

PART FOUR

The Field Operation

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I. The Agreements

THE SERIES of formal agreements¹ between the Administration and the receiving governments or the military authorities in control of a given area were an essential outgrowth of Resolution 1 which specified that the nature of UNRRA operations must be determined by the Director General "only after consultation with, and with the consent of, the government or authority (military or civil) which exercises administrative control in the area."²

The agreements with military authorities were for the most part made early in the life of UNRRA when the war was still in progress or just ended and before civilian governments had been restored to full authority. They dealt with specific situations and had no points in common.³ They were of three types:

(1) Agreements covering the relations of UNRRA and its personnel with the military authorities during the period of military occupation immediately following liberation of a country: the Cairo Agreement of 3 April 1944 governing UNRRA participation in Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia, and a later interpretation thereof, both accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) on 11 October 1944;⁴ an "Agreement as to the Conditions of Service of UNRRA Personnel (Including Members of Voluntary Societies) Serving in the Balkans at the Request of the Military Authorities," approved by CCS on 18 November 1944.⁵

(2) Agreements establishing the relationship of UNRRA to the

¹ See Appendices Five, Six, Seven, for the texts of UNRRA agreements with military authorities and UNRRA agreements with governments of receiving countries and accompanying or supplementary documents.

² Resolution 1, I, paragraph 2, based on Articles I and VII of the UNRRA Agreement.

³ See Part Five, Chapter I; Part Seven, Chapter I, Sections 5, 6, for discussion of their origins and import.

⁴ Agreements between the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and the Yugoslav Authorities and the Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian National Army of Liberation and an Agreement between the United Kingdom and Greek Governments also governed the use of UNRRA personnel during the military period in these countries. See Part Five, Chapter III, Section 2; Chapter IV, Section 1; Chapter II, Section 2.

⁵ See Part Five, Chapter I.

military authorities in regard to displaced persons operations: the UNRRA-SCAEF (Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force) Agreement of 25 November 1944 relating to the three Western zones of Germany, and the subsequent agreements with the individual zone commanders;⁶ interim agreements with United States, United Kingdom, and French Commanders in Austria governing the use of UNRRA personnel in displaced persons operations;⁷ Agreement with SACMED (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations), 15 July 1945, for the transfer to UNRRA of responsibility for "the care, maintenance, and repatriation" of eligible non-Italian displaced persons in Italy.⁸

(3) Agreements which formed the basis for an UNRRA program in a receiving country: ⁹ Agreement with the United Kingdom War Office on behalf of the British Military Administration (Dodecanese), 1 August 1945; ¹⁰ memoranda exchanged with the Soviet Military Command in North Korea, 27 June 1946, and with the American Military Government in South Korea, 3 July 1946.¹¹

The agreements with receiving governments were recognized as essential, not only to confirm the consent of the controlling authority to UNRRA's operations in the area, but, for UNRRA's part, to ensure that the principles embodied in the Council resolutions were understood and carried out. Particularly, the agreements emphasized that the provision of relief and rehabilitation supplies by UNRRA did not involve the receiving government in a lasting foreign exchange debt, and that, while responsibility for the distribution of these supplies rested with the government, distribution must be carried out without political, religious, or racial discrimination.

UNRRA's relations with fourteen of the seventeen receiving countries were governed by formal agreements with the governments or controlling authorities, signed on the dates indicated: Albania, 1 August 1945; Austria, 5 April 1946; Byelorussian SSR, 18 December 1945; China, 13 November 1945; Czechoslovakia, 26 February 1945; Dodecanese Islands, 1 August 1945; ¹² Ethiopia, 4 July 1946; Greece, 1 March 1945; Italy, First Agreement, 8 March 1945; Supplementary Agree-

⁶ See Part Seven, Chapter I, Sections 5, 6.

⁷ See Part Two, Chapter I, Section 11.

⁸ See Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 8.

¹⁰ See Part Five, Chapter X, Section 1.

⁹ See below.

¹¹ See Part Six, Chapter IV, Section 2.

¹² As has been noted, the Agreement covering UNRRA's operations in the Dodec-

ment, 19 January 1946; Korea, 27 June, 3 July 1946; ¹³ Poland, 14 September 1945; San Marino, 14 July 1945; Ukrainian SSR, 18 December 1945; and Yugoslavia, 24 March 1945. The remaining three Agreements—with Finland, Hungary, and the Philippines—were embodied in exchanges of letters with the governments.

The memoranda concerning Korea were atypical.¹⁴ The agreements with the other thirteen countries were relatively uniform and reveal their derivation from a so-called "Master Agreement,"¹⁵ prepared by the General Counsel's Office, Headquarters, in the autumn of 1944. This was the fruit of intensive studies undertaken in Headquarters from July to November 1944 and embodied the results of a lively exchange of views between the various divisions and bureaus as the aims and operational methods of UNRRA gradually evolved.¹⁶ The Master Agreement served as the basis for the terms of specific agreements with receiving countries, but each embodied variations which developed in the course of negotiations. After the Czechoslovak Agreement had been signed, this text was customarily used as a model.

The negotiation of these country agreements was carried on at first primarily by UNRRA Headquarters with government representatives in Washington. With the increased delegation of responsibility for European missions to the European Regional Office (ERO) at the end of 1944, negotiations were for the most part transferred to London and, as UNRRA missions entered the field, to the signatory country where the actual signing took place. The negotiations of the agreements of later date—those with Ethiopia, San Marino, Poland, Austria, and the Supplementary Agreement with Italy—were conducted throughout by the mission chief; in the last two cases in frequent consultation with Headquarters and ERO, and in the last three instances with the aid of a legal adviser loaned by one of these offices. Only the Czechoslovak, Dodecanese, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian Agreements were signed outside the boundaries of the country—the first two in London, the latter two in Washington.

anese was made with the occupying military authorities temporarily controlling civil administration.

¹³ The memoranda covering UNRRA's operations in Korea were also exchanged with the occupying military authorities.

¹⁴ See below.

¹⁵ Fourth and final complete draft, 18 October 1944.

¹⁶ General Counsel's files on Master Agreement.

Many of the minor textual variations¹⁷ in the agreements came from the desire of the Administration to respect the sensibilities of individual governments when this could be done without affecting the fundamental meaning. Thus, for example, in the clause providing that the receiving government must "inform UNRRA and *receive its views*" on government plans for, and methods of, distribution of UNRRA supplies, "receive its views" was adopted in all the agreements, except those with China, Italy, and San Marino, because some of the receiving governments considered this less demanding than an obligation "to consult."¹⁸

Major variations in content¹⁹ resulted in some few cases, notably in the Agreements with the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSR, from the insistence of the governments. For the most part, however, they arose from the limitations on a given program imposed by UNRRA. Thus the markedly divergent Agreement with Ethiopia reflected the decision of the Administration to confine its work in that country to a few specific projects closely controlled by UNRRA.²⁰ The first Agreement with Italy, an ex-enemy country, again differed considerably, in part because the UNRRA program had been limited by the Council²¹ to relief services in the fields of welfare, health, and displaced persons, and the resultant absence of proceeds of sale necessitated the establishment of the Lire Fund; in part because the apparent weakness of the Italian Government made the establishment of the Joint UNRRA-Governmental Committee for administration of the program seem advisable. Aside from these major sections defining the program and outlining the financial and administrative provisions, this Agreement accorded in general with the others. The Supplementary Agreement with Italy, while perpetuating the important differences of the first, in its other sections followed the usual form with few variations.²² The Agreement with San Marino, negotiated by the

¹⁷ No attempt is made herein to point out all the minor differences in wording.

¹⁸ Memo, Frank Weisl (Bureau of Areas, HQ) to Michail A. Menshikov (Deputy Director General, Areas, HQ), 17 November 1944; conference of Headquarters senior officials with Yugoslav delegation on basic Agreement, 24 October 1944.

¹⁹ Discussion of the major peculiarities of individual agreements appears in the chapters on each country mission.

²⁰ Since the UNRRA program in Ethiopia was small and unique, the peculiarities of this Agreement have no general significance; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter XI, for the major divergences.

²¹ Resolution 58.

²² For unique provisions in both Agreements with Italy, see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter VIII, Sections 2, 4; also Part Four, Chapter IV, Section 3.

Italy Mission, was almost identical to the text of the first Italian Agreement.²³ In wording, the Dodecanese Agreement departed widely from the usual form but mainly in its brevity. It included all the major principles embodied in the others.

In the Agreement with Austria, a few additional sections were required to cover the peculiar relations of the civil Government with the Allied Council and the relations of UNRRA to the Allied Council in regard to displaced persons.²⁴ Unique sections also appeared in the Austrian and Italian Agreements covering their status as nonmembers of UNRRA. The Chinese Agreement, moreover, contained an article governing the loan of "program personnel" to the Chinese Government and special sections relating to the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA) and the provision of local currency for mission expenses.²⁵

The UNRRA missions to receiving countries operated in accordance with certain common principles laid down in all the UNRRA country agreements. Article I²⁶ of all the agreements stated basic principles governing the provision of UNRRA supplies and services. The Administration agreed to furnish relief and rehabilitation supplies in accordance with the UNRRA Agreement of 9 November 1943 and the Council resolutions, and the receiving government, in turn, promised to cooperate with UNRRA for this purpose. UNRRA furthermore undertook to provide supplies and services within the limits of its resources and the availability of supplies and transport. To this general provision was added in the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Agreements a fixed value in dollars for the aid to be furnished to each, and an undertaking by UNRRA "to strive to procure [such aid] prior to 1 July 1946."²⁷

All agreements specified that supplies and services were to be furnished only so long as the receiving country was declared to be unable to pay for them in foreign exchange, nor was UNRRA to make any request or claim for payments in foreign exchange.

Retention of title by UNRRA to certain categories of long-term

²³ Appendix Seven, Document 13*a*.

²⁴ See Part Five, Chapter IX, Section 2.

²⁵ See Part Six, Chapter II, Section 1; Chapter I, Section 4.

²⁶ The numbering of articles used herein follows that in the majority of the agreements.

²⁷ See Part Five, Chapter VII, Section 2, for the background of this unique insertion.

equipment, such as watercraft and railway rolling stock, was agreed²⁸ on the assumption that subsequent redistribution by some other international body such as the European Central Inland Transport Organization might prove desirable. In the end, however, the Administration in all cases transferred ownership to the governments.

Supply procurement procedure was outlined in most of the agreements: the receiving government was to present monthly supply requests at least six months in advance of the date on which delivery was desired, with indication of which goods were to be given priority in case UNRRA was unable to fill the entire program. The Administration, in turn, was to state its program of deliveries, if possible at least three months ahead of planned arrival in the receiving country, although the government agreed to discuss changes in schedule at any time.

Article II dealt with the administration of services, stating simply the basic provision that "relief and rehabilitation services furnished by UNRRA will be administered in conformity with plans agreed between the latter and the [receiving] government and in accordance with the policies of the Council embodied in Resolutions 2, and 7 through 13." Although the Agreements with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Albania mentioned supplementary agreements "in regard to the organization of relief and rehabilitation services," these were actually concluded only with Czechoslovakia²⁹ and were thereafter abandoned as unnecessary.

Article III dealt in some detail with the transfer and distribution of supplies within receiving countries. In accordance with Resolution 7, responsibility for the distribution of UNRRA supplies within the receiving country was placed with the government, not UNRRA; and the government was, moreover, required to ensure nondiscriminatory distribution in accordance with Resolutions 2 and 7. Supplies were to be consigned to the UNRRA Mission, and title and control transferred to the government as soon as the goods reached certain frontier points or ports of entry or "such other ports" agreed upon between UNRRA and the government.³⁰ The above provision was only adopted after

²⁸ Omitted in Byelorussian and Ukrainian Agreements. See Part Three, Chapter VII, Section 2.

²⁹ Appendix Seven, Document 5c.

³⁰ The exceptions to this rule were few and involved only small emergency programs, or a brief period of time; for example, the first limited program for Italy, the first fifteen months of the Ethiopian program, Finland, Korea, the last few months of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian programs.

prolonged argument both within the Administration and in negotiations with several of the governments. It was the contention of Menshikov, Deputy Director General, Bureau of Areas, Headquarters,³¹ and subsequently of Czechoslovakia,³² Yugoslavia,³³ and the two Soviet Republics,³⁴ that the governments received the supplies from UNRRA by right and that consignment should, therefore, be made to them directly. This view, which Soviet representatives continued to reiterate, the Administration steadfastly refused to accept, considering itself obligated to maintain control of supplies until delivery in the country so that goods might be withheld in case a government failed to carry out any of its obligations, and so that last-minute diversion of shipments might be made in the event of an emergency.

The receiving government was required to "inform UNRRA and receive its views" on plans and machinery for distribution of UNRRA supplies. This information was to cover, "at least," the agencies and channels of distribution, allocation of supplies by regions and main classes of consumers, price and rationing policies for each commodity furnished by UNRRA,³⁵ and facilities and procedures for handling, moving, and storing such supplies. The two Soviet Republics, however, in their anxiety to protect their sovereignty, merely undertook to "inform UNRRA periodically" and again³⁶ "fully" on the quantity and type of relief supplies actually distributed to consumer groups in each administrative region.

The receiving government further agreed to keep UNRRA adequately informed of the actual distribution of supplies, to afford UNRRA representatives opportunity to observe distribution "at all necessary stages," and to discuss it with appropriate government authorities.³⁷ The Master Agreement had specified that UNRRA

³¹ Meeting of Lehman with senior staff, 19 October 1944.

³² For example, memo, Joel Gordon (Bureau of Areas) to Menshikov, George Xanthaky (Bureau of Areas), 24 November 1944.

³³ For example, memo, Leith-Ross, conversation with Rudolf Bicanic (UNRRA Council member for Yugoslavia), 8 January 1945.

³⁴ Memo, Oscar Schachter (General Counsel's Office, HQ) to Lehman, Alfred E. Davidson (General Counsel), David Weintraub (Bureau of Supply, HQ), 9 November 1945, reporting two meetings with V. F. Teplyakov (General Counsel, Soviet Purchasing Commission).

³⁵ Added in Chinese Agreement: "and for other commodities having an important bearing on the distribution of Administration supplies."

³⁶ Article V of these Agreements.

³⁷ In the Austrian Agreement, "and other" authorities was added to cover discussion with the Allied Control Commission. See Part Five, Chapter VII, Section 2, for

representatives must have opportunity to observe *and inspect* distribution, but the latter verb was dropped at the insistence of the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks who found the wording "insulting" to their governments.³⁸

The Czechoslovak and Chinese Agreements further required that UNRRA representatives be afforded opportunity "generally to satisfy themselves that the system of distribution is operating in accordance with the Council Resolutions," and the Chinese Agreement added a provision that they must be given reasonable access to warehouses, transport depots, and distribution centers.

Further, the receiving government was bound to afford UNRRA opportunity to "make public" information regarding delivery and distribution of UNRRA supplies, and to permit the use of special markings and labels.³⁹ This latter provision was included partly because of the desire of the United States Congress that UNRRA supplies be marked as such;⁴⁰ but, in view of misgivings on the part of some receiving governments,⁴¹ it was worded so as to leave open the question of whether markings should appear only on crates and bulk containers or also on packages in which the goods were to reach the ultimate consumer.⁴²

A section specifying that no indigenous supplies substantially of the same kind imported by UNRRA should be exported by the receiving country was included only in the Austrian Agreement,⁴³ but the policy was also embodied in a general statement issued by the Administration to all mission chiefs.⁴⁴

Article IV on financial provisions dealt chiefly with the proceeds in local currency derived from the sale, lease, or other transfer of

details of the argument over inclusion of provision for observation of distribution in the Soviet Republics.

³⁸ Report by Weisl on meeting with Czechoslovak representatives, 17 November 1944; cable, Cairo to Washington 685, 5 November 1944.

³⁹ The first part of this provision does not appear in the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Agreements, and the "wording" of the "special labels" is explicitly subject to previous agreement between UNRRA and these Governments.

⁴⁰ Memo, Schachter to Morse H. Salisbury (Director, Public Information Division, HQ), 15 April 1944.

⁴¹ Memo, Menshikov to A. H. Feller (General Counsel), 5 August 1944.

⁴² The vague wording of Resolution 4 was employed. See also Part Two, Chapter VI.

⁴³ See Part Five, Chapter IX, Section 2.

⁴⁴ *Basic Field Manual*, Part VII, Section 413 *i-l*; see *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section II, Document 3.

UNRRA supplies and services within a receiving country. It was only after a long period of discussion within and between Headquarters and ERO that the policies embodied in these sections, included with minor variations in all the agreements, were finally agreed.⁴⁵

Only in the Czechoslovak and Italian Agreements and the Agreements with the two Soviet Republics was there an explicit statement that supplies and services furnished by UNRRA would be sold by the government against payment in local currency; this basic understanding must be inferred in the other agreements. From these funds each receiving government agreed to supply UNRRA with local currency for its administrative and operating expenses within the country, and to provide a periodic record of the net proceeds of sale. Again, only in the Czechoslovak Agreement was there a definite statement that the administration of the net proceeds should rest with the Government rather than UNRRA, although the inference is clear in all the other agreements or their covering letters (except the Italian). Provision was, however, definitely made in all the texts that the receiving governments must spend for relief and rehabilitation purposes, and within a reasonable time after the start of UNRRA operations in their respective countries, funds equivalent to the net proceeds of sale of UNRRA goods minus the amounts made available to UNRRA for expenses. Examples of purposes for which these funds might be used were included, and in the cases of Byelorussia and the Ukraine these were regarded as setting a specific program.⁴⁶ Further provision was made, except in the two Soviet Agreements, for transfer of part of these funds to UNRRA for similar purposes subject to accord on the projects between UNRRA and the government. The governments were, moreover, obligated to discuss with UNRRA their plans for using these funds⁴⁷ and to submit periodic reports on such expenditures.

Possible revision of the financial provisions at the end of the first six months of UNRRA's operations in the country was included in

⁴⁵ See Part Four, Chapter IV, Section 1.

⁴⁶ Central Committee (CC) (48)2, Director General to Central Committee, "Final Report on Proceeds of Sale," 15 January 1948, p. 2.

⁴⁷ See Part Five, Chapter VIII, Section 4, for discussion of terms in Supplementary Agreement with Italy.

all⁴⁸ except the Italian⁴⁹ and the two Soviet Agreements, but was never invoked.

Article V provided for establishment of an UNRRA mission⁵⁰ in the receiving country, specified that the chief of mission and his major assistants were to be appointed in agreement with the receiving country, and that the government would facilitate the admission and movement of UNRRA personnel.⁵¹ UNRRA further undertook to be responsible for the good conduct and moral character of its personnel and agreed to recall anyone who should violate these standards.⁵²

All references to "administration personnel" in the agreements were to be interpreted as including employees of nonindigenous, voluntary relief societies working under UNRRA authority (Class III personnel).⁵³ UNRRA's employment of residents and nationals of the receiving country (Class II personnel) was to be facilitated by the government on condition that its approval was obtained in each case.⁵⁴

During the negotiations, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the two Soviet Republics, and Yugoslavia expressed a strong desire that the missions be small. The Administration stoutly refused to permit any limitations on size to be incorporated in the formal agreements, but in the cases of Albania and the Soviet Republics stated in covering letters its willingness to send small missions.⁵⁵

Article VI dealt, in some cases in great detail, with the provision by the governments of facilities, privileges, and immunities in accordance, though not always so specified, with the recommendations

⁴⁸ In the Czechoslovak Agreement this provision applied to the entire Agreement, Article IX*b*.

⁴⁹ Reference was, however, included to the periodic review by the Administration of the country's ability to pay, Article V*e* of Supplementary Agreement.

⁵⁰ In the Chinese Agreement the word was "Office." The Italian Agreements did not include any of the subsequent provisions regarding mission personnel.

⁵¹ See Part Five, Chapter VII, Section 2, for the variant clause in the Agreements with the Soviet Republics.

⁵² See, for example, Part Five, Chapter III, Section 8; Chapter IV, Section 1.

⁵³ Not included in the Agreements with Poland and the two Soviet Republics but covered in the case of the former in supplementary letters, see Appendix Seven, Document 12*b, c*. See also Part Four, Chapter V; Part Five, Chapter VI, Section 8.

⁵⁴ The Yugoslav, Austrian, and two Soviet Agreements added that such employees should be paid in accordance with local wage scales.

⁵⁵ Although the Ukrainian SSR refused to accept the covering letter drafted by the Administration because of objections to other clauses, and the letter was, consequently, not technically binding, the Administration, nevertheless, lived up to the terms; see Part Five, Chapter III, Section 2; Chapter VI, Section 1; Chapter VII, Section 2.

in Resolutions 3, 6, 16, 32-36. Italy, Poland, and the Soviet Republics, however, granted the privileges customarily accorded to diplomatic missions—a provision considered by the UNRRA negotiators in Poland as covering all the desired points “and probably a few more.”⁵⁶ The Yugoslav negotiators were at some pains to attempt to restrict the list of immunities to be granted,⁵⁷ but in the end no significant points were omitted.

The Agreements with Albania, Austria, China, Greece, Poland, and Yugoslavia included exemption from export controls and other restrictive measures for UNRRA supplies in transit.

By Article VII, UNRRA, its assets, property, income, transactions, and operations were declared immune from taxes, fees, tolls, or duties, and its nonindigenous personnel⁵⁸ from taxes on salaries or wages, although, except in Greece and Italy, this exemption was not to extend to indirect, especially consumers', taxes. Legislative, administrative, and such other action necessary to ensure these exemptions was promised by the governments.

Receiving governments, by Article VIII, were obligated to maintain adequate statistical records on relief and rehabilitation operations “necessary to the discharge of the Administration's responsibilities,” and to furnish UNRRA, upon request, with records, reports, and information pertaining to relief and rehabilitation.

Article IX provided for the possibility, never exercised, of “subsequent modifications” of the agreements “by mutual consent”;⁵⁹ and the conclusion, if necessary, of “Supplementary Agreements and arrangements.” Formal Supplementary Agreements were actually concluded with Czechoslovakia dealing with the administration of services, with China on a variety of subjects, with Italy on the assumption by UNRRA of full supply responsibilities, and with Ethiopia on the reversion to the standard practice of turning over supplies to the Government at the port of reception.

According to Article X each agreement was to go into effect on the

⁵⁶ Menshikov to Lehman, “Report of the Work of the Temporary UNRRA Delegation to Poland,” 3 October 1945.

⁵⁷ Memo, Leith-Ross, conversation with Bicanic, 8 January 1945.

⁵⁸ Nonindigenous voluntary agency personnel working directly under UNRRA authority were included except in the two Soviet Republics (where there were none), and in Poland (where they were later allowed to share in the immunities and privileges granted to UNRRA); see Appendix Seven, Document 12*b*.

⁵⁹ The Czechoslovak Agreement included a provision for review of the Agreement at the end of six months; this was not carried out.

day on which it was signed.⁶⁰ It could be terminated, at the written request of one of the contracting parties, six months after the request was made. No such instance occurred, however. Only the Agreements with the two Soviet Republics specified a definite terminal date—1 July 1946; extension was possible, however, if negotiations were begun no later than three months prior to that day. By an exchange of letters dated 30 May 1946 both agreements were accordingly prolonged to 31 December 1946.

Arrangements were included to cover a possible period following expiration of the agreements. The contracting parties in such an event were to be governed by the UNRRA Agreement of 9 November 1943 and the articles on financial provisions; facilities, immunities, and privileges; taxation; and reports and records were to be regarded as still in force for a period to be agreed between UNRRA and the receiving government, "for the purpose of an orderly liquidation of UNRRA activities" within the country. This provision was invoked to govern the closing months of the UNRRA Missions in the Soviet Republics.

The limited emergency programs for Finland, Hungary, and the Philippines were covered by an exchange of letters with the Governments.⁶¹ These letters, in view of the small and restricted programs, included only bare essentials. The nature of the program was described and the following provisions briefly stated: supplies furnished by UNRRA were to be distributed by the government in accord with Resolutions 2 and 7; the UNRRA mission was to represent the Administration and observe the operations of the program; the government was to keep it fully informed regarding distribution, to allow observation of distribution, to grant the privileges, immunities, and exemptions recommended by the resolutions, and to meet all local currency expenses of the UNRRA Mission.

The arrangements with the occupying military authorities in regard to Korea resembled in brevity and content the exchanges of letters rather than the formal agreements with the other receiving countries, this program being also of a restricted and emergency nature.⁶²

The major provisions of the agreements with receiving countries may be summarized as follows:

⁶⁰ The Ethiopian Agreement, however, named 1 July 1946 as the effective date although it was not signed until 4 July.

⁶¹ Dated respectively, 18 December 1945; 11 January 1946; 13 February 1946; 19 March 1946; 11, 12 June 1946.

⁶² See Part Six, Chapter IV, Section 2.

(1) UNRRA would, subject to the limits of its resources, available supplies, and Council resolutions, provide relief and rehabilitation supplies, transport, and services as nearly as possible in accord with the requests and priorities of the receiving government, and would have no claim for payment in foreign exchange for such supplies and services.

(2) The receiving government was to take title to such supplies on arrival at its ports.

(3) The receiving government was to distribute these supplies in accordance with Council resolutions and was to keep UNRRA informed regarding provisions for, and methods of, distribution.

(4) The receiving government was to permit the establishment, within its territories, of an UNRRA mission and was to grant all necessary facilities to the mission to permit it to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to the Administration by the Council.

(5) The receiving government was to make available to the mission sufficient funds from the proceeds of the sale of UNRRA-provided supplies to cover the local currency requirements of the mission. It was to use the remainder for further relief and rehabilitation activities and to inform UNRRA of such uses.

The agreements thus made provision for the fulfillment of the basic UNRRA principles established by the Council. Countries were to be helped to help themselves by the provision of supplies and services and by the considerable degree of responsibility vested in them.

No enduring foreign exchange debt was to be created since no claims for payment in foreign exchange were to be made for any of the supplies or services provided.

Distribution was to be conducted without discrimination; the responsibility and obligation for the fulfillment of this principle were placed squarely on the receiving governments.

National independence and sovereignty were fully protected. Once supplies had reached a country, the Administration's role thereafter was consultative only.

The agreements provided the framework within which the varied activities of the Administration were conducted in seventeen countries. The actual operations differed considerably from one nation to another, but the basic obligations assumed by the countries were everywhere substantially the same. The Administration undertook to

give them help; they undertook to use that help in accordance with the policies and principles established by the Council, on which, of course, they were represented. The material supplies were to come from the Administration; their use rested with the governments.

II. Services

1. DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNICAL SERVICES

THE COUNCIL at its First Session elaborated, both by report and resolution, the brief statement in the Agreement that the purposes and functions of the Administration should include "the provision of . . . medical and other essential services," and "facilitate . . . the furnishing of these services."¹ UNRRA, it was decided, was to undertake to provide, to such member governments as requested them, technical experts who would advise on aspects of health, welfare, agricultural and industrial rehabilitation. The Administration was, moreover, to give assistance and encouragement to the training and re-establishment of a skilled body of technicians among the countries' own citizens.²

The paying member governments made few requests for such services since they found their professional classes more nearly intact at the end of the war than they had earlier expected. To many of the receiving governments, however, the Administration sent experts and established such programs as the antimalaria campaigns in Greece and Italy, child-feeding projects, and training courses in the use of farm and industrial machinery in several countries, which not only served an immediate purpose but promised to have lasting influence on the rehabilitation of the countries concerned.

In planning for the organizational structure of UNRRA it was anticipated that health, welfare, and industrial rehabilitation service programs would be extensive. These administrative sections were, therefore, established as technical or functional divisions. In addition, commodity divisions within the Bureau of Supply were set up to handle medical, agricultural, and industrial rehabilitation supplies; no separate category for welfare supplies was, however, recognized. At the end of the first six months of UNRRA, it appeared that some of the major industrial rehabilitation services originally considered within the scope

¹ Article I, 2a.

² Resolution 1, II, paragraphs 2-4; Resolutions 8, 9, 11, 12; Reports of Committee IV, Subcommittees 2, 3, 5, 6.

of UNRRA would be handled by other international bodies, such as the European Coal Organization, and the residual work in industrial rehabilitation was, therefore, transferred to that commodity division in the Bureau of Supply.³ The service programs in agricultural and industrial rehabilitation which later developed were administered by the Bureau of Supply.

The mission staffs were from the beginning recruited to include specialists. Such personnel who were early in the field often found, however, that they had to serve principally as supply officers and were too concerned with their duties of advising the governments on the preparation of supply requirements, methods of distribution, pricing, rationing, and so forth, to be able to devote much time to developing projects or teaching methods in their particular areas of specialization.

To implement the Council resolutions, Headquarters in June 1945 gave authorization, "long on policy but lacking in procedure,"⁴ for the provision to member governments of technical experts and training facilities.⁵ Requests for such services increased markedly as field operations developed and UNRRA supplies and equipment, some of them complex or unfamiliar, began to arrive in the receiving countries.⁶ These services were further defined and implemented in January 1946 when Headquarters determined that:

UNRRA may employ and send abroad, for the purpose of organizing on-the-spot training programs, experts in epidemic control, welfare, sanitary engineering, farm machinery, transportation, or other fields in which the country requires specialized outside assistance to expedite its relief and rehabilitation activities.⁷

By the spring of 1946 a substantial number of such experts had joined the missions: some on permanent assignment; some for brief service in various countries as particular needs arose, as, for example, to survey the incidence of tuberculosis or to meet a particular seasonal need (such as seed-cleaning experts at spring planting), or to advise on the

³ A section on inland transport remained in the Bureau of Areas until the Bureau was abolished in May 1945.

⁴ Memo, Burton E. Palmer (Acting Deputy Director General, Bureau of Finance and Administration) to Jackson, 4 December 1945.

⁵ Administrative Order 66, 28 June 1945, issued as European Regional Office (ERO) Administration Order A. 155, 26 October 1945.

⁶ Cable, Washington to London 1329, 23 February 1946.

⁷ Field Administrative Order 86, 10 January 1946, issued to the missions as ERO European Region Order 11, 26 April 1946.

assemblage and use of specific types of machinery just delivered in a given country.

In all cases, the services provided by UNRRA were closely linked with the Administration's supply programs. Not only did the experts endeavor to ensure the fullest possible understanding and utilization of the goods and machinery imported by the Administration but UNRRA, in turn, provided much of the equipment needed for demonstrations or special projects, and technical books and periodicals for training programs.

The question of what types of educational supplies came within the province of UNRRA was long debated in Headquarters. It was, of course, indisputable that professional schools and research institutions in the receiving countries had lost much of their working material during the war, and that such of their staffs as had survived had in many cases been cut off from knowledge of discoveries and methods developed in unoccupied countries in recent years. Although many officials in Headquarters were early convinced that UNRRA should attempt to supply some of the most pressing needs of these institutions,⁸ the development of such a program was long delayed by the reluctance of Headquarters to embark on an undertaking which might be contrary to the consensus of the First Council Session⁹ and the wish of the United States Government that UNRRA should refrain from direct participation in educational work in receiving countries.¹⁰ By early February 1946 it was decided that technical material for direct use in projects and institutions providing training in health, welfare, agriculture, and industry might be supplied by UNRRA as part of its effort to promote rehabilitation in these fields.¹¹ Accordingly, the Administration authorized procurement of several million dollars' worth of items ranging from test tubes, basic chemicals, and microscopes to moving picture projectors and educational films, and such intricate laboratory apparatus as refractometers and colorimeters. In addition, a fund of \$100,000 was allotted for technical journals and publications. Headquarters also worked closely with the American

⁸ An *Ad Hoc* Committee on Educational Requirements was meeting in Headquarters by mid-1945, monograph, Hugh G. Calkins and V. Harris, "Field Services Branch, Agricultural Rehabilitation Division," HQ, pp. 11-13.

⁹ Committee II, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes of meetings, 17, 18 November 1945; *Journal*, First Council, pp. 63, 68.

¹⁰ *Congressional Record* (Washington, D.C., 1944), XC, No. 52, 2845-2853.

¹¹ Cable, Washington to London 813 (repeated to all missions), 14 February 1946.

Book Center for War Devastated Libraries, Inc., and with a group of American educational organizations which provided schoolroom supplies—pencils, paper, textbooks, and the like—which the Administration believed itself precluded from supplying.¹² Although the technical equipment and publications procured by UNRRA by no means satisfied even the minimum requests of receiving governments, every item filled a desperate need, and at least a nucleus for the revival of research and professional instruction in many essential fields was provided.¹³ The work was subsequently carried on by the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and voluntary agencies of various countries.

2. HEALTH SERVICES

The health program of UNRRA¹⁴ was planned to furnish emergency relief supplies to receiving countries, to assist the national health organizations with advice and up-to-date information, and, perhaps most significant, to continue, until such time as the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) could be established, the epidemiological work performed prior to the war by the League of Nations International Health Organization.

The UNRRA Health Division had the advantage of inheriting the well-integrated plans prepared by the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) Committee on Health and by the Inter-Allied Committee's Technical Advisory Committee on Medical Supplies and Services; and some of the members of these committees continued to serve on the UNRRA technical advisory committees on health in Washington and London. Moreover, the Headquarters Division had as Director Dr. Wilbur A. Sawyer, who had just retired from the directorship of the International Health Division of the Rockefeller Foundation; the Director of the Health Division in ERO,

¹² Note, Charles H. Alspach (Deputy Director, Welfare Division, HQ), October 1946; monograph, Gerard A. Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," p. 510.

¹³ *Ibid.*; monograph, Calkins and Harris, "Field Services Branch, Agricultural Rehabilitation Division," *passim*.

¹⁴ This section is based largely on Dr. Wilbur A. Sawyer, "Achievements of UNRRA as an International Health Organization," *American Journal of Public Health*, XXXVII, No. 1 (January 1947) 41-58; Dr. Andrew Topping, "UNRRA in International Health," *Medical Press*, No. 5676 (18 February 1948), pp. 137-139; Dr. Wilbur A. Sawyer, "Post-war Epidemics," 19 May 1947, one of a series of radio broadcasts, "The Doctors Talk It Over," sponsored by Lederle Laboratories Division, American Cyanamid Company. See also *supra*, Part Three, Chapter V.

Dr. Andrew Topping, had been Deputy Medical Officer of Health for the London County Council; and Dr. M. T. Morgan, President of the International Office of Public Health in Paris, and Dr. Melville D. Mackenzie, former chairman of the Inter-Allied Technical Advisory Committee on Medical Supplies and Services, served on the ERO Expert Committee on Quarantine. Close liaison was maintained with such sections of the League of Nations Health Organization as were still extant and with the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau.

The representatives of international health organizations put heavy emphasis on the continuation by UNRRA of the International Sanitary Convention of 1926 (Maritime) and the International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation of 1933, formerly handled directly by the International Office of Public Health in Paris and through the Far Eastern regional office of the League's Epidemiological Intelligence Service and the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau. They succeeded in putting revised versions of these Conventions through the machinery of UNRRA,¹⁵ and by 15 January 1945 a sufficient number of member governments had ratified to bring them into effect.

The principal duties devolving on UNRRA under the Maritime Convention were the collection and dissemination of information on the appearance and movement of serious diseases, ERO acting as a clearinghouse for Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, and Headquarters for China, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States, and—through the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau—for the other American republics. In accordance with the revised Conventions, all communicable diseases which "in the opinion of UNRRA constitute a menace to other countries" were added to typhus, plague, cholera, yellow fever, and smallpox for which notification was formerly required. A standard form of declaration, moreover, replaced the obsolete bills of health, the practice being made uniform for both Conventions.¹⁶ A semimonthly *Epidemiological Information Bulletin* was issued by the Health Division in Washington, and a fortnightly "Bulletin of Communicable Diseases and Medical Notes" and a small "Weekly Epidemiological Bulletin" by the Health Division in ERO. A close working arrangement was developed with the International

¹⁵ By Resolution 52, passed at the Second UNRRA Council Session in Montreal in September 1944, arrangements for the draft Conventions were approved, and the Director General authorized to undertake the functions involved.

¹⁶ Technical Subcommittee on Health for Europe (THE/E) (44) 13, "Report of the Expert Commission on Quarantine," 18 May 1944.

Office of Public Health in Paris when this was re-established after the liberation of France.¹⁷

The duties imposed on UNRRA by the Convention for Aerial Navigation were carried out by the Expert Commission on Quarantine of the UNRRA Technical Subcommittee on Health in ERO. These included delineating the yellow fever areas of the world and establishing standards for yellow fever vaccine. In connection with the latter, the Commission in 1946, after carrying out exhaustive tests on the immunizing properties of the Dakar yellow fever vaccine, recommended that the method be accepted for international certificates of inoculation.¹⁸

By the ratification of protocols UNRRA's responsibility for administering these two Conventions was extended in the spring of 1945¹⁹ until the Interim Commission of WHO (WHO-IC) agreed to take over the task from 1 December of that year.²⁰ Largely because of the transfer to UNRRA of personnel already associated with these activities, the Health Division was able to assume and carry out the administration of the Conventions with a minimum of difficulty. The framework of UNRRA was sufficiently flexible to permit the inclusion of this essential aspect of rehabilitation on a truly international scale, in addition to the Administration's primary functions of providing supplies and services to individual countries.

In most of the UNRRA missions the medical staff served primarily as advisers and consultants, in the fields of public health, nursing, and sanitary engineering. In the month of June 1946 the Class I professional health personnel in the field, exclusive of those in displaced persons operations, totaled 353, of whom 54 were in Italy, 114 in Greece, and 174²¹ in China. Occupied exclusively in UNRRA's work with displaced persons in the same month were 640 members of the

¹⁷ Letter, Lehman to President of Office Internationale d'Hygiene Publique, 24 March 1945; Office Internationale d'Hygiene Publique to Lehman, 5 April 1945.

¹⁸ Sawyer, "Achievements of UNRRA as an International Health Organization," p. 56.

¹⁹ The Council authorized the extension of UNRRA's responsibility by Resolution 85, passed at the Fourth Council Session, March 1946. Provision for transfer to the World Health Organization (WHO) was made by Resolution 94, passed at the Fifth Council Session, August 1946; see *supra*, Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 2.

²⁰ By an exchange of letters signed by the Director General and the Executive Secretary of the Interim Commission, 22 October 1946; see *infra*, Appendix Eight, Document 2.

²¹ This figure includes 113 "program personnel" on loan to the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA).

UNRRA professional health staff in Germany, 55 in Austria, 17 in the Middle East camps, and 5 in Italy.²² Recruiting this type of personnel in the face of the competing military and civilian needs in wartime was exceedingly difficult. The United States Public Health Service, however, assigned many of its commissioned officers to UNRRA; others were drawn from the United States, Central and South America, Europe, Palestine, and China; and in Germany, from the displaced persons themselves.

In its services to national health authorities the UNRRA Health Division, both in its Headquarters planning and in its field operations, concentrated first on preventing the epidemics which throughout history have been a dreadful sequel to war. The member governments were, in fact, sufficiently impressed with this aspect of UNRRA's activities to permit its extension to enemy and ex-enemy countries.²³ Medical assistance and supplies offered on this basis to Rumania and Bulgaria were not requested by the Allied Control Commissions in those countries,²⁴ but health services were included in UNRRA programs for other ex-enemy countries—Italy, Austria, and Hungary—under further authorizations by the Council or Central Committee.

Fortunately, very effective new drugs and methods of using them were at UNRRA's command, and, through the cooperative efforts of UNRRA staff and the national governments, much was accomplished in combating epidemics. A threatened typhus epidemic in Poland in the winter of 1945-1946 was successfully averted by the liberal and prompt use by national health authorities of DDT and dusting guns supplied in large quantities by UNRRA and demonstrated by UNRRA field personnel.²⁵ In Yugoslavia the work started by the United States Typhus Commission was continued by UNRRA and prevented a repetition of the terrible epidemic which had swept the area during World

²² Sawyer, "Achievements of UNRRA as an International Health Organization," Table 1, p. 42; see *infra*, Appendix Ten, Section I, Document 5. These figures differ slightly from those contained in monthly reports from the missions and compiled in "Statistics—European Region," Vol. I, since the latter recorded the numbers by administrative sections rather than by profession.

²³ Resolution 57.

²⁴ Memo, conversation between Cavendish Cannon (United States Department of State) and Carl B. Spaeth (Diplomatic Adviser's Office), 4 April 1945; telephone conversation between Lehman and Senior Deputy Director General (in ERO), 5 April 1945; letter, Oscar Schachter (General Counsel's Office) to C. Tyler Wood (United States Department of State), [ca 17 April 1946].

²⁵ See Part Five, Chapter VI, Section 8.

War I.²⁶ UNRRA drugs and vaccines²⁷ and UNRRA medical personnel also helped in combating plague and serious outbreaks of cholera in China,²⁸ and in curbing an alarming increase of typhoid in Poland.²⁹ A prompt campaign against rats in Taranto, Italy, successfully stopped an outbreak of bubonic plague and prevented its spread elsewhere.³⁰ Thanks to such services and supplies and the activities of national and military health authorities, Red Cross societies, and voluntary agencies, plus an undeterminable percentage of good luck, Europe happily escaped any widespread epidemics in the post-war years.

The UNRRA medical staff also achieved notable results in combating endemic diseases. Most spectacular were the campaigns against malaria in Greece and Italy, involving large-scale spraying of DDT in mosquito-breeding regions.³¹ In most receiving countries UNRRA personnel conducted surveys showing the incidence of tuberculosis, venereal disease, and malnutrition, and suggested methods for their control. Traveling consultants as well as regular medical staff in the missions gave advice on the medical aspects of child and maternity care and demonstrated the latest techniques in X-ray, manufacture and use of prosthetics, dentistry, nursing, and sanitary engineering, and the use of such new products as DDT, penicillin, and sulfa drugs.

UNRRA medical staffs in most receiving countries were successful in achieving close working relationships with the Ministries of Health, even in countries such as the Ukrainian SSR in which direct contacts with government ministries except the official UNRRA bureau were rare.³² Their technical advice, therefore, often had more opportunity to reach the officials immediately concerned than did the suggestions from UNRRA experts in other fields. They not only served on joint committees with government experts in allocating medical supplies to the wholesale druggists and hospitals and sanatoria, but traveled indefatigably, often by jeep through mud or snow, to confer with local

²⁶ Sawyer, "Achievements of UNRRA as an International Health Organization," p. 48.

²⁷ Topping, "UNRRA in International Health," p. 138.

²⁸ See Part Six, Chapter II, Section 3.

²⁹ See Part Five, Chapter VI, Section 8; Sawyer, "Achievements of UNRRA as an International Health Organization," pp. 49-50.

³⁰ Sawyer, "Achievements of UNRRA as an International Health Organization," p. 51.

³¹ See Part Five, Chapter II, Section 8; Chapter VIII, Section 9.

³² See Part Five, Chapter VII, Section 3.

officials to discover the medical needs of rural areas and to check on the distribution of UNRRA medical supplies.

The Health Division, furthermore, worked as far as it was able with the Bureau of Supply at Headquarters in formulating the medical supply programs on the basis of the requirements drawn up by the receiving governments and the UNRRA medical staff in the missions, and advising on the more technical aspects of procurement.³³

A phase of the UNRRA health program which had particularly long-range value was the training of nationals of the receiving countries. In addition to the thirty health specialists given instruction in the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland under the UNRRA Fellowship Program,³⁴ a group of twelve medical experts from China was brought to the United States in 1944 for advanced training. In the summer of 1946 a Nurse-Teacher Fellowship Project was initiated whereby 121 carefully chosen graduate nurses interested in teaching were trained in hospitals in New York City and in London, with brief observation trips to other centers. Of those stationed in New York City, 27 came from Italy, 20 from China, 19 from Poland, and 18 from Czechoslovakia, while those in London included 20 from Austria and 17 from Greece.³⁵

UNRRA also sponsored or assisted in specific training programs within receiving countries. In Poland, lectures in universities, inaugurated by experts sent in by UNRRA, were continued in the principal cities by a team of seven health specialists under the auspices of the Unitarian Service Committee. This United States voluntary agency, assisted by UNRRA, also provided Czechoslovak universities with a traveling group of lecturers.³⁶ UNRRA medical personnel in several missions gave short courses in various technical fields, while nursing consultants assisted local schools for nurse training to reopen and reorganize their curricula.³⁷ In China, for example, eleven UNRRA teachers in 1945 started a medical training program in conjunction with the National Institute of Health at Koloshan, near Chungking, and later, short-term courses were also offered in Shanghai, Peiping, Nanking, and other major centers.³⁸

³³ See Part Three, Chapter V, Section 6. ³⁴ See below, Section 5.

³⁵ Sawyer, "Achievements of UNRRA as an International Health Organization," p. 57.

³⁶ See Part Four, Chapter V.

³⁷ See, for example, Part Five, Chapter II, Section 8.

³⁸ See Part Six, Chapter II, Section 4.

UNRRA's health services were terminated at the end of 1946 in the European receiving countries, in China at the end of March 1947,³⁹ and in the displaced persons operations in Europe on 30 June 1947. UNRRA continued its influence in practical fashion, however, by the transfer of funds and many of its key medical personnel to WHO to enable that organization to carry on some of the activities initiated by UNRRA.⁴⁰ With the continuing impetus given to public health in receiving countries by UNRRA medical services and supplies, and the transfer to WHO of responsibility for the International Sanitary Conventions, the original purpose of the UNRRA Health Division to bridge the gap between prewar and postwar international health work was achieved.

3. WELFARE SERVICES

The decision to have an UNRRA Standing Technical Committee on Welfare and a Welfare Division within the Administration was not made until late in the First Council Session, although a Subcommittee on Welfare was included among the subcommittees of Council Committee IV (Relief and Rehabilitation). The other Standing Technical Committees stemmed in part from Inter-Allied subcommittees on like subjects, but no Inter-Allied group had dealt with welfare as such; nor was there precedent among League of Nations organizations. Moreover, it was the opinion of many Council delegates and of some of the OFRRO staff that, since the purpose of the whole UNRRA operation was, in the broad sense of the word, "welfare," no purpose would be served by setting up a special committee and division to deal with the subject.⁴¹ The proponents of the opposite view—principally, a few members of the OFRRO staff and Ellen S. Woodward, of the United States delegation—used "welfare" in a narrower and more specific sense. "The term 'welfare,'" they held, "refers to services for the personal rehabilitation of individuals requiring special help,"⁴²

³⁹ The UNRRA Medical Supply Division in China continued, however, until the UNRRA China Office closed, 31 December 1947.

⁴⁰ See Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 2.

⁴¹ Committee IV, Subcommittee 3, Secretary's notes, 15 November 1943; Committee on *Ad Hoc* Committees, Secretary's notes, 22 November 1943; interviews: G. E. Fox and D. K. Clark with Ellen S. Woodward (member of United States delegation, First Council Session), 15 October 1946; D. K. Clark with Harry Greenstein (Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations [OFRRO] and UNRRA Welfare Division, HQ), 25 October 1946.

⁴² Reception 97, I/F/4.3/5.

particularly "children, expectant and nursing mothers, the aged and disabled, and other victims of war."⁴³ They represented the viewpoint of the highly trained United States social worker with a field of specialization in child care, psychiatry, nutrition, or the like. This concept of social work as a profession was, in fact, relatively new in the United States and was accepted in few other countries. With Lehman's backing and by intensive lobbying, this small group was, however, able to secure the support of delegations from several smaller countries eager for wider representation on UNRRA committees, and eventually the United States delegation,⁴⁴ with the result that a Standing Committee on Welfare was approved by the Council;⁴⁵ decision to have a Welfare Division within the Administration followed.

The Welfare Division, in the words of one of its deputy directors, regarded itself as "the conscience of the Administration,"⁴⁶ commissioned to ensure that emergency needs were met and that supplies were provided to the special groups who were unable to secure them through normal commercial channels. It sought, moreover, to ensure that these supplies were distributed through local agencies and by methods which would conserve or restore the social structure of the community, in accordance with the UNRRA maxim, to help people help themselves.⁴⁷ Not only did the Division seek to keep UNRRA officials in Headquarters and ERO alive to such problems but the welfare staff in the field concentrated on these aspects in advising receiving governments. The welfare staff also served as the focal point within the Administration for liaison with, and coördination of, foreign voluntary agencies.⁴⁸

Some members of the Administration, particularly Hendrickson⁴⁹ and many of the Supply officials, regarded the welfare staff as an unnecessary adjunct serving an ill-defined purpose. The majority of

⁴³ Resolution 31.

⁴⁴ Interviews: Fox and Clark with Woodward, 15 October 1946; Clark with Greenstein, 25 October 1946.

⁴⁵ Resolution 31.

⁴⁶ Interview, Fox and Clark with Alspach, 25 September 1946; for a discussion of UNRRA's work in the welfare field, see W. Hardy Wickwar, "Relief Supplies and Welfare Distribution: UNRRA in Retrospect," *Social Service Review*, XXI, No. 3 (September 1947), 363-374.

⁴⁷ *Journal*, First Council, Report of the Subcommittee on Policies with Respect to Welfare Services, pp. 152-153.

⁴⁸ Resolution 9; see *infra*, Part Four, Chapter V.

⁴⁹ "Notes on Conferences at Caserta, 16-19 March 1945," statement by Hendrickson, p. 11.

the Administration gradually swung to a modified acceptance of this point of view, particularly as the early expectation that receiving governments would request the services of substantial numbers of welfare staff proved unfounded. None, for example, was requested by the Governments of Yugoslavia and Albania. In March 1946 the Welfare Division was merged with the Repatriation Division in the London Office;⁵⁰ and Headquarters followed suit in April 1946,⁵¹ encouraged in this decision by the new Director General's aversion to the very word "welfare."⁵²

A factor contributing to the weakness of the Welfare Division was an absence of leadership and guidance and, because of a succession of four deputy directors in Washington and five in ERO, a devastating lack of continuity in administration and planning. Following the merger of Welfare with Repatriation, moreover, the senior officers of the Division were mainly preoccupied with displaced persons problems. What the welfare staff accomplished was primarily due to the energy and initiative of individuals in the ranks; and, despite all these handicaps, their contributions were substantial.

In May 1946, the peak month of employment of Relief Services personnel in the field, 133 Class I welfare officers, exclusive of those in displaced persons operations, were at work in seven European receiving countries, while 16 per cent (525) of the assembly centers staff in the Displaced Persons Operations in Germany were specifically designated as welfare officers, and many of the 486 displaced persons personnel in Austria and 146 in Italy were performing welfare functions.⁵³ In addition, the Class I Welfare and Repatriation staff in China numbered 169, most of whom were welfare officers.⁵⁴

In accordance with the requests of the Governments, the welfare staff in Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Hungary, and Poland were very few in number⁵⁵ and their services purely advisory. They worked with the joint UNRRA-Government committees and the ministries of welfare in formulating plans for the use and distribution of UNRRA

⁵⁰ ERO Administration Order A. 199, 12 March 1946.

⁵¹ Senior Deputy Director General's staff meeting minutes, item 2454, 13 April 1946.

⁵² Note, meeting between Palmer and LaGuardia, 2 April 1946; Senior Deputy Director General's staff meeting minutes, item 3785, 31 May 1946.

⁵³ "Statistics—European Region," Vol. I.

⁵⁴ As of 30 June 1946; figures for May not available, "Deskbook of Statistics," Table F-6.

⁵⁵ Respectively, one, one, one, and nine as of 31 May 1946.

relief supplies through indigenous charitable organizations and official welfare channels. They also consulted with representatives of foreign voluntary agencies and the Government to prevent duplication of effort and to produce a well-integrated relief plan for the country. They assisted in determining the groups who should receive basic necessities free, urged the allocation of UNRRA supplies to child-feeding projects, clinics for prenatal and maternity care, orphanages and hospitals, aided in arrangements for free distribution of contributed clothing, and performed spot checks to ensure that no needy groups or worthy institutions had for any reason been overlooked.

In Italy, Greece, the Dodecanese, and China the welfare staff was considerably larger. Because government controls and organizations were particularly weak or transport badly disrupted, they took an active part in relief operations in addition to their advisory functions. The UNRRA program in Italy was for the first year limited to health, care of United Nations displaced persons, and welfare services; and many of the welfare projects, such as the provision of hot meals to school children and supplementary feeding of infants and pregnant and nursing mothers, were continued jointly by the Government and the Mission under the full-scale UNRRA program.⁵⁶ In Greece, the welfare staff engaged in manifold programs, such as child feeding, care of orphans, summer camps for children, and occupational training in many fields;⁵⁷ while in the Dodecanese they took an active part in the committees which throughout the Islands administered the cash relief and work relief systems.⁵⁸ One of the many welfare activities conducted in China by UNRRA and CNRRA was the operation of thousands of small emergency feeding stations which dispensed milk, cod-liver oil, and other essentials to orphan and refugee children and often to mothers as well.⁵⁹

A particularly essential part of the duties of welfare officers in these missions was to persuade the government and the chief of mission to request supplies for welfare projects and to allocate, for welfare purposes from goods received, a reasonable proportion of commodities

⁵⁶ See, for example, monograph, "Activities of the Welfare Section—Emilia and Toscana Region."

⁵⁷ See monograph, Glenn Leet, editor, "History, Welfare and Repatriation Division, UNRRA, Greece," Vols. I-IV; see also *infra*, Part Five, Chapter II, Section 7.

⁵⁸ Monograph, W. Wankowicz, "Historical Record of the UNRRA Dodecanese Mission," pp. 11-12; see also *infra*, Part Five, Chapter X, Section 5.

⁵⁹ Monograph, Thelma Samson and Robert Van Hynning, "Welfare"; see also *infra*, Part Six, Chapter II, Section 2.

with several possible end uses, such as blankets, clothing, or food. Unfortunately, articles peculiar to welfare needs, such as household equipment or layettes, were for some time in very short supply; the quantities involved were small and represented a disproportionate amount of labor to procure; and, moreover, at first the responsibility for their procurement lay in no one section of the Bureau of Supply.⁶⁰ This situation was, of course, outside the control of the welfare staff in the field who could only extemporize or postpone projects until the necessary supplies arrived.

The welfare staff in all these countries concentrated primarily on providing transport and helping local relief agencies, private and official, to establish and improve their own organizations so that the projects started with UNRRA aid could be continued after UNRRA had ended. They worked, therefore, to train local personnel through courses and conferences as well as by example. Training programs ranged from, for instance, small local projects in some of the China provinces for instruction of youths and indigents in trades and handicrafts⁶¹ to formal courses in welfare principles and techniques conducted in Athens and later in the provinces by the Greece Mission from August 1945 to its close.⁶² In Italy, regional welfare officers met monthly with the provincial secretaries and with representatives of the Ministry of Post-War Assistance to discuss social welfare problems and plan for the future development of Italian welfare services;⁶³ while in China the UNRRA-CNRRA National Welfare Conference in March 1947 brought together representatives of the major foreign and indigenous voluntary agencies to consider proposals and reports carefully prepared in advance by various welfare groups.⁶⁴

The largest numbers of welfare staff were employed in Displaced Persons Operations in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Indeed, the Welfare Division at Headquarters from time to time attempted to establish its claim that the whole displaced persons operation rightly belonged under its supervision.⁶⁵ Assembly center teams usually included one or

⁶⁰ Cable, Washington to Belgrade 311, 8 August 1945.

⁶¹ Monograph, Samson and Van Hyning, "Welfare," pp. 113-114.

⁶² Monograph, "History, Welfare and Repatriation Division," II, 446.

⁶³ For example, monograph, "Activities of the Welfare Section—Emilia and Toscana Region," pp. 3-4.

⁶⁴ Monograph, Lillian Robbins, "Relations with Voluntary Agencies," pp. 20-21.

⁶⁵ Memo, Conrad Van Hyning (Welfare Division, HQ) to J. J. Corson (Deputy Director General, Finance and Administration), 19 November 1944; memo, Mary

more welfare officers who, for example, supervised recreation, employment, vocational training, and furnished guidance and psychiatric aid. Other welfare personnel searched for lost children or gave special attention to the needs of unaccompanied children and orphans.⁶⁶

All receiving countries showed particular interest in child care, realizing that the hope of restoring their broken economies rested ultimately on the development of a new generation, healthy in mind and body. Child-feeding programs were conducted and orphanages and other institutions for children restored and maintained with the aid of UNRRA supplies and encouragement and advice from UNRRA missions. Out of this general concern for the next generation grew the International Children's Fund, which was to finance child-feeding projects wherever emergency needs existed. It was inaugurated at the Fifth Council Session (August 1946), named as a residuary legatee of UNRRA funds,⁶⁷ and subsequently taken over by the United Nations as the International Children's Emergency Fund.

As is the case with all the services provided by UNRRA, no precise estimate of the value of its welfare services can be made. To the continuation by governments or United Nations agencies of actual welfare programs initiated by UNRRA must be added the encouragement, guidance, and stimulus given by UNRRA welfare personnel to national and private welfare organizations and foreign voluntary agencies—contributions intangible but enduring.

4. AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION SERVICES

Although the work of UNRRA in the fields of agricultural and industrial rehabilitation is usually thought of in terms of supplies provided, the value of these to the receiving countries was greatly enhanced by technical advice on the restoration of institutions and channels through which the supplies could be utilized and the formal and informal instruction on their use furnished by the missions and by visiting experts in the employ of UNRRA.

With the growing recognition within the Administration in the

Craig McGeachy (Director, Welfare Division, HQ) to Sir George Reid (Director, Welfare Division, ERO), 6 February 1945.

⁶⁶ See Part Seven, Chapter II, Section 12.

⁶⁷ Resolution 103; see *supra*, Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 3.

winter of 1945-1946 of the need for technical services in receiving countries, Headquarters, supported by the Central Committee,⁶⁸ determined to place special stress on agricultural rehabilitation services in view of the developing world food shortage. They decided, therefore, to provide particularly, on request from receiving countries, "specialists for limited periods to advise with regard to methods of immediate food increase, to demonstrate effective use of machinery and other supplies, to instruct with regard to newest factors in [the] science of agricultural development, and to provide guidance in adjustments requiring continued efforts beyond [the] UNRRA period."⁶⁹ To this end, the Field Services Branch, with Hugh G. Calkins from the Headquarters Division of Agricultural Rehabilitation as Chief, was established in March 1946 in Rome, to serve the missions in Europe and Ethiopia. The Italy Mission was responsible for its local administration, but it was subject to Headquarters for technical direction. The selection of Rome was dictated by the probability that most of the requests for specialists would come from Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia.⁷⁰ Actually, however, virtually every UNRRA mission in Europe was visited more than once by one or more of these experts.

By mid-1946 there were scattered about the missions UNRRA specialists in various branches of industrial and agricultural rehabilitation, such as, fisheries; forestry; plant pathology; telecommunications; pesticides; the assemblage of electric power plants, canning factories, and cement-block manufactories; artificial insemination; highway construction; vegetable seeds; and many other departments of human knowledge. The variety of the services rendered by these permanent and peripatetic specialists is as impressive as the diversity of their individual fields.

They advised government officials and committees. In Austria, for example, farm machinery specialists acted as trouble shooters wherever difficulties arose over assembly, distribution, or incorrect use of oil and gasoline; and their advice and guidance to the Ministry of Agriculture greatly assisted in the substantial improvement eventually achieved in

⁶⁸ Central Committee (CC) (46)33, minutes 23d meeting, 8 March 1946 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], II, 137-139).

⁶⁹ Cable, Washington to London 1329, 23 February 1946.

⁷⁰ Cables: London to Washington 2838, 6 March 1946; Washington to London 2953, 23 March 1946.

the handling of tractors and other agricultural machinery.⁷¹ In Italy, as another example, discussions were held between UNRRA livestock experts and the Ministry of Agriculture in regard to the best use of UNRRA-imported cattle of superior quality to improve local breeds through artificial insemination and other measures.⁷² In Czechoslovakia, on a more immediately practical level, the UNRRA farm machinery expert was customarily accompanied on his visits to machinery and tractor stations by an official from the Ministry of Agriculture to whom he could point out shortcomings with the hope of prompt rectification.⁷³

The specialists served as general information centers on all kinds of questions relating to their particular fields. In one week the Food Processing Division of the Italy Mission dealt with the following queries:

What are the possible uses of nutmeg—and of parsley powder? Do you have information as to the availability of mustard seed in Italy? Can powdered milk be used for the production of pasta? To what extent is corn syrup a preservative of jams? Is cocoa butter usable and convenient for the production of biscuits? May we have the formula for Ketchup? . . . Please arrange urgently for allocation of corn syrup for fly-killing liquids and of sugar for bee feed, as the Italian production of 100,000 tons of molasses is perhaps insufficient.⁷⁴

They made surveys on a great variety of subjects for the use of government ministries, UNRRA missions, and Headquarters and ERO—notably the reports on their observations in several UNRRA countries submitted by Dr. C. S. M. Hopkirk, veterinary consultant from New Zealand; Professor John Hammond, livestock specialist from Cambridge University, England; and Dr. P. S. Hudson, of the Imperial Bureau of Plant Breeding and Genetics, Cambridge University; all serving on the staff of the UNRRA Field Services Branch.⁷⁵

They prepared handbooks of instructions embodying recent methods and practices in the language of the country for the use of

⁷¹ Monograph, Jan Fudakowski, "Historical Report of the Agricultural Branch," Austria, p. 43.

⁷² Monograph, J. R. G. Sutherland, "Division of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries," Italy, Part II, p. 2.

⁷³ Monograph, Herbert C. Hanson and Lea Kossova, "Historical Report of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Section, UNRRA Mission, Prague," p. 2.

⁷⁴ Monograph, Bruno Luzzato, "History of Industrial Rehabilitation," Italy, Part II, Section *b*, pp. 3-4.

⁷⁵ Monograph, Calkins, "History of the Field Services Branch," pp. 2-4.

farmers, housewives, machinists, and government technicians. In Greece, for example, plans by UNRRA experts for the establishment of home gardens were published in the monthly periodical of the Pan Hellenic Federation of Unions of Agricultural Co-operatives;⁷⁶ in Poland, classroom manuals were issued on "Job Instruction Methods" and "Job Relations Methods";⁷⁷ in Yugoslavia, handbooks on the erection of Bailey bridges and Nissen huts and other industrial equipment were produced by the Mission.⁷⁸

They conducted training courses in the use of industrial and agricultural machinery and supplies, instruction which was given not only in the classroom and by textbooks but also, and far more effectively in countries not accustomed to modern equipment, by practical demonstration in the field. Such demonstrations and schools for teaching the use of tractors and other farm machinery were held in provincial centers and in the fields where planting or harvesting was in process in all countries receiving this type of equipment from UNRRA; in China and Poland, by teams from the Brethren Service Committee and the Mennonite Central Committee (United States) in coöperation with UNRRA, as well as by regular and visiting UNRRA personnel. In Yugoslavia, although the Government was none too hospitable to instruction from foreigners, a five-month training project was carried on by UNRRA specialists on the Belgrade-Zagreb road, and 96 trainees learned on the job the use of tractors, bulldozers, scrapers, etc.⁷⁹ In some cases, representatives from large commercial companies manufacturing specialized machinery traveled in receiving countries under UNRRA auspices to ensure the correct use of their products. Thus, seven farm machinery experts drawn from United Kingdom, Canadian, and United States firms to demonstrate tractors and other agricultural machinery such as seed-cleaners worked under the Field Services Branch for considerable periods and visited virtually all the European missions.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Monograph, "Historical Report of the Division of Agriculture and Fisheries," Greece, p. 19.

⁷⁷ Monograph, "History of Food and Agriculture Division," Poland, p. 6.

⁷⁸ Monograph, Barbara Kerr, "The Division of Industrial Rehabilitation," Yugoslavia, p. 49.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 48, 50; monograph, Theodore Sorensen, "Program of Industrial Equipment Specialists."

⁸⁰ Monograph, Calkins, "History of the Field Services Branch," p. 2.

Demonstrations of home canning and food drying using UNRRA equipment were given, particularly in Poland, Italy, and Greece. Indeed, at one center in Greece the disconcerted instructor had great difficulty in dissuading his enthusiastic students from consuming their entire product immediately.⁸¹

5. FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM

To the Welfare Division at Headquarters belongs the credit for initiating plans for the UNRRA Fellowship Program, designed to provide opportunities to technical experts from receiving countries for training and observation in the fields of welfare, health, agricultural and industrial rehabilitation in the United States and countries of Western Europe. It was based on the precedent set by a training program begun in 1944 for fifty Chinese specialists, sponsored by UNRRA and administered by various China relief agencies in the United States. The scheme, long contemplated, was set in motion in January 1946⁸² under the stimulus of requests from member governments.⁸³

The Fellowship Program when established provided for 165 fellowships, allocated to receiving countries in proportion to their share in UNRRA's total resources,⁸⁴ except for Austria, Albania, and Italy, which, as nonmembers of UNRRA, were given only half the proportionate number assigned to the others.⁸⁵ In the end, 155 Fellows from nine countries were giving training.⁸⁶ Of these, 126 came to the United States and 29 to the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Holland, Sweden, or Switzerland. Although several had overlapping interests—food preservation techniques, for example, involving both agricultural and industrial rehabilitation—their distribution in major fields of study was roughly as follows:

⁸¹ Monograph, "Historical Report of the Division of Agriculture and Fisheries," Greece, pp. 15, 18-20, 26.

⁸² Field Administrative Order 86, 10 January 1946.

⁸³ Monograph, Oscar J. Falnes, "A History of the UNRRA Fellowships Program," HQ, pp. 2-4.

⁸⁴ Cable, Washington to London 1147, 20 February 1946.

⁸⁵ Originally, however, it was proposed that they be given none; monograph, Falnes, "A History of the UNRRA Fellowships Program," pp. 18-19.

⁸⁶ Austria, 5; Byelorussian SSR, 2; China, 25; Czechoslovakia, 21; Greece, 26; Italy, 14; Poland, 27; Ukrainian SSR, 8; Yugoslavia, 27; total 155.

TABLE 18

FIELDS OF STUDY OF UNRRA FELLOWSHIP HOLDERS

<i>Field</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>No. in U. S.</i>
Health	25	16
Penicillin	5	5
Welfare	20	18
Public services	6	5
Agricultural rehabilitation	32	27
Industrial rehabilitation	67	55
Total	155	126

The remaining ten fellowships were not filled, either because, in the cases of Ethiopia and Albania, no nominations were made by the Governments largely for lack of sufficiently qualified candidates, or because of delays in visas and travel arrangements, or last-minute withdrawals.

Candidates were required to pass a physical examination, and to have a reading, writing, and speaking knowledge of English, though French and German were acceptable for European study. They were to be experts in some phase of social welfare, health, agricultural or industrial rehabilitation in which advanced training was not available in their own countries. They were also required to promise to return immediately after their period of training for three⁸⁷ years of work in the rehabilitation of their countries. Nominations were made by the governments, approved by the UNRRA missions in each country, and given final approval by Headquarters or ERO in the light of the feasibility of carrying out their plans for study in the United States or one of the Western European countries. All expenses outside the Fellow's own country were assumed by UNRRA within established limits for living allowances, medical expenses, and the like, and charged against a special budget which included administrative expenses and was ultimately set at \$686,784.⁸⁸

Applications were due by the end of May 1946, and the period of study was eventually extended to 28 February 1947. Because of delays in securing full information on candidates, and arranging for visas

⁸⁷ In exceptional cases, by agreement between the government and the mission, this period could be reduced to two years.

⁸⁸ Monograph, Falnes, "A History of the UNRRA Fellowships Program," pp. 26-29, 103, 117.

and travel, Fellows arrived at intervals from late May through November 1946.⁸⁹

Administration of the program was placed in the Training Branch of the Personnel Division at Headquarters and in the Department of Relief Services at ERO, aided by advisers in the Divisions of Welfare, Health, Agricultural Rehabilitation, and Industrial Rehabilitation. These officials gave the Fellows personal direction by interview, field visits, and correspondence, and planned their observation tours, periods of formal study, and placement in industries or in national, state, or local agencies (private and government). Headquarters also arranged brief formal orientation courses designed to acquaint the Fellows with practical aspects of living in the United States, while the UNRRA Mission in Paris, in coöperation with the French Government, sponsored instruction in rehabilitation work being done in France for the many European Fellows passing through en route to their places of study.

The programs of study did not for the most part include formal academic work since the Fellows were experienced specialists interested chiefly in observing how, for example, social welfare problems similar to those in their own countries were handled in rural areas of the United States, or learning the manufacture and use of penicillin at the Connaught Laboratories in Toronto, Canada, or modern methods of afforestation or hydroelectric power production in Switzerland. One major difficulty encountered was a lack of familiarity with English which seriously hampered the work of some twenty of the Fellows who came to the United States and which obliged others who had hoped to study in the United States to select instead a country in Western Europe. In some few cases⁹⁰ in the United States, industrial firms, for more or less openly avowed political reasons, refused to allow Fellows from Eastern European countries to have access to their methods and processes.

Since the United States Department of State had admitted the UNRRA Fellows under 3(7) visas as employees of UNRRA, the Administration felt a moral obligation to ensure their prompt departure at the close of their period of training.⁹¹ Actually, only three Fellows resisted repatriation. One of these at once left the United

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁹⁰ Less than 5 per cent of the companies approached by UNRRA, *ibid.*, p. 96.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-46.

States, and the other two cases were turned over to the proper Government authorities.⁹²

So far as can be learned, virtually all Fellows carried out their promises to engage in rehabilitation activities on their return to their home countries, although a very few were prevented from doing so by political changes that occurred in their absence. Examples of the type of valuable work done by the returned Fellows include lecturing in a wood technology research institute in Czechoslovakia, serving as representative of the Greek Government at the Food and Agriculture Organization International Timber Conference, serving as Director of the Division of Rehabilitation Services for the Disabled sponsored by CNRRA in China, organizing research on chestnut blight, and developing hybrid corn in Italy.

The Fellowship unit in ERO was energetic in passing on information and the fruits of its experience to UNESCO, and there was ground for hope that other sections of the United Nations might follow in other fields the example of WHO in continuing the Fellowship Program initiated by UNRRA.

⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 162-174.

III. Distribution

NEARLY ALL supplies provided by UNRRA were turned over to the receiving governments in the ports of reception or at frontier entry points.¹ The responsibility for distribution was placed squarely on "the government or recognized national authority which exercises administrative authority in the area."² This was in accordance with the desire, clearly expressed at the First Council Session by many of the member governments which considered themselves potential recipients of UNRRA goods, to keep the control of distribution in their own hands, and was accepted without question by the major contributing countries.³

This decision was reached, not only from insistence on maintaining national sovereignty against foreign interference, but also from general agreement that the primary purpose of UNRRA was to help the receiving countries to help themselves toward recovery and that this goal could best be achieved by building up normal economic processes within the disrupted countries as rapidly as possible. No distribution controlled from abroad could have accomplished this end.

For practical reasons, too, the decision to place distribution in the hands of the receiving governments was well taken. The UNRRA supply program was in most countries so large that to perform all the actual tasks of distribution would have required an enormous staff, extremely expensive to maintain and difficult to administer. UNRRA supplies, moreover, while planned in part to meet immediate relief needs, in addition included raw materials, fuel, and industrial machinery; seeds, fertilizers, and tractors; trucks, draft animals, and railway

¹ The exceptions were: the first limited program in Italy in which UNRRA did the unloading from ships, and transfer to the Government was effected from warehouses within the country; the first fifteen months of the small Ethiopian program in which UNRRA handled distribution to the ultimate consumer; the small emergency programs for Finland, Korea, and the Philippines, in which title was transferred on loading into ships commissioned and financed by the receiving governments and authorities in the ports of contributing countries; and the final months of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian programs when the receiving governments took title to goods at loading ports.

² Resolution 7, paragraph 2.

³ Committee IV, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, *passim*.

rolling stock, designed to aid in re-establishing local industries, agriculture, and transportation. Such items were clearly unsuited for direct distribution to individuals by an outside agency.

Decision as to how UNRRA supplies were to be distributed also rested with the receiving governments. Distribution was effected in one or more of three ways: (1) the supplies were given free to the needy; (2) were held by the government for the use of, or lease by, state-controlled agencies; (3) were put into normal commercial channels for sale to manufacturers and consumers, subject to the same rationing, pricing, and other controls as similar goods from other sources. The resultant local currency, or an equivalent sum, was then used by the government to pay UNRRA expenses within the country and for relief and rehabilitation purposes.⁴ The second method was, of course, a variant of "normal commercial channels" common in countries in which the economy was largely state controlled; and, in the discussions in the second half of 1943 and in the early months of UNRRA's existence, it seems to have received no consideration.

There was from the first, however, general agreement that, while some relief supplies must be given free to meet pressing general emergencies or the needs of the sick, disabled, children, the aged, and indigents, the major portion of UNRRA imports should be sold within the receiving country. At the conference of experts on UNRRA financial and economic problems called by the staff of OFRRO in June 1943, for example, there was "considerable support . . . for the view that distribution should be made on a commercial basis as much as possible and that prices should be charged for goods." The objection that "it would be difficult to obtain American public support for the policy of a relief recipient country distributing its goods at a price after it had received them from UNRRA as a gift" was countered by the assertion, afterward proved overoptimistic, that "the education of the American public" to this necessity "could be achieved."⁵

This idea was, of course, in direct contrast to the type of "soup-kitchen" relief used by the American Relief Administration directed by Herbert Hoover after World War I and habitually employed by the various Red Cross societies and voluntary relief agencies, in which supplies consisting solely of relief items such as food, clothing, and

⁴ See Part Four, Chapter IV.

⁵ Notes on conference of experts called by Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) staff, 26 June 1943.

medical supplies were given free to the needy under the immediate supervision of the agencies themselves. As the *Handbook* for the United States delegation to the First Council Session⁶ pointed out, however, "very few recipient individuals want to live on 'handouts.' They want the opportunity to work for regular incomes and to pay for their goods." Use of normal commercial channels would, moreover, aid in rehabilitating the economic structure of the country, while the sale of goods would serve to draw off hoarded cash and thus combat inflation.⁷

The sale of a major portion of UNRRA goods was apparently accepted as axiomatic by the member governments at the First Council Session. Lehman found it necessary, however, to explain the idea in some detail in the immediately subsequent United States Congressional hearings on the authorization of the first appropriation to UNRRA. He could by then reinforce his point by citing the pattern set by the military authorities in North Africa, and in Italy where 95 per cent of the relief supplies had been sold through normal commercial channels.⁸

Although distribution was agreed to be the responsibility of the receiving governments, certain safeguards, some of which had been recognized in the June 1943 conference as essential, were urged on the governments by the First Council Session and by later interpretation of the resolutions then adopted. Relief and rehabilitation supplies should at no time be used as a political weapon, and no discrimination should be made in distribution because of race, creed, or political belief.⁹ Furthermore, "in determining the relative needs of the population, there may be taken into account the diverse needs caused by discriminatory treatment by the enemy during its occupation of the area."¹⁰ Pricing, the Council went on to prescribe, must be at such levels as to permit all classes to receive equitable shares of essential commodities, and both pricing and rationing should be under effective government control, with vigorous and unremitting prosecution of measures against black markets.¹¹ Private traders were to be allowed no more than a fair and reasonable remuneration,¹² and the normal government, com-

⁶ See Part One, Chapter I, Section 4.

⁷ United States Department of State, *Handbook, United States Delegation* (First Session of the Council, Atlantic City, N.J., 1943), Section M, Document II, pp. 12-13.

⁸ United States Congress, 78th, 2 Session, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192* (Washington, D.C., 1944), pp. 30-31, 45.

⁹ Resolution 7, paragraph 1.

¹⁰ Resolution 2.

¹¹ Resolution 7, paragraphs 3, 4.

¹² Resolution 7, paragraph 5.

mercial, and coöperative channels of distribution were to be used "to the maximum practicable extent . . . to the particular ends of combatting inflation and restoring normal economic activity."¹³ UNRRA goods were not to be re-exported; UNRRA would not supply to a receiving country goods which were essentially the same as those being exported; UNRRA would not supply raw materials for the production of finished goods for export unless Headquarters had approved these exports as being for UNRRA's account or as fulfilling needs UNRRA would otherwise be called upon to meet. In order to ensure that these conditions were met, the receiving governments were urged to provide the resident missions with full information on exports.¹⁴ The use of UNRRA supplies by armed forces within a receiving country was forbidden¹⁵ except in individual cases involving small quantities, when, in the judgment of the mission chief, an exchange of goods "would directly facilitate and make more effective civilian relief."¹⁶

Furthermore, although the receiving governments were to bear full responsibility for distribution, the right of the Director General to be fully informed on the distribution of UNRRA supplies was recognized, and "the fullest working coöperation between the governments . . . and the Administration for this purpose" was provided for.¹⁷ Provision was, moreover, included for such situations of emergency as might require a military authority or a government to request actual aid from UNRRA in distribution. Even in these cases, however, the Administration was to make the fullest possible use of local authorities and organizations.¹⁸

There was in the early months of UNRRA a great deal of confused thinking within the Administration on the degree to which it would be called upon to perform actual distribution. This arose largely from the decision made at the very outset, despite the opposition of the Bu-

¹³ Resolution 7, paragraph 6.

¹⁴ *Basic Field Manual*, Part VII, Section 413, *i-1*; see *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section II, Document 3. This was drawn from a Central Committee resolution, 14 March 1946, Central Committee (CC) (46)19, CC(46)32 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council) ([CC Docs.], II, 162-163).

¹⁵ Resolution 91 dealt with the question less explicitly; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter IX, Section 2.

¹⁶ *Basic Field Manual*, Part VII, Section 413, *m*; see *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section II, Document 3. See *infra*, Part Five, Chapter III, Section 8, for discussion of the problem in Yugoslavia.

¹⁷ Resolution 7, paragraph 9.

¹⁸ Resolution 7, paragraphs 7, 8.

reau of Supply, to entrust the responsibility for distribution of supplies to the Bureau of Areas.¹⁹ The Bureau of Areas saw in this function one of its few chances to take an active part in operations in contrast to its other somewhat nebulous duties of coördination. The Bureau, therefore, in 1944 spent a great deal of time and energy planning for direct UNRRA participation in warehousing and internal transport within the receiving countries, even extended to such minutiae as the provision of paper bags for dispensing food to the ultimate consumer.²⁰ The Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Distribution and Transport of the Balkan Mission, for example, voiced in a memorandum of 6 September 1944 his understanding of the general view of the Bureau of Areas that "UNRRA should retain a firm control over supplies down to a level as near as possible to the consumer":

I hold [he explained] that in certain areas of Europe it will be possible to ensure that supplies are distributed equitably in accordance with the principles embodied in Resolutions 2 and 7, only if we recognize realistically that the governments of those areas may not be relied upon fully during the post-liberation period. . . . I have talked with many representative citizens of Greece and Yugoslavia on this subject. One and all they feel that UNRRA would be very foolish to overlook the realities of the situation. I recognize that in principle UNRRA is not supposed to operate within a liberated area except in so far as it is invited to do so by the administrative authority in control of that area. This restriction is persuasive in theory, but in practice will lead to dangerous consequences if adhered to strictly.²¹

The UNRRA supply officials both in Washington and in ERO, on the other hand, tended to view their exclusion from responsibility for distribution as a minor defeat in the light of their expectation that most of the receiving governments would be able to handle distribution for themselves and that the beginning of actual operations would force

¹⁹ Monograph, Frederick C. McMillen, "Organizational History of the Bureau of Supply," HQ, p. 5.

²⁰ For example, cable, Washington to Cairo 348, 10 August 1944; memo, Leo Gerstenzang (Balkan Mission) to Sir William Matthews (Chief, Balkan Mission) *et al.*, 31 August 1944; memo, Loda Mae Davis (Bureau of Areas, HQ) to Michail A. Menshikov (Deputy Director General, Bureau of Areas), 4 August 1944. The 200-page *Operations Manual Covering the Storage and Transportation of UNRRA Supplies in Areas of Relief Operations* (Washington, D.C., 1945), prepared by the Distribution and Inland Transportation Division of the Bureau of Areas, was largely premised on actual UNRRA operations in distribution.

²¹ Memo, Gerstenzang to Matthews, 6 September 1944.

the transfer of concern with distribution from Areas into their own hands.²² They were presently vindicated on both counts.

The Council had specified that a military authority or a government might, in cases of emergency, request UNRRA to undertake actual distribution functions. Throughout 1944 the Administration found specific planning difficult against the general uncertainty as to the progress of the war and the impossibility of foretelling how widely emergency conditions would prevail in liberated countries and at what point and to what extent the Allied military authorities might request UNRRA personnel to aid them in distributing civilian relief supplies.

By the autumn of 1944 the paying countries of Western Europe had made plain their adherence to their views as expressed at the First Council Session — they preferred to deal directly on supply matters with the Allied military authorities and the Combined Boards without the intervention of UNRRA. Furthermore, as the formal agreements between the Administration and the nonpaying governments of the Balkans were negotiated in the winter and spring of 1944–1945, the rather extensive responsibilities for actual distribution envisaged for the Administration in the draft UNRRA-country agreements prepared at Headquarters in the summer of 1944²³ were considerably limited by the insistence of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments on doing the job themselves. This insistence stemmed largely from the desire of these Governments, still in exile or newly constituted, to confirm their authority in the eyes of their people. The UNRRA-Czechoslovak Agreement, being the first completed, tended to serve as a model for the others.²⁴ As it worked out, the Allied military authorities used UNRRA personnel during the military period in but two countries, Yugoslavia and Greece.²⁵ In Yugoslavia, UNRRA staff were employed for the brief military period by Military Liaison (Yugoslavia) to supplement its own observers of the distribution of the civil-

²² Memo, Roy F. Hendrickson (Deputy Director General, Bureau of Supply) to Menshikov, 13 December 1944; memo, Roscoe Herbert (Assistant Deputy Director General, Supply, European Regional Office [ERO]) to Frank Northam (Supply Officer, Poland Mission) and P. T. Homan (Department of Supply, ERO) 24 January 1945.

²³ See Part Four, Chapter I.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ UNRRA personnel also entered Albania with Military Liaison (Albania), but, since the military authorities were unable to reach an agreement with the Hoxha Government, they merely waited about until Military Liaison withdrew.

ian relief supplies provided by the military authorities. The presence of these extraneous elements was, however, resented by the Government as evidence of unwarranted suspicion of its good faith and ability to manage its own affairs and as a possible excuse for getting about the country to further political ends.²⁶

In Greece, Military Liaison incorporated UNRRA personnel into its own ranks to assist in actual distribution during the military period. This, however, was not a role which the Administration believed should be performed by the Mission once UNRRA had assumed responsibility for supplies. As Sir William Matthews, Chief of the Balkan Mission, said to members of the Greece Mission, "Please disabuse yourself of the idea that UNRRA could undertake distribution."²⁷ The Greek Government, moreover, signed in March 1945 an Agreement with UNRRA, similar to the other UNRRA-country agreements, accepting responsibility for distribution of UNRRA supplies. Although in actual practice the Mission found itself in the earlier months of its existence obliged to engage in actual operations, the responsibility of the Government remained unquestioned, and the Administration was scrupulous to return all operating functions to the Government as soon as there was any justification for believing it capable of carrying them out.²⁸

The pattern once set for the article in UNRRA-country agreements dealing with distribution of UNRRA supplies was followed with but minor deviations in the texts of subsequent agreements. In general, the receiving government undertook responsibility for distribution in accordance with the Council directives regarding non-discrimination, and agreed to inform the Administration and receive its views on such matters as distribution channels, allocation of commodities, price and ration policies and controls, facilities for moving and storing supplies, and to cooperate with the Administration in making public information concerning the source of UNRRA imports.²⁹ Representatives of UNRRA were, moreover, to have opportunity to observe distribution at each stage, make inquiries, and consult with appropriate government authorities, and generally to satisfy them-

²⁶ See Part Five, Chapter III, Section 3.

²⁷ Greece Mission, meeting of Mission personnel, verbatim minutes, 6 January 1945.

²⁸ See Part Five, Chapter II, Section 2.

²⁹ Only in Italy did the Administration assume joint responsibility with the Government in determining all these policies as they related to UNRRA supplies; see Part Five, Chapter VIII, Section 5.

selves that the distribution system was operating in accordance with the Council resolutions.³⁰

The Bureau of Supply was further vindicated in its expectation that the responsibility within the Administration for distribution policies would eventually come within its scope. With the modification of the Bureau of Areas into the Bureau of Services by the Director General's reorganization order of 3 May 1945, Areas' distribution functions were transferred to the Bureau of Supply. The Bureau, however, made no special efforts to direct field personnel in the carrying out of these duties, proceeding on what seems to have been the fundamentally sound theory that all members of a mission were concerned with distribution of UNRRA supplies and could, while pursuing their regular duties and travels about the country, furnish both the best advice as to proper methods of distribution and the most extensive kind of spot checks on the actual end use being made of UNRRA goods.

Welfare personnel in the missions, in particular, early found themselves serving as *ad hoc* advisers on distribution, especially in the countries with large welfare programs—Greece, Italy, and China—where they were stationed in outlying districts and often actively participated in child-feeding programs, the distribution of contributed clothing, and the like. Hendrickson had indeed remarked at the Caserta Conference in March 1945 that they could be regarded as “the tail end of the Distribution Section,”³¹ and Charles H. Alspach, Deputy Director of the Welfare Division at Headquarters, sent a letter in the following August to field welfare officers suggesting how they might aid Supply personnel by advice on distribution methods and by enforcing nondiscrimination at local levels.³² No effort was subsequently made, however, to provide them with policy directives, nor did the Administration make any attempt to fit them into the general pattern of observation of distribution.

In the autumn of 1945 the Administration began to take an active interest in observation of, and reporting on, distribution as a specific function assigned to personnel recruited for the purpose. It was stimulated thereto by the realization that persistent rumors of maldistribu-

³⁰ Article III in most agreements. See *infra*, Appendix Seven, and *supra*, Part Four, Chapter I.

³¹ “Notes on Conferences at Caserta,” 16–19 March 1945, p. 11.

³² Memo, Conrad Van Hyning (Director, Displaced Persons Division, ERO) to Nicolai I. Feonov (Deputy Director General, Department of Supply, ERO), 8 August 1945.

tion and discrimination must be met by detailed reports from the field if UNRRA's chances of further contributions, particularly from the United States Congress and the United Kingdom Parliament, were not to be ruined.³³ In October, therefore, Rolf Nugent was appointed Deputy Chief of the Bureau of Supply at Headquarters in charge of equitable distribution of UNRRA's available resources;³⁴ personnel designated as observers were included on the staffs of most missions and stationed as far as possible in regional offices in key cities;³⁵ and a new emphasis was ordered on systematic economic reporting, covering the use of indigenous supplies as well as UNRRA imports.³⁶ Public information offices were, moreover, instructed to look for stories suitable for publication in supplying countries, detailing projects aided by UNRRA, and refuting rumors and canards from non-UNRRA sources.³⁷ Early in 1946 a Protective Service was also inaugurated in such missions as requested it—Austria and Italy—and commissioned, among other duties, to work closely with civil and military police in curbing black-market activities and uncovering criminal misuse of UNRRA goods.³⁸

Nugent died in July 1946 before he had succeeded in winning the support of the Administration for his schemes for distribution planning and reporting.³⁹ The hearings on the final United States appropriations in May 1946, however, again stimulated general concern over observation of distribution,⁴⁰ and ERO, despite contrary advice from Headquarters,⁴¹ set up a small Distribution Unit to supervise this work in the missions.⁴² A peripatetic team of three traveled from one European mission to another during the last six months of 1946, reporting its findings on current allegations of maldistribution in each country visited.⁴³

³³ Cable, London to Washington 4513, 3 October 1945; minutes, Rome conference of mission chiefs, 21 October 1945; see *infra*, Part Two, Chapter 6.

³⁴ HQ Bureau of Supply Bulletin 36, 18 October 1945.

³⁵ Cable, Rome to Washington 862, 20 October 1945, reporting decisions at the Rome conference. In China the observation unit operated as the Office of Inspection and Observation, and its members were called "inspectors."

³⁶ Minutes, Rome conference, 21 October 1945.

³⁷ Cable, Rome to Washington 862, 20 October 1945; see *supra*, Part II, Chapter VI.

³⁸ European Region Order A.185, 24 January 1946, revised by European Region Order 73, 16 October 1946.

³⁹ Monograph, McMillen, "Organizational History of the Bureau of Supply," p. 33.

⁴⁰ Circular cable, London to all missions 45, 30 May 1946.

⁴¹ Cable, Washington to London 9352, 28 June 1946.

⁴² European Region Order 34, 24 June 1946.

⁴³ Miss M. Shufeldt (United Kingdom), V. Petrov (USSR), John Lindeman (United States).

Individuals or small investigating units were also sent out by ERO or Headquarters from time to time to one or another mission to discover the facts behind rumored discriminatory distribution. Notable examples of such investigations were the inquiry by a group of three headed by Colonel Alfred G. Katzin (Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Headquarters) which spent a few weeks in Yugoslavia in the fall of 1946; ⁴⁴ the Chief Executive Officer's extended investigation in China in the spring of 1946; ⁴⁵ and Richard R. Brown's temporary appointment in October 1945 as Senior Deputy Chief of Mission in Czechoslovakia in charge of supervising observation of distribution. ⁴⁶

At the end of June 1946 ERO defined ⁴⁷ in general terms the respective responsibilities of ERO and the missions on distribution, observation, and reporting, and a month later Headquarters sent out detailed instructions to the missions on the same subject. ⁴⁸ These directions were, however, issued too late in the life of UNRRA to have much effect. The mission staffs, for better or for worse, had long since worked out their own procedures in accordance with the local conditions with which they had to deal and the personnel at their command. In general, the missions, while recognizing that the responsibility for actual distribution lay with the governments, considered their task of checking on the failures of the governments in this regard as an essential and integral part of their general obligation to advise on all phases of UNRRA operations. These advisory functions were performed in most receiving countries through joint membership with government officials on committees allocating supplies, daily coöperation with the government bureaus set up to handle UNRRA affairs, and as many informal contacts at all official levels as mission members were able to establish. ⁴⁹ They also made spot checks throughout the country at points where UNRRA goods were being shipped, stored, or distributed, and investigated complaints of delays or mis-

⁴⁴ See Part Five, Chapter III, Section 8.

⁴⁵ See, for example, cables: Washington to Shanghai 1746, 22 April 1946; Shanghai to Washington 2340, 10 June 1946.

⁴⁶ Cable, Washington to London 5673, 15 October 1945.

⁴⁷ European Region Order 33, 24 June 1946.

⁴⁸ *Basic Field Manual*, Part VII; see *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section II, Document 3.

⁴⁹ For the unique organizational scheme of the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA) and UNRRA in China and the peculiar difficulties of equitable distribution to Communist territories, see Part Six, Chapter II, Section 1; Chapter I, Section 3.

handling, bringing these to the attention of the appropriate government officials.

One definite measure remained with the Administration when all persuasive efforts to induce receiving governments to improve distribution failed—it could stop shipments of supplies to the country. This was, however, as the governments well knew, a sanction which the Administration was loath to invoke since to stop the flow of supplies was to negate the purpose of UNRRA and to penalize the innocent and needy people of the country. This measure was carried out only in the case of China, and then but briefly, when the port of Shanghai had become clogged with supplies.⁵⁰

Certain problems in regard to the distribution of UNRRA supplies haunted all UNRRA missions. They were for the most part the inevitable result of the postwar conditions with which UNRRA and the receiving countries were obliged to struggle, but they did have a marked effect in preventing rapid and efficient supply distribution. First and perhaps foremost was the disruption of transport through the destruction of railways, highways, and bridges, and the loss of rolling stock, vehicles, and horses. Another common obstacle was the unavoidable inadequacy and unreliability of statistics which made plans for distribution extremely difficult to formulate. Again, particularly in the earlier months of UNRRA supply operations, all UNRRA missions and receiving governments suffered from the late or non-arrival of advance notices of goods being shipped. This was for the most part unavoidable since advance information in the countries of origin was usually not obtainable, competition for scarce commodities was keen and shipping tight, and loadings and departures only sure when the ships actually left the docks. The result for receiving countries was, nevertheless, unfortunate; advance plans for distribution were consequently impossible and delays or snap decisions on allocations inevitable. As supplies and shipping became more plentiful and communications improved, this difficulty was in large measure overcome.

Another delaying factor was the necessary inclusion of great numbers of unfamiliar items in the UNRRA supply program. Strange foods

⁵⁰ See Part Six, Chapter I, Section 3. The brief suspension of shipments to Albania was employed, not because of faulty distribution of UNRRA supplies, but to enforce just treatment of UNRRA personnel.

were inevitably regarded with suspicion, and European peasants, for example, had to be instructed in the use of soya products while Chinese learned how to deal with powdered milk. Medicines and drugs with English labels presented a somewhat similar problem, particularly in the European countries long dominated by German products. Distribution was therefore often delayed while small staffs of government and UNRRA officials labored to identify thousands of packages and translated labels into familiar terms for the use of local wholesalers and druggists.⁵¹ Again, seeds from all quarters of the globe were difficult to identify; their allocation had to be determined according to their suitability for widely different types of soil and climate.⁵² Unfamiliar machinery also posed many problems. The piecemeal procurement of parts of large installations such as penicillin plants and power plants and accompanying confusion as to their proper destination within a receiving country often long delayed their construction into a working unit.⁵³ UNRRA experts found themselves obliged to instruct government officials and wholesalers in the correct assemblage of unaccustomed farm machinery in order to hasten distribution to the provinces, and there to overcome the traditional conservatism of farmers, unacquainted with, and suspicious of, new methods, and to teach them the value, use, and care of, for example, modern tractors and attachments.⁵⁴

All UNRRA missions, with the exception of the China Office, testified—and the reports of special investigators from Headquarters and ERO corroborated these statements—that they were satisfied that the receiving governments, in so far as they were able, distributed UNRRA supplies in accordance with the Council directives. In making these statements, they bore in mind the impeding factors which varied from country to country but were everywhere in most cases beyond the governments' control—disrupted transport and communications, disorganized economies, inexperienced personnel, obstructive political minorities, venal petty officials or private traders who took advantage of the general confusion. Naturally there were delays, misunderstandings, and mistakes, and some malfeasance (almost always at a local level), but these were less and less frequent as the countries began to recover from the war, the governments established control,

⁵¹ See, for example, monograph, Cottrell, "Medical History, Austrian Mission," p. 4.

⁵² See, for example, Part Five, Chapter IX, Section 6.

⁵³ See, for example, Part Five, Chapter VII, Section 4.

⁵⁴ See, for example, Part Five, Chapter VI, Section 7; Chapter IX, Section 7.

and as the missions explained the purposes and policies of UNRRA and succeeded in gaining the respect and confidence of the officials with whom they worked. Even in China it is questionable whether blame can be clearly placed on the receiving government since the distribution of UNRRA supplies was bound up with the complex problems of a weak and unstable authority embroiled in civil war.

The UNRRA missions at every stage and at all levels in their daily relations with the governments labored to secure rapid, well-ordered, and nondiscriminatory distribution. From aiding the governments to prepare supply requirements through all the phases of advising on allocations, pricing and rationing, assembly, and transport, the staffs at mission headquarters worked with the objective of assisting the governments to get the supplies to the ultimate consumer. Equally actuated by this purpose were the regional officers in the provinces and the peripatetic welfare, medical, industrial, and agricultural rehabilitation experts. Missions and governments alike considered themselves engaged in a coöperative enterprise in which each complemented the other for the common benefit of the country.

IV. Proceeds of Sale

1. FORMULATION OF POLICY

THE FINANCIAL PLAN for UNRRA, adopted at the First Council Session, recommended "that governments not in a position to pay in suitable means of foreign exchange . . . make available to the Administration in whole or in part the local currency proceeds from the sale of supplies furnished by the Administration." It further directed that "it shall be the policy of the Administration to use any such local currency for relief and rehabilitation work, including the care and movement of displaced persons, and for such other purposes as may be agreed upon with the government. Programs for the utilization of such local currency shall be formulated by the Director General and the member government involved."¹ It recommended, in addition, "that so far as possible all expenses of the Administration within a liberated area shall be borne by the government of such area, and shall be paid in local currency made available by the government of the area or derived from the proceeds of sale of supplies."² There was also from the beginning general agreement that UNRRA goods, in so far as practicable, should be sold by the receiving government through normal commercial channels.³ The Financial Plan was ambiguous in that it did not recommend unequivocally that the total proceeds of sale should be accessible to the Administration nor did it determine clearly whether the Administration or the receiving government was to assume the dominant control of such funds as were made available for relief and rehabilitation purposes.

The various views on these questions expressed at the First Council Session⁴ and advanced from time to time within the Administration and by representatives of member governments were brought into sharp focus late in 1944 when the necessity arose for drafting an article on the subject for inclusion in the contemplated agreements with receiving governments. Two major and diametrically opposite

¹ Resolution 14, Section 19.

² Resolution 14, Section 20.

³ See Part Four, Chapter III.

⁴ Committee III, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes, 5th meeting, 21 November 1943.

points of view were presented during these discussions. The Director General continued to press the interpretation which he had advanced at the First Council Session,⁵ and which he had subsequently stated before committees of the United States Congress: ⁶ that control over the entire proceeds of sale should lie with the Administration. In this he was strongly supported by his Financial Adviser, Mieczyslaw Sokolowski,⁷ and with various qualifications by others of the senior staff at Headquarters. In view of the fact that UNRRA's limited resources were much too small to meet all the urgent relief and rehabilitation needs of Europe and the Far East, it was, they believed, incumbent on the Administration to make the widest possible use of all other means available for initiating relief and rehabilitation projects. This would, they felt, be demanded by public opinion in contributing countries. Furthermore, according to Sokolowski, control of funds from the proceeds of sale by the Administration was the only way of assuring that the money would actually be spent on relief and rehabilitation work within the country; otherwise, and in this Lehman concurred, the receiving government might easily succumb to the great pressure to use the money for other urgent government expenditures, at the same time turning to UNRRA to provide further relief which the government itself could and should have financed.⁸ It was, as Hendrickson emphasized, both improper and likely to antagonize public opinion in contributing countries to allow the proceeds from the sale of UNRRA relief supplies to be used for general government expenditures, including, perhaps, police and army maintenance.⁹

Advocates of the second school of thought—that control over proceeds of sale properly lay with the receiving government—reached this conclusion from several directions. Michail A. Menshikov, Deputy Director General, Bureau of Areas, Headquarters, for example, main-

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ United States Congress, 78th, 1 and 2 Sessions, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192* (Washington, D.C., 1944), p. 138; United States Congress, 78th, 2 Session, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on H. J. Res. 192* (Washington, D.C., 1944), p. 46.

⁷ Memos, Mieczyslaw Sokolowski (Financial Adviser, HQ), "Opinion on Meeting in Feller's [A. H. Feller, General Counsel] Office to Reconsider the Local Currency Provisions of the Master Agreement," 23 November 1944; Sokolowski to John J. Corson (Deputy Director General, Finance and Administration), 5 January 1945.

⁸ "Notes on Director General's Staff Meeting," 20 January 1945.

⁹ Cable, Washington to London 1031, 29 November 1944; memo, Hendrickson to Sokolowski, 22 November 1944.

tained that the Financial Plan in recommending that governments make proceeds of sale available "in whole or in part," and "so far as possible" for the expenses of the Administration, gave complete liberty to the government to decide what should be done with the funds; nor was it the intent, he argued, that there necessarily be agreement between the Administration and the government on their use.¹⁰

Sir Frederick Leith-Ross's adherence to this interpretation rose from less theoretical considerations. It would, he believed, prove administratively impossible to provide the large mission staffs needed to maintain a careful check on the proceeds of sale receipts and to direct their expenditure.¹¹ Moreover, he could see no point in the Administration's "acquiring local currency in excess of its actual needs." He believed, furthermore, that countries during the first year of liberation must be allowed to retain the great bulk of local currency to apply against their probable financial deficits.¹² He was strongly supported by the United Kingdom Foreign Office which had specifically in mind the precarious state of Greek finances. In December 1944 the ordinary revenues of the Greek Government gave promise of meeting one sixth of the monthly budget, and even with the addition of the proceeds from sale of UNRRA supplies, a deficit of one third was still to be expected. The diversion of the proceeds of sale from Government revenues would, the Foreign Office emphatically declared, probably result in a collapse of the Greek Government.¹³

Additional support to this point of view came from George S. Dunnett, a United Kingdom Treasury official and member of the UNRRA Committee on Financial Control, who maintained that control of local proceeds of sale by UNRRA constituted an impairment of the sovereignty of the receiving country. Each government, he felt, must work out its own salvation, and UNRRA must not attempt to run the country.¹⁴

¹⁰ Memo, Menshikov to Hendrickson, 16 November 1944; minutes, meeting in Feller's office to reconsider the local currency provision of the Master Agreement, 23 November 1944.

¹¹ Administrative Council, minutes 46th meeting, 22 November 1944.

¹² Memo, Leith-Ross to A. Morhange (Financial Adviser, European Regional Office [ERO]), 16 September 1944.

¹³ "Note of the Meeting Held at the Foreign Office," 21 November 1944; memo, conference between E. L. Lloyd (Middle East Supply Center), Alvin Roseman (Deputy Chief, Balkan Mission), and Kenneth Dayton (Treasurer, HQ), 19 December 1944.

¹⁴ Memo, conference between George Dunnett (United Kingdom Treasury), E. R. Copleston (United Kingdom Treasury), and Dayton, 18 November 1944.

It became evident that the Director General would encounter strong opposition in the Central Committee if he attempted to stand by his original premise, for the United States Government by now seemed prepared to support the views of the United Kingdom Government.¹⁵ He was, moreover, obliged to concede that the complete control by UNRRA of proceeds of sale gave insufficient recognition to the weak financial condition of receiving countries. On the other hand, however, he was unwilling to abandon all control, especially in view of his earlier commitment to the United States Congress. After an extended exchange of views between and within Headquarters and ERO, a compromise policy was adopted, transmitted for comment to the Central Committee on 20 January 1945,¹⁶ and subsequently incorporated in the agreements with UNRRA countries.¹⁷

The compromise gave receiving governments the right to merge proceeds of sale with their ordinary revenue in meeting their regular government expenditures, requiring only that they expend an "equivalent amount for relief and rehabilitation purposes within a reasonable period" after the commencement of UNRRA operations. The governments were to furnish sufficient local currency to cover mission expenses. They were, moreover, to be asked to maintain a record of actual proceeds derived from the sale of UNRRA supplies and to discuss with the Administration their plans for spending these sums on relief and rehabilitation projects. Finally, they were to furnish the Administration with periodic reports on such expenditures and to receive the Administration's views regarding them.

2. FACTORS AFFECTING THE SIZE OF PROCEEDS OF SALE

The size of the proceeds of sale funds obviously depended upon the widely divergent policies adopted in the different receiving countries for distributing UNRRA goods. The receipts from proceeds peri-

¹⁵ "Note of Meeting with the Director General on Local Currency Proceeds," 11 January 1945.

¹⁶ Since the Central Committee members were not asked to approve but only to comment individually, the paper was not included in the Central Committee's document series. It was much later presented to the Committee on Financial Control for its information and appeared as CFC(45)54, 8 December 1945; see *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section II, Document 1.

¹⁷ Usually as Article IV; see *infra*, Appendix Seven.

odically reported by the governments to the missions were, therefore, in no way a reflection of the value of the supplies provided to a given country. Despite these divergences, the net cumulative totals were, in most cases, substantial in comparison with other items of government income. For example, in Austria the net totals cumulative through 30 September 1948 were 18 per cent of the Government revenue from all other sources in 1947; in Czechoslovakia, 27 per cent; and in Poland, 11 per cent.¹⁸ Only in China, and in Greece for a few months in the winter of 1945-1946, did local distribution costs exceed the gross proceeds of sale.

Three major factors influenced the size of proceeds of sale. First, in State-controlled economies, capital equipment was, for the most part, not sold but remained in the hands of government corporations or agencies. The Administration, after considerable discussion and some vacillation, ruled in the spring of 1947 that no book value need be assigned to such items and that consequently they should not appear in the reports of proceeds of sale.¹⁹ Because of this decision, the cumulative total for Albania, for example, was considerably less than 50 per cent of the dollar value of the goods supplied by UNRRA, and the total for Yugoslavia about 50 per cent.²⁰ In Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, where the Government had from the first adopted the practice of reporting assigned values on capital equipment and, for the sake of consistency was allowed to continue to do so, the estimated total proceeds came to more than 100 per cent of the dollar value of the UNRRA supplies for that country.²¹

Secondly, a part of the supplies was distributed free, thus, of course, automatically reducing the size of the proceeds of sale. In accordance with the Council directive that all in need should be supplied,²² these goods went to charitable institutions, refugee camps, children, pregnant and nursing mothers, the sick, aged, and indigent. In China, moreover, from the late spring of 1946, after distribution through commercial channels had proved unsatisfactory, the staple foods

¹⁸ *The Financial Report of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (Ninth and Final Financial Report)* (Washington, D.C., 1949), pp. 65, 79; figures for government revenues supplied by International Monetary Fund, letter, J. J. Polak to George Woodbridge, 18 February 1949.

¹⁹ Central Committee (CC) (48)2, Director General to Central Committee, "Final Report on Proceeds of Sale," 15 January 1948, p. 4.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 10, 57; *Ninth and Final Financial Report*, pp. 55, 83.

²¹ CC(48)2, p. 23; *Ninth and Final Financial Report*, p. 65.

²² Resolution 7, paragraph 3.

supplied by UNRRA were given free or as "work relief" payments.²³

The bulk of the UNRRA supplies, however, was sold, sometimes at low, sometimes at high prices. The amount of proceeds, of course, reflected the price policy adopted: where high prices were charged, the proceeds were high in relation to the value assigned the programs by UNRRA; and, conversely, they were low where low price levels were set. Furthermore, the net proceeds as reported do not necessarily indicate the real amount available for additional relief and rehabilitation activities, if some of these net proceeds were in fact used to permit or aid in the purchase of UNRRA supplies. For example, in the Dodecanese it was decided to sell food at the market price. It was an established UNRRA policy that all classes of the population, irrespective of their purchasing power, should receive their equitable share. The indigent, that is, those whose purchasing power would not permit them to pay market prices for food, were in the Dodecanese enabled to do so by the distribution of cash relief paid from the proceeds of the sale of UNRRA goods.²⁴ A portion of these proceeds was thus, in effect, used for the direct distribution of UNRRA supplies. The real net available for additional enterprises was, consequently, less than the reported apparent net. In Italy and Greece, on the other hand, much food was distributed free or sold below the market price to the indigent.²⁵ In both these countries the reported net proceeds were fairly close to the real net.

A further factor which affected the value of the proceeds of sale was the change in the value of money within the receiving countries. In Italy, for example, the first half of 1947, when the receipts from proceeds were largest, was also, fortunately, a period when prices were at their peak. Thus the real value of the fund, necessarily expressed in local currency, was not thereafter reduced by increasing inflation. In China, on the other hand, where inflation had reached astronomical heights by early 1947, it was recognized that proceeds in terms of local currency no longer had any value, and cotton yarn manufactured from UNRRA raw cotton was held for sale as demands for local currency might arise.²⁶

Comparisons of proceeds, as reported, with the value of the supplies made available by UNRRA are likely to be misleading unless the

²³ See Part Six, Chapter II, Section 2.

²⁴ See Part Five, Chapter X, Section 4.

²⁵ See Part Five, Chapter VIII, Sections 2, 5; Chapter II, Section 7.

²⁶ See Part Six, Chapter I, Section 4.

amount of supplies retained and reported (or not reported) by the government, the distribution policies, and other factors are carefully considered.

3. ADMINISTRATION INFLUENCE ON THE SPENDING OF PROCEEDS OF SALE

The first claim on proceeds of sale was for UNRRA expenses. The second claim was for the costs of distribution of UNRRA supplies incurred by the governments. The missions had little choice but to accept the costs as presented by the receiving governments,²⁷ although they did raise objections to the heavy charges claimed by the Governments of Greece²⁸ and China. In the latter country, not only were the high distribution costs of CNRRA a constant bone of contention between the Mission and the Government, but the Government was extremely reluctant to make up the deficit from its own funds when the proceeds of sale were insufficient.²⁹

The remainder of the proceeds was to be spent for relief and rehabilitation purposes. As Leith-Ross had foreseen, no UNRRA mission had the staff to undertake a comprehensive review and analysis of such projects as the government proposed to undertake; and in the summer of 1946 Headquarters decided that missions were not justified in recruiting additional personnel to verify the accuracy of government reports on such expenditures already made.³⁰ So far as can be discovered, however, the net proceeds of sale in all receiving countries were, despite the earlier misgivings within and outside the Administration, used for relief and rehabilitation purposes.³¹

The fact that the receiving government was obligated to spend these funds or "an equivalent amount" on relief and rehabilitation projects "within a reasonable period" left to the government considerable freedom of decision as to how and when the money should

²⁷ Except in Italy where maximum distribution costs were agreed in the UNRRA-Italian Government Price Committee whenever it fixed prices.

²⁸ Memo, J. J. Polak to Crofton, *et al.*, 1 October 1945.

²⁹ Operational Analysis Paper 53, *UNRRA in China, 1945-1947* (Washington, D.C., 1948), Chapter IV.

³⁰ Memo, Morhange to Personal Representative of the Director General, 25 June 1946; I. M. Parker (Financial Resources Officer, ERO), "Report on Local Currency Proceeds in Athens, Rome, Vienna, and Prague," 25 June 1946; cable, Washington to London 11045, 23 July 1946.

³¹ CC(48)2, p. 6 and *passim*.

be spent. Nevertheless, the UNRRA missions were able in many cases to exert effective influence for or against specific proposals. The Czechoslovak Mission was, for example, instrumental in getting the Government to approve a relief program of 50 million crowns (\$1 million) for needy children and another emergency relief program in eastern Czechoslovakia of 100 million crowns (\$2 million).³² In Greece, the Administration succeeded in persuading the Government to spend local currency to complement the supplies and services imported by UNRRA for the Greek antimalaria program;³³ while the Poland Mission was able to obtain a diversion of some of the funds originally planned for restoration of the cities of Gdynia and Danzig to the milk fund for mothers and children.³⁴

In Italy, under the UNRRA Agreements with the Italian Government, the Mission played a unique role in the control and expenditure of proceeds of sale. The UNRRA programs were carried out in close coöperation between the Administration and the Government. Through a joint Price Committee which fixed most prices for UNRRA supplies from June 1946 to 31 March 1947, and through decisions reached by mutual agreement between the Mission and the Government on the use of proceeds, the UNRRA Mission had a far-reaching impact on the Italian economy. On the whole, this power appears to have been used wisely and elicited a high degree of coöperation from the Italian Ministries concerned.

A noteworthy part of the first Agreement with Italy³⁵ was the provision for a "matching" contribution—the beginning of the Lire Fund. Since the first program for Italy was limited to relief supplies, most of which were to be distributed free to meet special needs, there would normally have been no proceeds of sale. "As an indication of its desire to participate in the coöperative endeavour represented by the relief and rehabilitation programs of UNRRA,"³⁶ the Italian Government agreed to deposit in a special fund the value in lire, up to \$50 million, at the rate of 100 lire to the dollar, of the UNRRA supplies as they arrived in the country.³⁷ After the full UNRRA supply program for Italy began to operate early in 1946, the Lire Fund was

³² Press Release 557, 18 December 1946.

³³ Monograph, J. J. Polak, "Proceeds of Sale by Recipient Countries of UNRRA Supplies," p. 15.

³⁴ Poland Mission Monthly Report, May 1946.

³⁵ See Appendix Seven, Document 10a.

³⁶ Article Va.

³⁷ See Part Five, Chapter VIII, Section 2.

augmented by proceeds of sale, which, of course, accumulated as in other receiving countries.

Extended discussions were carried on between the Mission and the Italian Government during 1946 and 1947 concerning the uses and timing of expenditures of the total of 85,000 million lire³⁸ estimated as likely to accrue from the net proceeds of sale. The only practical plan appeared to be the expansion of emergency relief and rehabilitation programs that had already been undertaken in welfare, health, housing, clothing, and agriculture. All five categories involved constructive and significant projects, such as the UNRRA-Tessile program, a complex scheme for utilizing UNRRA imports of raw materials for textiles and shoes,³⁹ and the UNRRA-CASAS program, for repair and construction of houses.⁴⁰

It was widely recognized within the Administration that the timing of expenditures from proceeds of sale would be a very important factor in determining the nature and intensity of inflationary forces within a country.⁴¹ The withdrawal of local currency from circulation through the sale of UNRRA supplies was deflationary in effect, assuming that the purchase of UNRRA supplies was not financed by the expansion of bank credit. The expenditure of such proceeds for relief and rehabilitation within the country was, on the other hand, inflationary. Depending upon a number of considerations, such as the degree of pre-UNRRA inflation, the pricing policies for UNRRA supplies, and the types and rate of expenditure from the proceeds of sale fund, UNRRA policy had a direct bearing on the financial structure of the country.

In Austria, particularly, the UNRRA Mission had a determining influence on the timing of expenditure of proceeds.⁴² One of the first steps in rehabilitating the Austrian economy was the reorganization of its currency. The Austrian Government had issued a new schilling, replacing the former German currency. It had at the same time reduced the volume of circulation by blocking about eight billion schillings in bank balances. The amount in circulation was, however, still more

³⁸ Italy Mission, *The Lire Fund* (Rome, 1947), p. 48; the total net proceeds as of 30 September 1948 were 72, 899, 490, 251 lire, *Ninth and Final Financial Report*, Schedule K, p. 75.

³⁹ See Part Five, Chapter VIII, Section 11.

⁴⁰ See Part Five, Chapter VIII, Section 12.

⁴¹ See for example, CFC(45)53; CFC(46)1, 19, 34, 36, 49, 56.

⁴² See Part Five, Chapter IX, Section 10.

than five times that in prewar years. Since Austria's economic resources were fully utilized, and in view of the announced policy of the Government to stabilize its currency, the Mission supported the Government in maintaining that insistence upon immediate expenditure of proceeds of sale would be definitely inflationary and would, in effect, sabotage the Government's financial program.⁴³ To this Headquarters⁴⁴ and ERO agreed. No proceeds of sale were, therefore, spent during the life of the Mission,⁴⁵ and it was planned that eventual expenditures would be spread over a five-year period.⁴⁶

A minor use of proceeds of sale which had generated a great deal of discussion in the early months of UNRRA was the procurement of local surpluses in receiving countries for relief and rehabilitation of other UNRRA countries.⁴⁷ The suggestion was even advanced that such goods be sold by UNRRA to increase its resources in the purchasing countries.⁴⁸ Some Headquarters officials believed, on the other hand, that UNRRA's influence should be exerted to push direct exchanges of goods between receiving countries and to establish ordinary trade channels.⁴⁹ These plans, which were in some cases worked out in considerable detail,⁵⁰ never materialized, however, because trade within Central and Eastern Europe did not recover as rapidly as was anticipated in early postwar days and the expected surpluses did not accumulate.⁵¹

Attempts to use proceeds of sale for warehousing, handling, and

⁴³ Memos: E. Knobloch (Economic Adviser, Austria Mission), "The Use of Proceeds from Sale of UNRRA Supplies in Austria," November 1946; "Second Memorandum on the Use of Proceeds from the Sale of UNRRA Supplies in Austria," 15 November 1946.

⁴⁴ Cable, Washington to London 17926, 6 December 1946.

⁴⁵ CC(48)2, p. 14.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁴⁷ Memos: Erwin Schuller: 7 September 1944; to Roscoe Herbert (Deputy Chief of Supply, ERO), 1 December 1944; 26 April 1945; to David Weintraub (Bureau of Supply, HQ), 22 June 1945, 28 June 1945; cable, Washington to London 6793, 21 May 1946; memos: Sokolowski to Feller, 7 October 1944; Menshikov to Hendrickson, 24 November 1944.

⁴⁸ Memo, Rolf Nugent (Economic Adviser to Chief of Bureau of Supply), "Proposed Price Policy for UNRRA," 18 April 1944.

⁴⁹ Memos, Dayton to Corson, 24, 26 October 1944.

⁵⁰ For example, provisional agreements with the Government of Czechoslovakia for a \$1 million shoe program, and the exchange of raw wool against piece goods and knitwear; letter, Hendrickson to Frencisch Vondrich (Czechoslovakia Economic Service), 4 October 1944; memo, Erwin Schuller, 26 April 1945.

⁵¹ See *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA, Report Presented by the Director General to the Secretary General of the United Nations*, prepared by the Economic Adviser of UNRRA (Washington, D.C., 1946) pp. 7-8.

transport expenses incurred by the Administration within a given country in connection with UNRRA programs in other areas met with serious objections. Both Yugoslav and Greek representatives pointed out that the furnishing of transportation was for them a major source of foreign exchange. Furthermore, Greece, in order to provide transport of refugees to other countries, would be obliged to buy coal, and this, in view of its limited resources, it could not afford to do for the benefit of other countries.⁵² The Administration conceded the validity of the arguments.⁵³ The percentage of local proceeds of sale devoted to UNRRA expenses incurred in procurement of supplies, warehousing, shipping, and transportation for relief purposes in other UNRRA countries amounted, in all, to less than one-half of one per cent of the total proceeds.⁵⁴

4. ARRANGEMENTS FOR POST-UNRRA EXPENDITURE OF PROCEEDS OF SALE

LaGuardia when visiting European missions prior to the Fifth Council Session in August 1946 was greatly impressed with the possibilities of using proceeds of sale for further relief and rehabilitation. At the Fifth Council Session, in a proposal reminiscent of Lehman's earlier thinking, he recommended that these funds in each country be put in trust to be used as a revolving fund, primarily for revenue-producing projects, but also for public works which the government would otherwise be unable to finance. Control would reside in a small council or committee drawn from UNRRA or a succeeding international agency. LaGuardia was mindful that the receiving countries would object to this interference with their plans for using proceeds of sale, but he ventured to say that unless something was done, "in two years there will not be a penny of that fund existing anywhere."⁵⁵

After considerable discussion,⁵⁶ the Council merely authorized⁵⁷ the Director General to review the present status of proceeds of sale

⁵² Memo, Dayton to Corson, 26 October 1944.

⁵³ Sokolowski, draft, "Financial Instructions for the Chiefs of UNRRA Missions," Article 14, November 1944.

⁵⁴ *Ninth and Final Financial Report*, Schedules A-P.

⁵⁵ Council V Document 115, *Ad Hoc* Committee on Procedures (*Ad Hoc/Pr*)¹⁰, verbatim minutes 2d meeting, 13 August 1946.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*; Council V Document 167, *Ad Hoc/Pr* 19, verbatim minutes 3d meeting, 15 August 1945; *Journal*, Fifth Council, p. 111.

⁵⁷ Resolution 97.

and, after consultation with the Central Committee and in agreement with the receiving countries concerned, to make any modifications which might be found desirable in the arrangements for their future use. The Council further recommended that the functions and responsibilities of the Administration with regard to the utilization of local proceeds or equivalent funds for relief and rehabilitation purposes should, at the appropriate time, be transferred to the United Nations, under arrangements to be worked out by the Director General with United Nations authorities. Even to this, the receiving countries were unanimously opposed, on the grounds that their agreements with UNRRA sufficiently governed the use of proceeds.⁵⁸

The Administration subsequently presented a general policy applicable to all receiving countries for the final disposition of proceeds of sale⁵⁹ which was approved by the Central Committee on 14 February 1947 as a basis for negotiations with the governments concerned.⁶⁰ The missions were to agree with receiving governments on the specific categories of relief and rehabilitation expenditures for which proceeds of sale would be used (for example, health, agriculture, welfare), and the types of projects which would be undertaken within each of the broad categories.

Governments were further to be asked to agree in principle to the use, to a reasonable extent, of available proceeds of sale for financing the authorized local activities of other international organizations such as the International Refugee Organization and WHO, which were to take over UNRRA functions. Quarterly reports on the use of proceeds were to be made to UNRRA or such successor agency as might be designated, the right being reserved to UNRRA or the successor agency to comment on the use of proceeds of sale and to be consulted with respect to any projected changes which might involve the establishment of categories or projects not covered in the understanding with the mission. The successor agency, the Administration proposed, should be the United Nations.

On this basis, understandings or agreements were reached during 1947 with receiving governments. Obviously, many items had yet to be recorded when these documents were signed, but an anticipated total of proceeds of sale was in each case agreed upon for reporting

⁵⁸ *Journal*, Fifth Council, pp. 111-112.

⁵⁹ CC(47)22, memo, Director General to Central Committee, 12 February 1947.

⁶⁰ CC(47)24, minutes 47th meeting, 14 February 1947.

purposes. Agreements were not, of course, necessary for Ethiopia, since all UNRRA supplies were distributed free, nor for San Marino, because of the small size of the program;⁶¹ nor were they requested from the Governments of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSR, since more than three-fourths of the total funds had already been expended and the remainder firmly committed in accordance with the relief and rehabilitation categories specified in the original Agreements between UNRRA and the Governments of the Soviet Republics.⁶²

The UNRRA missions attempted to obtain as complete details as possible on relief and rehabilitation categories and projects. All governments met the Administration's minimum reporting requirements although little detailed information was made available by the two Soviet Republics.⁶³ The question of making local currency from proceeds of sale available to future international organizations carrying on UNRRA functions was not raised with all receiving governments, either because the funds were already spent or committed or because it seemed inapplicable under existing circumstances.⁶⁴ Of those which were approached only the Greek Government refused, on the basis that this was a matter for its direct agreement with such organizations.⁶⁵ All governments with unexpended proceeds of sale agreed to make quarterly reports to UNRRA or its designated successor.

Special arrangements for post-UNRRA utilization of proceeds of sale were made in two countries. Austria, which still had the total net proceeds unspent, set up a Board of Trustees with responsibility for approving projects and allocating funds within Austria.⁶⁶ The Board was composed of a representative of each ministry involved in drawing up relief and reconstruction plans, a representative of the Ministry of Finance, and three independent members. In China, a Rehabilitation Commission, with a partly international Board of Trustees for Rehabilitation Affairs, was established to direct the expenditure of proceeds of sale on a series of long-term rehabilitation projects which could not be completed within the lifetime of UNRRA.⁶⁷

In answer to the request of the Administration acting on the Council's instructions,⁶⁸ the United Nations Economic and Social Council,

⁶¹ CC(48)2, p. 58.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 17, 51.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 53.

⁶⁴ For example, Albania, the Soviet Republics, Yugoslavia, the Dodecanese, Korea.

⁶⁵ CC(48)2, p. 34.

⁶⁶ Letter, Leopold Figl (Federal Chancellor, Austria) to Brigadier R. H. R. Parminter (Chief, Austria Mission), 10 May 1947; see *infra*, Part Five, Chapter IX, Section 10.

⁶⁷ See Part Six, Chapter III, Section 5.

⁶⁸ Resolution 97.

on 24 March 1947, adopted a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to make arrangements with UNRRA for the transfer of the duties of receiving periodic reports from receiving countries, on the use of proceeds of sale, and advice from governments on changes in categories of expenditures. In regard to the latter, however, the United Nations refused to assume any responsibility for consultation with governments, so that, in effect, any outside influence on the use of proceeds ended with the passing of UNRRA.⁶⁹ The Administration transferred its records and responsibilities on proceeds of sale to the United Nations on 22 June 1948.⁷⁰

5. USES MADE OF PROCEEDS OF SALE

The uses made of, or projected for, the proceeds of sale⁷¹ fell within a few broad categories: social welfare, health, education, industrial rehabilitation, agricultural rehabilitation, rehabilitation of public utilities, and housing. The amounts assigned to each and the types of projects included, of course, varied widely from country to country. Almost all governments allotted the largest sums to welfare and health. Greece, for example, provided for the financing of welfare centers, the rehabilitation of equipment in maternity, orphans', and old men's homes and children's camps, the continuation of the anti-malaria campaign, the rehabilitation and maintenance of State nursing institutions, and the financing of free medical treatment. In the Ukrainian SSR, support was provided for the provincial health services and child welfare institutions, while the Byelorussian SSR restored the Medical Institution in Minsk, the county hospital in Palotsk Oblast, and schools in Minsk and two provincial centers. In the Dodecanese Islands, the system of cash relief was carried on. In Italy, the child-feeding programs were continued, as well as the campaigns against malaria and tuberculosis; a national Orthogenetic Institute was set up to study nutritional problems; and a penicillin manufacturing plant was partially financed. In the Philippines, the very small proceeds of sale were spent entirely on food for indigents; in Southern Korea, on child welfare

⁶⁹ See Appendix Eight, Document 6a, b.

⁷⁰ Letter, Director General to A. D. K. Owen (Assistant Secretary General in Charge of Economic Affairs, United Nations), 22 June 1948.

⁷¹ CC(48)2, "Final Report on Proceeds of Sale," 15 January 1948, contains a digest by countries of their reports on uses made or contemplated, with agreements between governments and missions and supplementary correspondence appended.

projects; in Finland, on relief to individual families, an orphans' home, and a workers' recreation center; in Hungary, on the rehabilitation of hospitals, child care institutions, and maintenance of a State factory for prosthetic appliances.

The Polish Government assigned the largest portion of its proceeds of sale to the rehabilitation of the buildings and equipment of all types of educational institutions and hospitals, infirmaries, tuberculosis sanatoria, and cancer institutes. Austria also gave priority to the restoration of schools and scientific and social administration institutions; the establishment of a welfare academy, and scholarships in Austria and abroad for social workers; the support of child-feeding programs, and the repair and maintenance of welfare centers and tuberculosis sanatoria.

The Albanian Government put first the reconstruction of roads, bridges, and ports, and the postal and telegraph system, with the second largest sum allotted to such agricultural rehabilitation projects as land development, improvement of olive groves, locust control, distribution of free seed, and other aid to farmers. Yugoslavia also found the rehabilitation of transport (repair of railways, rolling stock, waterways, and harbors) the primary need, although sizable amounts were assigned to maintenance of war orphans and blind children, and the rehabilitation of social institutions, schools, and villages. In Czechoslovakia, by far the largest amount was spent for the restoration of villages, the reconversion of military practice grounds to civilian use, construction of housing, and flood relief.

In these relief and rehabilitation programs, the diversity and extent of which is but hinted here, UNRRA had a continuing influence far beyond its direct contribution to the receiving countries. The true proceeds of sale, moreover, consisted not only of the funds actually realized but also included the assistance rendered by distributing UNRRA supplies free or selling them below market price. In their impact on the economies of the receiving countries these foregone proceeds were just as important despite their statistical elusiveness as were the reported proceeds.

V. Voluntary Agencies

THE ACCOUNT of UNRRA's operations would not be justly balanced without recognition of the valuable part played by the foreign voluntary relief agencies¹ of many countries. Not only did they make substantial contributions of supplies and personnel directly to UNRRA but, through their own programs supplementary to UNRRA's work, they met the particular needs of many special groups in all UNRRA countries and in the displaced persons operations, needs which UNRRA and the receiving governments could not fill from their limited resources necessarily devoted to general relief and rehabilitation.

Since the importance of coöperation between UNRRA and the voluntary agencies engaged in relief in foreign countries was early recognized by the member governments of UNRRA, the following statement was included in the UNRRA Agreement:

Foreign voluntary relief agencies may not engage in activity in any area receiving relief from the Administration without the consent and unless subject to the regulation of the Director General.²

The Council, in the First Session, further provided

That it shall be the policy of the Administration to enlist the coöperation and seek the participation of appropriate foreign voluntary relief agencies, to the extent that they can be effectively utilized in relief activities for which they have special competence and resources, subject to the consent and regulation of the Director General in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Agreement.

That the extent to which foreign voluntary relief agencies should be used for assistance in the relief and rehabilitation of distressed people in any country should be a matter to be determined by the Director General in consultation with the government or recognized national authority concerned.³

The assumption that an untried and temporary international organization could at once assume control of long-established and powerful

¹ That is, voluntary agencies carrying on relief in countries other than their own.

² Article IV, 2.

³ Resolution 9, paragraphs 2, 3.

groups with diverse backgrounds and purposes was patently unrealistic. The degree of coöperation achieved by mid-1946 when UNRRA was in full operation was reached only through a long period of more or less groping efforts on the part both of UNRRA and the agencies to work out methods of mutual assistance and coördinated plans. Many obstacles had to be overcome. In the first place, UNRRA had no sanctions by which to enforce the control of voluntary agencies envisaged in the Agreement, and some of the agencies had little disposition to yield in any degree their independence of action, particularly in the early months of UNRRA when its plans were unformed and its capacity for action unproved. Again, especially in the early period, some of the governments and occupying authorities preferred to make their own arrangements with voluntary agencies without reference to UNRRA, especially as UNRRA personnel were not yet in the country. Furthermore, responsibility for relations with voluntary agencies within the Administration had been placed in the Welfare Division, and the development and enforcement of policies in this field suffered from the general weakness of this Division. Only in the summer of 1945 when Leonard L. Henninger was appointed in the Bureau of Services at Headquarters and Sir Michael Creagh in the Department of Relief Services at ERO to head the work with voluntary agencies was this established on a firm basis within the Administration. Gradually thereafter the Welfare Divisions within the missions built up, through their contacts with voluntary agency representatives in the field, a mutual coöperation which reflected and reinforced the increasing coöperation at their headquarters.

In several of the UNRRA member countries national boards were set up to coördinate the wartime activities of voluntary societies planning relief work in war-stricken areas. Some of these, such as the President's War Relief Control Board and the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Relief, in the United States, and the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad (COBSRA), antedated UNRRA; others, namely, the Council of Canadian Voluntary Societies Assisting UNRRA, the Australian Council for UNRRA, the New Zealand Council of Organizations for Relief Services Overseas, and the South African Council of Voluntary Agencies, were established by the respective governments at the suggestion of UNRRA

and were specifically planned to assist the UNRRA program.⁴ With all these Councils the Administration worked closely.

Coöperation between the voluntary agencies and UNRRA fell roughly into four types: secondment or loan of agency personnel directly to UNRRA; development of supplementary projects by agencies working in UNRRA receiving countries; contributions of supplies by agencies direct to UNRRA or for special groups or areas in UNRRA countries; establishment of joint planning committees or councils with agency, UNRRA, and government membership in receiving countries.

In the early days of UNRRA the Administration tended to regard the voluntary agencies primarily as a valuable source of trained and experienced personnel in the fields of health and social welfare,⁵ and to seek the loan or secondment of such staff for service in actual UNRRA operations as so-called "Class III" personnel. Under the arrangements eventually worked out, the voluntary agencies paid the salaries of their workers on loan, while UNRRA provided accommodations and maintenance, free medical service, and transportation to and from the country in which the worker was stationed.⁶ Most of the UNRRA-country agreements⁷ stated that provisions relating to "administration personnel" should be understood as including "employees of non-indigenous voluntary relief societies working under the authority of the Administration."

The majority of the staff of the Middle East displaced persons camps, aside from British military personnel, were, until the arrival of UNRRA recruits late in 1944, drawn from voluntary societies such as the Friends Ambulance Unit (United Kingdom), British Red Cross and COBSRA societies, Near East Foundation (United States), Mennonite Central Committee (United States), South African Women's

⁴ See Welfare Division, HQ, minutes, staff meetings, 1944, *passim*; Welfare Division, HQ, report for three weeks ending 15 July 1944, report for week ending 22 July 1944; Standing Technical Committee on Welfare (TWE) (45)7, 12-14.

⁵ For example, letter, Erwin Schuller (National Council of Social Services, United Kingdom) to Mary Craig McGeachy (Director, Welfare Division, HQ), 3 January 1944; memo, James Brown (Welfare Division, HQ) to McGeachy, 22 April 1944.

⁶ Conditions of Service, 11 November 1944; TWE(45)40, 1 June 1945.

⁷ Usually Article V, except those with the Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSR where no foreign voluntary agencies were working. The omission of such a section in the agreement with Poland was subsequently rectified by an exchange of letters, see *infra*, Appendix Seven, Documents 12b, c.

Auxiliary Services, and the Greek and Yugoslav Red Cross societies. Many of these workers were, in fact, already in the field when the responsibility for the Middle East camps was transferred from the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration to UNRRA. With the dissolution of the Balkan Mission and the start of UNRRA operations in Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, and the Dodecanese, most of these agency personnel continued for some months on loan to UNRRA in these new areas. In the UNRRA Displaced Persons Operations in Germany seconded agency personnel formed a large percentage of the UNRRA staff, while in China many of the so-called "program personnel" loaned to CNRRA came from foreign voluntary societies. In March 1946, peak month for employment of Class III personnel in European missions,⁸ 1,165 were serving in Displaced Persons Operations in Germany, 242 in Greece, 75 in Italy, compared with 5,111, 215, and 162 directly recruited UNRRA personnel (Class I) in like fields of service.⁹

While secondment, particularly in the Displaced Persons Operations in Germany, continued throughout the life of UNRRA, the attachment of additional Class III personnel was officially ended on 31 August 1946.¹⁰ Indeed, for more than a year prior to that date emphasis had been shifting to the development of projects supplementary to the UNRRA health and welfare programs, to be carried on in UNRRA countries by the agencies directly.¹¹ In connection with such services UNRRA assisted in the necessary arrangements with receiving governments, including obtaining when possible the same privileges and immunities accorded to UNRRA personnel; and facilitated outward and homeward transport of personnel and shipment of supplies needed for the projects.¹² In many cases, also, the UNRRA missions provided rations, billeting, medical services, trucks, and gasoline, sometimes against reimbursement.¹³

In developing supplementary projects Headquarters and ERO not only evaluated relief plans suggested by the agencies but spent much

⁸ In so far as records are available.

⁹ "Statistics—European Region," Vol. I.

¹⁰ HQ Administrative Order 92, Supplement 11, 19 August 1946.

¹¹ Plans based on "Memo on the Relationship between UNRRA and Voluntary Relief Organizations Not Indigenous to Areas of UNRRA Operations," accepted by American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Relief, 7 July 1944.

¹² Administrative Order 75, 11 September 1945.

¹³ Notably in Austria.

effort in encouraging the missions to select pressing needs and persuade appropriate agencies to meet them. Theoretically, each agency made a formal agreement with UNRRA for each supplementary project undertaken. This involved the submission by the agency of a detailed description of the proposed plan, with the approval of the home government (in the United States, the President's War Relief Control Board¹⁴ or the American Council of Voluntary Societies served as an accrediting board), the approval of the government or authority in control of the area in which the project was to be carried out, the approval of the UNRRA mission chief, and of UNRRA Headquarters for the United States agencies and ERO for European societies.¹⁵ In actuality, the practice was anything but uniform. In some countries, notably Poland and Czechoslovakia, the governments preferred to keep the control of foreign voluntary agencies in their own hands, and UNRRA was given no opportunity to advise regarding their admission. In other countries, such as Greece, the UNRRA mission often made its own agreements without prior reference to ERO or Headquarters.¹⁶ In China, Headquarters made no effort to control the activities of voluntary agencies, the whole responsibility for determining the nature, scope, and location of their work having been placed on CNRRA by the June 1945 "Principles of Coöperation among CNRRA, UNRRA, and Foreign Voluntary Agencies."

The most complex situation in relation to the agencies existed in Germany where some thirty foreign voluntary agencies worked under the varying regulations of United States, United Kingdom, and French military authorities. In the summer of 1944, General Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, had given the responsibility for civilian relief, including displaced persons, to the American and British Red Cross societies. Both had promptly provided substantial relief supplies and had put a considerable number of teams into the field, the British Red Cross supplementing its own personnel with

¹⁴ Succeeded after 10 July 1946 by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid which exercised a less complete control.

¹⁵ Material Furnished by UNRRA to Preparatory Commission for International Refugee Organization, Voluntary Agency Agreements with UNRRA, document 126F; European Regional Office (ERO) Administration Order A.164, 17 November 1945; memo, Marjorie Bradford (Central Headquarters, Germany) to Hansi Pollak (Welfare Officer, British Zone, Germany), 27 February 1946.

¹⁶ Office of Voluntary and International Agency Liaison (OVIAL) file, Supplementary Agreements, Greece, *passim*.

teams from some of the British societies belonging to COBSRA.¹⁷ In administrative memoranda¹⁸ issued subsequent to the SCAEF Agreement of 25 November 1944, SHAEF delegated to UNRRA the responsibility of serving as agent for the military authorities in designating, subject to military approval, the voluntary agencies to work with displaced persons in Germany. This arrangement was subsequently confirmed in the UNRRA Agreements with the occupying authorities of the three Western zones.¹⁹

Following the designation by SHAEF of UNRRA as its agent in dealing with voluntary agencies, the American Red Cross withdrew its personnel. The British Red Cross teams, however, remained in the British Zone, working independently of UNRRA until a formal agreement was achieved on 8 November 1945 by which UNRRA assumed operational control while leaving administrative control to the British societies.²⁰ Many of the Red Cross societies of other countries—France, Belgium, the Netherlands, etc.—working in Germany tended to show a similarly independent attitude.²¹

UNRRA's task in dealing with voluntary societies in Germany and Austria was also complicated by the political stresses of its member governments. Since, for example, the Polish Red Cross (London) was undeniably working against repatriation (the major objective of UNRRA in its displaced persons operations²²), and after 5 July 1945 no longer enjoyed the support of the Polish Government recognized by most of the member governments of UNRRA, the Administration fought a lengthy and eventually successful battle to oust that organization from UNRRA-operated camps in Germany²³ and Austria.²⁴

¹⁷ Sir Michael Creagh, (Department of Relief Services, ERO) "Report on Visit to Germany," 4 September 1945.

¹⁸ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force [SHAEF] "Eclipse" Memorandum 14, 28 December 1944; SHAEF Administrative Memorandum 39 (revised), Appendix G, 7 May 1945; see *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section V, Document 1.

¹⁹ See Appendix Five, Documents 3-5.

²⁰ "Report on Voluntary Societies in British Zone," 4 December 1945.

²¹ Monograph, W. S. Boe, "Voluntary Agencies, United States Zone, Germany," Part I, p. 3.

²² See Part Seven, Chapter II, Section 6.

²³ Agreement reached March 1946 with two months allowed for liquidation, monograph, "Voluntary Societies in United Kingdom Zone, Germany," June 1946; monograph, Boe, "Voluntary Agencies, United States Zone, Germany," Part III, p. 6.

²⁴ Removed by the military authorities in August 1946, monograph, "United States Zone Headquarters—Relations with Other Organizations, Austria," 1D.

It was succeeded by the Polish Red Cross (Warsaw). Similarly, the United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America and the United Ukrainian American Relief Committee were not approved by UNRRA (nor indeed by the United States State Department) because their political activities were not acceptable to some UNRRA member governments although the zonal authorities had approved their program.²⁵

The situation in Austria was also complicated by the presence of the four occupying military authorities constituting the Allied Council, which kept in its own hands the conduct of displaced persons operations. No formal agreements on this aspect of relief were ever achieved between UNRRA and the United States, United Kingdom, and French authorities in whose zones the displaced persons camps were situated. By an informal understanding, however, the United States zonal authorities recognized only those voluntary agencies working with displaced persons under UNRRA approval. Official clarification of UNRRA's right to coördinate voluntary agencies doing general relief work in Austria did not come until 30 August 1946, so late in the life of UNRRA that the Mission preferred to leave the responsibility with the Austrian Government, which would ultimately have to assume it in any case. The Mission had, however, with the approval of the Allied Council, already signed conditional agreements with several agencies and continued to furnish various services in facilitating travel, clearance, billeting, etc.²⁶

UNRRA also made arrangements with the voluntary societies to handle the relief supplies which they contributed. Goods given outright to UNRRA for use as the Administration might choose or for a specific country without designation as to area or type of recipient were shipped free of cost by UNRRA from the loading port. In theory, although many exceptions were made, UNRRA assumed no costs or responsibility for shipment of supplies consigned to a particular group or area or for a specific supplementary project, but aided by authorizing space within ships carrying UNRRA goods.²⁷ Agencies

²⁵ Letter, Florence Black (OVIAL) to Charles S. Miller (Director, Welfare Division, Austria Mission), 6 December 1946; monograph, Boe, "Voluntary Agencies, United States Zone, Germany," Part III, p. 11.

²⁶ Letter, Miller to Black, 24 October 1946.

²⁷ Administrative Order 23 (revised), 12 June 1945.

were under no obligation to go through UNRRA in the shipment of supplies, but experience demonstrated the value of UNRRA's services.

The Administration both in Headquarters and ERO and in the missions endeavored to assess the needs of special groups for supplies and to stimulate the agencies to respond. Many of the larger agencies, indeed, spent far more on relief supplies than on services. No reliable estimate is available of the total contributed by voluntary agencies in UNRRA receiving countries, but the amount must have run to many millions of dollars. In Germany, for example, the amenity supplies²⁸ from foreign voluntary agencies exceeded the total provided by UNRRA, while in Hungary and Finland the total value of voluntary agency supplies was considerably larger than the limited UNRRA emergency programs.

Least-publicized aspect of UNRRA's relations with voluntary agencies, but perhaps the most valuable in its lasting effects, was the development of permanent organizational machinery for coöperation between government ministries of health and social welfare, indigenous private charitable organizations, and foreign voluntary societies. UNRRA staff were not only active in the formation or expansion of such committees or councils and took part in their deliberations during the life of UNRRA, but attempted from the beginning to set up organizations which might continue effectively after the UNRRA program was ended. Thus a Coördinating Committee of Foreign Voluntary Agencies was established in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, and in the three Western zones of Germany; a joint committee on child care was set up in Poland; the Dodecanese Welfare Association was formed to administer the expenditure of proceeds of sale of UNRRA supplies after the withdrawal of the UNRRA Mission; a Government committee of indigenous voluntary societies in Hungary was expanded at the instance of UNRRA to include UNRRA staff and foreign voluntary agency representatives;²⁹ in China, in October 1946, a National Clearing Committee was organized with a membership of UNRRA, CNRRA, CLARA (Communist Liberated Areas Relief Administration), the Ministry of Social Affairs, and most of

²⁸ Used in the UNRRA sense to include all items outside the basic supplies provided by the military authorities—equipment for vocational training, educational and recreational activities, as well as candy, cigarettes, food packages, and personal comforts.

²⁹ See Part Five, Chapter VI, Section 8; Chapter X, Section 5; Chapter XIV.

the foreign voluntary agencies, for the purpose of coördinating relief activities and ensuring the equitable distribution of CNRRA relief supplies.³⁰ Even in countries where no such formal committees were achieved, UNRRA, the governmental authorities concerned, and foreign voluntary agency representatives met frequently on an informal basis, and it was hoped that the habits of coöperation, which had become more firmly fixed during the UNRRA period, might continue thereafter.

More than 125 agencies from some 20 countries or of international membership coöperated with UNRRA on one or more of the bases described above.³¹ Large voluntary societies which conducted programs in virtually all the UNRRA receiving countries, as well as in some cases loaning personnel to UNRRA, included the Friends Ambulance Unit (United Kingdom), Friends Relief Service (United Kingdom), and American Friends Service Committee; the National Catholic Welfare Conference (United States) and the Catholic Committee for Relief Abroad (United Kingdom); various country units of the Save the Children Fund; Don Suisse (Switzerland); American Joint Distribution Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine; the International, United States, United Kingdom, and Canadian Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations. Red Cross societies of many European countries also furnished supplies, tracing teams, and medical aid to their displaced nationals scattered about Europe, while the International Red Cross and the American Red Cross provided relief supplies for distribution by indigenous Red Cross societies as well as conducting their own relief projects. The British Red Cross and the COBSRA societies, in addition to their work with displaced persons in Germany, operated in several UNRRA countries.

Other agencies confined themselves to relief for a specific country; for example, American Relief for Italy, which supplied food and clothing for distribution by the Italian organization ENDSI (Ente Nazionale Distribuzione Soccorsi Italia), medical supplies for certain hospitals and welfare institutions, and conducted a supplementary feeding program for children and vocational training centers in co-

³⁰ Monograph, J. Lawrence Burkholder, "National Clearing Committee (China)."

³¹ Few detailed accounts of the work of foreign voluntary agencies appear in UNRRA files since these programs were not a direct responsibility of the Administration.

operation with the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations; the Greek War Relief Association (United States), which supported mobile and semipermanent medical clinics, continued the child-feeding program initiated by the Swiss Red Cross during the German occupation, coöperated with the Greek Government in establishing welfare centers and registration of homeless children in each province (*nomos*), developed nurse-training programs, and sent through UNRRA several thousand cattle to replenish the depleted livestock of Greece; and the many organizations for aid to China, coöordinated in the United Kingdom by British United Aid to China, in Canada by the Chinese War Relief Fund of Canada, and in the United States by United Service to China (formerly United China Relief), which gave generously a variety of supplies and services.

The first foreign voluntary agencies to sign an agreement with UNRRA for a supplementary project in an UNRRA receiving country³² were the Unitarian Service Committee and the Congregational Christian Service Committee which together conducted a medical nutritional survey in Italy jointly with UNRRA. Under this plan a team of doctors, nurses, and laboratory technicians carried on for one year an experimental feeding program for malnourished children in six areas in Italy, evaluated the general feeding program in terms of dietary deficiencies, and assisted local medical groups in the application and development of medical nutrition in their communities.

A series of contributions which typify the keen personal concern shown by the millions of donors to voluntary agencies was made through the Brethren Service Committee (United States).³³ This group, predominantly small farmers, gave several hundred choice breeding cattle from their herds and sent them overseas to Poland, Ethiopia, Greece, and Czechoslovakia, accompanied by their own trained veterinarians. They also contributed six fine bulls to Greece for use in artificial insemination, collected contributed clothing which was carefully sorted and mended by volunteer labor before shipment, and carried on such projects as child welfare and feeding programs in Italy, a medical program in Ethiopia, and the provision of experts

³² Although the text was agreed between the two agencies and the Administration in November 1944, the agreement did not go into effect until the UNRRA Agreement with Italy had been signed, 31 March 1945; letter, Lehman to Charles R. Joy (Executive Director, Unitarian Service Committee), 23 April 1945.

³³ Aided by the Mennonite Church and the Evangelical and Reformed Church.

in tractor operation for training programs in Poland and China, in coöperation with UNRRA.

Many agencies worked with UNRRA in the care of children, particularly in supplying and administering school lunches and other supplementary feeding programs (for example, Save the Children Fund societies of many countries and American Relief for Czechoslovakia), and in supporting orphanages and children's clinics and welfare centers (Don Suisse village housing 5,000 children near Warsaw; War Relief Services of National Catholic Welfare Conference in Italy). Supplementary feeding programs for special groups, such as expectant and nursing mothers, hospital patients, and the aged (International Red Cross and American Red Cross parcels and bulk supplies to many countries; Danish Red Cross in Poland) were also numerous. Health programs sponsored by voluntary agencies were particularly varied, including, for example, a field bacteriological unit of the Friends Ambulance Unit and a Don Suisse orthopedic hospital in Yugoslavia; provision by Swiss and Swedish agencies of convalescent treatment for displaced persons from concentration camps and tubercular children from Poland and other countries; the American Unitarian Service Committee's traveling team of medical lecturers in Poland and Czechoslovakia; and the medical teams and mobile clinics supplied by several agencies to the Displaced Persons Operations in Germany.

Quite as valuable as the provision of basic relief was the restoration of mental health, morale, and the dignity of the individual achieved by recreational, spiritual, and vocational training programs. Illustrative of the first were the summer camps conducted by the International YMCA/YWCA for the displaced persons in Germany and Austria, and for young people in Greece and Poland, and the Swedish Inomeuopeisk Mission recreation home in Wrzeszcz, Poland, for poor mothers and children and university students. Religious services were provided: by such Jewish societies as the American Joint Distribution Committee and Vaad Hahtzala to displaced persons in Germany, Austria, Italy, and China; by the Roman Catholic agencies, and by the Protestant World Council of Churches and various denominational agencies to displaced persons and other groups in many countries. Guidance, training, and educational programs included the British Friends Relief Service resident training camp school for girls in Greece; the aid given by the World Student Relief to students in

many countries; and particularly the work among displaced persons in Germany by the British societies belonging to COBSRA, the American Friends Service Committee, American Christian Committee for Refugees, International Rescue and Relief Committee, the American Joint Distribution Committee, Jewish Agency for Palestine, Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad, and World ORT Union, which was aimed not only at preparing displaced persons for immediate employment but also at fitting them for self-support after repatriation or resettlement. In addition to personnel services, these agencies also generously provided the hand tools, sewing machines, findings, and educational materials which made such training possible.³⁴

In both Germany and Austria UNRRA acted for the United States Government in supervising the seven United States voluntary societies carrying out the United States Immigration Program for Displaced Persons, a tremendous task involving registering, screening, and solving legal intricacies.

Although the UNRRA and agency staffs who were obliged to cope with the administrative complexities of their various mutual arrangements often grumbled at the work involved, there can be no question but that the coöperative effort was in sum total advantageous to both parties and certainly to the recipients of aid. Many of the initial difficulties and delays were the natural concomitants of operations in devastated countries; others arose from a general lack of information as to what services UNRRA was prepared to provide and from UNRRA's early inability fully to carry out the coördinating responsibilities entrusted to it. In time, many of these handicaps were overcome, and both UNRRA and the agencies profited greatly from their mutual sharing of facilities, personnel, supplies, and plans. For the recipients of aid such coöperation meant a more even distribution of supplies and services and a better balanced provision for their multi-fold needs. The lot of the diverse groups in the displaced persons camps, especially in Germany, would in particular have been much harder without the many and varied relief programs carried through by the devoted efforts of the foreign voluntary agencies.³⁵

³⁴ See Part Seven, Chapter II, Section 10.

³⁵ See Central Committee (CC) (47) 11, Director General's Report to Central Committee under Resolution 112, 28 January 1947, for account of work of voluntary agencies with displaced persons, pp. 14-24, and Appendices B and C.