¹⁵⁴ Resolution 110.

¹⁵⁵ CFC(46)76, "Statement of Administrative Budget for 1947," 7 December 1946.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*; for further details see *infra*, Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 7.

In the spring of 1947 the Committee on Financial Control, having examined the status of the administrative budget, recommended to the Central Committee a liquidation budget of \$5 million.¹⁵⁷ This included a supplementary budget for 1947, plus an amount for the calendar year 1948 and for subsequent years.¹⁵⁸ The budget was approved by the Central Committee at its meeting on 23 May 1947.¹⁵⁹

Later, the Council member for the USSR proposed to the Director General that, since the Administration had residual funds which were being handed over to other organizations, it was inconsistent that further funds should have been approved for liquidation, and that the resolution relating to the liquidation budget should be repealed.¹⁶⁰ This recommendation was referred to the Committee on Financial Control. The matter was twice deferred because the Soviet member was unable to be present, but on 23 March 1948 the Committee decided it could be postponed no longer, although the Soviet member was still absent. The Committee referred the question to the Central Committee on the understanding that the Soviet member would have an opportunity to present his comments when the matter was taken up.¹⁶¹ When it came before the Central Committee on 8 April 1948, the Soviet member asked that it be deleted from the agenda as he had not received instructions from his Government. It was finally settled at a meeting of the Central Committee on 2 June, when the Soviet member's proposal was rejected by a majority vote.¹⁶² At the time when the liquidation budget was approved by the Central Committee and the assessments made on member governments, there was a possibility that the Administration would be faced with a deficit, since various revenues had not then been realized. Later, as it turned out, these outstanding matters were settled favorably, and a potential deficit was changed to a surplus. The Administration had throughout taken the view that it would be inadvisable to become involved in all the complications incidental to reopening the budget just because a possibility

¹⁵⁷ CFC(47)16, "A Resolution relating to the Liquidation Budget covering Administrative Expenses," 24 April 1947.

¹⁵⁸ CFC(47)15, minutes 42d meeting, 2 April 1947.

¹⁵⁹ CC(47)70, "A Resolution relating to the Liquidation Budget covering Administrative Expenses (as approved by Central Committee at its 53d meeting, 23 May 1947)," 26 May 1947.

¹⁶⁰ CC(47)110, letter, J. I. Krasiuk (Council member for USSR) to Director General, 10 September 1947.

¹⁶¹ CC(48)21, minutes 64th meeting, 8 April 1948.

¹⁶² CC(48)29, minutes 65th meeting, 2 June 1948.

of a surplus—which had always existed—had become a fact.¹⁶³

At this time some eight member governments were in arrears in making their administrative contributions, and the Administration was doing all it could to collect the sums outstanding.¹⁶⁴ To support this action, the Central Committee passed a formal resolution instructing the Administration to communicate with the governments concerned, informing them that the Central Committee had requested the Administration to do so, and urging them to pay their administrative contributions.¹⁶⁵

The result of this final effort was that administrative contributions were realized almost to the full amount of the allocations. Only two governments out of UNRRA's total membership failed to complete their payments—the USSR and Iraq. Whether the latter country was, in fact, a member of UNRRA was uncertain after October 1946, when the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the Director General that Parliamentary sanction could not be obtained to the UNRRA Agreement and that therefore the Iraqi Government could not make an operating contribution or continue to share in administrative expenses.¹⁶⁶ Although perhaps technically Iraq, in the absence of ratification of the Agreement, was not a member, the Administration, nevertheless, continued to include it as such in official reports and accounts.¹⁶⁷

In spite of the Soviet protest over the liquidation budget, both the Ukrainian and Byelorussian Republics paid the amounts allocated to them.¹⁶⁸ Four defaulting governments took advantage of the option they had not hitherto exercised to charge their administrative dues against their operating contributions.¹⁶⁹

6. CONTRIBUTIONS FROM NONGOVERNMENTAL SOURCES

The Financial Plan contemplated that contributions would be received from "nongovernmental sources" and provided that such contributions might be accepted in accordance with "the rules and

¹⁶³ CFC(47)30, "Resolution Submitted by the Member for the USSR with Reference to the Liquidation Budget," 21 October 1947.

¹⁶⁴ CC(48)29, minutes 65th meeting, 2 June 1948.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ CFC(46)78, "Administrative Contribution and Membership of Iraq," 10 December 1946.

¹⁶⁷ See DGR 14; *Ninth and Final Financial Report*, p. 16.

¹⁶⁸ CC(48)38, minutes 67th meeting, 6 October 1948.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

regulations" established by the Director General.¹⁷⁰ The formulation of these "rules and regulations" was slow and gave rise to conflicts of view within the Administration over the conditions which should govern the acceptance of voluntary contributions. One body of opinion considered that the provisions in the resolution against discrimination in distribution¹⁷¹ prevented the Administration from accepting contributions to which conditions were attached;¹⁷² the other held that the resolution did not apply, since the question of discrimination arose only when undesignated supplies were distributed inequitably;¹⁷³ further, that if the Administration refused to accept voluntary gifts designated to particular countries or groups of people, it would probably lose valuable contributions which it otherwise might have had.

No final conclusion had been reached on this point when the Contributed Supplies Branch was created at Headquarters in June 1944, with the primary function of instituting national drives in the United States for the collection of used clothing to supplement the inadequate supplies of finished clothing then available from United States production.¹⁷⁴ The newly formed Branch evolved *ad hoc* plans for the acceptance and handling of all types of voluntary contributions.¹⁷⁵ In this process, the argument against accepting conditional gifts gradually lost practical force, and the Administration's policy, as finally developed, laid down that, in addition to outright gifts, it would accept voluntary contributions to which conditions were attached, provided that the contributions were of "such a nature and value as to justify the expense involved in handling and shipping," and that the "conditions attached by the donor are feasible and acceptable."¹⁷⁶

Most of the larger gifts, contributed in the form of cash and commodities by voluntary societies in the United States and elsewhere, were designated for use in specified countries. Among these were:

¹⁷⁰ Resolution 14, Section 9.

¹⁷¹ Resolution 7.

¹⁷² Note, meeting between Lehman and representatives of Agudas Israel, 14 December 1944.

¹⁷³ Memo, Oscar Schachter (Assistant General Counsel, HQ) to Weintraub, 19 February 1945.

¹⁷⁴ CS(44)31, "Report of the Bureau of Supply, Tenth Meeting of the Committee on Supplies, 7 September 1944."

¹⁷⁵ Memo, Elaine Carr (Contributed Supplies Branch, HQ) to Mary T. Featherstonhaugh (Bureau of Areas, HQ), 17 April 1945.

¹⁷⁶ *Basic Headquarters Manual*, Part IV, Section 124.31.

Contributions

Greek War Relief Association	\$3,331,193
American Relief for Czechoslovakia	485,036
The Rebuilders of Poland Association	613,475
Overseas Chinese Relief Committee of Siam	1,961,885
Polish Supply and Reconstruction Mission	410,965
State of Mississippi (for Greece)	304,069
American Hungarian Relief	50,000
Greek War Relief Fund (Australia)	41,424
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief	273,656
Brethren Service Committee	523,836

Many of these gifts included livestock which, of all supplies, were among the most welcome in the UNRRA countries. Of the total contribution made by the Greek War Relief Association, \$1,208,028 was designated for the purchase of cattle, horses, and mules.¹⁷⁷ This contribution alone increased by one-eighth the total value of livestock delivered to Greece during the UNRRA period. The contribution from the State of Mississippi was made entirely in livestock which had been collected through a campaign instituted by the Governor, Thomas L. Bailey, for the purchase of pedigreed dairy cattle for Greece. At a ceremony at Gulfport Pier, Mississippi, when the first shipload was being embarked, the Chief Executive Officer accepted the animals on behalf of the Administration; priests of the Greek Orthodox Church attended the ceremony and blessed the ship before it sailed.¹⁷⁸ Poland received 8,000 draft horses bought with the contribution of \$613,475 from the Rebuilders of Poland Association,¹⁷⁹ and heifers given by the Brethren Service Committee "for the glory of God, not ourselves."¹⁸⁰ In addition, the Brethren Service Committee made gifts of livestock to Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Italy.¹⁸¹

The greater part of the voluntary contributions was in the form of used clothing, collected through clothing drives which were instituted on a large scale in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The total value of the contributions through organized collections amounted to \$184,984,792.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁷ Monograph, Robert Lintner, "UNRRA Livestock Program," HQ, section on Greek War Relief Livestock Program.

¹⁷⁸ Press Release 474, "UNRRA in Greece," 20 July 1946.

¹⁷⁹ Monograph, Lintner, "UNRRA Livestock Program."

¹⁸⁰ Letter, Lehman to M. R. Zigler (Executive Secretary, Brethren Service Committee), 31 January 1946.

¹⁸¹ Press Release 461, 12 July 1946.

¹⁸² It was decided that a uniform evaluation of \$1.00 per pound should be placed

The first United States clothing drive was organized in the autumn of 1944. Various denominational groups—Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish—undertook the physical collection of the garments. Baling, warehousing, and transport to shipside were handled by Treasury Procurement. The Administration arranged shipment. Some 5,000 tons of clothing were collected and sent over within the next few months to various destinations in Europe, mainly to Greece and Yugoslavia.

This drive was succeeded in the spring of 1945 by a more ambitious scheme, the United National Clothing Collection, planned on the scale of a War Loan Drive. It was decided that responsibility should rest on a national committee of prominent public men, under a chairman to be appointed by the President of the United States. The Administration asked President Roosevelt to appoint Henry J. Kaiser as National Chairman. An appeal was made informally to Mrs. Roosevelt for her support which, characteristically, she gave in full measure. Kaiser accepted the appointment, and the scheme was launched. It resulted in the collection of over 50,000 tons of clothing which was sent to no less than twenty liberated countries in Europe and Asia. Paying and nonpaying countries alike were allowed to receive a share. A third drive, known as the Victory Clothing Drive, was organized early in 1946 and realized a total of over 20,000 tons.¹⁸³

Two clothing drives were conducted in Canada which resulted in collections valued at \$17,310,174. In Australia, although clothes rationing was in force, plans were made in the summer of 1945 for a drive, patterned on the United National Clothing Collection, which realized \$4,830,973 worth. In New Zealand a clothing drive which brought in \$1,497,559 of contributed goods was made by the New Zealand Council of Organization for Relief Service Overseas. The New Zealand Government assumed all expenses incidental to shipment.¹⁸⁴

Some of the garments included in the clothing collections were not of a practical kind. Some of them (particularly those derived from the

on used clothing (memo, Rooks to Lawrence J. Lismer [Accounts and Audits Division, HQ], 28 June 1946). This evaluation is, in fact, higher than that of the new clothing acquired by the Administration through government procurement agencies. In the result, therefore, it would appear that the Administration inflated the value of this commodity in its accounting records.

¹⁸³ Monograph, Henrietta Shaw, "Comments upon the History of Clothing Drives," HQ.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

first United States drive) were not fit for use in the condition in which they were received, with the result that complaints from the receiving countries were numerous. As the Administration gained more experience in handling this type of supply, and the receiving countries in utilizing it to the best advantage, however, supplies of used clothing came to be greatly appreciated. Every country to which contributed clothing was sent asked for a second allocation, and every country requested larger quantities than the Administration had to give.¹⁸⁵

Apart from clothing drives, the most important effort made by the Administration to increase its resources from voluntary contributions was through the Victory Food Program. It was begun during the summer of 1945 and had as its target the collection of 10 million cans of fruit and vegetables to be prepared in community canning centers in the United States.¹⁸⁶ Later it was decided to extend the project to include the collection of commercially canned products and also of money to be used for further purchases.¹⁸⁷ The provision for cash collections was perhaps the soundest part of the whole scheme. When LaGuardia became Director General, after the campaign had been running for some ten months and some 700,000 cans had been shipped, he recognized the extravagance of the canned vegetable scheme:

People out of the goodness of their hearts purchase all kinds of canned food not suitable such as soups, vegetables containing considerable water and we would be shipping water instead of food, and there is plenty of water in all these countries. . . . The cost of boxing alone is eighty to ninety cents for every twenty-four cans. In addition, contributors pay retail prices and we are shipping in wholesale quantities. This makes a difference of some 30 per cent. Therefore a cash contribution is desirable because meats, fish, milk, dehydrated food is acquired all ready for shipment.¹⁸⁸

Inevitably, there was some embarrassment within the Administration at the disappointment caused to the many people¹⁸⁹ who had generously

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ Memo, Harry Howell (Controller) to C. Tyler Wood (United States State Department), 26 March 1946.

¹⁸⁷ UNRRA Weekly Bulletin 62, 13 October 1945; memo, Burton E. Palmer (Acting Deputy Director General, Finance and Administration) to Lehman, 28 January 1946.

¹⁸⁸ Telegram, LaGuardia to Walter F. Fitzpatrick (chairman, Emergency Food Collection Committee, Providence, R.I.), 29 May 1946.

¹⁸⁹ For example, letter, Mariano A. Lucca (local chairman for campaign, Buffalo, N.Y.) to W. F. Straub (Director, Department of Agriculture Emergency Food Program), 27 May 1946.

responded to the original appeal for canned fruit and vegetables, but the wisdom of the Director General's view could hardly be disputed. Henceforth, for the remainder of the Victory Food Program, emphasis was on contributions of money, and ultimately cash gifts amounted to \$2,836,150—as much as the whole operating contribution of many of the smaller member governments—in addition to the canned foods already collected, which were valued at \$2,156,852.

In addition to the contributions of cash and food from the Victory Food Program, of clothing from the United States, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand clothing drives, and of livestock from numerous voluntary societies, there were countless other types of gift which came from private individuals, brotherhoods, voluntary societies, and charitable organizations in over thirty countries.¹⁹⁰ They included such diverse items as ambulances, razor blades, crutches, soap, brewers' yeast, garden seeds, and sodium nitrate.

In total, the contributions from nongovernmental sources amounted to \$209,895,377, or one-third more than the contribution of the Canadian Government—the third largest contributor. From the United States alone came voluntary contributions amounting to almost one dollar per head of the population. Altogether, these contributions made up about 6 per cent of UNRRA's total resources and were a tangible proof of the spontaneous recognition of people all over the world of the value of the work which UNRRA was doing.

¹⁹⁰ DGR 14.

