PART FIVE

The Field Operation in the European Region

I. The Balkan Mission and the Middle East Office

THE OFFICIAL Agreements reached early in April 1944 in Cairo marked for UNRRA the beginning of its first field operation, the Balkan Mission. The news of their signing was received with both relief and enthusiasm, particularly by the former members of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) serving on the UNRRA staff, who had seen relief projects which OFRRO had considered its province entrusted to other agencies [1] and had feared that a similar fate might be in store for UNRRA. To these apprehensions the Agreements put an end.

By an exchange of letters between the Director General and Lord Moyne, British Minister Resident in the Middle East, UNRRA took over from the United Kingdom Government the financial and administrative responsibility for the refugee camps hitherto administered by the United Kingdom Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA) and the less clearly defined duties of supervision of refugee movements in the Middle East, Africa, and India, and negotiation with governments in those areas for the reception of additional refugees.[2]

By the so-called "Cairo Agreement" of 3 April 1944, signed by Lehman and Major General I. T. P. Hughes, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (United Kingdom), and Brigadier General Benjamin F. Giles (United States), representing Allied Military Liaison (Balkans) (AML), pro-

[1] For example, the responsibility for the civilian relief program in Sicily which OFRRO had planned to undertake had been given to the American Red Cross, letters, Lehman to E. Reeseman Fryer (Chief, Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations [OFRRO] North Africa Mission), 14 July 1943; Lehman to Dean Acheson (United States Department of State [State]), 18 September 1943; Kenneth Dayton (Treasurer, HQ) Diary, 9 November 1943.

[2] Letters: Director General to Lord Moyne, 3 April 1944; Lord Moyne to Director General, 5 April 1944; see *infra*, Appendix Six, Section I, Document 1*c*, *d*. Except where otherwise indicated the account of the activities of the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA) is based on monograph, Elizabeth K. Simeon, "The Origin of the Balkan Mission."

vision was made for UNRRA's succession to MERRA as the civilian relief agency participating in the military relief program for the Balkans.[3]

These Agreements were the outcome of somewhat protracted negotiations initiated during the preceding summer as soon as it began to appear likely that UNRRA was to become an actuality. From that time on, the officials of MERRA and OFRRO looked toward the transfer of the duties of the former to the new international relief organization; [4] the small OFRRO staff in Cairo (presently transferred to the United States Foreign Economic Administration [FEA]) were in early October 1943 instructed to begin plans for relief operations in the Balkans; [5] the probability of transfer was recognized in the *Handbook* prepared in OFRRO for the United States Delegation to the First Session of the UNRRA Council; [6] and on 27 November 1943 Lehman raised the question officially with the United Kingdom Government.[7] There were, immediately thereafter, disquieting indications that UNRRA might, nevertheless, be excluded from relief operations in the Middle East and the Balkans. A direct request for personnel made by MERRA to the United States voluntary societies in December [8] seemed an ominous by-passing of UNRRA on the part of the United Kingdom Government, while the proposed Anglo-American Balkan Supply Center constituted another threat.[9] On 31 January 1944, however, the United Kingdom Government gave consent in principle to the transfer of MERRA functions to UNRRA; [10]

[3] The "Cairo Agreement" for Participation of UNRRA in Balkans—Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania—during Period of Military Responsibility, 3 April 1944; see *infra*, Appendix Six, Section I, Document 1*a*, *b*.

[4] Cairo Council of Voluntary Societies, minutes of meeting, 7 July 1943; letter, Lehman to Acheson, 13 September 1943; monograph, Simeon, "The Origin of the Balkan Mission," pp. 190, 209.

[5] Memo, Myres S. McDougal (OFRRO) to Lehman, 13 September 1943; cable, Washington to Cairo (Murray Latimer [OFFRO] to American Legation), 12 October 1943.

[6] State, *Handbook, United States Delegation* (First Session of the Council, Atlantic City, N.J., 1943), Section E, Document VII.

[7] Letters: Lehman to Colonel J. J. Llewellin (Council member for United Kingdom), 27 November 1943; Llewellin to Lehman, 27 November 1943.

[8] Airgrams: Lincoln MacVeagh (United States Minister to Greece in Cairo) to Greek War Relief A-33, 27 December 1943; Laird Archer (Acting Chief, OFRRO-FEA [Foreign Economic Administration] Office, Cairo) to Murray Latimer and James Landis (proposed head of Balkan Supply Center), 11 January 1944.

[9] Letter, Lehman to Ben Smith (UNRRA Council member for the United Kingdom), 30 December 1943.

[10] Letter, Ben Smith to Lehman, 31 January 1944.

and negotiations on details in London [11] and Cairo led to the April Agreements.[12]

The refugee camps for which UNRRA assumed direct responsibility were located in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, and had been established to care for the many thousands of Greeks and Dodecanesians driven from their homes by the German and Italian invasions in 1942 and 1943; Poles who came in two great waves by way of the USSR, Turkey, and Iran in 1942; and Yugoslav Partisans who began arriving via Italy early in 1944. A transit camp at Aleppo in Syria forwarded Greeks and Dodecanesians to the more permanent camps of Nuseirat, near Gaza in Palestine, and Moses Wells, a former Egyptian quarantine station for Mecca pilgrims, on the Suez Canal. Three new camps in Egypt sheltered the Yugoslavs: El Shatt, near the Canal; Khatatba,[13] on the desert road between Cairo and Alexandria; and Tolumbat, just outside Alexandria, which housed Yugoslav Royalists and political troublemakers from the Greek camps.[14]

MERRA had been a para-military organization. Although theoretically MERRA was a civilian establishment, most of its personnel, including the camp commandants, were seconded from the British Army. The Army also furnished the food and a good part of the clothing and medical supplies used in the camps. For the remainder of its personnel and supplies MERRA depended largely on foreign voluntary agencies, which acted in the main through the Cairo Council of Voluntary Societies, on the committees of which MERRA and the British Army were represented.

These arrangements UNRRA inherited,[15] with the understanding that military personnel were to be replaced by UNRRA staff as rapidly as possible.[16] Sir William Matthews, head of MERRA, became Chief of the UNRRA Balkan Mission with headquarters in

[11] Summarized in letter, A. W. G. Randall (United Kingdom Foreign Office [FO]) to Hugh Jackson (Deputy Director General, Regional Liaison, HQ), 8 March 1944; monograph, Simeon, "The Origin of the Balkan Mission," pp. 212–214.

[12] Monograph, Simeon, "The Origin of the Balkan Mission," pp. 207–227, 230–245.

[13] Khatatba was closed in November 1944; "Summary Report on Camps," 31 December 1944.

[14] In September 1944 the Yugoslav Royalists were moved to a new camp at El Arish, near to, and under the supervision of, Nuseirat, to make room for 800 mothers and children from El Shatt; Balkan Mission Report, August 1944; "Summary Report on Camps," 31 December 1944.

[15] Letter, Leith-Ross to FO, 28 June 1944.

[16] Letters: Lehman to Lord Moyne, 3 April 1944; Lord Moyne to Lehman, 5 April 1944.

Cairo.[17] The United Kingdom Government after some further parley agreed that the physical assets of MERRA should not be counted a charge against the United Kingdom contribution to UNRRA,[18] and sanctioned the continued provision of supplies to the camps by the Army with the understanding that UNRRA was to pay for them.[19]

As in the administration of the Middle East camps, so in the field of preoperational planning for the Balkans, UNRRA expected to follow in the footsteps of MERRA. The Cairo Agreement was intended to give official sanction to the admission of UNRRA to a share with the Allied military authorities in formulating and carrying out plans for civilian relief in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania so that UNRRA might be prepared to assume full responsibility for relief when the military period in each country should have come to an end. The Agreement was concluded with AML, an Anglo-American military establishment manned by army personnel and charged, among other tasks, with the planning and administering of civilian relief in the territories to be liberated. Largely with the hope of avoiding any hurt to the national sensibilities of the Balkan Allies, AML was made responsible for "advising" the Governments of Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania, rather than for exercising military government functions in their territories. Subordinate to AML were Military Liaison (ML) (Greece), ML (Yugoslavia), and ML (Albania).[20]

In negotiating the Agreement, Lehman resolutely resisted all efforts to integrate UNRRA personnel into the military organization, insisting instead that UNRRA serve as an agent of AML while maintaining intact its own chain of command.[21] In so far as the terms of the Cairo Agreement were specific and carried authority, he was successful. Actually, however, the Agreement left many questions unsettled and was, moreover, subject to the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS).

[17] As of 1 May 1944.

[18] Letters: Randall to H. Jackson, 17, 18 April 1944; Jackson to Randall, 18 April 1944; monograph, Simeon, "The Origin of the Balkan Mission," Appendices LV–LVII.

[19] Letter, Leith-Ross to FO, 28 June 1944.

[20] State, Dispatch 45 from Cairo, 4 February 1944; "History of the Civilian Supply Branch of the International Division [United States Army Service Forces]," pp. 238–240; cables: AMSME to FREEDOM, Algiers, AMSME 1641 (GAY2), 9 March 1944; AGWAR to FREEDOM, Algiers, CM-OUT-11915, 2552, 18 March 1944. The "A" of AML was dropped in October 1945, ML (Greece), "Final Progress Report," p. 7.

[21] Central Committee (CC) (44)9, memo, Director General to Central Committee, 19 April 1944 (Compilation of Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], I, 21–23).

Specifically, the Agreement provided that UNRRA, during the military period in Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania, under military control and subject to AML directives, would exercise immediate administrative supervision over UNRRA and voluntary agency personnel in undertaking:

(i) *Medical.* To prevent the spread of disease and to see that the best use is made of the technical equipment and stores that are being brought in, and render whatever practical medical assistance may be necessary.
(ii) *Relief.* To assist the local administrations in setting up Centres for the relief of those members of the population who are totally destitute and to provide so far as practicable necessary welfare services. To give assistance to displaced persons and aid in their return and repatriation.
(iii) *Supplies.* To determine the persons to whom and the media through which relief supplies shall be distributed, and to carry out the necessary supervision of distribution of supplies with a view of ensuring equitable distribution and endeavouring to limit black market and other irregular activities.
(iv) *Emergency Rehabilitation.* To assist in such emergency rehabilitation in agriculture, industry, transportation, public utilities and services as may be necessary to relief.

An Appendix to the Agreement gave AML's tentative estimate of UNRRA personnel required: a startling total of 1,005 (649 for Greece, 191 for Yugoslavia, 165 for Albania). This included voluntary society personnel already serving with MERRA but not UNRRA administrative and clerical staff. At the peak of UNRRA operations in these countries, 30 June 1946, there were only 748 Class I employees.

UNRRA has been criticized for concluding an agreement with an Anglo-American military organization, AML, as an abrogation of its international character. In theory as well as in practice, the Administration had no alternative if it was to work in the Balkans and to take part in preliminary planning and operations with the authority in actual command. Article VII of the Basic UNRRA Agreement specifically laid down that,

Notwithstanding any other provision herein contained, while hostilities or other military necessities exist in any area, the Administration and its Director General shall not undertake activities therein without the consent of the military command of that area, and unless subject to such control as the command may find necessary.

Resolution 1 further stipulated:

> In the case of a liberated area in which a government or recognized national authority does not yet exercise administrative authority, the Administration will operate from such a time and for such purposes as may be agreed upon between the military command and the Administration, and subject to such control as the military command may find necessary.

Unfortunately for UNRRA, CCS did not finally ratify the Cairo Agreement until 11 October 1944,[22] and it was not until 18 November that they approved the "Conditions of Service of UNRRA Personnel (Including Members of Voluntary Societies) Serving in the Balkans at the Request of the Military Authorities." This document prescribed details as to period of service, status, and security, and defined the respective obligations of UNRRA and the Anglo-American military authorities to provide accommodations, food, transport, medical services, clothing, etc., for the UNRRA employees specified.[23] It had been in negotiation between the United States War Department and the United Kingdom War Office for eight months and was only cleared when it was decided that United States forces were not to participate in the campaigns in the Balkans and that, for all practical purposes, the obligations outlined would rest on the United Kingdom military authorities.[24]

In the months before the Cairo Agreement and the Conditions of Service were ratified, the position of the Balkan Mission staff vis-à-vis AML was extremely uncertain. Not only were the physical arrangements for their subsistence in the field undetermined until after some of them had actually gone out from Cairo, but throughout the summer of 1944 the nature of the work which the Balkan Mission staff was to do with AML remained undefined. UNRRA could participate in joint planning only as a favor, not as a right, while the Allied military authorities had no official sanction for including UNRRA in their negotiations with the Balkan Governments represented in Cairo. The Mission staff had, moreover, to combat the various unacceptable interpretations put on the Agreement by AML, which extended even to

[22] See Appendix Six, Section I, Document 1*e*.

[23] See Appendix Six, Section I, Document 2.

[24] Memos: Alexander B. Hawes (General Counsel's Office) to H. Jackson, 18 October 1944; Keith Aickin (General Counsel's Office) to A. H. Feller (General Counsel), 31 October 1944; letters: Lehman to J. J. McCloy (United States Assistant Secretary of War), 3 November 1944; McCloy to Lehman, 6 November 1944.

a proposed complete integration of UNRRA personnel into the military relief units.[25] Indeed, even the official interpretation by CCS, while entirely satisfactory to the Administration, did not prevent the reintroduction of that idea by ML (Greece) a few months later.[26]

The Appendix to the Cairo Agreement was also the cause of much unnecessary trouble for UNRRA. Lehman had at the outset regarded as excessive the military authorities' estimate of the staff needed for relief operations in the Balkans, and had tended to discount it as a provisional figure.[27] During the summer and autumn of 1944, however, the military authorities, not only in Cairo, but in Washington, continued to press this upon the Administration as an essential target to be achieved with all possible speed.[28] The Administration by much effort came close to the goal by December 1944,[29] only to discover, as a result, that it had many unnecessary individuals on its hands in the Balkan Mission.

The Administration had promptly set about organizing the Balkan Mission as soon as the April Agreements were concluded, 1 May being set as the official date of its establishment. To the former MERRA staff and a nucleus inherited from the OFRRO North Africa Mission, who had continued in the Middle East on the FEA pay roll,[30] Washington and London began to add their own recruits and seconded foreign voluntary agency personnel.

The functions of the Balkan Mission were at the outset defined as: assisting the military authorities in formulating operating plans for the military period and in estimating and coördinating supply requirements therefor; formulating operating plans for the postmilitary period and estimating and coördinating supply requirements therefor; operat-

[25] See, for example, AML Directive, "Employment of UNRRA Personnel during the ML Relief Period," 29 August 1944.

[26] See Part Five, Chapter II, Section 2.

[27] The revised budget for the Balkan Mission, 20 April 1944, based on cable, Cairo to Washington 47 (Lehman to Salter), 7 April 1944, provided for 197 positions excluding health personnel.

[28] For example, cable, Algiers to United States War Department, 9 June 1944; memo, George Xanthaky (Chief, Southern European Division, Bureau of Areas) to Matthews, 15 June 1944, reporting an ultimatum from the Combined Civil Affairs Committee that all Balkan Mission personnel must be en route to Cairo by 23 August 1944.

[29] As of 31 December 1944, 805 were in the Middle East and 152 en route or awaiting transport, memo, "Organization of Balkan Mission."

[30] Letter, H. Sibley (FEA) to Michail A. Menshikov (Deputy Director General, Bureau of Areas, HQ), 12 February 1944; list of FEA-OFRRO personnel in Middle East, 7 April 1944.

ing the MERRA camps; and conducting appropriate training programs.[31] Direct control of the Mission was placed in Headquarters in the Southern European Division of the Bureau of Areas, although it was contemplated that control would eventually be delegated to the European Regional Office (ERO).[32]

The internal organization of the Balkan Mission was designed to accord with the sections of AML with which the Mission had to work, although some features characteristic of Headquarters and ERO were also included.[33] Thus there were, subordinate to the Balkan Mission, the Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania Mission, each with a chief of mission, three deputy chiefs of mission (Requirements Coördination and Supply, Distribution and Transport, Finance and Administration), and five Directors of functional divisions (Health, Welfare, Displaced Persons, Food and Agricultural Rehabilitation, Industrial Rehabilitation). These three quasi-independent Missions reported to the Chief of the Balkan Mission, Sir William Matthews, through a Senior Deputy Chief of Mission, Neville Miller, erstwhile Mayor of Louisville, Kentucky. The Balkan Mission proper had three parts: the Office of the Chief of Mission; five functional divisions; and the Camp Administration Division. Reporting directly to the Chief were a Financial Adviser, a Legal Adviser, a Public Relations Office, and a Special Assistant to the Chief.

Although this complex arrangement was, under the circumstances, necessary, it obviously required a strong administrative control if it was to work satisfactorily. This was unfortunately lacking. There was, in addition, a whole series of complicating factors. Former MERRA personnel, some of whom even in July 1944 had not yet been notified of their transfer to UNRRA,[34] tended to continue to use the methods and channels to which they were accustomed.[35] The Cairo Council of Voluntary Societies found the addition of UNRRA confusing and tended to regard the new personnel and regulations

[31] Memo, Menshikov to Matthews, 8 May 1944.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Memo, Menshikov to Matthews, 9 May 1944, enclosing "Administrative Plan for the Balkan Mission," 8 May 1944.

[34] Memo, Clarence M. Pierce (Balkan Mission) to Matthews, 3 August 1944, attached to memo, Pierce to Fred K. Hoehler (Director, Displaced Persons Division, HQ), 5 August 1944.

[35] Memo, Xanthaky to R. R. Brown (Bureau of Areas), 10 November 1944.

with suspicion.[36] Furthermore, UNRRA and voluntary agency personnel alike quickly absorbed the attitudes of mutual antagonism to be found in Cairo between the Americans and British. This feeling was augmented by widely varying salary scales, differing conditions of service for voluntary agency workers, and jealousy and misunderstanding between American specialists and British personnel with more general experience. Although representatives of ERO and the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad went to Cairo in July 1944 to attempt to resolve these antagonisms,[37] no real improvement took place until the staff moved into the field away from the Cairo influence. It is significant to note that this division along national lines did not occur elsewhere during the life of UNRRA. Disagreements there certainly were, but they cut across nationalities and generally concerned current work problems or were based on ideological rather than national differences.

During the summer of 1944 UNRRA Headquarters was itself, moreover, still feeling its way, and a paucity of instructions reached Cairo. No one seemed to take into account the slowness and uncertainty of wartime communications, and letters and cables were frequently delayed or lost.[38]

Because of military pressure, recruitment was largely based on the Appendix to the Cairo Agreement which did not provide for administrative or clerical staff likely to be needed by the UNRRA Mission but not by the military authorities. The result was the dispatch of a large number of specialists in welfare, health, agricultural and industrial rehabilitation, and an alarming scarcity of administrative and financial officers competent to take care of the housekeeping and business end of the Mission.[39]

Furthermore, the personnel of the functional divisions, reflecting the attitude of their superiors in Headquarters, were little disposed to recognize the authority of other sections of the Mission; while the

[36] Matthews to Lehman, "Report on Balkan Mission, 1 June–31 July," 10 August 1944.

[37] Letter, Mary Craig McGeachy (Director, Welfare Division, HQ) to Fred E. Daniels (Welfare Division, ERO), 15 July 1944.

[38] For example, memo, Matthews to Kenneth Dayton (Treasurer, HQ), 7 December 1944; "Summary Report on Camps," 31 December 1944.

[39] Milton P. Siegel (Liquidator, Balkan Mission), "Report, Liquidation Balkan Mission," 13 May 1945, Section F, "Conclusions," p. 2.

three country Missions tended to act as units separate from the control of the supposedly coördinating Balkan Mission.

The Camps Operation Division also, for many months, worked semi-independently of the Balkan Mission proper, partly from choice while it was still headed by the erstwhile MERRA commandant, Brigadier Alexander Ross, and partly because its relations with the Mission were so ill defined that little attention was paid to its activities by the rest of the Cairo Office. As one result of this isolation the camps suffered throughout the second half of 1944 from a lack of staff. UNRRA and voluntary agency personnel were drawn into the three country Missions even though this meant that they sat in Cairo for months waiting for the Balkans to be opened to relief operations. Personnel to replace them were few. The attempt to use the camps as training centers meant a continually changing and always inexperienced staff.[40] The work of administration was done primarily by the seconded British Army personnel, by a few devoted UNRRA and voluntary agency workers, and, in some camps, by the refugees themselves.[41]

Another result of the anomalous status of the camps was the failure to supply them adequately in the winter of 1944–1945 with medical supplies and clothing for women and children. It is difficult to apportion the blame among the Camps Operation Division, the Balkan Mission Division of Requirements Coördination and Supply, the Bureau of Supply at Headquarters, and lost cables, but in any case the refugees suffered.[42]

Inevitably, some of the plans which were developed in the Balkan Mission during the summer and autumn of 1944 had little relation to the realities of actual relief operations. Not only were the UNRRA staff admitted to military information only as individual units of AML saw fit, but they were also cut off from direct dealings with the Balkan Governments by the delayed ratification of the Cairo Agreement by CCS. They were consequently dependent on such scraps of information about the occupied areas as they could pick up from un-

[40] Memo, B. V. Novelli (Medical Officer) to Dr. W. E. Brown (Director, Health Division, Balkan Mission), 1 August 1944.

[41] Notably at El Shatt.

[42] Memos: R. L. Brown (Camps Division, Bureau of Areas) to Menshikov, 16 December 1944; Carolin L. Flexner (Camps Division, Bureau of Areas) to Menshikov, 12 March 1945.

official sources. Most work was accomplished by the Greece Mission in coöperation with ML (Greece), but the interests of the military authorities centered on the short-range problems of health, emergency housing, and mass feeding which they expected soon to face, and this was of little help toward planning for UNRRA's long-range work in the postmilitary period. Not being restricted to facts, the planners were sometimes inclined to foresee for UNRRA a more dominant and active role than, finally, the receiving Governments in the Balkans proved willing to allow. Thus the Albania Mission in early December 1944 produced an "Over-all Operational Plan" which included a detailed section on health premised on 21 UNRRA personnel and 116 voluntary agency personnel.[43] Ultimately, the Albanian Government accepted the services of one UNRRA medical officer.

By November 1944 the senior officials in Washington and ERO had come to the conclusion that the Balkan Mission, as originally conceived and organized, had achieved its purpose.[44] The advance guard of the Greece Mission had now entered Greece; groups from the Yugoslavia and Albania Missions had gone to Bari and Ruvo di Puglia in Italy following the removal thither of AML and its subsidiary units, ML (Yugoslavia) and ML (Albania); and a small contingent from the Balkan Mission had joined Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) at Caserta to maintain liaison on supply matters. After considerable discussion, in which Matthews joined during a visit to London, it was decided that no useful purpose would be served by maintaining a subregional office to supervise these groups now that they had gone into the field. Headquarters was, moreover, gradually approaching a decision to delegate to ERO administrative authority over the Middle East as well as the European missions, and no additional administrative layer seemed practicable.[45]

By January 1945 the basic steps had been agreed: completing of the separate organization of the Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania Missions; liquidation of the Balkan Mission as such; retention of an office in Cairo to run the camps, administer the repatriation of their occupants and other displaced persons in the area, and handle supply procurement

[43] Albania Mission, report for week ending 17 December 1944.

[44] For example, Acting Director General Hendrickson's meetings with senior staff, 17, 30 November, 1 December 1944.

[45] Telephone conversation, HQ with ERO, 5 December 1944; notes on meetings of Administrative Council, 8, 13 December 1944.

in the Middle East.[46] In March, the three Missions were declared independent with lines running back to Headquarters through ERO.[47] Matthews was released to the United Kingdom Government, which had requested his services,[48] and on 14 March Colonel H. Van Zile Hyde, on loan to UNRRA from the United States Public Health Service, became Chief of the Middle East Office.

Under Colonel Hyde, and Brigadier T. T. Waddington who succeeded him on 24 July 1945, the Middle East Office had initially to struggle with its heritage from the Balkan Mission. Of the large total of personnel whom the Allied military authorities had requested, 144 UNRRA personnel and several voluntary society teams had not yet been assigned to one of the three country Missions. These had to be fitted somehow into the Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania Missions, sent to the displaced persons camps in Italy and Germany, returned to ERO or Washington for possible utilization as other countries opened up, or, as a last recourse, their service was terminated.[49] Requiring attention also were chaotic or incomplete personnel and accounting records, inconsistent financial and salary policies, and haphazard or diverse supply arrangements.

The Middle East Office did not, however, merely perform residual Balkan Mission work.[50] It assisted in securing a contribution from the Egyptian Government. It carried on complex and continuing negotiations with the Egyptian Government on the Administration's use of land and property belonging to the Government and their mutual concern with the refugees of the Middle East camps. Quietly and efficiently it administered the camps and, as soon as the close of the war in Europe permitted, began the repatriation of their occupants. Working closely with the Allied military authorities, who provided the necessary transport, the Middle East Office organized each successive group, sending "flight teams" to watch over their welfare till they were safely landed on their native soil. In 1946 the responsibility

[46] Cable, Washington to Cairo 21, 3 January 1945; memo, Lehman to Chief, Balkan Mission, "Directive Relating to the Purpose and Scope of the UNRRA Balkan Mission, Its Relation to the Country Missions, and Its Disestablishment," 6 February 1945.

[47] Middle East Office, Fortnightly Report for 14–31 March 1945.

[48] Letter, A. D. Marris (United Kingdom Embassy in Washington) to Lehman, 2 March 1945.

[49] Siegel, "Report, Liquidation Balkan Mission," 13 May 1945, Section B, "Personnel."

[50] This section is largely based on monograph, Paul Rowland, "History of the Middle East Office."

for repatriating 33,000 Poles, and some special classes of displaced persons living outside camps in various parts of Africa, India, and Palestine, was also accepted by UNRRA, and this work fell to the Middle East Office. By 30 June 1947 a total of 53,966, including refugees inside and outside camps, had been repatriated.

The procurement of supplies in the area was also a not inconsiderable part of the work of the Middle East Office. It not only procured locally goods needed for the camps but also secured throughout the region such supplies for the UNRRA supply operation as ERO requested, notably Egyptian cotton, and arranged for transshipment of UNRRA supplies. As of 30 July 1947, the total shipments handled by the Middle East Office, excluding the Egyptian contribution, totaled 232,400 gross freight tons:

TABLE 19

UNRRA SUPPLIES SHIPPED BY MIDDLE EAST OFFICE
(Exclusive of Egyptian Contribution)

Source	*Tons*
Balkan Stockpile	29,000
Bulk procurement	72,000
ERO purchases	57,000
Middle East Office surpluses	3,000
Miscellaneous	1,000
Procurement from British Army	2,000
United States Military surpluses	6,400
United Kingdom Military surpluses	12,000
Transshipments	50,000
Total	232,400

The UNRRA operations in Cairo, which had at first been so unfortunately marred by delays and had been for the Administration the cause of bitter criticism, became so well ordered and efficiently administered that few people outside UNRRA were aware that an office was still being maintained in the Middle East. The closure of the office, somewhat postponed by continued efforts to complete procurement of Egyptian cotton, was effected on 30 June 1947.

II. Greece

1. *THE GREEK BACKGROUND*

IN THE best of circumstances, conditions in Greece are not good. It is a small country, somewhat smaller than North Carolina or Arkansas,[1] with a population just over 7 million.[2] Its density of population, though somewhat less than that of some Continental European countries, is relatively high—much higher, for example, than that of the Scandinavian and Baltic countries and the USSR—and over four times that of the United States.[3] It is a poor country with meager resources. About 60 per cent of the population earn their living by agriculture, but not much more than 20 per cent of the land is suitable for cultivation.[4] Acres of arable land per head amount only to 1.31 compared with 3.34 in France, 5.36 in the United Kingdom, 17.03 in the United States, and the world average of 1.90.[5] The country is completely dependent on imports (which before the war amounted to about 20 per cent of national income, a greater percentage than in the case of the United Kingdom, one of the major importing countries of the world);[6] over one third of the country's bread grains (which

[1] *Annuaire statistique de la Grèce 1939* (Athens [1940]), p. 3; *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1947* (Washington, D.C., [1947]), p. 3.

[2] *Annuaire statistique de la Grèce 1939*, p. 30. The population of North Carolina is about 3,570,000 and of Arkansas about 1,950,000, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1947*, pp. 6–7.

[3] *Annuaire statistique de la Grèce 1939*, p. 513.

[4] "Application of the Greek Government to the Director General of the UNRRA for the Determination of the Capacity of Greece to Pay," p. 2. "The useful agricultural land . . . is . . . 25 per cent of the total area. This is the full extent of all lands, whether potential or in current use, available for the production of food," Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), *Report of the FAO Mission for Greece* (Washington, D.C., 1947), p. 85.

[5] *Report of the FAO Mission for Greece*, p. 155.

[6] "Application of the Greek Government to the Director General of the UNRRA for the Determination of the Capacity of Greece to Pay," p. 6. For import figures, League of Nations, *Europe's Trade* (Geneva, 1941), p. 83; for the United Kingdom national income, *National Income and Expenditure of the United Kingdom 1935–1946* (London, 1947); the Greek prewar national income estimated in the application cited above, p. 4, to be $400 million, and in memo, Nicholas Anagnostopoulos (Greek Government) to George Xanthaky (Bureau of Areas, HQ), 26 August 1944, to be $462 million "as computed by the Supreme Economic Council," has here been assumed to be $500 million.

constituted more than 60 per cent of a meager diet hardly amounting to 2,300 calories per day per person) [7] were normally imported.[8] Health levels were low. Malaria was an especial scourge; the number affected never sank below 1 million and sometimes rose above 2 million.[9]

Though war damage was perhaps less obvious and spectacular than in some other countries (there were no Warsaws or Stalingrads or Hamburgs), the economic effect of the war was little short of disastrous. Most of the facilities of the fully modernized port of Piraeus, which handled about 59 per cent of 1936–1939 imports,[10] were destroyed. Not a single railroad line was left intact, and only 618 out of 7,810 engines and rolling stock survived.[11] Of about 18,000 motor vehicles hardly any remained.[12] Nearly 1,000 bridges (in addition to railroad bridges) were destroyed.[13] A merchant fleet of 1,900,000 tons (the ninth largest in the world) was reduced to just over 500,000.[14] Almost all tractors were lost.[15] Many villages were obliterated, and homes for about 1,500,000 (over one fifth of the total population) of the rural population were destroyed.[16] The value of property damaged or lost (a catalogue of which could be extended almost endlessly) has been estimated [17] at various figures from $2,000 to $8,400 million. If adjusted to the relative sizes of prewar national incomes, the lowest of these estimates would be equivalent to $280,000 million in the United States.[18]

[7] "Application of the Greek Government to the Director General of the UNRRA for the Determination of the Capacity of Greece to Pay," p. 5.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 6; United Nations, *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe* (Geneva, 1948), p. 169.

[9] "Application of the Greek Government to the Director General of the UNRRA for the Determination of the Capacity of Greece to Pay," p. 3.

[10] *Annuaire statistique de la Grèce 1939*, pp. 151–152.

[11] Bank of Greece, *The Economic Situation in Greece and the Bank of Greece in 1946, Report for the Years 1941, 1944, 1945, and 1946* (Athens, 1948), p. 94.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 95–96. [13] *Ibid.*, p. 97. [14] *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.

[15] "Application of the Greek Government to the Director General of the UNRRA for the Determination of the Capacity of Greece to Pay," p. 20.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 33.

[17] The lower figure is given in a memorandum submitted to UNRRA by K. Varvaressos (Minister of Finance, Greece), 18 September 1945; the higher figure was accepted at the Paris Conference on Reparations. Neither figure includes pensions, loss of productive capacity, etc., but the higher figure does include occupation expenses, etc.; see *Report of the FAO Mission for Greece*, p. 7, and Operational Analysis Papers (OAP) 25, *Post-War Public Finance in Greece* (London, 1947), p. 1. It should be recalled that all governments tend to overestimate war damage.

[18] The United States national income in 1937 was $71,513 million, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1947*, p. 269.

This physical damage was by no means the only or even the most adverse effect of the war: at least as serious was the extreme dislocation of the established patterns. After being cut off from its normal economic relations with the world and subjected to harsh occupation for three and a half years, Greece, on liberation, found its normally heavy need for imports augmented by the accumulated demand of the war years; yet its means for paying for these essential imports were largely gone. Before 1940 about 60 per cent of its foreign exchange [19] was derived from exports, about one third of which had gone to Germany; [20] somewhat less than 20 per cent from emigrant remittances, which had been declining [21] and were totally interrupted by the war; and about 10 per cent from shipping, three quarters of which had been lost. From 40 to 50 per cent of imports [22] had been supplied by Germany, the United Kingdom, and Rumania; two of these countries could no longer supply any, and one only on a reduced scale. Over-all agricultural production had declined to 40 per cent [23] of prewar levels; industrial production, to 10 per cent.[24] Internal land transport was gone. Even more serious, because before 1946 more internal traffic had moved by water than by land, over 70 per cent of coastal shipping had been lost.[25] Since, with rare exceptions, ocean-going vessels had to discharge their cargo at Piraeus or Salonika, the loss of coastal shipping enormously complicated the distribution problem. The occupation had, furthermore, ruined national finances. By April 1944 note circulation was 1,400 times greater than before the war; by October 1944 more than 2 million times.[26] Prices had increased even more.[27] In this respect, Greece suffered more than any other European nation.[28] Government revenue, 25 per cent of which had

[19] League of Nations, *Balance of Payments 1937* (Geneva, 1938), p. 113.

[20] *Annuaire statistique de la Grèce 1939*, p. 150.

[21] "Application of the Greek Government to the Director General of the UNRRA for the Determination of the Capacity of Greece to Pay," pp. 10–12.

[22] *Annuaire statistique de la Grèce 1939*, p. 150.

[23] United Nations, *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe*, p. 11; "Application of the Greek Government to the Director General of the UNRRA for the Determination of the Capacity of Greece to Pay," p. 35.

[24] "Application of the Greek Government to the Director General of the UNRRA for the Determination of the Capacity of Greece to Pay," p. 36.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 31; United Nations, *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe*, p. 28.

[27] United Nations, *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe*, p. 28.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

been derived from import taxes,[29] declined drastically because of the cessation of imports and German exactions. Huge deficits inevitably resulted.

Serious as was the economic situation, the political was little if at all better. For some years before the war, the Metaxas dictatorship had stifled political growth and developed deep cleavages and resentments within the country. This dictatorship achieved, near its close, a measure of national respect and support by its gallant and successful conduct of resistance to the Italian invasion. The dictator himself died just as the Germans appeared. During the occupation, Greek resistance movements were as brave, energetic, and successful as those in other countries; unfortunately, however, they never coalesced into one national movement but remained as suspicious of each other as of the enemy. Attempts to create a truly national government—the only legal government necessarily stemmed from the remnants of the Metaxas regime—were never successful. There were many political parties; none with a really large following, none willing to work wholeheartedly with any other. Civil war broke out sharply in December 1944, only three months after liberation.

With the economy of the country ruined, with the political situation troubled, and the future uncertain, the Greeks, whether rich or poor, had little cause for hope and courage to make sacrifices and to build for the future. There seemed to be no reason to do more than make the most of the present, to collect currency in an easily negotiable form (gold), to hoard goods, to make as much money as quickly as possible.

2. *THE ROLE OF THE UNRRA MISSION*

Against this troubled background the Greek Government was the first nation to submit a formal request for UNRRA assistance. The Subcommittee on Ability to Pay had little difficulty in deciding to recommend that the country be considered unable to finance the import of relief supplies.[30] On 14 September 1944 the Director General formally declared Greece eligible for the receipt of UNRRA assistance.[31] Long before this date the Administration had begun prepara-

[29] *Annuaire statistique de la Grèce 1939*, pp. 318–320.

[30] Memo, Xanthaky to Michail A. Menshikov (Deputy Director General, Bureau of Areas, HQ), "Meeting, Subcommittee on Ability to Pay (Greece)," 30 August 1944.

[31] Declaration of Director General, 14 September 1944, issued on 16 March 1945.

tions for assistance. A Greece Mission, subordinate to the Balkan Mission, had been established as early as May 1944 to plan and prepare for activities after liberation.[32]

The Germans at last left Athens on 13 October 1944, and the Government returned to the capital on 18 October.[33] The first UNRRA representatives arrived on 23 October,[34] as agents of the military authorities.

Not until more than five months had passed did UNRRA become responsible for making available to Greece supplies and services needed for relief and rehabilitation. Nevertheless, this period was one of great importance in determining the future work of the Mission in Greece. The ML organization attached to Headquarters Land Forces Greece, British Army, was responsible for programming and delivering supplies during the so-called "military" period following liberation. An Agreement, reached on 24 November 1944, between the Greek and United Kingdom Governments, on questions concerning "Civil Administration, Jurisdiction and Relief Arising Out of Military Operations in Greek Territory" provided, among other things, that:

> 6. The Commander [of Land Forces, Greece] will bring supplies and provide relief to the distressed population of Greece at the earliest possible time and as far as resources permit. Relief supplies will be distributed in Greece under the general direction of the Commander in such manner as he may find necessary to ensure equitable distribution on a basis of need and without discrimination as to race, religion, nationality, or political belief.
>
> 17. In distributing supplies and otherwise providing relief, the Commander will use the services of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

At the same time, it was decided in negotiations between Major General I. T. P. Hughes, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. (United Kingdom), Brigadier General P. L. Sadler (United States), Sir William Matthews, and Hugh Jackson, both of UNRRA, and R. G. A. Jackson, then of the Middle East Supply Center, that:

> (i) UNRRA under top military direction will take over all activities connected with displaced persons and welfare, and will retain control of its own administration.

[32] See Part Five, Chapter I.

[33] Military Liaison (ML) (Greece), Final Progress Report (for period, D-Day to 31 March 1945), p. 14.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

(ii) UNRRA will fuse with the Supplies and Relief Branch of ML during the military period, with special interest in supply distribution and supply procurement.

(iii) ML re-affirms that its aim is to establish UNRRA at the earliest opportunity subject to the approval of Commander Land Forces Greece.[35]

This initiated an arrangement known as "integration" of UNRRA personnel with ML [36] and somewhat modified the Cairo Agreement which had provided that UNRRA personnel would perform special tasks allotted to them.[37]

On 3 December 1944 armed conflict broke out between the forces of the Greek Government and those of ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army), the military wing of EAM (National Liberation Front). The British troops were almost immediately drawn into the struggle. On 10 December the Chief of Mission informed ML that:

> We recognize that there is an armed insurrection against the Greek Government by a political group; AFHQ for whom we are acting as an agent is taking steps to quell this insurrection by force. We therefore as UNRRA are unavoidably associated with a regime of force and discrimination.
>
> We therefore feel our position as UNRRA is being prejudiced and we feel ourselves compelled to disassociate ourselves from the present activities of 3 Corps until the position has been clarified.[38]

In spite of this note the UNRRA officials were apparently surprised when, two days later, they were informed that UNRRA workers, along with other "unessential" civilians, would be evacuated from Greece.[39] Ultimately, a compromise was reached which permitted certain welfare workers and a few others to remain in Greece. Those who remained did valuable work during the fighting period by distributing medical supplies and food to those in need on both sides of the fighting line. The rest of the Mission, however, was returned to Cairo.[40]

[35] ML (Greece), Progress Report 4, 24 November 1944 to 1 December 1944.

[36] Cable, Cairo to Washington 59, 18 January 1945, and other cables of this period.

[37] See Part Five, Chapter I; Appendix Six, Section I, Document *1a*.

[38] Memo, Chief of Mission to Major General I. T. P. Hughes and Brigadier General P. L. Sadler (Supreme Allied Command, Mediterranean Theater of Operations [SACMED]), 10 December 1944.

[39] Memo, Chief of Mission to Hughes, 12 December 1944.

[40] ML (Greece), Final Progress Report, p. 13: "All UNRRA personnel who could not be usefully employed in the capital—this proved to be the majority—were evacuated by air on 18 and 19 December." Cable, Cairo to Washington 59, 18 January 1945: 40 remained in Athens, 40 evacuated to Cairo, 23 remained in other parts of Greece.

The Administration was disappointed by the withdrawal and almost immediately began to plan for a return.[41] The principal issue at first centered on the question of "integration," to which the bulk of the Mission was strongly opposed.[42] Though this point was never clearly settled, interest soon centered on the practical questions of return and takeover.[43] Mission personnel went back to Greece after the signing of the Varkizi Pact on 11 January 1945, which marked the end of active hostilities.[44] They did not officially reintegrate, but "close cooperation between ML and UNRRA officers was, however, resumed." [45]

From the beginning of the discussions among those concerned—ML in Greece; the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in Washington; UNRRA in Washington, Cairo, and Greece—it was assumed that the takeover date, that is, the date when UNRRA would assume complete responsibility for the relief supplies and services in Greece, would be 1 April 1945.[46] Negotiations were successfully concluded by early February and provided that: (1) UNRRA would assume responsibility on 1 April 1945; (2) ML would program and process for requirements for loading up to 1 June and UNRRA for supplies to arrive on 1 July and thereafter; (3) ML food and clothing in Greece, arriving after 1 April, would be turned over to UNRRA; (4) ML organizational stores and equipment used for relief purposes (this included, perhaps most important of all, trucks) would be turned over to UNRRA if wanted by UNRRA and if not required for military purposes; (5) ML personnel were to assist UNRRA at first and later to be seconded to UNRRA if wanted by UNRRA and if the Combined Civil Affairs Committee agreed to release them.[47]

Concurrently, the Administration had been conducting with the Greek Government negotiations which culminated in the signing of

[41] Cable, London (from Lehman) to Cairo 310, 21 December 1944.

[42] Cables: Cairo to Washington 858, 21 December 1944; London to Cairo 318, 24 December 1944; Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) to Mideast F80628 cite FHGEG, 7 January 1945; and others.

[43] Letter, Laird Archer (Chief, Greece Mission) to Matthews (Chief, Balkan Mission), 6 January 1945; cables: Washington to Cairo 28, 5 January 1945; Cairo to Washington 59, 18 January 1945; and others.

[44] ML (Greece), Final Progress Report, p. 13.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] Letter, Archer to Matthews, 6 January 1945, referring to conversations between Hughes and Sir Michael Creagh (Deputy Chief, Greece Mission); and subsequent letters and cables on this subject.

[47] Cable, Washington to Cairo 151, 6 February 1945.

an Agreement on 1 March 1945.[48] This Agreement was similar to those made with other receiving countries.[49] It paved the way for the assumption by the Administration of full responsibility for the relief program on 1 April 1945. It was, nevertheless, a disappointment to many members of the Mission because, in line with established policy, responsibility for distribution was vested in the Greek Government and not in UNRRA.[50] This contrasted sharply with the British-Greek Agreement [51] which had placed responsibility in the hands of the British military commander. By arrangements made with ML this responsibility reverted on 15 March 1945 to the Greek Government.[52]

The Mission, which at last found itself in a position of active responsibility, had been in existence for about a year and some members had been moving in and out of Greece during the last six months. Its administration had never been strong.[53] The long months of waiting from May to October 1944, unavoidable since none could know precisely when Greece would be liberated, had not been conducive to the development of morale, discipline, or integration. The return to Cairo was followed by what almost amounted to revolt among the staff there.[54] Participation in actual work and the appointment of Buell F. Maben, formerly of the United States Department of Agriculture, as Acting Chief of Mission on 2 March 1945 [55] (as Chief on 17 May 1945 [56]), after a period during which the Mission had been virtually without leadership,[57] helped to pull the personnel together and to weld them into a reasonably effective team. The takeover from ML was handled "smoothly," [58] and UNRRA was in a position to carry forward the work of getting supplies and rendering services to Greece.

[48] For text see Appendix Seven, Document 8. [49] See Part Four, Chapter I.

[50] Mission Progress Report 3, 15 May 1945, Section I, p. 5: "On the whole, our interpretation of the Greek-UNRRA Agreement has left us in an advisory-observing capacity, . . . but frankly, at the moment, it seems that we must take a more active part." [51] See Appendix Six, Section I, Document 3*a*.

[52] ML (Greece), Final Progress Report, p. 13.

[53] See, for example, "Report of Meeting Called by Mrs. Severeid at 11 A.M. on 25 October 1944." For an informed opinion, see letter, Creagh to Matthews, 10 January 1945.

[54] See, for example, cables: Cairo to Washington Enjoy, 6 January 1945; Cairo to Washington 59, 18 January 1945; and also minutes of meetings of Greek Mission, various dates in December 1944 and January 1945.

[55] Cable, Athens to Washington 26, 1 March 1945.

[56] Headquarters Press Release 51, 17 May 1945.

[57] ML (Greece), Progress Report 20, 16–23 March, p. 3; Final Progress Report, p. 13.

[58] ML (Greece), Final Progress Report, p. 13; Mission Progress Report 3, 15 May 1945, Section I, p. 3.

The Mission grew steadily in size until April–May 1946 [59] and then declined until closure [60] on 30 June 1947:

TABLE 20

GREECE MISSION PERSONNEL

		Class I				Class II	Class III	Total [a]
Month	*Year*	*United Kingdom*	*United States*	*Other* [b]	*Total*			
October	1945	156	199	49(10)	394	1,460	280	2,134
March	1946	255	188	73(18)	516	2,379	242	3,137
September	1946	148	132	67(18)	347	1,873	90	2,310
March	1947	34	29	14 (8)	77	356	...	433

[a] "Statistics—European Region," Vol. I.

[b] The figures in parentheses in this column indicate the total number of different nationalities represented by this group.

It was organized in the normal pattern with three major departments: Finance and Administration; Supplies and Distribution; Welfare Services (health, welfare, and displaced persons). Attached to the Office of Chief of Mission were an economic adviser and a legal adviser, a Public Information Section, etc. There were eleven regional offices.[61]

Prior to the signing of the Agreement and the assumption of responsibility for the import program, the Mission members had hoped to perform active operating tasks, involving direct conduct of many varied enterprises.[62] The Agreement, of course, in line with the resolutions, provided for the Mission not an active, but an advisory role. The disappointment that many members felt proved, however, to be unnecessary as circumstances and the frequent failings of the Greek Government forced upon the Mission greater operating responsibility than the Administration could have anticipated or than was elsewhere assumed by the Administration.

[59] Largest total, all classes, 3,548 in April; largest total Class I, 563 in May, "Statistics—European Region," Vol. I.

[60] A small closure group, never exceeding twelve, remained in Greece until the end of March 1948, "Desk Book of Statistics," Table F 2.

[61] For a detailed account, see "Report to the Honorable Herbert H. Lehman, Director General, UNRRA from Mr. Buell F. Maben, Chief of Mission, UNRRA–Greece Mission, on organization and operations of the UNRRA Mission to Greece from November 1944 through June 1945," 1 August 1945.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

The Mission prepared and wrote bills to be enacted into law by the Government; it arranged for the appointment and selection of Government officials; it planned and prepared, in coöperation with the Government, the import programs; it determined where ships should be unloaded; in these and in many other respects it acted for the Government. The members of the Mission also undertook field operating tasks that would normally have been performed by Government officials. They planned the establishment and directed the operation of hospitals, camps, clinics, welfare centers; they controlled the operation of truck fleets, depots, and warehouses; they settled strikes; they killed insects.

Though many members of the Mission were undoubtedly pleased by this turn of events, the Chief of Mission and other senior officials were definitely displeased. While recognizing that, if anything in the way of satisfactory relief and rehabilitation operations were to be performed, there was no choice, they feared, on the one hand, that too close participation in the activities of the Government might seriously compromise UNRRA's position as an impartial international organization and, on the other, that the Greeks might easily become too dependent on outside assistance for the conduct of their own affairs and thus never learn to help themselves.[63] In spite, however, of continuous efforts to persuade, cajole, force, or require the Government to assume responsibilities which properly it should have accepted and to conduct operations which it rightly should have performed, the Mission, from April 1945 until the bulk of the UNRRA supplies had reached Greece in the summer of 1946, not merely advised the Government over a great range of matters, but also played a major operating role.

Relations with the Government were varied and complex and were, in spite of some friction, generally friendly though not always satisfactory. Soon after 1 April 1945 a Joint Policy Committee consisting of the appropriate Greek Government ministers and representatives of UNRRA and of the British Embassy (it was a matter of great regret to the Mission that representatives of the United States Embassy, who were invited to join, would not participate) was established. It was to

[63] Minutes, meeting of divisional heads, 13 April 1945, p. 7; Weekly Interim Activity Report 1, 25 April 1945, p. 3; letter, Maben to Emmaroyd Tsouderos (Deputy Prime Minister), 1 March 1946, p. 6; monograph, Dr. J. M. Vine, "Historical Notes, Health Division," p. 4; etc.

be an advisory body and the channel through which UNRRA was to offer advice to the Greek Government, and all matters in which UNRRA was interested were within its competence. To it were attached four Subcommittees: Joint Wages and Prices; Joint Transport; Joint Rationing; and Joint Welfare. In all cases, their chairmen were Greek and the secretariat Greek and UNRRA.[64] In matters of vital importance, the Chief of Mission had recourse to direct contact with the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister. Senior departmental and divisional chiefs had similar direct contacts with appropriate ministers, such as the Minister of Supply, head of the Ministry especially created to receive and distribute UNRRA imports, the Ministers of Finance, Health, Hygiene, Welfare, Agriculture, Labor, Transport, etc. Constant conferences were held with Government officials in Athens and elsewhere.

Innumerable further committees, on which UNRRA personnel served, were formed in Athens and elsewhere throughout Greece to consider every aspect of the work: programming of hundreds of items, distribution by *nomoi* (provinces) and communes in Greece, rationing, operation of vehicles, use of materials, pricing, employment of labor. On many of these the UNRRA representative was only an observer, but on almost all of them he had to play a dominant role in order to achieve some approach to fair and reasonable decisions free from political influence and to obtain practical action to complement promises and proposals.

In addition to its close and continuous relations with the Government, the Mission also maintained the closest working relations with many other governments and organizations: the United Kingdom and United States Embassies, the British Economic Mission (in 1946), the American Economic Mission (in 1947), the Food and Agriculture Organization (with its Greek Mission in 1946), the Near East Foundation, the Greek War Relief Association, and others.

The Greek Government was not always as helpful as it might have been. In justice it should be pointed out that the situation was difficult. As the ML authorities put it:

> In considering the difficulties which have faced the Greek Government since their arrival, and will face them in the future, it must be remembered

[64] Joint Secretariat, "Formation of Joint Policy Committee," 14 April 1945; UNRRA Greece Mission, "Institution of Joint Policy Committee," GP 11, 11 May 1945.

that not since 1936 has there been any form of elections in this country, even on a municipal level.

This means that the majority of civil servants holding office today have been nominated either by the Metaxas Fascist Regime, the Quisling Government under German Regime, or more recently by local and totally self-constituted EAM authorities.

There are four main problems which face the Government, and which intimately affect the working of this HQ. These are finance, supplies, internal security and the reconstruction of the Greek Governmental administrative machine. All these problems are extremely complex.[65]

Before the elections held at the end of March 1946, no Government lasted long; even afterward, no Government had full authority in the country. Each Government had to purchase its supporters. Each one had to meet difficult, if not insoluble, economic problems; and all were faced with a general feeling of discouragement, bordering on hopelessness, and with discontent, bordering on active hostility. The general atmosphere is well illustrated by the ML comment:

Trafficking in stolen Expeditionary Forces Institute and Detail Issue Depot stores is reaching formidable proportions in Greece. At Patrai, a man charged with stealing two spare wheels from a British vehicle was acquitted because "he is quite a good man with Royalist convictions." [66]

After all allowances have been made—and the situation certainly called for charity—it still remains true that the Government was frequently one of the obstacles which UNRRA had to overcome. Again, in the words of the ML authorities:

The Civil Service and Municipal Authorities whether due to paralysis resulting from the Occupation or to chronic incompetence, were frequently exasperatingly lethargic . . .

This led to the nomination of mediocre officials who were the only ones acceptable to all parties . . .

The chaos in the civil service both in the provinces and in the Ministries, the absence of adequate financial provision for the civil servants, the lack of transport and the ignorance of Ministries as to the whereabouts of their employees, all contributed to the magnitude of the problem.[67]

The UNRRA program in Greece was, as elsewhere, twofold. It was directed toward making available both supplies and services, with greater attention given to the latter than was generally the case in other

[65] ML Greece, Progress Report 1, 15 October to 10 November 1944, p. 4.
[66] ML Greece, Progress Report 19, 9 March to 16 March 1945, p. 5.
[67] ML Greece, Final Progress Report, pp. 1, 4.

countries. This service program had as its major goals the improvement of health conditions with special emphasis on the elimination of malaria, and the establishment of welfare services, particularly the correct care of the indigent. About 80 per cent of the supply program was directed toward the creation of transport, the provision of food, and the increased indigenous production of food. The two programs, and indeed all parts of them, were, in fact, closely bound together. Little, for example, could be done to improve agricultural output until transport had been established, villages were reconstructed, workers had food, clothing, and medical care, the indigent had assistance. Furthermore, in Greece, to a degree not elsewhere true in Europe, it was not sufficient just to make supplies available; it was essential to make certain that they were handled and used in such a way as to give the greatest possible support to the nation's basic economic and political organization which was on the verge of collapse and disintegration.

The supplies [68] made available were:

TABLE 21

UNRRA SUPPLIES FOR GREECE

	United States Dollar Equivalents	*Per Cent of Subtotal*	*Gross Long Tons*	*Per Cent of Subtotal*
Food	$180,393,500	59.5	1,536,710	59.1
Clothing, textiles, footwear	33,334,100	11.0	28,485	1.1
Medical and sanitation	7,790,400	2.6	8,628	0.3
Agricultural rehabilitation	43,263,400	14.2	363,176	14.0
Industrial rehabilitation	38,497,600	12.7	664,428	25.5
Subtotal	$303,279,000	100.0	2,601,427	100.0
Takeover from military authorities	43,883,000		228,711	
Total	$347,162,000		2,830,138	

Over half these goods had been shipped before the end of 1945,[69] and about 85 per cent by 30 June 1946.[70] Of the supplies delivered after

[68] For full details of conditions in Greece see the series of reports, "Economic and Financial Developments in Greece," covering the period from November 1944 through December 1946, prepared first by Charles A. Coombs and later by John O. Coppock.

[69] *Report of the Director General to the Council* (DGR) 7, p. 15; DGR 8, p. 26.

[70] DGR 9, p. 41; DGR 10, p. 54.

30 June 1946, agricultural and industrial rehabilitation materials amounted to over two-thirds.[71]


3. *TRANSPORT*

Even before April 1945 the UNRRA Mission was fully aware of the physical problem of distribution.[72] The destruction and neglect of small ports prevented the customary direct sea delivery to many parts of Greece with which there were little or no overland connections from Piraeus (central and western Greece, for example, and, of course, the islands).[73] The absence of railroads in many parts of the country and the considerable destruction inflicted on such rail systems as did exist (both to roadbeds and rolling stock), and the destruction of much of the coastal shipping, which could only be replaced slowly and with great difficulty, made it evident that a major role in internal distribution would have to be played by road transport. The Mission, therefore, early and frequently emphasized the need for importing trucks, spare parts, tires, and garage and repair equipment. UNRRA imported nearly 7,000 trucks and trailers [74] in addition to nearly 1,000 acquired in Greece from ML.[75]

During the ML period, since the Greek Government was itself unable to operate trucks with any efficiency and was likewise unable to control the private operators, the British Army authorities had had to organize national trucking companies directed and operated by experienced British transport officials.[76] After 1 April 1945 it was still impossible, in view of the inability of the Government to exercise controls, to turn trucks over to private operators, since they would either have charged exorbitant prices or would have spent their energies on more profitable commercial operations rather than on the delivery of relief supplies.[77] It was necessary, therefore, to continue the system of operation through the national companies which had been established in the ML period, with, however, the difference that

[71] DGR 10, p. 55; DGR 11, p. 34; DGR 12, p. 25; DGR 13, p. 11; letter, Maben to LaGuardia, 2 September 1946.
[72] Cable, Cairo to Washington 97, 29 January 1945, among others.
[73] Monograph, C. W. Randall, "Activities of the Shipping Section," p. 2.
[74] Memo, Louis N. Swenson (Chief, Bureau of Supply, HQ) to Director General, "UNRRA Program for Greece," 24 December 1947, Appendix A, p. 4.
[75] Monograph, "Traffic Division," p. 4.
[76] ML (Greece), Final Progress Report, p. 112.
[77] Monograph, "Traffic Division," pp. 4–5.

MAP II. GREECE: RAILROADS



these companies were, at least nominally, operated by Greek officials. An over-all State transport company, known as the "Service of Exploitation of State Vehicles" (YEKA), was formed. Its primary responsibility was to distribute relief supplies, taking them either from dockside when off-loaded to the principal warehouses or from the principal warehouses to local depots and distribution points.[78]

The system, sound in theory, was also in practice probably about the best that could be devised. It was, however, in no sense of the word efficient. Various Greek governments had a tendency to appoint to high positions in YEKA individuals who were desirable from a political point of view rather than individuals who were technically competent, though, of course, there were some capable individuals in the organization.[79] The UNRRA Chief of Transport at the Mission Headquarters in Athens was supposedly serving in an advisory position to YEKA. In practice, he frequently had to play a definite operating role. The same situation existed in the various regions of Greece.[80] In Salonika, for example, on 1 April 1945, when the Greek Government was supposed to begin conducting operations, no Greek officials appeared. The UNRRA representative there, after a day or two's delay, rather than have supplies wasted and people unfed, assumed direct control of the transport facilities and planned and arranged for the distribution of food and other supplies. This was typical of the operation as a whole.[81]

Not only did YEKA suffer from inefficient direction, it likewise did not have sufficient vehicles at the height of the UNRRA operation to make all deliveries.[82] It became necessary for the Greek authorities to get assistance from private operators. Through the allocation committees in which UNRRA participated, it became possible to exert a certain amount of pressure on these operators, since they were not issued tires unless they undertook to put in, each month, a certain amount of mileage on behalf of the Government.[83] They, however, insisted that they could not operate at the relatively low price that the Government paid its own transport organization, YEKA. The

[78] Monograph, Russell C. Singleton, "Transport History, Region EG, Northern Greece," p. 5.
[79] *Ibid.*; monograph, "Traffic Division," p. 5.
[80] Monograph, Singleton, "Transport History, Region EG, Northern Greece," p. 5.
[81] Mission Progress Report 3, 15 May 1945, p. 3.
[82] Monograph, "Traffic Division," p. 5.
[83] Monograph, Singleton, "Transport History, Region EG, Northern Greece," p. 8.

justice of this claim was recognized, and the Agricultural Bank undertook to pay them three times the rate paid to YEKA. In practice, however, certain officials of the Agricultural Bank seem to have resented this, and all too frequently the trucks of private operators were kept waiting exceedingly long times at warehouses when they called to collect UNRRA or Government supplies.[84] Such conduct, of course, did not improve relations between the Government and the private operators. In the course of time, however, YEKA became a reasonably efficient organization, partly as a result of trucks brought into the country by UNRRA and partly as a result of the discreet influence of UNRRA. By the summer of 1946 the transport situation was sufficiently improved so that the Government decided it was no longer necessary to maintain a large fleet of Government-operated trucks. The UNRRA Mission agreed with this but objected to the Government's original intention to turn over all the YEKA fleet to the railroads and insisted that other operators as well be given an opportunity to acquire these trucks.[85]

A central allocating committee at Athens, on which UNRRA was represented, allocated trucks by regions.[86] Regional committees, on which UNRRA again was represented, allocated trucks to operators.[87] At first, as indicated above, practically all trucks were allocated to YEKA or to other Government departments. As the number in the country increased somewhat, it became possible to include in the allocation the Association of War-Stricken Motorists (SPA).[88] This Association was made up of private operators who had lost trucks during the war, usually as a result of enemy action. Local committees carefully considered the needs of all claimants not only for trucks but likewise for spare parts and tires. In this, of course, as in so many of the other aspects of the work, almost the primary duty of the UNRRA member of the committee was to see to it that decisions were taken on the basis of merit rather than for political reasons. While they were not always successful, in the great majority of cases it did prove possible to have allocations made on some reasonably just basis.[89] The

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[85] Letter, Maben to LaGuardia, 2 September 1946, p. 3.
[86] Monograph, "Traffic Division," p. 5.
[87] Monograph, Singleton, "Transport History, Region EG, Northern Greece," p. 12.
[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13; monograph, "Traffic Division," p. 5.
[89] Monograph, Singleton, "Transport History, Region EG, Northern Greece," pp. 13–15.

imported trucks, during the period 1945–1946, were allocated approximately as follows: YEKA, 3,000; other Government agencies, 1,600; public utilities, 75; agrarian unions, 300; SPA, 2,100; operated directly by UNRRA, 700.[90]

The temptation to use trucks for highly profitable but unauthorized activities was an ever-present factor in the operation of YEKA. The individual Greek drivers, either by overloading with non-Government goods or by taking unauthorized trips, could make considerable sums. There is no doubt that some drivers succumbed to temptation. On the whole, however, the constant checking by UNRRA officials, constant insistence that the amount of gasoline issued be carefully recorded, constant insistence that trucks should not be overloaded, kept such activities within reasonable bounds.[91]

Important though the supply of trucks was, only one third of the funds used for the establishment of transport facilities was spent for their acquisition. Another third was used to acquire materials that contributed directly to their operations: spare parts, tires, garage equipment, and petroleum products.[92] The latter, which amounted to nearly 250,000 tons, were released from British military stocks in Greece between April 1945 and January 1946.[93] Thereafter, the Greek Government assumed responsibility for the supply of petroleum products, much of which was procured by the Administration on a reimbursable basis.[94] About 45,000 tires were supplied on the basis of four tires per 6-wheel truck and six per 10-wheel truck per year.[95]

The other third was used for road-building and dock equipment, bridge-building material (mostly Everall- and Bailey-type bridges obtained from the British Army [96]), railroad equipment, and water transport materials. The railroad equipment included 17 locomotives and nearly 700 railway cars, together with spare parts and repair equipment.[97] Though small in number, these supplies played a vital part

[90] Monograph, "Traffic Division," p. 5.
[91] Monograph, Singleton, "Transport History, Region EG, Northern Greece," p. 6.
[92] Industrial Rehabilitation Division, "Final Report of Shipments from All Areas as of February 29, 1948."
[93] Memo, J. R. Keany (Bureau of Supply) to E. Weissmann (Bureau of Supply).
[94] Monograph, "Industrial Rehabilitation Division," p. 1; and various Mission reports.
[95] Memo, L. E. Anderson (Bureau of Supply) to Swenson, 19 December 1947.
[96] Memo, Gilbert P. Rich (Bureau of Supply) to G. K. Arnold (Bureau of Supply).
[97] Industrial Rehabilitation Division, "Final Report of Shipments from All Areas as of February 29, 1948."

in the re-establishment of railroad operation and, together with the bridge-building material, supplemented the work being done by the Greek Government and the British Army and aided in the reopening of the main lines in northern Greece which linked the country with other parts of Europe.[98] The 11 tugs and 12 lighters, together with cranes and other dock equipment, gave important assistance to the improved use of the port of Piraeus as well as of some of the smaller ports and to the restoration of coastal shipping.[99]

Without the UNRRA supplies and also without the UNRRA technicians to assure at least an approach to a proper and efficient use of these materials, food and other items essential to life could not have been distributed, especially during the summer of 1945 and the winter of 1945–1946, and the effects would have been disastrous: certain disease and starvation; possible national collapse.

4. *FOOD*

Fifty-nine per cent of the total supply program, in both dollars and tonnage, consisted of food.[100] This heavy emphasis was necessary because even under normal conditions a substantial part of Greek food is imported. From 1 April 1945 to the end of 1946, UNRRA food, in spite of an excellent harvest in 1946, constituted approximately 50 per cent of the amount consumed in Greece, varying from a high point of 75 per cent in April 1945 to 27 per cent in September 1946.

The first task that confronted the Mission was the actual presentation of the import programs during the months immediately following 1 April 1945. This task, supposedly to be performed by the Greek Government, was actually performed by the Food Division of the UNRRA Mission. After preparation, appropriate Greek officials were consulted, and certain changes were made at their suggestion.

The second task of the Mission was to determine where ocean-going vessels bringing grain and grain products to Greece should off-load.

[98] Monographs: "Industrial Rehabilitation Division," p. 10; "Final Report for Railways Rehabilitation"; L. S. Kingston and H. F. V. Edward, "History of Industrial Rehabilitation Division, Region EG," pp. 11–16.

[99] Monographs: Kingston and Edward, "Industrial Rehabilitation Division, Region EG," pp. 22–24; Randall, "Activities of the Shipping Section," pp. 2, 4–6; "Report on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Ports"; Industrial Rehabilitation Division, "Final Report of Shipments from All Areas as of February 29, 1948."

[100] Monograph, A. W. Rowntree, "History of Food Division, UNRRA Greece Mission"; regular Mission monthly reports.

Due to the inadequate transport available in the country, it was important that as much as possible should be off-loaded in the ports serving the areas to which the grain was ultimately to go. Some of these could take ocean-going vessels only when they were partially loaded. As the Mission was informed that grain-carrying vessels were approaching Greece, it had to determine the best port for off-loading. In many cases this meant that ships had first to go to Piraeus or one of the other major ports to off-load some of their cargo and then proceed to one of the smaller ports. This, of course, required constant checking of the stocks on hand at each of the ports and constant watching for the arrival of ships.

It was also necessary to arrange for transport within Greece by coastal boat when possible and overland when not. Since the coastal freight was inadequate and, in many cases, not completely under the control either of the Government or UNRRA, this operation again required constant attention to shipping schedules, available space in the warehouses of the major ports, and needs of the various regions.

The third task was the preparation each month of ration scales for each region. This operation was complicated by the fact that, while UNRRA imported food was carefully price-controlled and rigidly rationed, much of the indigenous food was neither price-controlled nor rationed and could be sold freely. At no time was there sufficient food available to approach the theoretical UNRRA goal of 2,650 calories per day per person. It was the aim of the Mission to maintain total consumption, including both UNRRA and indigenous food, at approximately a 2,250–calorie level per person per day. The achievement of this level was, however, dependent on the proper distribution of indigenous food, which was, in the conditions existing in Greece, impossible. The actual amount received by the bulk of the population was, therefore, less. The Administration's calculations were based on what the Government might have done with its resources. The Administration was under no illusion that what the Government actually did in any way corresponded with these estimates.[101]

Before each month, ration scales, based on the known amount of UNRRA food on hand available for distribution that month and the presumed amount of indigenous food available in each region, were

[101] Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee (CC/P) (47) 13, minutes 49th meeting, 29 January 1947, pp. 13–14.

formulated. For example, it was clear that more wheat would be available in wheat-producing regions in June and July, when the first harvest collections were coming in, than would be available in other regions. The amount of UNRRA food allocated to such regions was, therefore, reduced. In addition to variations in terms of region and time, there were further variations in terms of types of consumer. There was a larger ration, for example, for heavy workers; there were special rations for the so-called vulnerable groups: expectant and nursing mothers, children under certain ages, hospital patients, invalids, civil prisoners. All these ration scales had constantly to be checked and altered, depending on variation of availability and season. In all cases it was essential to be certain that food stocks on hand were sufficient to meet the established ration scale for UNRRA food. The scale for the normal consumer varied from about 1,700 calories per day in April 1945 to 600 calories per day in September 1946, at which time the stocks of indigenously produced food were at their height. These ration scales were, theoretically, prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and promulgated by the Minister. Actually, they were largely prepared by the Mission, which arranged for the Minister to communicate them formally to the Government regional officials at the same time that the UNRRA office in Athens announced them to its regional representatives.

After the work of preparation had been completed, it was necessary to make certain that local distribution within regions was promptly and correctly carried out. Within regions, local committees, on which UNRRA representatives served, decided how much should be distributed to each village. Within villages local committees determined in which category individuals belonged. It was not possible for an UNRRA representative to serve continually on all the village allocating committees. Representatives, however, followed the work of these committees as closely as possible, and, whenever it was felt that their decisions were improper, this fact was immediately called to the attention of the Greek Government—locally by the regional officials, and to central Government officials by Mission Headquarters; remedial action usually followed.

In the summer of 1946 it was decided that the work being performed by the Mission should be assumed by the Greek Government. In order to facilitate the work of the Government, the Mission pre-

pared a detailed and elaborate plan for the collection and distribution of the 1946 harvest. In September 1946 the Mission Food Division was abolished, and full responsibility was transferred to the Greek Government.

There was, and continued to be for some time after the UNRRA operation, much discussion of black-market food operations in Greece. Technically speaking, there was no black market, or practically none, but a free market, since it was legal for Greeks to buy and sell indigenous food without restriction. Very little, if any, UNRRA food found its way directly into this market either from shipside or from main warehouses. All Greeks, however, were entitled to various types of UNRRA-supplied food, the entitlement varying according to the area in which they lived, the nature of their work, their age, etc. In certain cases the recipients, having legally and correctly received their UNRRA allotment, sold a portion of it in the free market. Theoretically, this was not supposed to be done, and recipients were supposed to consume rather than resell UNRRA food. In practice, however, if an individual who had received sugar preferred to sell it in order to buy something else, it was not possible to prevent this, even if it were considered desirable to do so. A certain amount of UNRRA food, therefore, did find its way into the free market, but it arrived there in what might well be called a legitimate fashion.

Though grain and grain products constituted by far the largest part of the food program, the aim was to make available to the people as well-balanced a diet as conditions would permit. Other food items imported, therefore, included dairy products, sugar, pulses, fish and fish products, meat and meat products, and fats and oils. The dairy products, fish, meats, fats and oils were largely for the vulnerable groups.

A typical UNRRA food ration for ordinary consumers for a month might be 9,280 grams of grain, 640 grams of pulses, and 256 grams of sugar, equivalent to 1,081 calories per day; [102] or 7,920 grams of grain, 640 grams of pulses, 256 grams of sugar, and 192 grams of fats, equivalent to 998 calories per day.[103] Prisoners were allowed bread or the equivalent, pulses, sugar, fats and meat or the equivalent at the rate of 1,800 calories per day.[104] Feeding centers were allowed 640 calories per day (mostly dairy products, with some sugar) for children under

[102] Ration Program for December 1945: Region K.
[103] Ration Program for December 1945: Region G.
[104] Ration Program for December 1945 (or any other month).

one year; for children under two, 554 calories; for those under six, 566 calories (flour, milk, rice, sugar, fats, etc.); for pregnant women and nursing mothers, 523 calories. Hospitals were allowed about 2,500 calories per day per patient, and orphanages, 2,280.[105]

UNRRA food was essential for the preservation of life and national existence, and the continuous, though sometimes unsuccessful efforts of the UNRRA staff forced the distribution of the food in an efficient and, on the whole, fair manner, particularly to the end of September 1946 when the virtual completion of the UNRRA program and the reduction of staff, coupled with the unfortunate renewal of vigorous guerrilla activities, considerably reduced the ability of the Administration to influence Government actions.[106]

5. *AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION*

Aid for the recovery of Greek agriculture was a logical extension of the food program.[107] Preparations for the work commenced long before the liberation of Greece. Plans were prepared in London in consultation with Greek representatives, reviewed in Washington, and again revised in Cairo by the Balkan Mission. This work of planning and preparation was continued during the ML period. Relations between the ML representatives and UNRRA were particularly cordial in this field. Somewhat more than 14 per cent of the total program was devoted to this purpose. The Greek Ministry of Agriculture, in spite of frequent changes of Ministers, was one of the most progressive and coöperative. The preparation of the import program on the Greek side was undertaken by a high official of the Ministry who worked with the division chiefs of the Ministry of Supply. This official was likewise responsible for determining the allocation of supplies to the *nomoi* (provinces), in each of which he had a representative and in each of which there was a *nomos* (province) committee consisting of a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, a technical inspector of the Agricultural Bank, and a representative of the local Agricultural

[105] *Ibid.*

[106] Letters: Maben to Gale, 13 July 1946; Maben to LaGuardia, 4 December 1946; cable, Athens to London 516, 21 March 1947; many other letters, cables, reports.

[107] Monograph, "Historical Report of the Division of Agriculture and Fisheries"; memo, Swenson to Director General, "UNRRA Program for Greece," 24 December 1947, especially Appendix E; memo, Hyde G. Buller (Bureau of Supply, HQ) to Phil H. Stitt (Director, Public Information Division, HQ), "Non-Use of UNRRA Supplies in Greece," 16 December 1947.

Coöperative Association. This committee was charged with determining the requirements of the nomos and of making allocation to each *eparchy* (district). In each of these, there was in turn a committee, again composed of the local representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, of the Agricultural Bank, and of the Coöperative. These committees determined the requirements of the eparchies and made allocations of supplies to the communities for distribution. In these, once again, there was a local committee consisting of a representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, of the Agricultural Bank, of the local Cooperative, of the farmers not belonging to the Coöperative, and the president of the community. This committee determined local needs and made local allocations. UNRRA officials were either represented on all these committees or worked closely with them.

Among the more important items supplied were livestock, farm machinery, seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides.

About 62,200 animals were supplied. These included more than 30,300 mules, 21,400 horses, 6,800 donkeys, and 1,900 cows. An additional 13,000 animals were supplied by the Greek War Relief Association, the State of Mississippi, and the Church of the Brethren.[108] During the war, the Greek animal population had been reduced by nearly 50 per cent, and practically all tractors had been destroyed. One of the vital needs was for draft power, which explains the emphasis on horses and mules.

The machines supplied included 1,330 wheel tractors, 140 tracklaying tractors, and about 100 small garden tractors, about 8,000 plows, 1,800 harrows, and similar machinery. The bulk of the tractors arrived in time for the 1945 fall planting. They were used to cultivate about half a million acres, more than 25 per cent of the land planted with wheat, by far the most important crop.

The 7,600 tons of wheat seed supplied were enough to plant nearly 600,000 acres, or about one third of the land sown with wheat.[109] Other seeds supplied in large quantity were barley, spring vetch, and oats.

Fertilizer, which had been practically unavailable during the war,

[108] Monograph, "Historical Report of the Division of Agriculture and Fisheries," p. 15, 24, and Appendix 3; memo, Swenson to Director General, "UNRRA Program for Greece," Appendix E, p. 4; see also *supra*, Part One, Chapter V, Section 6.

[109] Monograph, "Historical Report of the Division of Agriculture and Fisheries," Appendix II; memo, Swenson to Director General, "UNRRA Program for Greece," Appendix E, p. 4.

was another essential. Large amounts of potash, nitrate of soda, superphosphate, and rock phosphate were supplied. The last served the dual purpose of supplying raw material to help get the factories into operation and at the same time assisting in the rehabilitation of agriculture.

The pesticides program was particularly successful. The principal emphasis was on controlling vine disease, locusts, olive fly, and citrus scales. The value of the crop saved was estimated to be between ten and fifteen times the cost of the pesticides.[110]

Other supplies included materials for drainage and irrigation work, dairy and poultry operations, food processing machinery, hand tools, etc.

UNRRA's work, however, was by no means limited merely to making such supplies available. UNRRA experts served in various Greek agricultural and veterinary research institutes, both teaching and stimulating the Government to resuscitate such institutions. UNRRA field workers demonstrated the use of machinery, fertilizers, pesticides, etc. Other UNRRA experts undertook special research projects in order to advise on the best future use of Greek land, the most notable of these being the study made of the Vourakas River watershed.[111]

The UNRRA agricultural rehabilitation program in Greece was particularly successful, partly perhaps because it was in this field that there was the greatest coöperation and assistance from the Government. The proof of accomplishment was the 1946 grain harvest, for which 91 per cent of the average amount of land sown in the period 1934–1938 was planted, and which amounted to 98 per cent of the average crop of that period. As this took place less than two years after liberation, it represented a tremendous accomplishment. Total agricultural production, taking 1935–1938 as 100, was increased from 41 in 1945–1946 to 77 in 1946–1947.[112] The major share of credit should undoubtedly go to the farmers,

> who in spite of their appalling condition, undernourished, unclad, unshod, homeless in many cases, were out in the fields working with whatever animals they had left, with worn-out implements, but with a magnificent spirit and willingness to rebuild. The most unheard of combinations of

[110] Memo, Swenson to Director General, "UNRRA Program for Greece," Appendix E, p. 3.

[111] UNRRA, *Greece: Survey of Agricultural Resources, Vourakas River Watershed* (Washington, D.C., 1946).

[112] United Nations, *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe*, p. 11.

animals were used to plow the fields. Donkey colts were seen, for instance, hitched to wooden plows together with skeletonized oxen. In some cases the earth was turned by means of heavy hoes for lack of plows or animals to draw them. Farmers everywhere were asking for tools and animals, fertilizers and pesticides, when obviously their first needs were food, warm clothing and shoes.[113]

Nevertheless, the material assistance was supplied by UNRRA, and without UNRRA advice and guidance even the Greek farmer could not have accomplished what was little short of a miracle.

In a further effort to increase the food supply in Greece, UNRRA made available over $5,500,000 of materials for the fishing industry, which had been almost totally destroyed during the war.[114] Among the more important items were 6,600,000 board feet of lumber to repair damaged vessels, 660 Diesel engines, 15 fishing boats, nets, twine, tackle, etc. The bulk of these supplies was not delivered until 1946, and the Greek Government was somewhat slow in making use of them. Nevertheless, the means of rehabilitating, to at least 80 per cent of its prewar level, an industry which had made important contributions both to the meager food supply of the country and to its national income had been made available; and to the physical supplies had been added the instruction and advice of experts and the usual efforts to obtain Government action.

6. *FRUSTRATION*

Supplies not part of the transport, food, and agricultural rehabilitation programs amounted to less than 20 per cent of the total.[115] They consisted of clothing, textiles, and footwear (about five-eighths), industrial rehabilitation supplies (two-eighths), and medical supplies (about one-eighth). The clothing, textile, and footwear program was

[113] Monograph, "Historical Report of the Division of Agriculture and Fisheries," p. 4.

[114] Monograph, G. H. K. Hewison, "UNRRA Greece Mission, a Review of Fisheries, 1944–1946," in addition to the sources listed in note 107 *supra*.

[115] In addition to sources already mentioned, monographs: "Greek Tanning Industry"; "Public Utilities—Electricity"; "Report on Gas Supply"; "Telecommunications and Civil Postal Section"; "Rubber Industry"; "Industry of Caustic Soda, Chloride of Lime, and Liquid Chlorine"; "Greek Industry of Chemical Products and Fertilizer"; "Water Supply"; R. G. Rallis, "Report of the Activities of the Shelter Section"; "Report of Textile and Footwear Section"; Constance Votey, "Report of Donated Clothing Section"; Diana Malcolm-Sim, "Report on Non-donated Clothing Imported by UNRRA into Greece."

unusual, due to the relatively high proportion of footwear (about one-sixth) and of finished clothing (about one-third) compared with raw cotton and wool (also about one-third). The Mission encountered many difficulties—some possibly resulting from excess of zeal—in connection with the distribution of the supplies.

The attempted basis for the distribution of finished clothing was developed during the ML period in coöperation by ML and UNRRA officials and further developed from April to September 1945 during the months of the ascendancy of Kyriakos Varvaressos, perhaps the ablest postwar Greek official, in Greek politics.[116] Thereafter, the Mission carried on a more or less losing battle with a series of ministers who were not responsive to its conceptions. Fundamentally, the Mission wanted the UNRRA clothing to be distributed under an equitable rationing system to groups in greatest need at controlled prices related to wages.[117] The efforts to establish such a system were complicated and hampered by the fact that, while there was no practical alternative to distribution of UNRRA clothes through established retail stores, Greek-produced clothes, like food, were neither price-controlled nor rationed in spite of the Mission's efforts to have such controls established.

The Government practice of favoring Athens at the expense of other parts of the country and civil servants at the expense of other individuals added to the difficulties. Though repeatedly agreeing not to, the Government frequently authorized release of goods from warehouses without prior Mission approval, thus still further complicating the task of maintaining a workable rationing system. By August 1945 the Mission had persuaded the Government to accept its system of rationing which involved a registration of the population to determine who belonged to the eligible groups (wage earners, indigents, etc.) and to institute a distribution system. A change of ministers in September delayed the actual effective operation of these systems, which were never fully established. Thereafter, continual adjustments were proposed, accepted, rejected, altered, ignored, as ministers came and went. The Government from time to time proposed free sale, distribution in special areas (surplus wheat-producing areas, for example), to special groups (civil servants), and continually pressed for higher

[116] Monograph, Malcolm-Sim, "Report on Non-donated Clothing Imported by UNRRA into Greece."

[117] *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 34.

prices. The Mission as best it could tried to maintain its fundamental approach of fair, nationwide distribution at prices related to wages, but it was forced to yield, now to slightly higher prices, now to special distribution to one or another area or group. By September 1946 about two thirds of the total finished UNRRA clothing (including footwear and clothes made from UNRRA-supplied raw materials) had been moved from primary warehouses to distribution points, and about two fifths had been distributed to consumers, more or less in accord with Mission principles.

The distribution and use of raw cotton presented similar problems.[118] UNRRA hoped to obtain from the raw cotton a maximum production of utility cloth for general use. This would only be possible if some measure of control of the manufacturers was successfully established, since it was their tendency and desire to produce only the better types of cloth which could be sold at high prices. After much discussion in the early part of 1945, it was agreed that 75 per cent of the raw cotton would be used to make utility cloth to be produced on a nonprofit basis and that 25 per cent could be used by the manufacturers to make better grades of material to be sold at a reasonable profit.

On 5 June 1945 Varvaressos became Minister of Supply. He canceled the existing arrangements and insisted that the manufacturers use all the UNRRA raw cotton for production of utility cloth on a nonprofit basis. He refused to release any material until they agreed. The Mission objected to this proposal, believing that it was unrealistic and that there was no chance of getting the manufacturers to work on any such basis. In July, Varvaressos was compelled to admit that this was true. An agreement was finally made with the manufacturers, on the twenty-eighth of that month, whereby they were to devote their entire capacity to the production of utility cloth from UNRRA-supplied raw cotton until all such supplies had been used. During the entire manufacturing process, from raw cotton until finished goods, the material was to remain in the legal possession of the Government. The manufacturers were to be paid the cost of the operation plus a small profit.

This scheme, however, was not successful, because the Government was unable to enforce it. The manufacturers continued to use their production capacity to produce high-grade, more expensive materials

[118] Monograph, "Report of Textile and Footwear Section."

from indigenous cotton. As a result, the production of utility cloth from the UNRRA raw material lagged well behind schedule.

In June 1946 the Government finally concluded that the scheme was unworkable. With the reluctant concurrence of the Mission, which was compelled to recognize that the Government was unable to establish any effective controls, it was decided to release the UNRRA raw material to industrialists to manufacture on their own account in a normal commercial manner, subject, however, to certain safeguards as to equitable distribution and price control. This was an unsatisfactory solution, but it did at least mean that the material was put to use.

Similar delay and difficulties beset the use of practically all materials supplied for Greek industry. The Mission, on the one hand, was unwilling to permit free exploitation of such materials by the Greek manufacturers, and the Government on its side was unwilling to compel the manufacturers to use such materials subject to UNRRA conditions. As a result, much material remained unused in warehouses for inexcusably long periods.

There were some bright spots to lighten the prevailing discouragement. In 1944, due partly to war damage but principally to drought, water was available in Athens on only three days each week. Materials supplied by UNRRA permitted the construction of the Souli-Marathon water project which increased the current capacity of the entire Athens water systems by half and the normal capacity by a third. This helped give immediate relief and provided insurance against the recurrence of drought.[119]

The total picture likewise was not entirely black. In spite of delays and mismanagement, there was steady, if slow, improvement in the general level of Greek industrial output:

TABLE 22

INCREASE IN GREEK INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT[a]
(1938 Equals 100)

Year	*1st Quarter*	*2d Quarter*	*3d Quarter*	*4th Quarter*
1946	44	55	61	67
1947	64	71	71	

[a] United Nations, *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe*, p. 3.

[119] Monograph, "Water Supply"; see also *supra*, Part Three, Chapter VII, Section 6.

To this recovery the UNRRA materials certainly contributed; this much can be said for the program. It remains true, nevertheless, that the members of the Mission were extremely disappointed with the use that the Greeks made of these materials and continued to believe that inefficiency, political corruption, and the Government's unwillingness or inability to establish effective controls prevented the fullest possible use of the supplies brought into the country. The basic conflict between the Mission and the Government arose from the fact that the Mission, in accord with its interpretation of UNRRA resolutions, tried to impose upon Greece a system of controlled economy which was foreign to the tradition of that country and especially unwelcome to the governments in power. This attempt, undertaken both because it was considered mandatory in terms of the principles established by the Council and because it was thought to be essential to prevent economic and political collapse, was, at the best, only partially successful. While insistence upon it delayed the distribution of goods, it ensured that some at least, when distributed, did reach the broad mass of people at reasonable prices. No satisfactory reconciliation—if indeed such could be—was found between the principle of fair distribution at prices all could afford and the practice of uncontrolled, fiercely competitive economic action.

7. *WELFARE*

The welfare activities of the Mission were considered and planned as an integral part of the effort to aid in the relief and rehabilitation of the Greek people and of Greece.[120] The work included child welfare, welfare training, repatriation, home industries and occupational training, and the programming and distribution of welfare supplies.

Child welfare covered three major activities: camping and recreation; child feeding; and care of homeless and needy children. It was considered important that every effort should be made to aid children in recovering their health, undermined by the extreme hardships they had suffered during the war. To this end it was decided that summer camps and colonies should be established to permit children, especially

[120] Monograph, Glen Leet, "History, Welfare and Repatriation Division," in two parts and four volumes; Ruth M. Pauley, "Public Welfare Services in Greece," *Social Service Review*, XX, No. 4 (December 1946), 523–536; Joint Policy Committee and the Joint Welfare Subcommittee, minutes of meetings; monthly reports of the Welfare Division; etc.

city children, to enjoy the benefits of outdoor life, more exercise, and better food. The Greek Government was anxious to push this program. The ultimate goal was to establish facilities and trained personnel to care for 250,000 children for three weeks each during the summer months. During 1945 over 1,000,000 camping days were available to somewhat more than 45,000 children. In 1946, about three times as many children were cared for in the summer camps. To supplement this program, children's, boys', and girls' recreational facilities were established in urban centers. To these activities UNRRA contributed leaders, experts, supplies, and, perhaps most important of all, an element of push and drive that forced the Greek Government to carry into practical activity the plans drawn up either by its own ministries or by the UNRRA Mission.

A similar role was performed by the Mission in connection with the establishment of supplemental feeding programs in the schools, clinics for feeding expectant women and nursing mothers, and other activities designed to bring assistance to undernourished children. Again, a similar role was played in connection with caring for orphans in Greece, either in official homes or in the homes of foster parents.

The Administration contributed considerably to welfare training in Greece, partly by stimulating the reopening and the establishment of welfare centers and schools, by associating Greek personnel with the welfare work of the Mission, by conducting specific training courses, and by giving fellowships which permitted certain individuals to undertake advanced study and training in other countries. By advice, leadership, and insistence on practical performance, the Mission assisted in the re-establishment of Greeks returning from overseas and of Greeks who had been internally displaced within the country. It took a similar share in the development of home industries. Experts assisted in organizing and teaching spinning, weaving, shoemaking, furniture making, and other activities that fitted into the Greek mode of life and which could be carried on in homes. In connection with this, the Mission aided in the opening of occupational training centers in rural areas, at which workers were trained both for agricultural and industrial activities.

For all these enterprises, some supplies were essential. The Mission prepared the program and aided in the allocation and distribution of such supplies. The total value of such supplies imported into the coun-

try amounted to about $3 million, a very small part of the total program but essential to the development of these activities. The UNRRA materials were supplemented by those of other organizations, such as the New Zealand Wool Board, which contributed wool for the home industries program, the American Red Cross, the British Red Cross, the Greek War Relief Association, the Near East Foundation, and others.

Important as were these activities, by far the most important welfare work of the Mission was in connection with the care of resourceless persons. In the words of the Director of the Welfare Division:

> UNRRA Resolution Number 7, paragraph 3, provides "that distribution should be so conducted that all classes of the population irrespective of their purchasing power shall receive their equitable shares of essential commodities." The implementing of this Resolution has been the major purpose and function of the Welfare Division. This has been considered as the major responsibility not alone because of the high ideal of social justice which it represents, but because we believe that this was indispensable to the realization of the full potentialities for relief and rehabilitation in Greece which were inherent in the UNRRA program.[121]

One of the most serious problems confronting Greece was the very large number of indigents who could not afford even the bare necessities of life. Entirely apart from specific UNRRA principles, it was clearly essential, in terms of political stability and development, that something should be done to enable these people to live until such time as they could become self-supporting. Prior to the war the problem, when it had arisen, had been taken care of in an entirely local, haphazard fashion. In one community a monastery took care of the indigent; in another community, relatives; in another, a few comparatively well-to-do people. During the occupation the problem had become steadily greater. The solutions then evolved carried over to the period of liberation. The Government set the price of rationed food below free-market levels. It was hoped that in this way all people could afford to pay for food. The Government also required each large employer to employ a minimum number of workers, even though that minimum might be considerably in excess of the real number required.

The UNRRA Mission felt that these two policies were economically unsound, and that their continuance would help delay the recov-

[121] Monograph, Leet, "History, Welfare and Repatriation Division," I, 5.

ery of Greece. The sale of foodstuffs at uneconomically low levels deprived the Government of very substantial and badly needed revenue. It served to discourage producers of indigenous products, who found imported foodstuffs sold at prices very much below those at which they could afford to sell their products. Finally, it did not solve the problem at all, since, though it enabled the well-to-do to get their foodstuffs at very much below real value, it still did not permit the people who really were indigent to buy them. The Government was still forced to arrange for free distribution to the latter group. It thus lost considerable revenue without solving the problem.

The second policy, that of requiring employers to keep on their rolls a certain minimum number of employees, clearly led to inefficiency in industrial and other large-scale operations. There was no particular reason for management to develop modernized, efficient practices, because, even if it should do so, it still could not reduce the cost of operations. On the other side, there was no stimulus to the employees to shift to other activities, even activities that needed workers, since by remaining with any concern with which they happened to be associated they were certain to be employed. Again, this was, in the view of the Mission, undesirable in terms of national welfare, since it resulted in a serious loss of manpower.

While it seemed clear to the Mission that the two methods used by the Government to solve the problem of indigency were both positively undesirable, it was equally evident that these two practices could not suddenly be stopped, unless there were some alternative which would guarantee to a very large number of people that they would not starve during the period of readjustment. Again, both the UNRRA principles and the political needs of the country made the existence of some such alternative essential.

The Mission, therefore, planned, even before it arrived in Greece, and proposed,[122] soon after its arrival, the establishment of a national social service scheme to provide care and aid for the indigent. After investigation of the existing system, the Mission's initial views were thoroughly confirmed.[123] Figures, for example, were produced to show that a typical food ration was being sold at 38 per cent of the free-market price for the same food. This obviously resulted in an enormous loss of potential revenue, estimated in the summer of 1946 to be at an

[122] Weekly Interim Activity Report 1, 25 April 1945, p. 2.
[123] Meetings of divisional heads, minutes, 20 April 1945, Appendix A.

annual rate of 100,000 million drachma (about 10 per cent of actual 1946 Government revenue). Even then, a very substantial portion of the population still had to be given its food free. In the spring of 1945 indigents were officially estimated to be about 38 per cent of the total population. The method of determining whether people were indigent was, however, not entirely satisfactory. It was done by local committees appointed by the nomarchs. These committees, however, were given no standard instructions and made their determinations more or less in terms of local whims, unfettered by modern social science theories and concepts. Examination [124] of the criteria adopted revealed that various committees used the following bases for determining who were indigent: (1) those who paid their parish dues; (2) families of soldiers and sailors; (3) war victims; (4) committee members and their relatives; (5) civil servants and pensioners; (6) townspeople as opposed to farmers; (7) everybody; (8) nobody. The following bases were used to determine semi-indigents: (1) at least one person in every family; (2) two thirds of the population picked at random; (3) everybody not classed as totally indigent; (4) all but the very wealthy.

An intensive investigation conducted by UNRRA in one part of the country led to the conclusion that, if a proper and standard system of determination were established, the number of genuinely indigent could be reduced from over 30 per cent of the population to about 18 per cent. This, of course, would again permit a further saving of much-needed Government revenue.

The Mission, working through the Ministry of Welfare, prepared and had adopted on 9 June 1945 Law 388 which established:

(1) A welfare center in each nomos to replace other public or semi-public welfare organizations and to coördinate all state activities in the fields of social welfare and public assistance;

(2) An Administrative Board for each center, to be nominated by the nomarch and to consist of the bishop of the nomos as chairman, the mayor of the principal town, three public employees of high rank, a bank official, and four notable citizens, all appointed for two years, and an UNRRA representative in an advisory capacity;

(3) A director of each center and other staff members to be appointed by, and responsible to, the board;

[124] Welfare Division, Monthly Report, November 1945, p. 4.

(4) Central and branch offices in sufficient number to ensure adequate coverage throughout each nomos.

The law also defined as the first task of each center the determination of indigents in accordance with standards to be established by the Ministry of Welfare. Subsequent decrees and protocols elaborated and explained this law and provided [125] that:

(1) State assistance of every kind, either free of charge or at reduced rates, was to be made available for indigents.

(2) Any person, regardless of age, sex, race, or religion, if neither he nor any member of his family possessed sufficient means, was to be classified as indigent.

(3) All who were able to work were to register at employment agencies.

(4) Parish committees, consisting of the priest, a schoolteacher, and three eminent citizens appointed by the welfare center for two years, were to be established to determine indigency.

(5) An individual was to be considered indigent if his total income was less than one quarter of the estimated cost of full food requirements (rationed food and food that must be purchased in the free market), plus certain other small expense items.

In practice, the parish committees determined indigency in terms of their local knowledge rather than in accord with set formulas; but a standard had been established and some approach to national uniformity was achieved, with the result that the Mission estimate of the possible reduction in indigency rolls was realized.

On 20 January 1946 a new law, No. 836, replaced Law 388. The new law was issued without consultation with the Mission. Though it maintained the basic principles established in the earlier law, it centralized to a very considerable degree the control and operation of the welfare centers. The permanent employees, for example, were made responsible no longer to the local boards but directly to the Ministry of Welfare. This high centralization was considered undesirable by the Mission, but it was unable to prevent the change.[126]

During 1946 certain members of the British Economic Mission, who

[125] Decree No. 214, 21 August 1945; Protocol No. 75196, 27 June 1945; Protocol No. 90969, 22 August 1945; Protocol No. 94745, 5 September 1945; Protocol No. 98852, 25 September 1945; Protocol No. 103701, 23 October 1945.

[126] For a more favorable interpretation of this law, see Pauley, "Public Welfare Services in Greece," p. 530, where it is suggested that the increased centralization invigorated the welfare center staffs.

were anxious to reduce Government spending to as low a level as possible, supported the Ministry of Finance in a policy of reducing grants to the Ministry of Welfare, which resulted in a decrease in the number of employees which that Ministry could maintain and likewise made impossible a national survey of indigency.[127] The Mission considered this a shortsighted policy and was convinced that such a survey would ultimately save the Government far more than it would cost. It proved, however, impossible to have all of the cuts restored, although the basic service was maintained.

Perhaps the attempt of the Mission to introduce into an economically backward country a national welfare system more properly applicable in an advanced, prosperous country was unrealistic. Certain elements in the Greek Government considered the work to have practical value. When it was clear that UNRRA activities were coming to an end, the Ministry of Welfare, on 22 October 1946, addressed a memorandum to the Ministry of Coördination stating,

> Technical advice is proving of value in indicating methods which result in providing more effective service with limited resources. Modern methods of statistical analysis, budgetary control, and establishment of standards for measuring welfare services will assist Greece in using its resources to greatest advantage.[128]

The Ministry continued with a mention of certain activities performed under UNRRA auspices which were definitely and practically aiding the economic recovery of the country. The Ministry paid its tribute to UNRRA by specifically requesting that certain UNRRA employees, including Glen Leet, who headed the UNRRA Welfare Division, should be retained by the Greek Government.[129]

The work of the Mission did succeed in reducing the indigent rolls from over 30 per cent to less than 20 per cent. It did succeed in establishing national criteria applicable to all parts of the country, which, if

[127] Memo, Sir John Nixon (British Economic Mission, Greece) to the Ministry of Finance, "UNRRA Welfare Scheme," 29 August 1946; memo, Glen Leet (Welfare Division, Greece Mission) to Maben, "UNRRA Welfare Scheme," 31 August 1946; with attached memos, Leet to Maben, "Government Food Subsidy," 5 August 1945, and C. Placotaris (Welfare Division, Greece Mission), "Indigent Lists Put in Application by Ministry of Welfare," 23 August 1946; letter, Nixon to Minister of Finance, 2 September 1946.

[128] Memo, Ministry of Welfare to Ministry of Coördination, 22 October 1946.

[129] In fact Glen Leet and Eunice Minton, both of the UNRRA staff, remained as employees of the United Nations in Greece at the request of the Government to ensure continuance of the program.

they did not immediately limit the influence of political connections, did establish standards and methods of approach which were bound to reduce such influence. Finally, it may be said that the work of the Mission created in Greece an awareness of the need for a national approach to the problem of indigency and established a national organization with standard, nationwide criteria to cope with this problem.

8. *HEALTH WORK*

Public health conditions in the widest sense were, of course, poor in liberated Greece.[130] Doctors and nurses were inadequate in number, poorly trained, and lacking in knowledge of modern medical developments. Hospitals and laboratories had been looted and damaged, and lacked necessary equipment. The administrative organizations of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Hygiene had likewise suffered considerably and were hardly in a condition to undertake vigorous recuperative activities.

It was decided to concentrate on assisting the Greek medical personnel to re-establish and help themselves. The principal concentration of effort was, therefore, in the field of medical rehabilitation, with particular emphasis on the preventive and educational aspects of medicine; public health; the reduction and treatment of diseases of national importance; the training and organization of the nursing profession, which was in a particularly backward state; and the provision of such supplies as were essential for these purposes. The underlying principle adopted was that the situation in Greece before the war in respect to medical services should be ignored and that the aim would be to develop services as near as possible to the standards, both in respect of functions and equipment, of a modern Western nation. The general spirit of the UNRRA medical personnel is best exemplified by the comment of one of its members:

> We came to Greece to fight against disease, distress, poverty, and the other expected aftermaths of war. We found that we had as well to fight against laziness, inertia, self-interest, corruption, venality on the part of many of those who had the direction of this nation. A few enemies more or less did not make much difference and we accepted the challenge.[131]

[130] Monographs: Vine, "Historical Notes, Health Division," "Summary of Activities of Health Division"; and others.

[131] Monograph, Vine, "Historical Notes, Health Division," p. 13.

The scope of the work and the organization were both determined by the goals set by the Administration. The Medical Division at Headquarters, Athens, was divided, in order to control activities in the areas of greatest need, into the following sections:

(1) Medical Supply Section [132] to prepare the program of the essential supplies to be imported—apparatus, drugs, hospital supplies, etc.;

(2) Nursing Section to educate and train nurses and to supervise nursing activities in hospitals and clinics—the country was woefully short of both hospital and public health nurses; those few available were inadequately trained, and their profession was not sufficiently respected;

(3) Tuberculosis Section to establish a program for the reduction of one of the three major scourges of the country;

(4) Sanitary Section to aid in the rehabilitation of all sanitary activities but especially to establish programs for the reduction of the other two major scourges: malaria and typhoid;

(5) Nutrition Section [133] to study the problem and to recommend food programs particularly for the so-called "vulnerable" group [134];

(6) Laboratory Section [135] to recommend equipment needed in hospitals, laboratories, and research centers; to encourage the reestablishment of such institutions; to demonstrate the use of imported equipment; and to have translations of recent medical works prepared so that they might be available to the Greek medical profession;

(7) Rehabilitation of the Disabled Section [136] to develop and aid the work of assistance for the disabled of all types, including the blind.

In addition to the Headquarters sections, there were medical officers in all the regions, and specialists were from time to time brought to Greece to assist with particular problems.

Relations with the Ministries of Health and Hygiene in Athens were, with the exception of about six months in 1946 when A. Kalantjakos was Minister of Health, generally friendly. The Ministers changed frequently, which made any continuous policy difficult to maintain.

[132] Monograph, J. L. Wilson, "Medical Supplies Section."

[133] Monographs: Dr. A. Mendeloff, "Analysis of Work of Nutrition Consultant to UNRRA Greece Mission in 1945–1946"; A. Tsongas, "Vulnerable Group Feeding."

[134] See above, Section 4.

[135] Monographs: Dr. V. Cabasso, "Historical Report of the Laboratories Section"; "Section History, Bacteriological Section"; and others.

[136] Monographs: E. Boulter, "Final Report, Rehabilitation of the Blind"; Bell Greve, "Final Report, Rehabilitation of the Disabled."

These Ministries, like others, were full of officials who were appointed for political reasons rather than for technical knowledge and ability. They likewise contained many who were lethargic, who were unwilling to undertake vigorous measures, who resisted new ideas and new methods. There were, on the other hand, officials who were coöperative, energetic, and very helpful.

In the regions the UNRRA health representatives, whether doctors, nurses, or other specialists, established the closest contact with the Greek medical profession and with the Greek people in general. They became members of local medical societies and actively participated in Greek life, thus obtaining considerable knowledge of the country and its conditions and, at the same time, being in a position to spread, where it was most needed, a knowledge of modern methods and to encourage and even to insist upon energetic, practical action. On this regional level, relations with the Government and, even more important, relations with the Greek people in all walks of life were extremely cordial and conducive to the accomplishment of many improvements in the health conditions of the country.

The ultimate objective of the Nursing Section, under the direction of Miss O. Baggalley, was to increase the number of Greek nurses and to improve the quality of their services.[137] A program was adopted to make immediately available partly trained so-called "practical nurses" to fill the gap until more fully trained persons could be ready. Altogether, more than 1,000 were directly instructed by the UNRRA staff and were prepared for hospital and clinical work. The UNRRA staff also devoted themselves to the reopening of child welfare, tuberculosis, prenatal, and other clinics under the various organizations which had directed them before the war but which were, at the time of liberation, in a state of almost complete disorganization. Finally, they worked to improve the status of nurses, who had occupied a position similar to that of domestic servants and not in any sense one that a trained person might expect to hold. The UNRRA workers discovered an old but forgotten law, which they improved and extended and had approved by successive Ministers of Health. It constitutes what may well be called a nurses' charter, and its adoption would undoubtedly be an important step in elevating and improving

[137] Monographs: O. Baggalley, "Special Progress Report, Nursing Section"; J. Hiller, "Special Historical Report"; P. Keene, "Final Report, Nursing Educational Consultant."

in Greece the medical profession as a whole. Unfortunately, the Government continually found excuses for delaying its formal passage.

The elimination of the basic underlying causes of tuberculosis—malnutrition, overcrowding, poverty, low standards of living—was clearly beyond the scope of the Health Division. Any effective program had to be a long-term one involving a fundamental reorganization of the economic structure of the country. It was not, therefore, a program that readily appealed to the Greek Government, which was not particularly anxious to reform the economic structure and preferred the type of activity that produced quick and obvious results.

UNRRA's work in this field, conducted under the able direction of Dr. J. B. McDougall, undoubtedly one of the outstanding tuberculosis authorities in the world, concentrated on the attempt, by teaching and example, to raise the level of treatment of tuberculosis on the broadest scale, to improve diagnostic standards, and to introduce a modern system of mass X-ray, for which purpose much UNRRA equipment was brought to Greece. The development of diagnostic and treatment dispensaries and the augmentation of the woefully limited bed accommodations were likewise pushed. The Mission further encouraged the founding of volunteer societies to study the disease, attempted to coördinate efforts to combat it, and tried to spread sound and accurate knowledge of proper antituberculosis measures.[138]

Work in connection with both typhoid and malaria was somewhat different, since the Greeks themselves had before the war studied these diseases and had already introduced attempts to combat them. Since relatively quicker and more spectacular results were possible, Government coöperation was greater. The causes of typhoid and allied diseases were, on the whole, well understood in Greece, and the problem, generally speaking, reduced itself to one of poor hygiene and poor water supply. UNRRA engineers and nurses spread knowledge of proper hygiene, and, with the assistance of UNRRA supplies, UNRRA engineers improved drainage systems, sank new wells, and helped to develop pure water systems wherever possible.

The major work of the Sanitation Section, however, was the fight, ably conducted by Colonel D. E. Wright, United States Public Health Service on loan to UNRRA, against malaria, one of the greatest curses

[138] Dr. J. B. McDougall, "Tuberculosis in Greece: an Experiment in the Relief and Rehabilitation of a Country," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization,* I, No. 1 (1947–1948), 103–196.

of Greece.[139] In normal years the disease affected more than 1 million and in epidemic years more than 2 million people. Work began in the latter part of 1945, was pushed vigorously through 1946, and plans were prepared to permit continuation of the work under Greek auspices in 1947 and succeeding years. This work encountered all the usual obstacles of lack of materials, inertia, and resistance. During one period of 1946 it was nearly wrecked, as was most of the Mission's health work, by the uncoöperative and even openly hostile attitude of the then Minister of Health. In addition, certain special obstacles had to be overcome, such as fear that the work would result in the wholesale destruction of bees, fish, and farm animals. Before the work was completed, however, the Mission had obtained the wholehearted and even enthusiastic support of the Greek people.

Spraying by hand, with oil, Paris green, and similar materials, was started in 1945 and was then pushed throughout 1946 with DDT solutions. Much of this work was done by volunteer Greek labor. This program was supplemented in 1946 by airplane spraying which proved particularly effective. Airplanes, as well as the sprays, were supplied by UNRRA. They were flown by Greek Army pilots, operating on the instructions and under the direction of an UNRRA pilot. The Greek Government contributed local funds and some personnel and the Greek War Relief Association, funds. The results were extraordinarily successful. It has been reliably estimated that the current levels of malaria as a result of this program are no greater than 10 to 15 per cent of prewar levels. It can justly be said that malaria has been reduced from a major economic problem in Greece to one of minor significance. This accomplishment alone would justify the UNRRA work in Greece.

There were, however, still further beneficial results of this work. Not only were mosquitoes largely eliminated but also various other insects, such as flies, bedbugs, cockroaches. The near elimination of flies had the effect of reducing the incidence of typhoid fever and

[139] Monographs: Dr. G. Lividas, "Review of the Malaria Problem and Malaria Control Activities in Modern Greece"; Major Gordon Smith, "Report on the Uses of DDT in Greece—1946"; Colonel D. E. Wright, "Report on the Activities of the Sanitation Section"; Dr. J. M. Vine, "The Anti-Malaria Campaign in Greece (1946)," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, I, No. 1 (1947–1948), 197–204; and "Malaria Control on a National Scale, Greece, 1946," speech delivered to the Epidemiological Section of the Royal Society of Medicine, 28 March 1947, to appear in *Proceedings* of the Society.

dysentery. Spraying destroyed to a large extent the Dacus fly, one of the principal dangers to olive culture, also the tent caterpillar, and at least one kind of aphis on apples. Hand and airplane spraying was supplemented by the use of 26 per cent DDT emulsion in lime for whitewashing houses. As the whitewashing of homes is a Greek tradition in the villages, it is a particularly effective method of attacking the insect problem. It was proved that with proper care and correct solutions, noxious insects could be destroyed with a minimum loss of bees and virtually no loss of fish. The example set was of immediate and permanent benefit to Greece and should, because of its demonstration of practical, effective methods, be of benefit to many other communities in the world.

These represent only the major accomplishments of the UNRRA Health Division. One example of the many other activities was the trachoma experiment.[140] This disease affected about 10 per cent of the children of the country and frequently resulted in blindness. Treatments used had been painful and had seldom produced any definite cure. The UNRRA Chief Bacteriologist, Dr. V. Cabasso, had been associated with the experimental work on trachoma carried on by the Pasteur Institute in Tunis. In 1946 he procured, as a gift, from the Roussel Laboratories of Paris, a new sulfamide salt, Lutazol, which had been developed at the Institute. An official committee, with representatives of the Ministry of Hygiene, was created to conduct a trial on some fifty trachomatous orphans. The trial was directed by the official ophthalmologist of the Ministry and conducted under the supervision of an UNRRA nurse. The results were extremely beneficial and left no doubt as to the value of the treatment.

One of the problems confronting the Health Division was the tendency of the Greeks to rely on UNRRA personnel for the conduct of operations. This personnel was quite willing to do the work and to assume responsibility, but it was fully realized that, if too much were done by the imported staff, there would be serious results when UNRRA came to an end. Every effort, therefore, short of neglect of operations, was made to bring Greeks into active participation. The trachoma experiment was an example of this policy. In that case it was insisted that the work be done by the Greeks. The malaria campaign

[140] Monograph, Dr. R. E. Dax, "Report on the Demonstration of Treatment of Trachoma with Lutazol and Ophtazol."

was another example. There it was insisted that a Greek opposite number be provided for every UNRRA person engaged in the direction of operations. The political interference of the Ministry of Health frequently made this difficult and resulted in constant changes of personnel. Nevertheless, a substantial number of people were trained, thus assuring the continuance of the work after the UNRRA period. A similar policy was pursued in all other activities of the Division.

There can be no doubt that an immense amount of useful work was accomplished, useful both immediately and for the future. Under the best of circumstances the results achieved would have been remarkable; in the actual circumstances they were truly astonishing. It is typical, however, of the modest but enthusiastic approach of the very able group of doctors and nurses whom UNRRA was fortunate enough to obtain that the Director, Dr. J.M. Vine, who performed outstanding services, commented at the conclusion of his work: "Looking back on it all we think that . . . our combined efforts have not shown a complete defeat but rather that we have left the Greeks with something to think about." [141]

9. *ACHIEVEMENTS*

In Greece, UNRRA was more deeply involved in the life and activities of the Government and the people than in any other country. For this reason it encountered more difficulties and problems than elsewhere. Mistakes were undoubtedly made. There were unquestionably cases of inefficiency and even of corruption (these, however, were remarkably few considering the temptations).[142] The Mission certainly failed to reform the Government, and it did not succeed in establishing in Greece a wholly enlightened efficient administrative system. It was, however, keenly aware of the lethargy, inefficiency, and corruption affecting the activities of the Greek Government. Against these, it fought strongly and continuously [143] and achieved some successes.

[141] Monograph, Vine, "Historical Notes, Health Division," p. 13.

[142] Letter, Lewis to Rooks, AG.6/.11/2/X, 20 August 1947, with attached "Report on Greek Mission" prepared by Arthur Cohen, etc.

[143] "Distribution Observation Report, May 1946"; R. Herbert, "Report on Visit to Greek Mission, 15th/23d November 1945"; letter, Richard Lippincott (Assistant to Chief, Greece Mission) to Grigorios Kassimatis (Minister of Finance), 10 November 1945; letter, Lehman to James F. Byrnes (United States Secretary of State), 28 January 1946; etc.

To its credit were three definite accomplishments:

(1) The Greek people and the nation were quite literally kept alive by the contribution of UNRRA supplies and by the hard, practical work of hundreds of UNRRA employees without whom the supplies would never have reached the Greek people.

(2) Certain permanent improvements, notably in the field of health, were wrought in the country, again by UNRRA supplies and workers.

(3) The Greek people and Government were made aware by UNRRA example, practice, and advice that certain problems must be approached on a national basis with national standards and can be most effectively handled if technical competence is to the greatest possible extent substituted for political connections.

Perhaps the fairest estimate of the UNRRA work in Greece is to be found in a letter from James F. Byrnes, no admirer of UNRRA, when, as United States Secretary of State, he wrote to Governor Lehman:

> In the history of Greece since its liberation, UNRRA has played a vital role. The organization of which you are Director General has stood between the mass of the Greek people and starvation. There is absolutely no doubt whatsoever that had it not been for the expert manner in which UNRRA has brought essential supplies to Greece, conditions in that country would be infinitely worse than they are today.[144]

[144] Letter, Byrnes to Lehman, 22 March 1946.

III. Yugoslavia

1. *POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND*

ALTHOUGH Marshal Tito and his Partisan forces had liberated sections of Yugoslavia from the Germans prior to the establishment of UNRRA, more than a year elapsed before the much-needed relief could be brought to the devastated country. During this period Marshal Tito, in spite of opposition within and without, achieved control of Yugoslavia, first in coalition with and then replacing the exiled Royal Yugoslav Government which had signed the UNRRA Agreement and participated in the First Session of the Council. The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia was proclaimed 29 November 1944, more than thirteen months after the Partisans had liberated Belgrade and about five months before the Allied victory. Yugoslavia was not freed from remnants of the invading armies, however, before July 1945.[1]

Four years of occupation, resistance, and civil war had destroyed the partial self-sufficiency of the country. Yugoslavia's ability to feed its people had depended upon varied forms of transportation, as the main food producing area was restricted to the fertile basins of the Danube, Sava, and Tisa rivers. West and south of this region, a section extending the length of the country had been normally self-sufficient in foodstuffs except in the city areas. The lands running farther south and west of these parts, including the Adriatic coast and most of the mountainous regions of Bosnia, Hercegovina, and Montenegro, as well as part of Macedonia, had never met their food needs, relying before the war on large imports of grains from the eastern agricultural belt.[2] Here in the fall of 1944 there was actual starvation.[3] The

[1] Operational Analysis Papers (OAP) 29, *Distribution of UNRRA Supplies in Jugoslavia* (London, 1947), p. 2.

[2] *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA, Report Presented by the Director General to the Secretary General of the United Nations,* prepared by the Economic Adviser of UNRRA (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 44.

[3] Subcommittee of the Committee on Supplies (on Ability to Pay) (CS-CFC/AP) (44)12, memo, "Yugoslavia's Ability to Pay," 15 December 1944, p. 3.

retreating armies and resistance forces had damaged not only the source of supplies, through heavy destruction of farm buildings, agricultural machinery, draft animals, and other livestock, but had caused almost complete paralysis of the transport system.[4]

This was the most serious aspect of the war damage in Yugoslavia. The arteries through which deficit areas were fed and the major means for carrying exports to European countries had been destroyed. About 57 per cent of the standard-gauge railroad running through the Danube valley, which made connections with the main lines of Italy, Trieste, Austria, Hungary, and Rumania in the north and with those of Greece and Bulgaria in the south, and of the narrow-gauge roads extending from the fertile lands over the mountains to the coast were useless for traffic.[5] Three quarters of the large bridges, many mountain tunnels, major repair shops, and about half the rolling stock had been destroyed. Civilian motor traffic had been reduced to about 200 trucks, and the road system was seriously damaged; water transport had also suffered; about 30 per cent of the prewar cargo capacity of Yugoslav ships and only two small Dalmatian ports remained usable when UNRRA began operations.[6]

Although 77 per cent of the Yugoslav people had been engaged in agriculture before the war, the remaining population had produced about half of the national income. All the industries in which they worked—the sawmills and processed wood factories, the coal and nonferrous metal mines, the hundreds of small engineering and artisan workshops, the textile mills—suffered complete or partial destruction. The large iron mine producing 90 per cent of the prewar output of ore, together with all blast furnaces and rolling mills, was put out of action. On liberation six of the seven large power stations were unable to operate.[7]

These facts in addition to the great loss of manpower (estimated at 1,000,000 [8]) meant that Yugoslavia could not hope to maintain her population in the deficit areas nor regain her prewar favorable trade balance without help from outside sources. Her chief exports, timber,

[4] *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA*, pp. 43, 50–51.
[5] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia* (London, 1947), p. 16.
[6] *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA*, pp. 51–52.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 52.
[8] CS-CFC/AP(44)12, memo, "Yugoslavia Ability to Pay," p. 1. At the end of the war the estimate reached 1,685,000, or 10 per cent of the population, *Journal*, Third Council, p. 73.

minerals, and grain,[9] could not be produced without foreign materials and motor power.

2. *AGREEMENTS*

UNRRA's operation in Yugoslavia developed within the framework of three agreements: the Cairo Agreement of 3 April 1944 between UNRRA and the Allied Military Headquarters (Balkans);[10] the Agreement between the Yugoslav authorities and SACMED (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations), 19 January 1945; and the UNRRA Agreement with the Government of Yugoslavia of 24 March 1945.[11]

The Cairo Agreement led at once to active preparations by the Administration for its work as agent of the military during the period of military responsibility in Yugoslavia. Officers and technical staff were recruited to do the preliminary planning for the Mission within the Balkan Mission in Cairo during the summer of 1944.[12] In August, the Acting Chief, an Australian national, Alan Hall, moved an advance group to Bari, Italy, where as observers during the forthcoming negotiations between ML (Yugoslavia) and the Yugoslav authorities they awaited directives to enter Yugoslavia.[13]

Such negotiations were imperative. The Yugoslavs, who with Soviet help were expelling the German invaders, considered the Cairo Agreement an infringement on "the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state." Not only had no Yugoslav Government participated in its negotiation, on the assumption that the Allied military forces would both liberate the Balkan nations and provide civilian relief during the period of military operations, but such relief appeared to mean interference with the national administration of the country through the control of distribution by foreign military and UNRRA observers.[14]

This question of the power and number of foreign observers needed to ensure an equitable distribution of relief in Yugoslavia became an

[9] CS-CFC/AP(44)12, memo, "Yugoslavia's Ability to Pay," p. 8, Appendix Three; League of Nations, *Europe's Trade* (Geneva, 1941), pp. 110–111.

[10] See Part Five, Chapter I; Appendix Six, Section I, Document 1*a*.

[11] Appendix Seven, Document 15*a*.

[12] See Part Five, Chapter I.

[13] Balkan Mission Report, August 1944; memo, Hall to Sir William Matthews (Chief, Balkan Mission), "Yugoslav Mission," 1 September 1944.

[14] Letters, Rudolf Bicanic (Council member for Yugoslavia) to Lehman, 30 September, 6 October 1944.

immediate issue in the discussions at Bari. The Yugoslavs wished to handle distribution themselves. While they struggled with the military authorities for three tedious months to reach a compromise,[15] UNRRA's agreement with their representatives was taking shape in Washington and London.

Marshal Tito himself appealed to Lehman in April, asserting his country's right to immediate relief and asking for the representation of the National Liberation Committee (NLC) in the Council.[16] The coalition cabinet (formed in July 1944), in which NLC held several posts, made the grant of the latter request possible, and its delegate, Rudolf Bicanic, replaced the former Government-in-exile representative, Constantin Fotitch, at the Council Session in Montreal. Immediate relief, however, depended on the decision of the Allied military authorities. This fact was stressed when Lehman, urged by V. A. Klentsov (the USSR Council member) to send immediate relief to Tito's liberated areas via USSR transport from Bari,[17] and by a plea for help from a member of the coalition cabinet, S. Kosanovitch,[18] asked the Combined Civil Affairs Committee to consider increasing the volume of supplies then being sent to Yugoslavia by the military authorities.[19] His proposal came to nothing; operational regulations at the time and the limited ability of the Partisans to accept supplies made it impossible.[20] The military authorities, however, stationed two supply ships at Bari in November awaiting agreement with the Yugoslavs regarding distribution during the military period.[21] Although starvation was known to be increasing in Dalmatia, these ships were never unloaded. A small schooner, however, brought a few supplies to Yugoslavia in December.[22]

Negotiations ended in the agreement of 19 January 1945 between the

[15] Memo, A. H. Robertson (General Counsel's Office, European Regional Office [ERO]) to Director General *et al.*, 30 November 1944, enclosing "Summary of Negotiations at Bari."

[16] Memo, Tito to the Council of UNRRA, 2 April 1944.

[17] Meetings, Director General with Klentsov, 5, 14 July 1944.

[18] Meeting, Director General with Kosanovitch and Franges (Chargé d'Affaires for Yugoslav Government), 19 July 1944.

[19] Letter, Lehman to John J. McCloy (Chairman, Combined Civil Affairs Committee), 11 August 1944.

[20] Letter, McCloy to Lehman, 28 September 1944.

[21] Memo, Robertson to Lehman, *et al.*, 30 November 1944, enclosing "Summary of Negotiations at Bari."

[22] Interview, Grace E. Fox with George Perazich (former Director, Industrial Rehabilitation Division, Yugoslav Mission), 4 May 1949.

Yugoslav authorities and SACMED. This was designed to lead easily into the period of UNRRA's responsibility. ML was to deliver supplies to Yugoslav authorities at ports mutually determined. No more than 300 ML and UNRRA officers and staff were to enter Yugoslavia. Yugoslav organs only were to distribute relief supplies. To ML and the UNRRA staff the Yugoslavs promised all facilities to observe the process of distribution throughout their country. Their task was then to make recommendations to ML Headquarters and to give expert advice on distribution problems.

Meanwhile, the Yugoslav representatives and UNRRA had reached a satisfactory basis for an agreement. The negotiations, begun by Rudolf Bicanic in Washington [23] following the first request of his Government for an agreement with the Administration on 17 October 1944,[24] had been continued in London in December where Lehman discussed the controversial issues with Kosanovitch, member of the Yugoslav Cabinet, and General Vladimir Velebit, a representative of Tito. Although an understanding was obtained regarding the place of transfer of title, the acceptance of observers, and the disposition of proceeds of sale, the Yugoslavs advised Lehman to delay further negotiations until the agreement could be concluded with a "United Yugoslav Government." [25]

The establishment of the Regency in March 1945 apparently fulfilled this requirement. Upon an invitation from the new Yugoslav Government,[26] Roy F. Hendrickson, Deputy Director General for Supply at Headquarters, flew to Belgrade where on 24 March he and Nikola Petrovic, the Minister of Commerce and Supply, signed the UNRRA-Yugoslav Agreement, which followed the usual pattern.[27] About three weeks earlier the Subcommittee on Ability to Pay had recommended that Yugoslavia be declared unable to pay for its relief supplies [28] in

[23] Meeting, senior staff members with Bicanic, 18 October 1944.

[24] Meeting, Director General with Bicanic and Franges, 17 November 1944.

[25] Monograph, Charlotte Lloyd, "Negotiation of the UNRRA-Yugoslav Agreement," p. 14; Central Committee (CC)(45)5, Report of the Director General to the Central Committee, 25 January 1945 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], I, 78).

[26] Monograph, Lloyd, "Negotiation of UNRRA-Yugoslav Agreement," p. 15; cable, Washington to Cairo 330, 10 March 1945.

[27] Cable, Caserta to Washington unnumbered, 25 March 1945; see *infra*, Appendix Seven, Document 15*a*.

[28] CS-CFC/AP(45)8, minutes 7th meeting, 2 March 1945.

view of the evidence submitted by the Yugoslav Government and the Administration.[29]

3. *THE UNRRA MISSION*

The ML period, 19 January–15 April 1945, held both advantages and liabilities for the UNRRA Mission. Arrangements agreed upon in a letter between the Commander, ML (Yugoslavia), and Alan Hall, Acting Chief of Mission,[30] gave the UNRRA staff both the authority and the independence necessary to prepare them for the assumption of full relief responsibility within a short time.[31] About 50 UNRRA Headquarters and technical supply personnel among the ML total of 300 gained preliminary experience with field conditions and contact with Yugoslav authorities, particularly in the cases of the divisions which took over early the work of ML branches (Agriculture, 7 March; Health, 21 March; Supply, 25 March). On the other hand, the lack of field coördination, except from Split Headquarters, among the ML and UNRRA observers meant that representatives of both groups tended to appear seriatim in the same town on the same day, asking the same questions, thus arousing the suspicion of the local people. The uncontrolled use of the 300 passes issued to ML made the Government uneasy, since it had no way of knowing who had entered the country or what they were doing. The ML supply program further disappointed the Yugoslavs.[32] A general distrust of UNRRA personnel as agents of the military resulted, which was difficult for the UNRRA Mission to overcome.[33]

Gradually, UNRRA regional offices were set up at the capitals of each of the federal states of Yugoslavia—Zagreb (Croatia), Ljubljana (Slovenia), Sarajevo (Bosnia and Hercegovina), Skoplje (Macedonia), Cetinje (Montenegro)—with a subregional office at Split for

[29] CS-CFC/AP(44)12, memo, "Yugoslavia's Ability to Pay," 15 November 1944; CS-CFC/AP(44)14, "Memo on Foreign Exchange Position of Yugoslavia," 22 December 1944.

[30] Letters: Hall to Brigadier C. G. Forestier-Walker (Commander, ML [Yugoslavia]), 24 January 1945; Forestier-Walker to Hall, 26 January 1945.

[31] Cable, Cairo to Washington 105, 30 January 1945.

[32] Monograph, M. Barratt-Brown, "Office of Chief of Mission," pp. 28–32; Supplement to Mission Monthly Report, March 1945, pp. 7–8.

[33] Letter, Hall to Joel Gordon (Chief, Yugoslav Branch, Bureau of Areas), 15 May 1945; cable, Belgrade to London B/297, 31 May 1945.

Dalmatia and the Lika. The regional office for Serbia operated out of Mission headquarters at Belgrade. Port offices were also established, first at Dubrovnik, Split, and Sibenik, and then, as operations developed, at Trieste, Susak/Fiume, and Salonika; and procurement offices, at Rome, Leghorn, and Paris.[34]

A near-standard UNRRA Mission took shape slowly in Belgrade. Although a small group of UNRRA staff had been in residence since 4 April,[35] the long anticipated Chief of Mission, Michail Alexseevitch Sergeichic,[36] did not assume control until 19 May. A USSR citizen and a civil engineer, Sergeichic had been during the war an executive officer in a USSR Government agency in Iran handling supplies for the Soviet military authorities.[37] He was somewhat handicapped by an almost complete lack of knowledge of English, but his ability at internal organization, his zeal in undertaking his work, and his competence in dealing with the Yugoslav authorities were from the beginning appreciated.[38]

Throughout the Mission, however, there was a shortage of competent personnel, especially in the Department of Finance and Administration. Directors of Accounts and Personnel changed frequently, leading to instability of policy.[39] There was also a large turnover in local personnel owing to recruitment of people whose appointments the Yugoslav Government later refused to confirm.[40] Extreme cases of irregularity developed in the Leghorn and Trieste Offices, resulting in the dismissal of both executive officers.[41] At its peak in August 1946 the staff numbered 518 persons: 148 Class I representing 16

[34] For details, see monographs prepared on each office.

[35] Monograph, Barratt-Brown, "Office of Chief of Mission," p. 32.

[36] Meeting, Director General with Kosanovitch and Velebit, London, 20 December 1944; Yugoslav Mission, minutes Directors' meeting, 25 March 1945; meeting, Director General with Klentsov, 26 April 1945.

[37] Lehman in United States Congress, 79th, 1 Session, Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on House Joint Resolution Making Appropriations for UNRRA for the Fiscal Year 1946* (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 35.

[38] Letter, Richard C. Patterson, Jr. (United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia) to United States Secretary of State, 4 June 1945; cable, London to Washington 2028, 11 July 1945; interview, Fox with Perazich, 4 May 1949.

[39] Monographs: D. H. Rosser, "Department of Finance and Administration," Appendix I; Thomas F. Fiddes, "Division of Accounts," pp. 8–15; Mary C. Cozens-Hardy, "Division of Personnel," pp. 8–28.

[40] Monograph, Barratt-Brown, "Office of Chief of Mission," p. 34.

[41] Full documentation of these cases where men used their position in UNRRA to increase their private fortunes, but not through the use of UNRRA funds, are in the Yugoslav Mission files; see Mission Index.

nationalities, and 370 Class II.[42] The one unique feature in the structure of the Mission was the office of Field Operations and Distribution, set up 14 September 1945 directly under Sergeichic.[43] Given the main responsibility for liaison with the Government on matters of distribution and for the observation of the distribution of UNRRA supplies throughout the country,[44] it was never fully accepted by the Department of Supply, which questioned the independence of an office so closely related to its work.[45]

The Mission dealt with the Government through the Foreign Trade Department of the Ministry of Commerce and Supply in Belgrade. Here a Bureau of Special Studies (Zavod Za Vanredno Nabavke, generally called the Zavod or ZZVN) was established. Through the Zavod, and in discussion with the ministries concerned, the Mission had to establish joint UNRRA-Yugoslav formal supply programs, arrange for the reception and clearance of supplies at Yugoslav ports, and obtain permits necessary for each trip made by a staff member within the country.[46] Zavod officials represented the Central Government in every federal state, working with UNRRA regional officers on all distribution problems.

Zavod representatives also played an important part in the procurement of supplies abroad. They were attached to the Yugoslav Embassies in London and Washington, and dealt with the purchase of supplies. They worked alongside the Mission representatives at Headquarters and ERO, coördinating the views of the Government, the Mission, UNRRA Headquarters or ERO, and the manufacturers. They attended the important supply conferences. Their ability to make immediate decisions for their Government led to the procurement of supply items which might have been lost in the time necessary to consult Belgrade.[47]

4. *UNRRA SERVICES*

The Yugoslavs were primarily interested in supplies, not services. They wished to establish their own social services and welfare schemes

[42] Monograph, Cozens-Hardy, "Division of Personnel," Appendix V.
[43] Yugoslav Mission, Administrative Order 63, 14 September 1945.
[44] Yugoslav Mission, Administrative Order 91, 12 December 1945.
[45] Monographs: Barratt-Brown, "Office of Chief of Mission," pp. 36–39; W. E. Johns, "Bureau of Supply," pp. 10–11.
[46] Monograph, Barratt-Brown, "Office of Chief of Mission," p. 32.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

along their own lines. They wanted foreign help only in the form of supplies—food, special foods for children, clothing, beds and bedding for institutions. Hence the numerous welfare experts and displaced persons specialists recruited for the UNRRA Mission were required for a short time only, to prepare and justify a program of supplies.[48] A small health services program was, however, provided. UNRRA furnished the weapons to attack typhus in the intensive campaign of 1946 and the equipment to fight malaria in Macedonia.[49] The Administration's main contribution in this field lay, however, in the plastic surgery program, in sanitary engineering supplies,[50] and in hospital supplies. Three plastic surgery teams sent out under UNRRA auspices by the United Kingdom Ministry of Health taught Yugoslav doctors and directed or performed operations on more than a thousand young men between November 1945 and January 1947, which aroused the enthusiasm of the Government and appreciation of UNRRA throughout the country. Marshal Tito himself visited the clinic.[51] The installation of hospital units and the partial restoration of worn-out equipment in strategic places meant life for thousands of people.[52] In Macedonia alone UNRRA increased the prewar number of hospitals from 9 to 17, which meant the provision of 1,700 beds as against 869.[53] The medical and sanitation programs, hindered as usual by slow deliveries,[54] were UNRRA's smallest contribution to the relief of Yugoslavia.

5. *REHABILITATION OF TRANSPORT*

The success of UNRRA's relief program in Yugoslavia depended upon the speed with which the seriously damaged transport system could be restored for emergency use. Distribution of supplies to starv-

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 51–52.

[49] Monograph, K. W. C. Sinclair-Loutit, "Office of Relief Services and Health Supplies," pp. 16–18.

[50] Monograph, Captain M. A. Shapiro, "Sanitary Engineering Section."

[51] Monograph, O. T. Mansfield, Dr. R. Davies, and Angela Sinclair-Loutit, "Plastic Surgery"; Plastic Surgery Register, theater operations to January 1947 of Maxillofacial Unit.

[52] Yugoslav Mission, Survey of Distribution of UNRRA Supplies, January–May 1946, Section XI.

[53] Monograph, Perry Gangloff, "Macedonia—Period March 1946–December 1946," p. 12.

[54] Monographs: K. W. C. Sinclair-Loutit, "Office of Relief Services and Health Supplies," p. 42; Sybil Dinaburg, "The Medical and Sanitation Program for Yugoslavia," HQ.

ing people in deficiency areas and the stockpiling of food in mountain districts isolated from supply centers during the winter months were contingent upon the improvisation of an adequate long-distance road-haulage system. This involved repairs to bridges and roads as well as the supply of vehicles, spare parts, maintenance equipment, tires, and petroleum products. Draft animals were also necessary for roadless sections and the steep mountain passes. With characteristic energy the Yugoslavs had begun the temporary restoration of their roads and bridges in 1944 in the wake of the retreating armies,[55] but the final, systematic devastation carried out by the Germans in addition to the Partisans' deliberate destruction of all enemy communications [56] meant that UNRRA had a struggle against time to meet the ever-increasing relief needs of Yugoslavia.

In April 1945 the two usable ports, Split and Dubrovnik, had a monthly import capacity of 25,000 tons, while Yugoslavia's needs represented between 100,000 and 150,000 tons per month. Furthermore, neither railway lines nor sufficient truck transport were in condition to deliver the goods into the interior. The Yugoslavs urged the use of Trieste because of its rail connections with Belgrade.[57] Not only were all forms of transportation essential but arrangements for storage and warehouse clearances, skilled drivers, mechanics, and traffic controllers had to be obtained before port congestion would cease to menace the relief program.[58]

Progress was spectacular. By 31 May 1945 total supplies taken over by UNRRA from ML amounted to only 16,000 tons.[59] The first UNRRA ship arrived late in June.[60] Direct communications were re-established between Belgrade and Split and Dubrovnik [61] on 30 June. By mid-July two other Yugoslav ports were in use, making the monthly import capacity of the Dalmatian landings 100,000 tons per month.[62] Trieste had also been opened on 7 July with facilities for handling 30,000 tons monthly—a figure which reached 86,000 tons in Decem-

[55] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia*, p. 14.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[57] Letter, P. M. Nikezich (Chief, Bureau of Special Studies) to UNRRA Mission, 1048, 31 May 1945; OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia*, pp. 26–27.
[58] Yugoslav Mission, minutes Directors' meeting, 4 May 1945.
[59] Committee of the Council for Europe (CCE) (45)73.
[60] Cable, Belgrade to Washington unnumbered, 24 June 1945.
[61] Yugoslav Mission, minutes Directors' meeting, 30 June 1945.
[62] Cable, Belgrade to Washington 171, 16 July 1945; monograph, Mary Rosser, "Shipping Division," pp. 6–7.

ber. To meet the serious food situation in Macedonia in 1946 arrangements were made for the discharge of one Liberty ship a month at Salonika; this continued until August. Varna was also used for a few weeks during that period.[63]

With the port capacity problem under control in July 1945, trucks were the next necessity to defeat the winter in the deficit areas. Deliveries were at first slow. Through both the military authorities and UNRRA only 1,203 trucks had reached Yugoslavia in July.[64] Road conditions were hazardous. Tires lasted an average of 5,000 miles. Fuel requirements were 10,000 tons monthly.[65] The Yugoslavs pleaded their needs at Rome [66] and in London.[67] By September UNRRA deliveries of trucks reached 2,000 and 4,000 more were expected.[68] In October an average of 100 arrived daily.[69] Ten thousand had reached Yugoslavia by the end of 1945,[70] and UNRRA had achieved its initial goal.[71] Through the use of these trucks about 100,000 tons of UNRRA supplies were distributed throughout the country.[72] Road vehicles provided by UNRRA eventually reached a total of 15,171,[73] more than twice the prewar number, necessary, however, because of the still unreplaced losses of draft animals and river craft.[74]

Spare parts for repairs were in continuous demand.[75] Seventy per cent of the 10,000 trucks delivered in 1945 had been used by the Allied armies before their purchase by UNRRA. Their efficiency was further impaired by the condition of the Yugoslav roads and abuse by inexperienced drivers. Consequent immobilization was frequent; distribution of supplies suffered accordingly. UNRRA's ability to secure sufficient spare parts was never adequate for the need.[76]

[63] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia,* pp. 28–29; monograph, Rosser, "Shipping Division," p. 7.

[64] *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA,* p. 53.

[65] Yugoslav Mission, minutes Directors' meeting, 8 September 1945.

[66] Supply conference, Rome, minutes of meetings, 6–10 July 1945; cable, London to Washington 2028 (PP), 11 July 1945. [67] *Journal,* Third Council, pp. 22–23.

[68] Yugoslav Mission, minutes Directors' meeting, 8 September 1945.

[69] Cable, Belgrade to Washington 911, 26 October 1945.

[70] *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA,* p. 53.

[71] Cable, Rome to Washington 509, 10 July 1945.

[72] *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA,* p. 53.

[73] Industrial Rehabilitation Division, "Final Report of Shipments from All Areas as of February 29, 1948."

[74] *Ibid.;* OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia,* p. 57.

[75] Yugoslav Mission, minutes Directors' meeting, 8 December 1945.

[76] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia,* pp. 41–42; monograph, Barbara Kerr, "Division of Industrial Rehabilitation," pp. 41–44.

Petroleum products were equally important for the truck fleet. Supplies imported from Rumania via the Danube were not available as in prewar days. Allied military responsibility for these products came to an end 1 November 1945. Yugoslavia's requirements at the close of 1945 approximated 20,000 tons per month. A temporary road transport crisis arose during that winter owing to difficulties when UNRRA took over procurement from military stocks.[77] On 27 February 80 per cent of transport in Dubrovnik, Split, and Sibenik was at a standstill. Deliveries in March began to make good these deficiencies, and further holdups in transport from lack of fuel were averted.[78] UNRRA brought a total of $9,985,945 in liquid fuels and lubricants into Yugoslavia.[79]

Replacement of essential rail transport also moved ahead. For this UNRRA contributed a total of 237 locomotives including shunting engines, 855 railway cars, and spare parts valued at about 2 million dollars.[80]

When UNRRA assumed relief responsibilities in Yugoslavia only the single-track Belgrade-Nis railroad and a few of its branches were in working order. All of the Danube and most of the Sava bridges were down. Sarajevo could be reached only by a long haul with transshipment of supplies from rail to road or vice versa at three points.[81] Less than two years later Yugoslavia was reunited as an economic whole. At least 90 per cent of the railway lines were in operation, including the main international line and two transverse lines from the coast.[82]

This represented tremendous energy on the part of the Yugoslavs and ingenuity in their choice of import priorities. As the Germans withdrew, they began the repair of bridges, at least temporarily, with the aid of military bridging imported by UNRRA or with local wood and salvaged steel. By October 1945 about half the destroyed bridges were again in use. During that year the total movement of rail traffic approached 50 per cent of the prewar volume.[83] Salt could again

[77] Cable, Belgrade to Washington 504, 2 February 1946.

[78] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia*, pp. 43–44; monograph, Kerr, "Division of Industrial Rehabilitation," pp. 26–27.

[79] Industrial Rehabilitation Division, "Final Report of Shipments from All Areas as of February 29, 1948."

[80] *Ibid.*

[81] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia*, p. 13.

[82] *Ibid.*; *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA*, p. 53.

[83] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia*, pp. 13, 15; *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA*, p. 53.

be sent from Tuzla to the areas in need: food was carried from the rich lands of Voivodina to starving Montenegro and coal from the Bosnian mines to Belgrade.[84] Steady progress continued in 1946. Railway bridges repaired reached 78 per cent.[85] Rail connections of some sort were established between all the main centers of northern Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, but connections with the Dalmatian coast remained inadequate.[86]

UNRRA established an Inland Transport Division within the Supply Department in April 1946 to handle the heavy transport operations for UNRRA goods. Branch offices were opened at Ribnik in Poland, at Subotica, the Yugoslav-Hungarian frontier station, at Moravska Ostrava in Czechoslovakia, at Ljubljana in Yugoslavia, and in Paris. Employees of the Yugoslav Government, Yugoslav engineers, and railway men were detailed to work with UNRRA personnel on specific undertakings.[87] Among their operations was the transfer of locomotives, closed cars, gondolas, and other equipment for Yugoslavia purchased upon instructions from Washington by the Surplus Procurement Paris Office of the Yugoslav Mission. As the locomotives and rolling stock were in Belgium it was possible to use them for carrying equipment to Yugoslavia. Between April and December 1946 the new Division transported from this source a total of 30 heavy locomotives, 500 closed rail cars, 235 gondolas, and 9,370 tons of equipment. One hundred and forty boxcars allocated to the Yugoslav Mission were used to bring 1,500 repatriates from France to Yugoslavia in November 1946. The new rolling stock and native train crews also made possible the transport to Yugoslavia of the 75,000 tons of hard coal contributed by Poland to UNRRA, 49,820,262 metric tons of coke, as well as a large quantity of gas coal through the "unauthorized" diversion of over 300 rail cars by an official of the Ministry of Communications, also from Poland; 5,000 tons of potash from the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany; more than 7 million kilograms of potatoes, and 60,000 tons of metallurgical coke from Czechoslovakia.[88] Thus full use was made of Yugoslavia's rehabilitated railways. Their permanent restoration as opposed to this

[84] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia*, p. 18.
[85] *Ibid.*, p. 57.
[86] *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA*, p. 53.
[87] Monograph, Victor N. Shevtsov, "Inland Transport Division," pp. 2–4.
[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 6–15; monograph, Rubin J. Baratz, "Yugoslav Liaison Office to Paris Surprop Equipment," pp. 11–12.


MAP III.
YUGOSLAVIA:
FOOD
PRODUCTION;
RAILROADS
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
SLAVONIA
LJUBLJANA
ZAGREB
CROATIA
SURPLUS FOOD
PRODUCING AREA
NOVI SAD
BELGRADE
RUMANIA
BOSNIA-
HERCEGOVINA
DEFICIT FOOD
PRODUCING AREA
SERBIA
SARAJEVO
MONTE-
NEGRO
CETINJE
BULGARIA
SKOPLJE
MACEDONIA
ITALY
ALBANIA
GREECE
KEY
RAILROAD LINE
MOUNTAINOUS
AREA
PROVINCE
BOUNDARIES

temporary rehabilitation, however, seemed likely to absorb both raw materials and manpower for many years to come.[89]

The restoration of inland water transport, so important for Yugoslavia's prewar trade in agricultural produce, was accomplished very gradually.[90] For its rehabilitation UNRRA contributed a total of $1,441,646,[91] which also covered some repairs on the seacoast. An estimated 90 per cent of the river vessels were lost during the war, and mine fields, sunken craft, and destroyed ports prevented any general use of river transport until the middle of the navigation period in 1946. Mine fields had then been cleared and some important river ports restored.[92] Five thousand metric tons of certified seed wheat and several tons of gift potatoes were shipped by barge from Bratislava to Yugoslavia in that season.[93] Although by 1947 the Danube was navigable over its whole length, destroyed bridges, pontoon bridges, wrecks, and insufficient control of signals continued to obstruct traffic, and the entire river floating stock was approximately 50 per cent smaller than in the prewar period.[94]

6. *FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION*

UNRRA's success with the transport program in the fall of 1945 relieved famine and prevented starvation in the deficit areas the following winter.[95] This achievement was by no means assured when the Council assembled in London during the previous August. Sergeichic's plea at that time,[96] in addition to Lehman's firsthand impression of Yugoslavia's needs acquired just prior to the Council,[97] made the nation's plight clear. The hope that relief, food, clothing,

[89] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia*, p. 22.

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

[91] Industrial Rehabilitation Division, "Final Report of Shipments from All Areas as of February 29, 1948."

[92] Monograph, Shevtsov, "Inland Transport Division," p. 2.

[93] *Ibid.*, p. 12–13.

[94] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia*, pp. 34, 57.

[95] Cable, Belgrade to Washington unnumbered, 8 November 1945; OAP 23, *Agriculture and Food in Jugoslavia* (London, 1947), p. 42; monograph, Irving Ross, "Croatia," p. 10.

[96] Michail A. Sergeichic (Chief of Yugoslavia Mission), "The Food Situation in Yugoslavia, July 1945," London, 1945; memo for Committee on Supplies at Third Council Session, "Jugoslavia's Food Needs in Relation to Food Procurement Crisis," Belgrade, 31 July 1945.

[97] H. E. Caustin (Special Assistant to Director General), "Notes on the Third Council."

and shelter would be brought "immediately upon liberation" had not been fulfilled. The western half of the country had sunk below starvation level. Here resistance had been the strongest, devastation most complete. Liberation had coincided with the sowing of winter wheat in the eastern areas. Only half the wheat acreage was planted. Serious drought reduced the crop still further, making its estimated yield less than a third of the prewar average. The Government's well-organized drive to sow the prewar acreage in maize, in compensation for the anticipated loss in wheat, had had to be later than usual, and the yield promised to be less than three fourths of the prewar average. Only a small surplus could, therefore, be expected for the relief of the western sections. The sugar beet harvest would scarcely reach a third of the prewar yield, and meat and fats in the east alone would approach a level below UNRRA nutrition bases. Under these conditions, Sergeichic claimed, starvation in the west was inevitable.[98]

The food supplies brought in by ML since December and by UNRRA from ML sources had amounted to 110,000 tons, a quantity inadequate for the needs of the devastated areas. Upon liberation Sarajevo, burdened with refugees, received only enough supplies to provide an average of five pounds of flour per head during the coming weeks. By July the daily ration in Slovenia (Ljubljana) [99] including all foods was 1,100 calories a day—less than half of the 2,650 adopted as the standard in the bases of requirements. In Vlazenica the daily allotment had sunk to 300 grams of flour with nothing else but fruit in season. Men and beasts alike were dying from lack of food.[100]

The ultimate solution of this situation involved not only the rapid repair of transport but the rehabilitation of agriculture and the importation of enough food to maintain an adequate consumption level while the regular production of indigenous crops was again made possible. The Administration's initial aim was to work out in conjunction with the Yugoslav authorities a program of food imports which would raise the daily consumption level attained by locally produced food to the UNRRA standard—a moderate allowance at best, some 200 calories less than the prewar average in the eastern areas. The Administration hoped, however, to make possible a more balanced diet by including an intake of 75 grams of fat and 20 grams of protein,

[98] Sergeichic, "The Food Situation in Yugoslavia, July 1945."
[99] Memo, "Jugoslavia's Food Needs in Relation to Food Procurement Crisis," p. 3.
[100] Sergeichic, "The Food Situation in Yugoslavia, July 1945."

of which 25–35 per cent should be of animal origin [101]—a higher ratio of these elements than the predominantly cereal content of the prewar diet allowed.[102]

In the 1945 cereal program UNRRA matched its success with the trucks, achieving impressively large deliveries during the latter months:

TABLE 23

UNRRA DELIVERIES OF CEREALS TO YUGOSLAVIA, 1945 [a]

Month	*Gross Long Tons*
July	12,470
August	29,421
September	57,280
October	93,917
November	113,325
December	97,272

[a] Monograph, Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," p. 17.

Owing to world shortages the monthly requirements in animal protein foods, sugar, and fats were never reached. Imports of dried and powdered milk alone were substantially increased in December.[103] Adequate supplies of grain assumed, therefore, increasing importance.

As a result of Headquarters' warning in December 1945, however, that the world shortage of wheat was likely to mean insufficient allocations for all receiving countries and that the strongest justifications would be required before allocations could be made, Yugoslavia's grain demands were scaled down to 250,000 tons [104] for 1946 after an initial mission estimate of 414,000 tons, or 69,000 tons per month, until the harvest of 1946.[105] Actually, UNRRA imported 246,428 tons, averaging about 41,000 tons per month, during that period.[106] The nutritional needs of the country remained great. Indigenous foods yielded an average of 1,750 calories per head daily—"the bare minimum level of food consumption envisaged in the mini-

[101] Monograph, Rose Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," p. 2.
[102] OAP 23, *Agriculture and Food in Jugoslavia*, p. 26.
[103] Cable, Washington to Belgrade 1165, 22 December 1945; monograph, Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," p. 17.
[104] Monograph, Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," pp. 20–21.
[105] Cable, Belgrade to Washington 5, 1 January 1946.
[106] Yugoslav Mission, "Notes on the Situation of the Food Supply Program," 5 June 1946; monograph, Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," p. 21.

mum ration scales" [107]—and UNRRA imports provided an additional quota ranging between 320 and 570 calories per day per head of the total population during the winter months of 1946.[108] UNRRA foods, such as powdered milk, tinned fish, tinned meat, peas, and fruit juices, were sometimes wasted because of ignorance of their value and difficulties in educating peasants to their use.[109] In spite of all these facts, the bread-grain rations were never reduced in 1946, and the prewar rate of consumption in the deficit areas, though of course never adequate, was thought to have been achieved.[110]

The success of the UNRRA food program in 1945 and of the spring sowing in 1946 led to overoptimism on the part of the Yugoslav Government regarding national self-sufficiency in food by the close of that year.[111] The Yugoslav authorities, therefore, made no provision during the summer and autumn of that year for feeding the deficit areas during the winter months. Two successive droughts, the second the worst of the century, resulted in poor wheat and other small grain crops (about 75 per cent of prewar), less than 50 per cent of the prewar yield in maize, a heavy loss in summer grazing and animal feed crops, and disastrous losses in pulses and potatoes where the yield amounted to only 25 and 15 per cent respectively of the prewar harvest. The specter of starvation again appeared in the western areas during the winter of 1946–1947. Government grain collections made in accordance with the decree of April 1946 yielded less than anticipated and were soon exhausted.[112] The situation was aggravated by further shortsightedness on the part of the Government in giving 10,000 tons of wheat to Albania during the November flood disaster and loaning 20,000 tons to Rumania, irredeemable before the 1947 harvest. The UNRRA food program, geared to the six months before the 1946 harvest, had virtually ceased. The last grain ship had arrived in August. The few remaining funds in the UNRRA food budget of $135,029,700 had already been committed against procurements

[107] Dr. A. P. Meiklejohn (Health Division, ERO), "Nutrition in Yugoslavia, Survey of Conditions and Needs with Particular Reference to Deficit Areas," February–March 1946.

[108] Memo for Herbert Hoover, "The Food Situation, April 1946," p. 3.

[109] Memo, M. Barratt-Brown, (Representative of Chief of Mission, Sarajevo) to Delegate's Office, Sarajevo, June 1946, "Instructions in Use of UNRRA Supplies."

[110] Monograph, Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," p. 21.

[111] OAP 23, *Agriculture and Food in Jugoslavia*, p. 46.

[112] *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47; monograph, Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," pp. 32–35.

made of milk, meat, fats and oil, and other foods including potatoes.[113]

By mid-November the Government had admitted in its estimated trade balance for 1947 the need for grain imports to attain a normal level of consumption in 1947. Contradictory facts presented to the Mission, however, made both the extent of reserve stocks and the intensity of the need unclear, thus delaying action.[114] By early February the Mission advised Washington that a minimum of 100,000 tons of corn or grain, 25 tons of lentils, 50,000 tons of potatoes from the United States, 10,000 tons of meat, and 15,000 tons of fats were the minimum needed for immediate dispatch, and requested that food be given the highest priority for the Yugoslav program.[115] Bread rations were cut for all except heavy workers in February and for all categories in March.[116] The Director General and the Food Division at Headquarters were sympathetic. Decision to help, however, lay with the International Emergency Food Council (IEFC), the United States members of which needed to be convinced of the gravity of the Yugoslav need in relation to that of other countries.[117] Although the United States Embassy in Belgrade recommended that the State Department support an allocation of 100,000 tons of cereals for Yugoslavia,[118] IEFC conceded but 30,000 tons to the end of June 1947, more than a third of which had already been shipped.[119] The United States Government was not convinced that there would be such actual starvation in Yugoslavia as was threatening other countries,[120] nor was the Canadian Government willing to supply even this small allocation.[121] It was impossible to get approval from the Program Subcommittee for a share of the Emergency Food Fund [122] or from the Central Committee for procurement from the general resources of the

[113] Food Section, notes on "Food Crisis in Yugoslavia," 17 March 1947, p. 3.
[114] Monograph, Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," pp. 31–34.
[115] Cable, Belgrade to Washington 3101, 11 February 1947.
[116] Food Section, notes on "Food Crisis in Yugoslavia," 17 March 1947.
[117] Cable, Washington to Belgrade 4324, 2 March 1947; see *supra*, Part Three, Chapter IV, Section 6.
[118] Monograph, Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," p. 36.
[119] Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee (CC/P)(47)28, letter, Secretary General, International Emergency Food Council, to Beno Habjanic (Commercial Attaché, Yugoslav Embassy), 21 April 1947.
[120] Cable, Washington to Belgrade 4449, 17 March 1947.
[121] CC/P(47)26, minutes 52d meeting, 8 April 1947.
[122] *Ibid.*; see *supra*, Part Three, Chapter IV, Section 6.

Administration.[123] Reports of serious conditions in specific areas were of no avail.[124] Further inquiries regarding grain allocations from May onward met a similar fate.[125]

Hand in hand with emergency imports of food a significant agricultural rehabilitation program was developed. As 77 per cent of Yugoslavia's prewar population had been engaged in agriculture, the first concern of the Government upon liberation was the restoration of this industry to its prewar productivity.[126] Plans were begun at once for land reforms involving the expropriation and redistribution of parts of the large estates, the transfer of farmer groups from deficit to fertile areas,[127] and the importation of essential supplies. The tremendous losses in animal draft power and human labor required emphasis on agricultural machinery, hitherto little used, with the consequent need for training unskilled operators. Seeds, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides were equally essential.

The more than 4,000 tractors imported by UNRRA, some of which were brought in by air, not only made possible the successful plowing campaigns of 1945 and 1946 but became "a country-wide symbol both of international coöperation and of the modernization of Jugoslav agriculture." [128] In preparation for their use, a detailed plan for the training of tractor drivers and mechanics for operation and maintenance servicing, in addition to setting up tractor machine stations, had been published as early as 6 April 1945. By the end of June approximately 3,000 students had been qualified as tractor drivers. Late in the autumn an agricultural machine school was organized at Zemun, where UNRRA technical experts gave intensive instruction in tractor driving and elementary mechanics to tractor drivers, teachers, and future directors of machine stations. Thus rapid use could be

[123] CC(47)61, minutes 52d meeting, 29 April 1947.

[124] *Ibid.*

[125] Monograph, Taylor, "Food Section, Department of Supply," pp. 31–37; Food Section, notes on "Food Crisis in Yugoslavia," 17 March 1947; memos: N. H. Rezak (Director, Office of Field Operations and Distribution) to Chief of Mission, "Survey of Food Situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina," 6 March 1947; David Leff (Office of Field Operations and Distribution) to Rezak, "Food Conditions in Eastern Montenegro," 10 March 1947; telegram, Sarajevo to Belgrade, 3 April 1947; cables: Washington to Belgrade 4493, 25 March 1947; Washington to London 23068, 30 April 1947.

[126] Yugoslav Mission, "The Progress of Reconstruction in Yugoslavia," Report 1 (January 1946), III, 5.

[127] *Ibid.*, pp. 9–11.

[128] Monograph, W. G. Casseres, "Division of Agricultural Rehabilitation," p. 51; see *supra*, Part Three, Chapter VIII, Section 2.

made of the 2,000 new UNRRA tractors which had arrived by the end of October.[129]

Only 630 tractor plows had arrived by that time, however, and the Yugoslav farmers displayed great ingenuity in their determination to complete the winter plowing campaign on time. All available material was used; in some places two single plows were joined together with angle irons to achieve fairly satisfactory results; in one place four single-bottom walking plows were used with one man guiding each plow. Tractors were operated twenty-four hours a day. Favorable weather enabling the plowing to continue into the first days of December in sections further aided the completion of the task.[130]

UNRRA imports of livestock, though small in relation to the need (more than 50 per cent had been destroyed), also helped to reduce the draft shortage. The 13,680 utility horses and 9,562 mules,[131] the latter distributed mostly in the deficiency areas, were extremely useful in the plowing campaign in the spring of 1946, while the small number of breeding stock, milk cows, and poultry from UNRRA reduced the twenty years estimated as necessary to restore the livestock industry to its prewar level.[132]

UNRRA was able to meet the seasonal schedules of the sowing campaigns and harvests effectively. Seeds of good quality, 14,639 tons of them, arrived in time, with sufficient advance information to allow planning for distribution.[133] Fertilizer (112,128 tons), bagging (21,655 tons), as well as binder twine and pesticides (9,570 tons) all played their part in producing, in spite of serious droughts and other adversity, grain crops in 1945 and 1946 which reached 50 per cent of the prewar average [134] and prepared the way for greater future crops. The resulting shortage in grain and fodder for animal feed, however, necessitated the slaughter of livestock in 1946 which further retarded recovery.[135]

[129] Yugoslav Mission, "The Progress of Reconstruction in Yugoslavia," Report 1, III, 6.

[130] *Ibid.*

[131] Monograph, Casseres, "Division of Agricultural Rehabilitation," pp. 44, 51–52; figures represent imports from April 1945 through 1 December 1946.

[132] Yugoslav Mission, "The Progress of Reconstruction in Yugoslavia," Report 1, III, 8.

[133] Monograph, Casseres, "Division of Agricultural Rehabilitation," pp. 38, 39, 51.

[134] *Ibid.*, pp. 37–41.

[135] Yugoslav Mission, "The Progress of Reconstruction in Yugoslavia," Report 1, III, 8; Report 3, March–April 1946, p. 25.

7. *INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION*

UNRRA's industrial rehabilitation program took on primary importance in Belgrade in view of modern Yugoslavia's great emphasis on industrial development. In 1945 the Government stressed repairs, especially in transport; in 1946, more durable reconstruction with priorities on the rehabilitation of the sources of power, such as coal mining and electrification, and the exploitation of natural resources; in 1947, industrial development involving the establishment of a five-year plan which set annual targets in all the main branches of industry. Although these target figures were never published, the press and semi-official publications indicate that the target during that year was achieved or surpassed in nearly all branches.[136]

The impact of UNRRA supplies on this development is difficult to evaluate precisely, but the effect of many shipments was immediate. The rehabilitation of transport obviously revitalized the country;[137] 4,000 tons of caustic soda put the glass industry back into production and also assisted textile and soap manufacturing;[138] 603 long tons of explosives contributed to resumption of mining operations. Coal mining had regained over 50 per cent of its prewar productivity by October 1945, and UNRRA's imports of over 140,000 tons of grades not found in Yugoslavia made good a small part of the remaining deficiencies. Nonferrous metal mines were reported working at 60 per cent of prewar capacity about the same time that the Government was selling substantial quantities of chrome, bauxite, and magnesite from stock and current output. The Trepca lead mine was in operation by May 1945, and lead was exported to Switzerland that year.[139] Altogether, mining equipment to the value of $7,171,600 was imported by UNRRA.

Deliveries of complete installations, such as the two 1,000-kilowatt rectifiers in the Zenica rolling mills, assisted industrial output. Installation of power stations in deficiency areas provided a basis for reconstruction of electric power production. To help with the restoration

[136] United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, *Economic Developments in Selected Countries: Plans, Programmes and Agencies* (Lake Success, N.Y., 1947), pp. 209–234; monograph, Barbara Kerr, "Division of Industrial Rehabilitation," pp. 56–57.
[137] See above, Section 5.
[138] Monograph, Kerr, "Division of Industrial Rehabilitation," p. 54.
[139] *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA,*" p. 55.

of forestry and food processing UNRRA supplied 44 saw mills and 433 woodworking machines and delivered 25 portable flour mills which produced grinding capacity needed for the 1946 harvest. Equally important were the 49 mobile shops which the Administration provided for general engineering repairs throughout widely damaged areas.[140]

Damage to textile factories was repaired fairly rapidly without UNRRA's assistance, but the industry was retarded by a general deterioration of equipment and an acute shortage of skilled labor and managerial personnel.[141] In addition to providing $17,054,100 of finished clothing, $8,511,700 of footwear, and $1,625,000 of blankets and comforters—a large percentage of which arrived during 1945 to meet the immediate necessities of the ragged people in the deficit areas[142]—UNRRA brought in generous quantities of cotton and woolen textiles, raw cotton and wool, and relatively small stocks of leather, hides, and miscellaneous textile and footwear materials. Although much of the footwear and clothing—including gifts of used garments from uninvaded member nations—was in bad condition or proved unsuitable for the rural population who needed it, the quantity was sufficient to provide slightly over 3 kilograms of textiles per head, which approximated the wartime consumption of textiles in the United Kingdom.[143] The problem of coping with repairs and allocating fairly goods of such varying quality held up distribution and delayed goods in reaching the ultimate recipients, but by February 1947 the people in rural districts were sufficiently clad to resist the rigors of winter.[144]

8. *DISTRIBUTION*

Suspicion clouded the distribution of UNRRA supplies in Yugoslavia from the beginning of the Mission. It was the inevitable legacy of the trying discussions concerning arrangements for distribution and observers which plagued the Yugoslav Government's negotiations of agreements with both the military authorities and UNRRA.[145] It was present in the United States Embassy in Belgrade when the

[140] Monograph, Kerr, "Division of Industrial Rehabilitation," pp. 26–29.

[141] *Economic Recovery in the Countries Assisted by UNRRA*, p. 55.

[142] Monograph, Adam A. Lipszyc, "Textile and Footwear Branch," pp. 9–10.

[143] One and three-tenths kilograms per head for wool and 1.8 kilograms per head for cotton.

[144] Monograph, Lipszyc, "Textile and Footwear Branch," pp. 15, 17, 19.

[145] Memo, Robertson to Lehman *et al*, 30 November 1944, enclosing "Summary of Negotiations at Bari"; monograph, Lloyd, "Negotiation of the UNRRA–Yugoslav Agreement."

Mission Chief first called.[146] Because of this and because of local and foreign groups which were hostile to the Government of the Federal People's Republic, the Mission was harassed by criticism of the UNRRA operation,[147] much unfounded, some justified. Supplemented at times by special commissions from ERO and Headquarters, the Mission made heroic efforts to trace down every report or rumor of inequities. In this, as well as in their rectification, it had the coöperation of the Central Government.[148] All were conscious that UNRRA principles as well as the Government's policy on the distribution of consumers' goods were on trial. Both were the same: "no discrimination for political, racial, or religious reasons, prices low enough for the average consumer, a stringently controlled distribution system, social relief to assist the indigent in obtaining their share of food and clothing." [149]

The Yugoslav Government's distribution machinery stemmed from two decrees of 15 May 1945. In the first, the Supreme Economic Council authorized the Ministry of Commerce and Supply to plan country-wide distribution and consumption of certain commodities, whether domestic or imported. The second decree listed the commodities affected: cereals, fats, dairy products, sugar, and salt; raw materials and finished textiles and footwear; metal and metal goods; livestock; timber and building materials; and fuel. Allocations to the federal states were broken down further by the authorities (people's committees) at regional, district, and village levels. In July 1945 a national food rationing system was adopted covering all major foodstuffs, indigenous or imported; to this system the federal states gradually adhered. The scheme followed closely those standard in other countries: a general card for all civilians; and supplementary cards for heavy and light workers; for children from two to seven years of age, and for those under two; for pregnant women and nursing mothers; for non-hospitalized sick; and for heads of households. In urban areas, town committees issued the cards; in the villages, lists drawn up by local committees and discussed at open village meetings were used instead. In deciding the proper ration, both type of work and individual need,

[146] Letter, Patterson to United States Secretary of State, 4 June 1945.

[147] For example, monograph, Paul A. Unger, "Dalmatia," p. 4; cable, Belgrade to Washington 1582 (Special Series 16), 19 June 1946.

[148] OAP 29, *Distribution of UNRRA Supplies in Jugoslavia*, pp. 44, 48; monographs: Barratt-Brown, "Office of Chief of Mission," pp. 49–51; N. H. Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," pp. 35–36, 38.

[149] Monograph, Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," p. 41.

including amount of home production, were considered. As authorization for purchase the relevant part of the lists was given to the retail shops with which the consumer registered.[150] Subsequent decrees established the maximum ration scales for each category of the population, within which the Ministries of Supply and Commerce fixed their own monthly scales of ration issues for each commodity.[151]

A few food items were not rationed and could be purchased without coupons at Government-fixed prices on the open market. These normally included fresh fruits and vegetables, although, owing to the failure of the crop in 1946, potatoes had to be rationed in Belgrade in November. Meat was unrationed in areas where feed shortages caused overslaughter of livestock and where no means of preservation existed. UNRRA food stuffs offered on free sale outside the ration were usually restricted to "quartermaster" food, surplus Army-packed rations, and canned and dried foods, not easily distributed in normal rations. The greater part was consigned to institutions and special ration categories, but a remainder, unexpectedly increased after February 1946, went on free sale by agreement between the Mission and the Government until 30 September 1946, when the Government stopped all sales of items not already in the shops. There were also instances of other UNRRA items, such as powdered milk or fruit juice, being put on free sale, either because of their unpopularity or because of difficulties in rationing them fairly, but upon the Mission's recommendation that they be distributed instead to children or to institutions, the Government complied.[152]

UNRRA clothing did not become available on the ration until after April 1946; previously, the clothing supply, domestic or imported, simply did not suffice. The Yugoslavs began by selling contributed clothing to meet local handling costs, but early in 1946, after the basic UNRRA policy of distributing contributed clothing free of charge was brought to their attention, the Economic Council issued an order to that effect. Transport, handling, and repair costs were thereafter borne by the Ministry of Foreign Trade.[153]

The federal and state ministries of agriculture distributed agricul-

[150] OAP 29, *Distribution of UNRRA Supplies in Jugoslavia*, pp. 10–11, 13–18, 26–27.
[151] *Ibid.*, pp. 28–30. For details of ration issues, see OAP 23, *Agriculture and Food in Jugoslavia.*
[152] OAP 29, *Distribution of UNRRA Supplies in Jugoslavia*, pp. 30–31.
[153] *Ibid.*, pp. 30–35; Report of the Special Commission of Enquiry to Yugoslavia, pp. 108–111.

tural supplies, in the case of machinery an important part being played by state enterprises such as the Administration of Machine Stations and Agricultural Machine and Equipment Stations (SPOM). Land was plowed by SPOM tractors at a fixed charge to the owner; the tractors, operated mainly on the level lands, were efficiently used. Less familiar UNRRA machinery went to state farms designed primarily as research centers. Hand tools and implements, chemicals and fertilizers, seeds and livestock, were distributed to individual farmers through coöperatives, and veterinary supplies through veterinary dispensaries. Livestock, other than mules, were sold to individual farmers, preference being given to those who had lost their stock.[154]

The motor transport organization, JUGAUTO (earlier DASP—Motor Transport Enterprise) and its subsidiaries in the federal states, took over UNRRA trucks; JUGOPETROL received and distributed petroleum products.[155] The greatest proportion of vehicles was, until November 1945, allocated to the Adriatic zone for the movement of supplies to the deficit areas.[156]

By strict control of its economy Yugoslavia prevented a black market of any proportions; indeed, by 1946, consumer goods were even being reduced in price. The traditional spread in bread prices between the Voivodina and the deficiency areas ceased to exist with the establishment of a Government equalization fund. All prices for UNRRA goods were fixed by the Central Ministry of Commerce and Supply and published in the *Official Gazette*. In general, prices corresponded with those set for similar local products, but certain variations were at times agreed upon by the Government and the Mission in order to offer UNRRA imports, such as livestock, at lower prices to regions or population groups in special need. Basic food commodities were always priced within the reach of the average consumer.[157]

Indigents, whose number had increased during the war years, were, however, unable to pay even these prices. To them, assistance was provided in the form of relief in cash or kind and as credits made available to people in temporary need from funds contributed by cen-

[154] OAP 29, *Distribution of UNRRA Supplies in Jugoslavia*, pp. 37–40. For details of coöperatives and machine stations, see monograph, Casseres, "Division of Agricultural Rehabilitation," pp. 21–24, 26–28.

[155] OAP 29, *Distribution of UNRRA Supplies in Jugoslavia*, pp. 40–42.

[156] OAP 27, *Transport Rehabilitation in Jugoslavia*, pp. 45–46.

[157] Monograph, Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," pp. 37, 42; OAP 29, *Distribution of UNRRA Supplies in Jugoslavia*, pp. 22–23.

tral, republic, and local government sources and by individuals, and from proceeds from the sale of UNRRA supplies. Recipients could purchase their basic food rations and other essentials through coupons issued by the social welfare section of the local people's committee or through monthly cash allotments.[158]

UNRRA observers of distribution carried out their tasks in constant association with representatives of the Central Government, appointed to each state capital as UNRRA regional offices were established. Field staff and Zavod delegates covered every part of Yugoslavia, checking the application of the ration system, talking with all types of citizens as well as with government authorities, inspecting warehouses, factories, retail outlets, and official records. They canvassed children's homes, hospitals, tractor stations, truck depots,[159] reporting their findings to the federal state authorities, as well as to the Belgrade Office. They worked most closely with the people's elected committees at each government level, especially in the early days when these committees had the most important role in distribution. Such contacts enabled them to watch the process at every stage of its development.[160]

There were difficulties, to be sure. Lack of trained personnel in the Government service and distribution agencies, as well as general unwillingness to use UNRRA's technical staff in advisory capacities [161] and in checking the distribution of machinery; [162] a widespread, persistent belief, sometimes encouraged by local officials, that Yugoslavia must pay for UNRRA supplies, which made people indifferent to requests for reports; [163] lack of communications which made it impossible to put the accepted central accounting and reporting systems into operation in some communities until late spring 1946 [164] and seriously hindered the coördination of regional operations with Cen-

[158] OAP 29, *Distribution of UNRRA Supplies in Jugoslavia*, p. 24; for example in Dalmatia, monograph, Unger, "Dalmatia," p. 19.

[159] For example, cables: Belgrade to Washington 1425 (Special Series 4), 7 June 1946, 1439 (Special Series 5), 6 June 1946; monograph, Unger, "Dalmatia," p. 15.

[160] Monographs: Barratt-Brown, "Office of Chief of Mission," pp. 49–51; Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," p. 42. For duties of field staff, see Regional Memo 3, 30 June 1945, and memo, Chief of Mission to Office of Field Operations and Distribution, October 1946.

[161] Monographs: Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," p. 34; Casseres, "Division of Agricultural Rehabilitation," pp. 53–54.

[162] Monograph, W. E. Johns, "Office of the Chief of Department of Supply," p. 11.

[163] Interview, Fox with Perazich, 4 May 1949.

[164] Letter, Sergeichic to V. Srzentic (Deputy Minister), 26 April 1946; monograph, Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," p. 34.

tral Government policy; [165] incompetence and absence of understanding of UNRRA in the case of some regional Government representatives; [166] reluctance on the part of local officials to give UNRRA information outside their clearly defined authority without clearance up the line; [167] all led during the early period to exasperating delays in the preparation of satisfactory reports on distribution and at times shook the faith of the Mission staff in the Government.[168] Problems about passes for UNRRA staff to enter factories as observers were not solved until the spring of 1946, owing to unclear lines of authority between the Central Government and the federal states, and to Yugoslav fears arising from the abuse of passes during the ML period.[169] Finally, all major difficulties were corrected and the Distribution Control Unit sent from ERO to various receiving countries, after weeks of interviews in November and December 1946 and extensive investigation of Yugoslavia's reported abuses, could conclude that "the UNRRA principles were scrupulously observed by the Yugoslav Government." [170]

This did not mean, of course, that instances of irregularity were not discovered and reported by UNRRA observers. In Dalmatia, for example, the Federal Government's maximum ration scale was violated by the consistent issue of food in larger quantities than was permitted, with workers receiving disproportionately large rations while the general population was given far less than entitled. Correction was achieved in four months by continuous on-the-spot reporting and through Mission negotiations in Zagreb and Belgrade.[171] Contrary to agreements between the Mission and the Government, some UNRRA goods were placed on free sale in Slovenia, and commodities such as powdered milk were given to a category of the population not entitled to them. Prices were also reported as too high. UNRRA's protests against these abuses, as well as against the poor administration

[165] Monographs: Unger, "Dalmatia," pp. 9–10; Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," p. 34.

[166] For example, monograph, M. Barratt-Brown, "Bosnia-Hercegovina," pp. 130–131.

[167] Report of Distribution Control Unit, "Distribution and Rationing of Supplies in Yugoslavia," Section 8.

[168] Monograph, Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," p. 36.

[169] *Ibid.*, p. 34. For example, see monograph, Bernard G. Forbes, "Slovenia," p. 10; minutes, conference of regional officers, Belgrade, 7–10 June 1946.

[170] "Distribution and Rationing of Supplies in Yugoslavia," Sections I, XI.

[171] Monographs: Unger, "Dalmatia," pp. 4, 21; Rezak, "Field Operations and Distribution," p. 43.

of DASP Ljubljana, which caused loss and damage to UNRRA vehicles, and against the preferential ration cards introduced into the ration system in 1946 led to the correction or discontinuance of these practices either by Belgrade or at the local level.[172]

That the Yugoslavs were doing a good and equitable job of distribution was attested time and again by persons in a position to receive and investigate complaints. The United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia, who had been alerted by Sergeichic's initial feeling that overcareful attention to distribution would offend Yugoslav officials,[173] stated in November 1945 that he had no reliable information of misuse of UNRRA supplies.[174] Eleven members of the British Parliament, of three political parties, had only praise for Yugoslav distribution in a report signed that same month.[175] Randolph Churchill early in 1946 in an article not otherwise friendly to the regime pictured it as distributing fairly.[176] The Personal Representative of the Director General testified to the same effect in May 1946; [177] as did successive Council members for the United States in July [178] and September of that year.[179]

In spite of such public statements, charges of maldistribution were continuous. Most of the major attacks occurred in 1946; from May onward scarcely a month passed without them, May and June constituting a particularly fertile period [180] and a potentially embarrassing one, as the United States Congress was considering the appropriation of the last increment of the second United States contribution. The United States Department of State had become increasingly concerned over these reports; as a result, Sir Humfrey Gale was instructed to make inquiries in Belgrade, since the State Department wished to be fully acquainted with the facts before going before the Congress. Consequently, the Mission was kept busy sending cables to Washing-

[172] Monograph, Forbes, "Slovenia," p. 9.
[173] United States Department of State, Dispatch 57 from Belgrade, 4 June 1945.
[174] Cable, London to Washington 6793, 27 November 1945.
[175] Press Release 423, 28 November 1945.
[176] London *Daily Telegraph*, 25 January 1946.
[177] Cable, Rome to Washington 1125, 21 May 1946.
[178] William L. Clayton in United States Congress, 79th, 2 Session, Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on H. R. 6885* (Washington, D.C., 1946), pp. 227, 231.
[179] C. Tyler Wood, quoted by Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., in Washington *Post*, 10 September 1946.
[180] Monograph, Rezak, "Field Operations and Distribution Division," p. 44.

ton.[181] The Mission and the United States Embassy were able to puncture a rumor that a C-47 aircraft sold to Yugoslavia by UNRRA had been shot down, because of its United States markings, by the Soviets over Hungary.[182] The Mission produced evidence that newsprint seized in Trieste had come from ML and not UNRRA stocks.[183] UNRRA marshaled refutations by fellow journalists of an American reporter's impressions of Yugoslavia. The State Department believed that UNRRA in these cases should publish a rebuttal;[184] and the upshot of the Mission's efforts was that in July 1946 William L. Clayton, Council member for the United States, having reference particularly to Yugoslavia and Poland, insisted to a skeptical Senate committee that neither UNRRA nor the United States had anything of which to be ashamed in the record on equitable distribution.[185]

The most frequently voiced charge against distribution of industrial supplies was that they had gone to the army. UNRRA and Yugoslav Army trucks both derived in part from Allied military stocks, so that confusion as to the owners could easily occur. Tracking down the truth in these cases involved a lengthy process, but no abuse of any significance appeared. Tito explained that, in 1945, army vehicles had been pressed into service to transport relief supplies and because of the consequent wear on their own vehicles, the military units had taken back newer UNRRA vehicles; but he ordered that systematic exchange take place.[186] Exchange of army breeding mares for UNRRA mules had been approved by the Mission. Peasants also exchanged on a mule-for-mule basis, alleging that the army type was better suited for the mountains. These cases involved 176 mules out of the 9,565 which UNRRA delivered. UNRRA petroleum products

[181] Memo, Alfred G. Katzin (Chief Executive Officer) to David Weintraub (Bureau of Supply, HQ), 30 May 1946; memo of conversation, Katzin, David Persinger (United States Department of State), and C. Tyler Wood (United States Department of State), 24 May 1946; see monograph, Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," Appendix 13.

[182] Memo, Katzin to Weintraub, 30 May 1946; memo, conversation between Katzin, Persinger, and Wood, 24 May 1946; letters: Sergeichic to Director General, 28 May 1946; Sergeichic to Harold Shantz (American Embassy, Belgrade); cable, Budapest to Washington 65, 29 May 1946.

[183] Memo, Katzin to Weintraub, 30 May 1946.

[184] *Ibid.;* Press Release 419, 15 June 1946.

[185] United States Congress, 79th, 2 Session, Subcommittee of Senate Committee on Appropriations, *Hearings on H. R. 6885*, pp. 227, 231.

[186] Report of the Special Commission of Enquiry to Yugoslavia, pp. 54–63.

were diverted to the Yugoslav Navy at Split in repayment of a loan made to the local civil authorities during the petroleum famine in February and March 1946. Belgrade had not authorized the transaction, and on being apprised of it, dismissed the responsible official; the petroleum products were returned to civilian stocks.[187]

On 5 October 1946 a Special Commission of Enquiry, appointed by LaGuardia, arrived in Belgrade to investigate charges involving maldistribution and violation by the Yugoslav Government of its Agreement with UNRRA. For the Mission, October 1946 was a month of tension, so much so that the Special Commission felt obliged in its report to take account of the atmosphere in Belgrade. The shooting down of United States aircraft in the summer had seriously disturbed United States–Yugoslav relations,[188] touching off in the United States a campaign to stop UNRRA aid to Yugoslavia, which persisted despite State Department displeasure.[189] Some of the Americans in the Mission began to fear for their future security in the United States, and when Robert Burnup, United States road construction engineer, was accused of espionage—not, however, in connection with his official UNRRA capacity [190]—and was arrested and held incommunicado by the Yugoslavs, they became anxious about their security in Yugoslavia. The Mission's handling of the Burnup case was reassuring; [191] nevertheless, information reported out of context by UNRRA personnel reached the United States Embassy and became the basis of the charges that brought the Special Commission to Belgrade.[192]

The Commission was composed of Alfred G. Katzin, of South Africa, Deputy Chief Executive Officer at Headquarters and formerly economic adviser to the Commander, ML HQ (Balkans); C. Hart Schaaf (United States), Assistant Deputy Director General for Supply at ERO, formerly of the faculty of the College of William and Mary; and Jean Burnay, Chief Administrative Liaison Officer in ERO, formerly an official of the French Department of Justice.[193] The

[187] Monograph, Rezak, "Office of Field Operations and Distribution," pp. 39–40.
[188] *Ibid.*, pp. 10–12.
[189] New York *Times*, 23 August, 11 September 1946; CC(46)97, minutes 36th meeting, 12 September 1946 (CC Docs., IV, 5–7).
[190] Cable, Belgrade to Washington 2360, 28 September 1946.
[191] Cables: Washington to London 14954, 1 October 1946; Washington to Belgrade 3624, 2 October 1946.
[192] Report of the Special Commission of Enquiry, pp. 10–13.
[193] Press Release 553, 31 October 1946.

Special Commission conducted a thorough investigation, interviewing, for example, the British, French, Soviet, and United States Ambassadors, appropriate Yugoslav ministers, Mission members at Headquarters and in each of the regions, and finally Tito. It concluded that the Yugoslav Government had not violated the Agreement; at the most, it was slow in providing information, and this reflected, said the Commission, imperfect government machinery. It found some of the charges frivolous, but also that the Mission ought not to have authorized free sale of quartermaster foods. While failing to dispel in the United States Embassy a general distrust of Yugoslav distribution, it attempted to improve the Embassy's relations with the Mission by setting up a United States–United Kingdom–French–Soviet UNRRA Liaison Committee. To this the Soviet Ambassador, however, had some objection. The Special Commission's evidence of the Yugoslav Government's willingness to coöperate and its attention to equitable distribution was borne out in a survey by the group of distribution experts later sent out by ERO.[194]

9. *EVALUATION*

Relief and rehabilitation in Yugoslavia, April 1945–June 1947, was achieved through the joint efforts of UNRRA and the Yugoslav Government, aided always by the hard work and dauntless spirit of the Yugoslav people. During this period the Administration gave to the country the following supplies:

TABLE 24

UNRRA SUPPLIES FOR YUGOSLAVIA

Categories	*U. S. Dollar Equivalents*	*Gross Long Tons*
Food	$135,029,700	1,200,306
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	81,785,200	89,061
Medical and sanitation	19,911,600	20,822
Agricultural rehabilitation	36,044,300	234,843
Industrial rehabilitation	108,147,200	1,018,599
Takeovers from military authorities	34,724,000	130,165
Total	$415,642,000	2,693,796

[194] Report of the Special Commission of Enquiry, *passim;* Report of the Distribution Control Unit.

Local observers pointed with pride in 1947 to the accomplishments of the two years.[195] Emergency needs had been met. Food from UNRRA had prevented starvation, bringing strength and health to the deficit areas until the early harvests of 1946. UNRRA clothing and footwear replaced rags and gave minimum protection against winter weather. Government distribution was equitable in relation to need—not *equally* to all members of the population. No government could apply such a principle, and UNRRA had not envisaged it.[196] The Yugoslav people had organized themselves, making good use both of UNRRA and of local resources. The basis for constructing a stable economy had been laid when UNRRA withdrew. Coastal ships and railroads were again in regular operation; agriculture had revived; factories had reopened, production had increased, and costs were steadily dropping; UNRRA supplies had likewise reduced the prices of local foodstuffs; people were receiving 50 per cent more in calories than in the spring of 1946; epidemics, expected, had not occurred; UNRRA industrial and agricultural equipment revolutionized the work methods and thinking of the country.[197] Much remained for the Yugoslavs to do. UNRRA had provided the means with which to begin. They were ready to "help themselves."

[195] Monographs: Ross, "Croatia," pp. 10–12; Unger, "Dalmatia," p. 22.

[196] Letter, Katzin to W. Perry George (United States Embassy, Belgrade), 14 October 1946; "The Distribution and Use of UNRRA Supplies in Yugoslavia," final report, 20 June 1947.

[197] Monographs: Unger, "Dalmatia," p. 22; Gangloff, "Macedonia—Period March 1946–December 1946," p. 14; Boris L. Rubinstein, "Montenegro," p. 8.

IV. Albania

1. *RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT*

A NUCLEUS of the Albania Mission was formed within the UNRRA Balkan Mission in Cairo in the summer of 1944 to plan with ML (Albania), a unit of the Anglo-American AML, for relief operations within the country as soon as it should be liberated.[1] By September 1944 Dudley Haskell had been called from his post as Liaison Officer for the United States Office of Censorship in Brazil, to be Chief of the Albania Mission. At the end of August, ML HQ (Albania) began to move to Bari, Italy: about a month later the Mission followed and established itself at Ruvo di Puglia, some twenty miles distant. Not until almost a year later was the UNRRA-Albanian Agreement signed and the Mission permanently established in Tirana. The intervening period was a turbulent succession of unsatisfactory and sometimes acrimonious conferences, correspondence, and negotiations between the Mission and ML, between ML and General Colonel Enver Hoxha, Commander-in-Chief of the Albanian National Army of Liberation, and between the Mission and Hoxha.

Since for many months ML's plans for bringing aid to Albania were uncertain and confused, the plans formulated by the Mission also varied widely from time to time in scope and proposed functions. Some of the schemes envisaged token deliveries of relief supplies and trucks, more than 1,000 military personnel, and 165 UNRRA staff.[2] At one stage the Mission was faced with assumption of full responsibility for distribution and warehousing within the country of relief supplies to be provided by ML and a demand for immediate large-scale recruitment.[3] At the end of 1944 the Mission was apprehensively debating whether an international organization could consistently join in ML's proposed "peaceful invasion" of the country to bring relief without prior consultation with the local authorities.[4] This dilemma was solved

[1] See Part Five, Chapter I.
[2] "Appreciation and Plan of Allied Military Liaison Force (Albania)," March 1944.
[3] "General Plan of Operations," 15 September 1944.
[4] Memo, all members Albania Mission to Balkan Mission, 22 December 1944; let-

at the eleventh hour by ML's sudden decision to undertake negotiations with Hoxha.[5] In the course of this crisis the Chief of the Albania Mission, by his rather equivocal handling of the situation, lost the confidence of his staff and was recalled to Cairo and relieved of his appointment.[6]

The negotiations between ML and Hoxha ran a stormy course, particularly as Hoxha refused to accept the number of personnel that ML proposed to bring in.[7] On 26 February 1945 Hoxha asked for UNRRA aid.[8] The Administration agreed to consider his application but suggested that he first reach an agreement with ML, which had facilities that UNRRA lacked for bringing immediate relief.[9] Fresh negotiations led to an agreement between ML and Hoxha on 11 April 1945.[10]

Under ML sponsorship D. R. Oakley Hill, new Chief of Mission, went to Albania at the end of April to negotiate on UNRRA's behalf an agreement with Hoxha,[11] whose Government, though not recognized by the Western powers, was accepted by the Administration as the "recognized national authority exercis[ing] administrative authority" within the country.[12]

The negotiations were, however, disturbed by the deterioration of relations between the Allied military authorities and Hoxha. By 5 July 1945 there was an open rupture, and the UNRRA personnel in the country judged it wise to withdraw with the ML staff.[13] Negotiations between the Chief of Mission and Hoxha continued by correspondence, however, and the points at issue were eventually met: limitation on the size of the Mission, demanded by Hoxha, was not

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ter, Commander Military Liaison (ML) (Albania) to HQ ML Balkans, 28 December 1944; monograph, Peter C. Floud, "History of the Mission Prior to Entering Albania," pp. 19–26.

[5] Letter, Dudley Haskell (Chief, Albania Mission) to Balkan Mission, 29 December 1944.

[6] Monograph, Floud, "History of the Mission Prior to Entering Albania," pp. 26–35, 38.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[8] Cable, Caserta to Washington 113, 10 March 1945.

[9] Cables: Caserta to Washington 128, 16 March 1945; Caserta to Washington 188, 30 March 1945.

[10] Agreement between SACMED (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations) and Commander-in-Chief, Albanian National Army of Liberation, 11 April 1945.

[11] Airgram, Washington to London A-51, 7 May 1945.

[12] Resolution 1, I, paragraph 2.

[13] Cable, Tirana to Washington unnumbered, 7 July 1945.

incorporated in the Agreement, but a covering letter from Oakley Hill provided that "UNRRA will limit the number of the Mission staff as far as is compatible with discharging the Administration's responsibilities," the initial staff to be forty and any substantial additions to be agreed with Hoxha.[14] The Administration, moreover, conceded that Hoxha might sign as Prime Minister of the Democratic Government of Albania.[15] On 1 August 1945 an Agreement on standard lines was reached.[16] With this unhappy background it is not surprising that this Mission, which arrived in Tirana early in August 1945, achieved the distinction of experiencing the most trouble with the Government of the country in which it was stationed.

The Mission, as the Government had requested, was never large; at its peak, in July 1946, it numbered 45 Class I and some 90 Class II employees.[17] Again, in accordance with the Government's wishes, it included a health staff of only two, mainly concerned with medical supplies, and no welfare or displaced persons personnel.[18] With the exception of two farm machinery specialists for a brief period, the Government requested no technical experts.[19]

The Mission in its day-to-day relations with the Government dealt with the Inter-Ministerial Commission for UNRRA Supplies, set up in August 1945 in the Ministry of Economy, and composed of representatives of the ministries handling UNRRA imports. Like most Albanian officials these were very young men, trained in Moscow. They were all overburdened with manifold duties; the Mission staff was amazed to find that even the ministers had no private secretaries—Albanian shorthand had not been invented. In this small and highly personal government even the hiring of an extra messenger boy for the Mission required the approval of the Prime Minister himself. Delays were, of course, inevitable. With the reorganization of the Commission and its transfer to the Prime Ministry in April 1946 its efficiency somewhat improved.[20]

[14] Letter, Oakley Hill to Hoxha, 1 August 1945, see *infra,* Appendix Seven, Document 1*b, c.*

[15] Cable, London to Washington 2029, 12 July 1945.

[16] For text, see Appendix Seven, Document 1*a.*

[17] The total of 511 Class II, reported by the Mission, included the Brindisi Port Detachment staff.

[18] "Statistics—European Region," Vol. I.

[19] Monograph, Katherine Livingston, "History of the Agricultural Rehabilitation Division," p. 9.

[20] Monographs: Peter C. Floud, "Relations with the Inter-Ministerial Commission," *passim,* and "Relations with the Prime Ministry, Introduction," p. 1.

The Mission presently gave up trying to discover the causes for the Government's bewildering shifts from a relatively coöperative attitude to downright obstructionism. Obviously, the Government's stormy relationships with the Western powers were to some degree reflected in its treatment of the Mission, but this was unpredictably counterbalanced by its desire to avoid an open break which would cancel receipt of a substantial proportion of its UNRRA program. Thus, during the first six months of the Mission (the latter half of 1945), when recognition of the Albanian Government by the United Kingdom and the United States appeared likely and the Government seemed to have established its authority firmly within the country, the Mission found its day-to-day relationships with the Government steadily deteriorating.[21] On the other hand, the Government accepted philosophically [22] the decision not to admit it to membership in UNRRA, taken at the Fourth Council Session in accord with the earlier exclusion from the United Nations.[23]

Throughout the life of the Mission the staff was never able to overcome the Government's suspicions that it was simply a front for some nefarious Anglo-American purpose. To this, the Mission's early connection with ML [24] and the almost 100 per cent Anglo-American composition of its staff [25] lent color. A small minority of its personnel, particularly in the first months, was, moreover, manifestly unsuitable,[26] and some of those who found the Hoxha regime and its tight State control obnoxious broke under the strain of trying to remain objective, or were not successful in concealing their feelings.[27] These people were eventually weeded out, in three cases at the request of the Government,[28] but not before the latter had concluded that its suspicions were well founded.

The Government's attitude was most plainly expressed by its frequent issue of unfavorable and critical publicity concerning UNRRA through the State-controlled newspaper and radio; [29] through the

[21] Monograph, Peter C. Floud, "General History of Relations with the Government, Introduction," p. 2.
[22] Monograph, Peter C. Floud, "Appraisal and Controversial Issues," pp. 18–19.
[23] *Journal*, Fourth Council, pp. 88, 91.
[24] Monograph, Floud, "Appraisal and Controversial Issues," pp. 1–6.
[25] At the Mission's peak, in July 1946, there were 18 (United Kingdom), 15 (United States), 2 (Egypt), 7 (New Zealand), "Statistics—European Region," Vol. I.
[26] Monograph, Peter C. Floud, "Observation of Distribution," pp. 10–12.
[27] Monograph, Edna A. Boorady, "Expulsion of Mission Members," pp. 3–6.
[28] *Ibid.*, *passim*.
[29] Monograph, Peter C. Floud, "Publicity"; see *supra*, Part Three, Chapter VI.

constant carping in Inter-Ministerial Commission meetings at the non-arrival of certain categories of supplies—notably cigarette paper for the local manufacture of one of the few amenities in that Spartan economy, anthracite coal for the Scutari cement plant, and Bailey bridge equipment; [30] and through the failure or refusal to issue the travel passes necessary for each observation trip or for the mountain picnics which were the one amusement available to the Mission.[31]

In regard to the first, the Mission could do little but reflect gratefully that no United States Congressman was likely to read the Albanian newspaper or listen to Radio Tirana.[32] On the second point, the staff for many months felt itself too much on the defensive and too much at a loss to explain the causes for the delays in supply deliveries to protest these criticisms vigorously.[33] On the matter of passes, the Mission having in the first place accepted the system, which of course applied equally to everyone in Albania, attempted to deal with each case as it arose. During the early months of 1946, when the Government's relations with the West were bad and internal pressures had resulted in a series of arrests of Albanian citizens, the issue of passes to Mission members gradually dwindled almost to zero. In the brief visit in May of Richard R. Brown from Headquarters as representative of the Director General to investigate the state of the Mission and the manner in which the Government was fulfilling its obligations,[34] the question was thoroughly aired, and no serious difficulty subsequently arose over passes for observation purposes.[35]

In the final two months of 1946 the relations between the Government and the Mission reached a crisis [36] during which the withdrawal of the Mission seemed for a time unavoidable. On 8 November ten Albanian engineers accused of sabotage of the extensive draining project at Lake Maliq near Korce were brought to trial. The proceedings consisted almost entirely of "confessions" by the accused, in the course of which members of the United States Mission and two UNRRA employees were implicated in the alleged acts of sabotage. The trial was given the fullest publicity in the press, loud-speakers

[30] Monograph, Jeanne Simmons, "Fulfillment of Supply Program," pp. 11–12, 13–16.
[31] Monograph, Peter C. Floud, "Freedom of Movement," *passim.*
[32] Monograph, Floud, "Appraisal and Controversial Issues," p. 17.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[34] Cable, Washington to London 4245, 14 April 1946.
[35] Monograph, Floud, "Freedom of Movement," *passim.*
[36] Summarized in monograph, L. H. Clemetson, "The Crisis with the Government, November–December 1946."

relayed the proceedings into the street, and films were taken inside the courtroom.[37]

The United States Mission acted promptly and at once asked the Government for its passports. On 11 November, while the trial was still in process, the Government demanded the expulsion of the two UNRRA employees.[38]

The charges were manifestly unfounded. On two of the three days when the sabotage was alleged to have occurred, the UNRRA men had not been within fifty miles of Lake Maliq. On the other day they had visited the place under the escort of the General Secretary of the Ministry of Public Works.[39] Peter C. Floud, who had succeeded Oakley Hill as Chief of Mission, requested an immediate audience with Hoxha to inform him that he would not accept the charges against the UNRRA employees, that he had stopped all further movement of supplies from Brindisi, and that he had asked the Director General to withdraw the Mission immediately unless the request for the removal of the two was withdrawn and UNRRA completely exonerated by an official Government statement.[40] Floud consulted all the senior members of the Mission, who agreed unanimously with this course of action.[41]

On 13 November, Floud spent two hours with the Prime Minister and apparently somewhat surprised him by the vigorous stand he took. The Prime Minister endeavored to placate the Chief of Mission by pointing out that the accusations were against the individuals as individuals and not against UNRRA as an organization, and that the accusations were not made by the Government but by the accused engineers. Floud insisted, however, on a public statement by the Government, withdrawing all charges.[42]

The Director General sent S. M. Keeny, Chief of the Italy Mission, to Tirana on 17 November as his personal representative to Hoxha,[43] and the Government, when it saw how seriously UNRRA felt about the matter, agreed to withdraw its charges against the UNRRA employees. It showed willingness, moreover, to make concessions on a

[37] Cable, Tirana to Washington 1146, 12 November 1946.
[38] *Ibid.*
[39] Cable, Washington to Prague 2445, 5 December 1946.
[40] Cable, Tirana to Washington 1146, 12 November 1946.
[41] Monograph, Clemetson, "The Crisis with the Government," p. 2.
[42] Cable, Tirana to Washington, 14 November 1946.
[43] Cable, London to Washington 13057, 14 November 1946.

number of points, quite unrelated to the particular issue, that Floud thought opportune to press at the same time—notably, arrangements for acceptable publicity for UNRRA in the press and over the radio; improvement in the issue of travel passes to Mission staff; facilitating access to official records and statistics; prior consultation with the Mission regarding changes in rationing and price controls; and consultation regarding proposed expenditures from the proceeds of sale of UNRRA supplies.[44] Keeny, however, perhaps because he lacked Floud's long experience of dealing with the Albanian Government, did not press for a public recantation by the Government and was satisfied with a promise that it would "issue instructions to all appropriate officials informing them of the need for the closest possible coöperation with the UNRRA Mission . . . [and] a general statement supporting UNRRA's principles and pointing out the extent of the UNRRA program for Albania and the benefits Albania had obtained from it." [45]

After Keeny left, with the matter apparently settled, the Government began to prevaricate about its undertakings. It was then that Floud issued an ultimatum and told the Government that the entire Mission would withdraw, lacking compliance by a given date.[46] The Government, failing in an attempt to play the Mission off against Headquarters by sending a direct cable to the Director General,[47] then gave way and accepted all the points made at the meeting of 20 November.[48]

The great crisis was over, and in some respects it had improved the Mission's position. Not only was there within the Mission a new sense of unity brought about by the feeling that Floud's uncompromising tactics and leadership had been correct, but the final period in the Mission's history passed without any serious difficulties with the Government.

2. *THE SUPPLY PROGRAM*

Although, for many reasons, the UNRRA program for Albania proved one of the most difficult to carry out, at first glance it appeared

[44] Monograph, Clemetson, "The Crisis with the Government," p. 5.

[45] Letter, Keeny to Hoxha, 20 November 1946 (summarizing agreements reached in discussions of Keeny and Floud with Hoxha on the same day).

[46] Cable, Tirana to Washington 1197, 10 December 1946; monograph, Clemetson, "The Crisis with the Government," p. 7.

[47] Cable, Hoxha to Director General, 9 December 1946.

[48] Letter, Prime Ministry to Chief of Mission, 17 December 1946.

one of the easiest. As the Mission Chief once assured the Program Subcommittee, "Albania is a simple country to help, she wants the simplest things and those most easy to provide." [49] Some 90 per cent of the population of a little more than 1 million [50] were peasants living on their livestock and farm produce. In prewar years only 12 per cent of the mountainous country was tilled, and because of primitive techniques and the poor quality of the soil, the average diet during 1936–1938 was estimated to be only 2,000 calories per day.[51] In bad harvest years, starvation in some areas was not uncommon. Rudimentary transport facilities, moreover, permitted little aid from surplus to deficit regions.

On this low level Albania was almost self-sufficient in the staple cereals.[52] But although its imports were small and despite its exports of crude petroleum, hides, dairy products, and tobacco,[53] Albania's international trade showed deficits averaging 15,885,000 gold francs [54] annually during the thirteen years 1927–1939.[55] These deficits were largely financed by "political" loans from Italy, Albania's principal customer and source of supply. The country's annexation by Italy in 1939 brought some development in public utilities, public health services, transport, and a few small industries as well as the more intensive exploitation of the Kucova oil resources.

During the war there was bitter fighting throughout the country, culminating in the systematic and widespread destruction of bridges, roads, port facilities, and industrial installations by the retreating Germans who had occupied the country after the Italian collapse in 1943. Despite the severe damage [56] inflicted by the war, Albania emerged in 1945 with an economy which, although battered and bruised, was organically sound. Not much dependent on chemical

[49] Monograph, Jeanne Simmons, "Development of Albanian Requirements Programs," p. 19.

[50] According to the 1930 census: 1,003,000; 1945 census: 1,125,000.

[51] Monograph, Frank L. Woodard, "Report on Albanian Agriculture," pp. 1–5.

[52] Grain imports, according to the League of Nations statistics, averaged 27,500 metric tons yearly during the three years 1936–1938.

[53] League of Nations, *International Trade Statistics, 1938* (Geneva, 1939).

[54] United States $5,200,000 approximately (rate of exchange reported in *Annuaire statistique de la Société des Nations, 1940–1941* [Geneva, 1941], p. 185, for December 1938 was $.327: 1 Albanian franc.)

[55] For 1927–1937, Albanian Ministry of Finance, *Tableau du commerce extérieur du royaume d'Albanie,* (Tirana, 1938), Table I; for 1938–1939, *Annuario statistico italiano* (Rome, 1941), p. 357.

[56] Monograph, Woodard, "Report on Albanian Agriculture," pp. 3–4.

fertilizers, modern agricultural machinery, and elaborate transport and marketing arrangements, Albania's primitive agricultural economy found in its own backwardness its best protection against permanent injury. The diversion of agricultural labor to guerrilla warfare and the consequent decline in production probably caused more economic damage than even the loss of livestock. The outlook for the restoration of the country's economy was, therefore, not discouraging, providing relief supplies of food, seed, livestock, trucks, and replacements of such essentials as key bridges, port facilities, and waterworks, could be furnished quickly.

Unfortunately, however, the fulfillment of the UNRRA program was subject to a series of complications, arising in part from the Albanian Government's attitude and actions, in part from the difficulties of supply delivery to Albania's small and damaged ports, and in part from inadequate attention within Headquarters to handling small programs. These causes were in some measure interrelated, since the nonarrival of expected supplies tended to aggravate the Government, while reports of the Mission's difficulties with the Government, sometimes far from objective,[57] in turn caused lack of sympathy with, or at least indifference to, the Albanian program in Headquarters and ERO.

Delivery of supplies to the country was a major problem.[58] Durres, largest of the Albanian harbors, could accommodate alongside its rotting wooden jetty nothing larger than a ship loaded to 20 feet draft. The other three harbors could take only small schooners. Offloading from vessels anchored offshore was not feasible since there were but one tug and one barge. In only four instances was an UNRRA shipment sent directly to Durres. In all other cases, items were unloaded at Brindisi, across the Adriatic in Italy, and reloaded on smaller boats (including the S.S. "Cantakeit") which formed a shuttle service to Durres, or, in transporting heavy equipment, on an occasionally available LST (landing ship tank). These transshipping arrangements were for some months confused by uncertainties over jurisdiction and accounting as between ERO, the UNRRA–AFHQ liaison office in Caserta (later moved to Rome), the Italy Mission, and the Brindisi Port Detachment. Consignments tended to be broken up at Brindisi

[57] Monograph, Floud, "Observation of Distribution," pp. 10–12.

[58] See monographs: A. E. Lovely, "Albanian Port Operations" and "Shipping and Charters"; Captain Charlton, "Brindisi Port Detachment."

so that complementary items became separated in reshipment; port security at Brindisi (but not in the Albanian ports) was poor, and pilferage sometimes occurred. These difficulties were in time largely overcome; the port facilities in Albania were improved by various types of cranes, provided by UNRRA from military surpluses; and toward the middle of 1947 when the large backlog of heavy equipment came through to Albania, the Brindisi-Durres arrangements were adequate to handle it.

Supplies for implementing substantial sections of the Albanian program were procured and shipped so that they arrived when most needed. To this end, the Albanian Mission, like all mission staffs, labored persistently. A major achievement was the provision of sufficient grain and flour, some 51,000 tons, to enable the Government to maintain its meager ration through the winter of 1945–1946. Since UNRRA grain amounted to about 30 per cent of the total consumed during that winter, and since bread provides some 80 per cent of the Albanian diet, the ration without these imports would inevitably have fallen below the subsistence level and starvation would have occurred in the towns.[59] Seed wheat also arrived in time for planting in the fall of 1945. By the end of that year enough trucks to move these vital supplies had been delivered, either via Brindisi or by ship from Naples to Dubrovnik in Yugoslavia and thence driven south over the mountains to Albania.[60]

A fair trickle of medical supplies also arrived throughout the life of the Mission, including air shipments of vaccine to meet a threatening typhoid epidemic.[61] Distribution of these was for the most part postponed, however, pending an elaborate reorganization of the State health services, not completed when the Mission closed.[62] A particularly disappointing feature was the failure of the Government to make use of the planes, equipment, and preliminary training provided by UNRRA for malaria control through spraying mosquito-breeding areas.[63]

Clothing, both contributed and new garments and footwear, was

[59] Monograph, Floud, "Appraisal and Controversial Issues," p. 22.
[60] Monograph, Lovely, "Shipping and Charters," pp. 7–8.
[61] Monograph, Simmons, "Fulfillment of Supply Program," p. 9.
[62] Monographs: Floud, "Appraisal and Controversial Issues," p. 27; Dr. A. J. C. Eland, "History of the Health Division," *passim.*
[63] Monograph, L. H. Clemetson, "The Malaria Control Program," *passim.*

shipped early and often. Since only a limited need existed in the towns and most of the items were not suited to the rough life of the mountaineers, the Mission soon learned the necessity for vigilance in order to secure diversion elsewhere.[64]

As for the remainder of the program—industrial equipment such as Bailey bridges, agricultural machinery including tractors, and livestock—the long delays in arrival occasioned many disagreeable criticisms from the Government,[65] many intense cables [66] and a few visits from Mission personnel to Headquarters and ERO in search of news of the missing items,[67] and the recurrent if ineffective note in Bureau of Supply and Chief Executive Officer's staff meeting minutes: something must be done about Albania.[68] Not until 1947, however, was the jam broken, in part, of course, because items requiring a long time for manufacture were at last ready for shipment; in part because the Administration had determined to fulfill its programs as nearly as possible; in part because the Albania Mission at length secured a representative at Headquarters to watch over the program.[69] By the time the Mission closed at the end of June, all but 10 per cent of the program had been delivered.[70] The total deliveries to Albania were as follows:

TABLE 25

UNRRA SUPPLIES FOR ALBANIA

Categories	*U.S. Dollar Equivalents*	*Gross Long Tons*
Food	$6,713,900	70,199
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	3,990,600	2,727
Medical and sanitation	1,788,800	2,019
Agricultural rehabilitation	5,557,500	19,857
Industrial rehabilitation	6,807,100	32,571
Takeovers from military authorities	1,393,000	2,675
Total	$26,250,900	130,048

[64] Monograph, Simmons, "Fulfillment of Supply Program," pp. 2–3.
[65] Monograph, Floud, "Relations with the Inter-Ministerial Commission," pp. 2–3.
[66] For example, cables: Tirana to Washington 795, 16 July 1946; Belgrade to Washington 1258, 17 January 1947.
[67] See monograph, Simmons, "Fulfillment of Supply Program," *passim.*
[68] For example, Chief Executive Officer's staff meeting minutes, item 6113, 13 November 1946; item 6488, 19 December 1946; item 6846, 22 January 1947.
[69] Monograph, L. H. Clemetson, "Industrial Rehabilitation Program," p. 39.
[70] Monograph, Simmons, "Fulfillment of Supply Program," p. 19.

Even so, some aspects were a disappointment. In October 1946 a disastrous flood ruined many of the young plants in the fields.[71] The Director General promptly approved an emergency grant of $250,000,[72] most of which the Government elected to have in grain. In view of the withdrawal of the American Mission from Albania, the United States Government refused to allow export of grain to the country, the Administration failed to find another source for procurement, and the Albanians got through the winter somehow, without additional wheat,[73] the grant being finally used for seeds.[74]

The delays to which the Albanian program was subjected, particularly in Headquarters, were at least in part common to all small programs. The Bureau of Supply was used to dealing in large terms in most of the country programs. For these the nonarrival of a few thousand tons of grain meant little; for Albania, it meant deprivation for a large section of its population. Again, specialized items were difficult to procure, particularly in small quantities: to find a few hundred tons of a special grade of anthracite meant disproportionate labor and expense for the Bureau; for the Scutari cement plant its nonarrival spelled stoppage of production.[75]

The extreme difficulty of communications was also a contributing factor. Because of the inaccessibility of the country, mail was slow and undependable. Cables were the principal channel; but they were often lost or badly garbled, and at best an unsatisfactory substitute.[76]

Albania was undoubtedly handicapped by the absence of diplomatic representatives in Washington and London to plead its cause, and by the fact that no powerful contributing country took an interest in its welfare. Both the Albanian Government and the Mission could not forbear envious glances at the supplies arriving in Italy on the one side and Greece on the other.[77]

The Mission, and visitors from Headquarters and ERO, had little

[71] Cable, Tirana to Washington unnumbered (Hoxha to Director General), 29 October 1946.

[72] Cable, Washington to Tirana 1505, 31 October 1946; Central Committee, CC(46)130, minutes 41st meeting, 4 December 1946 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council) (CC Docs.), IV, 157–158.

[73] Monograph, Jeanne Simmons, "History of the Food Program," pp. 9–10.

[74] Chief Executive Officer's staff meeting minutes, item 6846, 22 January 1947.

[75] Cable, Geneva to Washington Fifth Council 113, 14 August 1946.

[76] See Part Two, Chapter V, Section 1.

[77] Monographs: Simmons, "Fulfillment of Supply Program," p. 17; Floud, "Appraisal and Controversial Issues," p. 20.

criticism for the efficiency with which the Government established and enforced a food rationing system in a country which had never before experienced such a centralized control. Distribution in UNRRA trucks to State shops, consumers' coöperatives, and grain enterprise warehouses in 55 centers was accomplished smoothly and rapidly.[78] Theft was punishable by death; [79] there was virtually no black market.[80] So tight was the Government's control of the country that there was little probability of diversion of any significant amounts from the destinations planned by the State. Whether these classes of recipients were sufficiently inclusive to meet the Council resolutions on nondiscrimination was difficult for the Mission to determine and still more difficult for it to influence. No Albanian was likely to hazard a complaint in the presence of the Government escort who always accompanied staff members on their observation tours, and in Tirana the staff found themselves carefully avoided by most of the populace. If an instance of individual discrimination chanced to come to their attention, they could hardly endanger their informants by passing on the details to the Government.[81] No obstacles were put in the way of their inspecting whatever warehouse, factory, or ration store they wished; in arranging such trips the escort was, as a matter of fact, invaluable. The only area from which they were excluded was the Kucova oil fields. Since, in spite of this reported fact, Headquarters approved the provision of equipment for their development, the Mission felt itself absolved from making further efforts to check on these installations.[82]

The staff attempted to protest when they saw, in a few cases, direct use of UNRRA supplies by the army. They found it difficult, however, to explain to a group of hardheaded realists why they objected to the use of UNRRA trucks for transporting troops but took no interest in similar use made of trucks brought in a few months earlier by ML.[83]

In general, the Mission concluded that the Government, to prevent internal unrest, took care that the population as a whole, regardless

[78] Monographs: Simmons, "History of the Food Program," p. 10; L. H. Clemetson, "Chronological History of Relations with the Prime Minister," p. 5.
[79] Cable, Tirana to Washington 370, 9 April 1946.
[80] Monograph, Floud, "Appraisal and Controversial Issues," p. 31.
[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 27–31.
[82] Monograph, Floud, "Freedom of Movement," p. 8.
[83] Monograph, Floud, "Observation of Distribution," p. 8.

of political affiliations, had at least the minimum essentials of food and clothing. With the widening of membership in urban coöperatives in 1946, goods distributed through these channels also apparently reached most of the townspeople.[84] Certainly the trucks, agricultural machinery, bridges, telecommunications equipment, and industrial raw materials and machinery benefited the entire country to the degree that they restored transport and agricultural and industrial production. Since so many of these items reached the country shortly before the Mission's departure, no estimate was possible of how fully the supplies would be utilized or what their ultimate effect might be on the country's economy. The Mission could, at any event, take pride in having carried through to the end a particularly difficult operation.

[84] Monograph, Floud, "Appraisal and Controversial Issues," p. 30.

V. Czechoslovakia

1. *THE AGREEMENT*

EARLY in 1944 the Czechoslovak Government-in-Exile first approached UNRRA with general inquiries [1] about the possibilities of aid. Czechoslovakia had been dismembered and truncated: parts had been absorbed into Germany, Hungary, and the German "Général Gouvernement" of Poland; Slovakia was a separate vassal state of Germany; and the rump of Czechoslovakia—the Czech lands—was under the heel of German "protection." Though the country had not yet been a battlefield—that grim experience was still to come as the Soviet armies continued their victorious course westward—it had been pillaged, and its resources had been grievously depleted to further the Axis war effort. It was obvious that it would need urgent relief and economic rehabilitation when liberated.

In May 1944 the Soviet and Czechoslovak Governments agreed that the civil administration of Czechoslovak territory liberated by the Soviet forces would be handed over to the Czechoslovak authorities as the territories were liberated, and as rapidly as would be consistent with military requirements.[2] As a result of this arrangement, the Czechoslovak Government became the authority responsible for civilian relief and economic rehabilitation without the intervention of any military period.

In December 1944 the negotiations that had begun in the summer between the Czechoslovak Government and UNRRA Headquarters [3] were transferred to London and became the responsibility of ERO.[4]

[1] Letter, Frantisek Nemec (Czechoslovak Minister of Industry and Commerce) to Director General, 29 February 1944.

[2] Treaty between USSR and Czechoslovakia on military collaboration and administration of liberated territories, London, 9 May 1944; note, meeting between J. J. Corson (Deputy Director General, Finance and Administration) *et al* and Ladislav Feierabend (Czechoslovak Minister of Finance), 15 August 1944.

[3] Notes: meeting between Lehman and Czechoslovak delegation led by Feierabend, 29 August 1944; meeting between Lehman and V. S. Hurban (Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States), 4 October 1944; monograph, Charlotte Lloyd, "Negotiation of Agreement with Czechoslovakia," pp. 2–3.

[4] Monograph, Lloyd, "Negotiation of Agreement with Czechoslovakia," pp. 3–4.

The resulting Agreement,[5] the first with a receiving country, was an important factor in shaping those concluded subsequently. The six Supplementary Agreements [6] arose out of the Czechoslovak Government's anxiety to define more closely the relief and rehabilitation projects on which the net proceeds of sale could be spent.[7]

2. *THE MISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT*

At the beginning of 1945 the nucleus of the Czechoslovakia Mission began to gather in London.[8] In January, Peter I. Alekseev, previously USSR Trade Representative in Iran and Deputy Chief of the Eastern Division of the USSR Commissariat for Foreign Trade, was accepted by the Czechoslovak Government as Chief of Mission.[9] Alekseev reached Prague from Moscow on 23 May 1945. His principal assistants arrived on 22 June, and the Mission officially came into existence on that date.[10]

The organization of the Mission followed the normal pattern, except that health, welfare, and displaced persons functions, not having the same importance as in missions where the Administration carried out an active program of direct relief, were grouped together in the Office of the Chief of Mission.[11]

The Czechoslovakia Mission fulfilled a mainly advisory and liaison function. This was made easier by the fact that the Czechoslovak Government, despite the disorganization caused by the war and the inexperience of some Government officials, was one of the most competent administratively of all the receiving governments. It had the organizational machinery and ability to carry out its part of the UNRRA work, the distribution and utilization of UNRRA aid, without constant intervention and "nursing" by the Mission. It is, there-

[5] Signed in London, 26 February 1945, see Appendix Seven, Document *5a*.

[6] These six Agreements covered the following subjects and were largely identical: welfare services, health services, agricultural rehabilitation, rehabilitation of industry and public utilities, Czechoslovak displaced persons, and non-Czechoslovak displaced persons; see Appendix Seven, Document *5c*.

[7] Letters: Leith-Ross to Jan Masaryk (Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), 24 February 1945; Masaryk to Leith-Ross, 26 February 1945; see *infra*, Appendix Seven, Document *5b*.

[8] Monograph, J. H. Duckworth, "Personnel," p. 1.

[9] Memo, Major General K. J. Martin, D.S.O. (European Regional Office) to Frank Weisl (Bureau of Areas, HQ), 20 January 1945.

[10] Monthly Report, June–July 1945.

[11] Monograph, Duckworth, "Personnel," Attachment I.

fore, not surprising that the Czechoslovak Mission remained small [12] in comparison with, for instance, the Greek and Italy Missions which had to develop important operating functions.[13]

The Czechoslovak Office of Relief and Rehabilitation (CORR) was set up under a Government decree of 7 June 1945 as an interministerial office with the following tasks:

1. To carry out the activities of the Czechoslovak Government in connection with assistance rendered by UNRRA;
2. To coördinate the requirements submitted by the respective Ministries;
3. To administer and control the supplies furnished by UNRRA; and
4. In coöperation with the appropriate Ministries, to determine and control the distribution of supplies.[14]

Frantisek Nemec, who held ministerial rank, was President of CORR, which came under the Minister of Food, Vaclav Majer.[15]

General policy was discussed and determined at weekly meetings of the senior Mission staff and representatives of CORR presided over by the Chief of Mission.[16] The Government, moreover, at the suggestion of the Mission established a special UNRRA Department in every ministry concerned with UNRRA aid and readily accepted the Mission's suggestion of forming *ad hoc* Working Parties on Agricultural Rehabilitation, Food, Clothing, Textiles and Footwear, Medical Supplies, and Industrial Rehabilitation.[17] Throughout the course of the Administration's relations with Czechoslovakia the Government's friendly coöperation and ready acceptance of UNRRA principles not only contributed to making the Mission's task easy, but were also an important factor in making the operation in Czechoslovakia one of the most successful undertaken by UNRRA.

3. *THE SUPPLY PROGRAM*

The Administration's main problem in delivering more than a million and a half long tons of supplies to landlocked Czechoslovakia was to

[12] At its peak, in June 1946, the Mission staff numbered 45 Class I and 88 Class II.
[13] Monograph, P. I. Alekseev, "Office of the Chief of Mission," p. 8; see also above, Chapter II; below, Chapter VIII.
[14] Monthly Report, June–July 1945.
[15] *Ibid.*
[16] Monograph, Alekseev, "Office of the Chief of Mission," pp. 2, 10.
[17] Monthly Report, August 1945.

get them there. Fortunately, however, food and transportation supplies bulked large in the early deliveries, and thus the most immediate relief and rehabilitation needs were quickly met.

As in most countries, the earlier allocation for food, because of the rise in food prices, had to be increased to maintain essential supplies, and the medical supplies program suffered as a result of procurement difficulties at Headquarters.[18] In Czechoslovakia, moreover, a cut of $6 million was made in January 1947 to release funds for the Administration's Emergency Food Program.[19] As a result of these and other, lesser changes, the total supplies delivered amounted in value to $261,337,400 exclusive of shipping costs (1,619,627 gross long tons).

TABLE 26

SUPPLIES DELIVERED TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA BY UNRRA

Categories	*U. S. Dollar Equivalents*	*Gross Long Tons*
Food	$117,916,400	767,211
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	26,843,800	44,048
Medical and sanitation	13,243,500	11,901
Agricultural rehabilitation	31,794,200	410,593
Industrial rehabilitation	71,539,500	385,874

Czechoslovakia was not, however, a receiving country only: it was the first liberated country to make operating contributions, and these ultimately exceeded in value those made by any other receiving country.[20] During the most critical period of world shortage, at the end of 1945, the Government donated 2,000 tons of sugar,[21] and in August–September 1946 Czechoslovakia shared the benefits of a good vegetable harvest with her neighbors by donating over 30,000 tons of potatoes, cucumbers, tomatoes, pears, apples, and cabbages to UNRRA.[22]

In addition, UNRRA made purchases in Czechoslovakia amounting to some $8,500,000.[23] Since manufactured goods constituted Czechoslovakia's traditional exports, the Administration had hoped that it might be possible to make arrangements in Czechoslovakia for the processing of UNRRA raw materials into textiles for other receiving

[18] See Part Three, Chapter V, Section 6.
[19] See Part Three, Chapter IV, Section 6.
[20] See Part One, Chapter V, Section 3.
[21] Monograph, J. S. Kralick, "Supply Department," p. 25.
[22] *Ibid.*
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

countries. Inflated postwar costs, however, made Czechoslovak prices prohibitive, production difficulties made delivery dates uncertain, and the scheme was consequently abandoned.[24] In the end, therefore, UNRRA's procurement was largely confined to agricultural surpluses and coal. The principal items procured were:

TABLE 27

GOODS PURCHASED BY UNRRA IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA [a]

Commodity	*U. S. Dollar Equivalents*	*Destination*
Lignite	$300,000	Austria
Coke	1,044,000	Yugoslavia
Clover and vegetable seeds	2,250,000	Austria, Yugoslavia, and Byelorussia
Potatoes	300,000	Yugoslavia
Seed rye [b]	1,348,600	Poland, Austria, and Yugoslavia
Seed wheat [c]	284,000	Austria and Yugoslavia
Seed potatoes [d]	2,892,240	Austria
Total	$8,418,840	

[a] Monograph, Kralick, "Supply Department," p. 24.
[b] Plus ton-for-ton replacement with good milling wheat.
[c] Plus ton-for-ton replacement with good milling wheat.
[d] Austria delivered 6,000 tons of salt valued at $228,000 to the Czechoslovak Government in part payment, leaving $2,664,240 to be financed by UNRRA.

4. *TRANSPORTATION*

The movement of supplies to Czechoslovakia afforded a good example of international coöperation in a practical job. Guided and supervised by UNRRA staff of various nationalities, the supplies came from all over the world to some 15 European ports [25] under no less than 11 different sovereignties.[26] Then, from the ports, the supplies had to be moved over the war-damaged and disorganized European roads, railways, and inland waterways to Czechoslovakia. Through

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[25] Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Cherbourg, Constanza, Cuxhaven, Fiume, Hamburg, Le Havre, Odessa, Rotterdam, Trieste, Varna, and Venice.
[26] Allied Military Government in Trieste, Belgium, British Zone of Occupation in Germany, Bulgaria, France, Holland, Italy, Rumania, Ukraine SSR, United States Zone of Occupation in Germany, and Yugoslavia.

June 1947, 587 seagoing vessels brought supplies, and during the same period 96 shipments of supplies arrived by air.[27] The flow of deliveries is summarized in the following table:

TABLE 28

DELIVERIES OF UNRRA SUPPLIES TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA THROUGH JUNE 1947 [a]
(Metric Tons)

Month	*1945*	*1946*	*1947*
January	5.2	115,067.0	96,422.1
February	. . .	49,806.7	42,603.1
March	. . .	127,445.6	22,961.0
April	1,186.1	120,128.4	10,394.2
May	8,765.4	114,181.1	13,207.9
June	9,636.6	105,179.6	6,486.0
July	17,297.5	118,010.8	
August	11,535.9	81,751.9	
September	54,692.3	69,454.8	
October	45,124.3	95,983.9	
November	67,526.1	83,676.7	
December	77,415.6	40,476.3	
Total	293,185.0	1,121,162.8	192,074.3

[a] Czechoslovakia Mission, "Statistical Report on UNRRA Supplies for Czechoslovakia at 30 June 1947," p. 3.

The first shipments were necessarily unloaded at Black Sea ports—the only ones available—but movement from the ports was slow, and no great improvement could be expected.[28] The North German and North Adriatic ports—Czechoslovakia's principal prewar points of access to the sea—were, therefore, brought into use as soon as possible.[29]

Under the auspices of the European Central Inland Transport Organization, monthly meetings were held in London, attended by representatives of the various authorities controlling the ports, railways, and other means of transportation.[30] At these meetings Mission representatives submitted bids for the necessary facilities, made detailed arrangements with the various authorities concerned, and gradually developed

[27] Czechoslovakia Mission, "Statistical Report on UNRRA Supplies for Czechoslovakia at 30 June 1947," p. 3.
[28] Monograph, G. F. Hamilton, "History of Transportation Division," pp. 13–14; Monthly Report, November 1945.
[29] Monograph, Hamilton, "History of Transportation Division," pp. 2–6, 14–20.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

an organization which controlled and supervised port reception and subsequent movement of supplies to Czechoslovakia; [31] close liaison with the Czechoslovak Ministry of Transport, CORR, and MKDK [32] (Inter-Ministerial Transportation Coordination Committee) ensured the reception and proper storage of the supplies on arrival in Czechoslovakia.[33]

In common with most other missions, the Czechoslovakia Mission was unable to get sufficient advance information about shipments from Headquarters and ERO. With all port reception and much of the inland movement complicated by the fact that they had to take place in territory foreign to the Mission, this lack was more keenly felt; it is not surprising, therefore, to note some exasperation in the Mission's complaints when it too often found that CORR could get details through the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington from UNRRA Headquarters, which apparently did not bother to send the necessary details to its own Mission.[34]

Most of the movement from the ports, including the movement of petroleum products, was by rail, but barges on the Elbe and on the Rhine were also used; loads too large or too heavy to be carried by rail necessitated diversion of ships to Hamburg, whence the awkward lifts could be moved by barge.[35] Ships also had to be diverted when there was a temporary congestion in a port or a block in the port clearance arrangements.

Perhaps one of the most troublesome problems was that of moving nearly 34,000 head of livestock for the agricultural rehabilitation program. Difficult as it was to transport inanimate supplies, to move animals which required proper feeding, watering, and other care, and which were already debilitated by long sea voyages, was even harder, and called for special arrangements.[36]

It was not enough, however, to move supplies to Czechoslovakia; they still had to be distributed within the country. The transportation system had been completely disrupted by the war, and vehicles of all types were urgently needed not only for the internal movement of

[31] See also Part Three, Chapter IX, Section 6.

[32] This Committee met twice weekly in Prague for the discussion of all transportation questions and included representatives of all the ministries and the UNRRA Mission.

[33] Monograph, Hamilton, "History of Transportation Division," p. 5.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–8. [35] *Ibid.*, p. 11. [36] *Ibid.*, pp. 41–42.

UNRRA supplies, but also for the reactivation of agriculture and industry. In all, 12,137 general-purpose trucks, 1,327 special-purpose trucks, 52 busses, 644 chassis, 6,144 trailers, and 774 motorcycles were delivered through June 1947.[37]

Pilsen, provided with large parking areas and repair workshops, and lying at the junction of the main road and rail arteries leading into Czechoslovakia from Germany, was the obvious choice for a reception and storage area for supplies reaching Czechoslovakia overland. In November 1945 an UNRRA office was established there,[38] and the Czechoslovak Government set up an elaborate organization, including four battalions (approximately 1,000 men) of military drivers,[39] to undertake the reception, storage, sorting, repair, and reconsignment of the supplies. This organization, after a bad start, succeeded in handling with few serious faults upward of a million tons of supplies, virtually all the road vehicles provided by UNRRA, and 2,400 locomotives and rolling stock.[40]

The vehicles, most of which were from the surplus stocks of the Allied Forces, required varying degrees of overhaul and repair before they could be put on the road. Although spare parts were included in the program, there were not enough to satisfy all needs, and some vehicles had to be cannibalized. The vehicles were distributed to ministries, Government agencies, and local Government bodies, and about a quarter of them were sold to commercial firms and organizations requiring them for essential purposes.[41]

The timely arrival in September 1945 of over 2,000 Canadian 3-ton, general-purpose trucks in good running order, convoyed from the Netherlands across Germany by Canadian Army personnel, was of especially great importance to the early restoration of essential communications.[42] No exact figures are available of the volume of road traffic in 1945–1946, but it was estimated, on the basis of Czechoslovak Ministry of Transport figures, that some 40 per cent of the total traffic was carried in vehicles supplied by UNRRA.[43] UNRRA repair equip-

[37] Czechoslovakia Mission, "Statistical Report on UNRRA Supplies for Czechoslovakia at 30 June 1947," pp. 19–21.
[38] Monograph, Hamilton, "History of Transportation Division," p. 23.
[39] Monthly Report, November 1945.
[40] Monograph, Hamilton, "History of Transportation Division," p. 25.
[41] Operation Analysis Papers (OAP) 17, *Transport Rehabilitation in Czechoslovakia* (London, 1947), p. 31.
[42] Monthly Report, September 1945.
[43] Monograph, A. Evreinov, "History, Economic Section," pp. 30–31.

ment, spare parts, tires and tubes, and fuel contributed their share to the rehabilitation of transportation, which would have been even more pronounced if occasional delays in the delivery of one or another ancillary item or of fuel had not created bottlenecks and temporarily immobilized vehicles and agricultural machinery.[44]

Although the immediate emphasis in the rehabilitation of Czechoslovakia's transport facilities was on road transportation, UNRRA also provided very liberal aid to the railway system. Seventy-five locomotives and 2,330 rail wagons,[45] bridging equipment, and other materials necessary for the repair of the war-damaged railways were supplied. By the end of 1946 Czechoslovakia's road and rail systems were sufficiently restored to meet all essential transportation requirements.

5. *FOOD AND AGRICULTURE*

Before the war Czechoslovakia was barely self-sufficient in food. It had enough meat and bread cereals, but imported considerable quantities of fats and oilseeds.[46] War and occupation depleted supplies and livestock, and intensive farming combined with the shortage of feedstuffs reduced crop yields and animal production.[47] At the time of liberation the food situation was highly critical, and the ration for the first period (23 May to 21 June 1945) for normal consumers amounted to a bare 1,350 calories per day.[48] Moreover, there was little other food available to supplement the ration.

In the Czech lands an effective rationing system established immediately after liberation, with controlled prices at accessible levels, together with cash allowances for indigents and the benefits provided by social insurance, aided equitable distribution of the available food. As an incentive to increase food production and deliveries from the farmers, self-suppliers, however, were allowed to retain foodstuffs on a rather more liberal scale in comparison with that of the normal consumer.[49]

In Slovakia, owing to the complete breakdown of the administration

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[45] Czechoslovakia Mission, "Statistical Report on UNRRA Supplies for Czechoslovakia at 30 June 1947," pp. 19–21.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[47] OAP 11, *Agriculture and Food in Czechoslovakia* (London, 1946), p. 2.
[48] Monograph, Evreinov, "History, Economic Section," p. 3.
[49] *Ibid.*

in that area, as well as the greater damage done to communications during the fighting in 1944–1945, rationing was not introduced until the beginning of December 1945 and then only for sugar, flour, and bread.[50] The lack of a proper rationing system in the early stages inevitably led to allegations of corruption, mismanagement, and discrimination. The Mission's detailed special investigations revealed, however, that although mistakes had been made, and the distribution system in Slovakia was far from perfect, there was no significant amount of deliberate discrimination.[51]

Certain kinds of UNRRA goods were at first reserved for special consumer groups: fruit juices and fruit powder and condensed milk were reserved for children and youths; hospitals received special allocations of rice, dried eggs, coffee, tea, and cocoa powder.[52] As the flow of UNRRA food supplies increased, however, with the opening of the Northwest European ports, the Ministry of Food introduced a points rationing system for the distribution of nonstaple items. This system (partially modeled on the United Kingdom scheme) was introduced in Bohemia and Moravia at the beginning of March and in Slovakia at the end of May 1946. Some 80–90 per cent of the foods available on points was provided by UNRRA.[53]

After the 1946 harvest some items were taken off the ration, and the basic rations of bread, meat, and fats were increased. Gradually, the prices and points value of other foods were reduced [54] and by the end of the UNRRA period bread cereals, meat and meat products, milk, eggs, fats, and sugar were the only foods still rationed. By the spring of 1947 the calorie intake of rationed foods by a normal consumer amounted to approximately 2,000 per day.[55]

The grain and grain products supplied by UNRRA, amounting in all to 320,000 long tons ($25 million), covered about 15 per cent of the total consumption up to the 1946 harvest.[56] More important was UNRRA's help in the supply of fats in which UNRRA deliveries

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 4.
[51] For example, Monthly Report, August 1945.
[52] Monograph, Evreinov, "History, Economic Section," p. 4.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] In September 1946 the Mission reported a 20–50 per cent reduction by the Ministry of Food in prices and points value of most UNRRA foodstuffs, Monthly Report, September 1946.
[55] Monograph, Evreinov, "History, Economic Section," p. 4.
[56] Report of Czechoslovak Ministry of Food, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 7.

covered more than 33 per cent of the total consumption.[57] UNRRA deliveries of canned meat distributed on the points system represented an increase of about 15 per cent in the meat ration and had a long-term effect in enabling livestock to be withheld from the market and developed to full weight—a factor of undoubted importance in the regeneration of Czechoslovakia's herds.[58] Over 33,000 tons of UNRRA fish and fish products, by providing an alternative protein food, also helped in the saving of livestock.[59]

During the German occupation the black market had been developed in Czechoslovakia both as a necessity to eke out the totally inadequate rations allowed to the ordinary consumer and as a patriotic duty. After liberation, however, the black market meant injury, not to an enemy, but to the Czechoslovak economy. It is interesting, therefore, to note that the Czechoslovak Ministry of Food reported that, "There is no doubt that without UNRRA deliveries in the first year after liberation the black market would have been maintained at its previous rate." Thus, the UNRRA supplies of food, in addition to providing some 300 calories per head daily during 1946—the difference between dire want and austere adequacy—served to diminish in Czechoslovakia one of the most intractable social ills left by the enemy in all occupied countries.[60]

Before the war, one third of the population of Czechoslovakia was employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries.[61] In addition to wartime damage, Czechoslovakia's agriculture was considerably affected by the Government's decision to return the bulk of the German and Hungarian minorities to their own countries. Up to November 1946 over 2 million Germans had been moved out and approximately 1,650,000 Czechoslovak farmers resettled.[62] Inevitably, these large movements of population, involving a net loss of manpower, had their effect on the economy and, not least, on agriculture.

The numbers of farm animals had declined materially during the war.[63] It was accordingly decided to assist the re-establishment of livestock by importing breeding animals of suitable types. During the war years cattle had decreased by half a million, and the reduction in the number of milk cows was nearly 400,000.[64] Largely because cows had

[57] *Ibid.* [58] *Ibid.* [59] *Ibid.* [60] *Ibid.*, pp. 9–10.
[61] OAP 11, *Agriculture and Food in Czechoslovakia*, p. 7. [62] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 14; from 2,600,000 head in 1935–1937 to 1,700,000 head in 1945.
[64] Czechoslovak State Statistical Office.

been used for draft and for meat production as well as for milking purposes, the milk yield had always been small. Some 500 head of dairy cattle were imported. They were distributed mainly to State farms, where herds could be kept intact and the dangers of crossbreeding and improper care were less. With this aid, and with the importation of other suitable cattle by the Government, it was hoped that Czechoslovakia's milk production, which in 1945 and 1946 was only about 45 per cent of the prewar yield, would in a few years exceed the prewar average, and that the yield per cow would be increased.[65] The additional provision of approximately 5,000 heifers and calves contributed both to the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the herds.[66] Approximately 27,000 horses, mostly for draft but including nearly 600 for breeding purposes, were provided by UNRRA to supplement mechanical draft power.[67]

Poultry numbers had decreased by about 50 per cent during the war, and, to assist in restoring the important poultry industry, 444,240 Rhode Island Red and White Leghorn eggs were shipped from the United States. Unfortunately, however, only approximately 10 per cent of the eggs hatched.[68] A considerable number arrived broken or damaged and many were infertile; but the chicks that did hatch were usually larger and healthier than the homebred ones. The low percentage of hatchings was attributed to poor packing, delays in shipment, and insufficient care in selection of eggs. All shipments went by air to Prague, but at the beginning they came via England, where the eggs were transferred from one plane to another. The later shipments direct to Prague gave far better results. The chicks were distributed to poultry coöperatives and experienced farmers—a proportion of the cocks and hens to be kept in pure flocks and the rest to be used for improving local flocks by crossbreeding, thus introducing new genes and raising egg-laying capacity.[69]

Over $6,500,000 worth of farm machinery served to accelerate rapidly the mechanization of agriculture and helped to compensate for the loss of agricultural manpower. The first shipment of farm machin-

[65] Monograph, Herbert C. Hanson and Lea Kossova, "Agricultural Rehabilitation," pp. 14–15.
[66] Czechoslovakia Mission, "Statistical Report on UNRRA Supplies for Czechoslovakia at 30 June 1947," p. 26.
[67] *Ibid.*; monograph, Hanson and Kossova, "Agricultural Rehabilitation," p. 15.
[68] Monograph, Hanson and Kossova, "Agricultural Rehabilitation," p. 17.
[69] *Ibid.*

ery arrived in Brünn on 27 June 1945 via Constanza.[70] These first deliveries were loaned to district national committees and sent to areas needing immediate help. Eventually, in accordance with an agreement worked out between the Ministry of Agriculture in Prague and the Slovak authorities in Bratislava, one third of the supplies went to Slovakia and two thirds to Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia. By the end of 1946 there were 205 tractor stations in the Czech lands and 43 in Slovakia. These were mostly attached to farmers' coöperatives (district cooperative tractor stations) and some to the district national committees (State tractor stations). Each was equipped with a repair shop, and the Ministry of Agriculture paid great attention to the proper operation and use of the equipment.[71] Eleven hundred and fifty UNRRA tractors arrived in 1945, but unfortunately many of them could not be used for the autumn planting owing to lack of spare parts and fuel. In the next year, however, the increased supplies made themselves felt; the Ministry of Agriculture estimated that, without the UNRRA tractors, 100,000 acres of cereal cropland would have remained fallow in 1946, while 50,000 acres of other cropland would have remained entirely idle and 75,000 acres would have been only superficially tilled.[72] There were inevitable difficulties in finding skilled personnel and proper accommodations for the tractor stations, but the Ministry of Agriculture tackled these problems energetically; UNRRA helped in the supply of technical literature and films, and arranged for four farm-machinery specialists to spend some time in the country aiding in the assembly of the machinery and instructing operators in its proper use.[73] One of these experts also prepared an excellent manual on the operation of tractors which was translated into Czechoslovak and published by the Government. In addition to over 4,000 tractors, UNRRA provided considerable numbers of threshers, combines, plows, harrows, cultivators, sprayers, planters, and beet lifters.[74]

In tonnage, the bulk of the agricultural rehabilitation supplies to Czechoslovakia—326,480 gross long tons—consisted of fertilizer. Widely distributed to farms and agricultural coöperatives, it contributed appreciably to the much improved harvest in 1946 and the

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 21.
[71] *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.
[72] Monograph, Evreinov, "History, Economic Section," p. 17.
[73] See Part Four, Chapter II, Section 4.
[74] Czechoslovakia Mission, "Statistical Report on UNRRA Supplies for Czechoslovakia at 30 June 1947," p. 28.

consequent easing of the food situation in 1946–1947.[75] Seeds, pesticides, and forestry and veterinary supplies completed the UNRRA agricultural rehabilitation program.

6. *INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION*

Before the war the pattern of Czechoslovak industry was in many respects similar to that of the United Kingdom. Poor in raw materials and fuel (with the exception of coal), Czechoslovakia imported most of its industrial supplies, including a large quantity of raw materials and some finished products. During the war, plants were stripped of machinery or were converted to the manufacture of munitions, stocks of raw materials were used up or removed, and all equipment inevitably suffered from lack of replacement and maintenance as well as from direct war damage.

Some $95 million worth of supplies, including textile and footwear raw materials, were provided by UNRRA for the industrial rehabilitation of the country. Nearly half this amount was spent on transportation equipment and fuel. With practically no indigenous sources of petroleum and with the disruption of the railways forcing traffic on the road transport system, Czechoslovakia's requirements of petroleum products for essential purposes were high in relation to her prewar imports.[76] UNRRA's supplies were, therefore, essential to the resumption of economic activity in the country.

UNRRA supplied some 33,000 tons of textile fibers, of which raw cotton constituted approximately two-thirds. The need for clothing after the wartime shortages was so urgent, however, that the Administration was obliged, during the early stages of the program, to provide some 2,000 tons of finished textiles, garments, and blankets, and 1,000 tons of footwear for immediate relief. In addition, over 8 million pounds of contributed clothing were distributed free through the Ministry of Social Welfare and district national committees, to institutions and hospitals, and direct to indigents.[77] A small proportion—about 300,000 pounds—of the contributed clothing was sold to cover the cost of sorting, repairing, and cleaning the whole.[78]

[75] Monograph, Hanson and Kossova, "Agricultural Rehabilitation," p. 18.
[76] Monograph, Evreinov, "History, Economic Section," p. 26.
[77] Monograph, Kralick, "Supply Department," pp. 10–11.
[78] *Ibid.*

Some 6,000 tons of tanning materials helped to rehabilitate Czechoslovakia's world-famous footwear industry; crude rubber, tires and tubes, spare parts, machinery, and machine and hand tools supplemented the large supplies of vehicles and petroleum products and contributed to the re-establishment of transportation. Nonferrous metals and chemicals of all types, over 10,000 tons of mining equipment, and construction equipment, such as bulldozers, tractor elevators, and bridge-welding apparatus, were among the many other components of the industrial rehabilitation program which, despite the irregularities of arrival and the occasional delivery of unwanted or unsuitable supplies, not only provided employment for the Czechoslovak industrial worker, but also restarted the flow of indigenously manufactured consumer goods to restock the depleted resources of the population in general.

When UNRRA ceased, in the middle of 1947, Czechoslovakia was in a better economic condition than any of the other UNRRA-assisted countries. It had been possible to cut the supply program by $6 million, and Czechoslovakia had also made contributions in kind to the Administration's supply programs for the benefit of neighboring countries. The standard of living had recovered from wartime misery, and, while it could not be claimed that the country's economy was fully restored, it seemed that only some unforeseen development could interfere with the steady march toward complete economic viability. Although the main credit for these favorable developments is due to the efforts made by the people themselves, UNRRA's timely assistance can justifiably claim a share in the rehabilitation of Czechoslovakia.

VI. Poland

1. *WAR'S AFTERMATH*

THE TERRITORIES administered by the Polish Government after World War II were among the most ravaged areas in Europe. Three times the tide of battle had swept across the country—in 1939, 1941, and 1944. Warsaw was a vast rubble heap; in the surrounding countryside people were for the most part living in cellars and dugouts. Gdynia, Danzig, and Stettin had been so thoroughly wrecked that at the close of hostilities hardly a ship berth in the area remained usable. Damage was widespread throughout the country, but the provinces of Poznan and Breslau, a stretch of middle Silesia, and parts of Krakow Province had, with the Warsaw area, suffered most severely. Factories had been stripped of machinery and burned; key railway and highway bridges had been demolished; more than 70 per cent of the standard-gauge tracks had been torn up or damaged; [1] power stations in the cities and the Silesian industrial sections had been wrecked. In a country predominantly agricultural, one sixth of the farms had been put out of operation [2] and many fields sown with mines. Some 70 per cent of the horses, in a land which had little other transport, had been killed or driven away. Of the cattle, used as draft animals as well as for food, only one third remained.[3]


The effect of the war on the people of Poland was tragic. Over six million had died; as many more had experienced deportation, forced labor, and the concentration camp. Seven hundred thousand were physically disabled,[4] and other thousands suffered from tuberculosis, venereal and other diseases. The Germans had, moreover, in their efforts to wipe out Poland as an entity, systematically exterminated the Jews. Many of the most highly trained professional people and skilled workers had perished. Less than half of the 12,900 doctors of

[1] Monograph, J. W. Cohen, "UNRRA's Program for Relief and Rehabilitation for Poland," HQ, Chapter I, p. 2.

[2] Operational Analysis Papers (OAP) 45, *The Impact of UNRRA on the Polish Economy* (London, 1947), p. 21.

[3] OAP 30, *Agriculture and Food in Poland* (London, 1947), p. 10.

[4] Monthly Report, July 1946.



MAP IV. POLAND: POSTWAR BOUNDARIES

prewar Poland survived; [5] about one fourth of the telecommunications experts had been killed; [6] the small workshops which had manufactured clothing had virtually disappeared.[7] Everywhere the UNRRA Mission found a lack of experienced personnel, from the Polish Government offices to the stevedores in the ports.

The country also faced major economic readjustments. The provisional western boundary, along the Neisse and Oder rivers, added 39,000 square miles of former German territory, including Silesia, rich in coal, iron, and various manufactories, and the important harbor of Stettin. In the east a larger area of agricultural land, marsh, and forest, with some valuable mineral resources, had been transferred to the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Republics of the USSR. The lands administered by the Polish Government were, as a result, reduced to four fifths of prewar Poland. Tremendous shifts in population were also involved, a million and a half Poles being moved from the lost eastern regions straight across the country to replace the somewhat larger number of Germans who had left the newly acquired western provinces. These mass migrations still continued during the period of UNRRA operations in Poland. There was a drop in total population from the prewar figure of 35 million to 24 million as a result of the loss of the eastern provinces, war deaths, and the exile, voluntary or otherwise, of hundreds of thousands of Poles and former Polish citizens (*Volksdeutsche*) throughout Western Europe and the Middle East.[8] Partly from these changes in boundaries, resources, and population came the decision of the Polish Government to convert the traditionally feudal agricultural country into a partially State-owned economy with stress on modern mechanized agricultural methods and increased industrialization.[9]

2. *EARLY PLANNING*

The full extent of the damage suffered by Poland was not realized until its liberation, but the world was well aware that its needs would

[5] Monograph, Dr. Henry A. Holle, "The UNRRA Health Program in Poland," p. 4.

[6] Monograph, S. Skribeland, "Mission Communications History," Enclosure 5.

[7] Monograph, R. G. Hampton, "History of Textiles and Clothing Section," p. 3.

[8] OAP 45, *The Impact of UNRRA on the Polish Economy*, pp. 2–4. See *infra*, Part Seven, Chapter II, Section 1.

[9] OAP 35, *Industrial Rehabilitation in Poland* (London, 1947), pp. 15–21, for discussion of the Polish Government's Four-Year Plan of Economic Reconstruction.

be great and its ability to meet them negligible.[10] Since the country lay in the operating area of the Soviet armies, the combined United States and United Kingdom military authorities did not plan to provide civilian relief supplies to Poland,[11] and that responsibility fell to UNRRA.

Requirements for Poland had been included in the estimates of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements; representatives of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London were active participants in the First Council Sessions and in the UNRRA technical committees there established; and planning for operations in Poland was done in Headquarters and in ERO from the beginning. Arrangements were complicated, however, by the announcement by the USSR in July 1944 that the Polish Committee of National Liberation, which had its headquarters in Lublin, would take over the administration of liberated Poland west of the Curzon Line. Lehman and his advisers, bound by the Council resolutions to secure, for relief activities in liberated areas, only the consent of the government or authority actually exercising administrative authority therein,[12] pursued their aim of providing aid to the Polish people. They felt obliged to act with great circumspection, however, so that no UNRRA activity could be construed as supporting the claim of either the London or the Lublin Poles to be the legitimate Polish Government. In the months during which the Great Powers were endeavoring to arrive at a basis for a reconstituted Polish Government, the Director General and his senior staff, therefore, were careful to consult with them frequently in order to preserve a correct neutrality.[13]

Plans for recruitment of an UNRRA Mission to Poland and definite supply planning were begun in the summer of 1944.[14] A formal request

[10] The UNRRA Subcommittee under Resolution 23 later recommended (on 20 December 1945) that Poland be declared unable to pay in foreign exchange, Subcommittee of the Committee on Supplies (on Ability to Pay) (CS-CFC/AP) (45) 38.

[11] Notes on conversation between Major General J. H. Hilldring (Director, Civil Affairs Division, United States War Department) and Lehman, Salter, and H. Jackson, 3 May 1944.

[12] Resolution 1, I, paragraph 2.

[13] For example, notes, meeting of Director General with Dean Acheson (United States State Department), Ben Smith (United Kingdom UNRRA Council member), Lester B. Pearson (Chairman, UNRRA Committee on Supplies), *et al*, 19 September 1944; notes, meeting of Director General with Vasili A. Sergeev (UNRRA Council member for USSR), *et al*, 20 September 1944; cable, London to Washington 1278, 12 December 1944; memo, Francis B. Sayre (Diplomatic Adviser) to Lehman, 23 March 1945, reporting conversation with United States Department of State.

[14] Notes, meeting of Director General with senior staff, 28 July 1944.

for aid and an estimate of supply requirements during the military period had already been submitted by the London Poles.[15] During the Second Council Session a cable was received from the President of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, also requesting supplies for the liberated areas of Poland.[16] The first feasible shipping route for such supplies was provided through the opening by the Soviet Government in January 1945 of the Black Sea port of Constanza in Rumania, whence UNRRA goods could be sent by rail into Poland and Czechoslovakia.[17] On 12 March the first shipload of relief supplies for Poland sailed from New York.[18] Michail A. Menshikov, Deputy Director General, Headquarters Bureau of Areas, was chosen in the same month to head a Temporary Delegation [19] commissioned to negotiate a formal Agreement with the Provisional Government, to set up a permanent mission, survey conditions within the country, and assist in computing its relief needs.[20] The necessary Soviet transit visas for the Delegation were, however, delayed until 6 July 1945,[21] the day after the United States and United Kingdom Governments had accorded formal recognition to a reconstituted Government, the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Menshikov and his staff of nine arrived in Warsaw on 29 July 1945. Negotiation of the Agreement was interrupted by the attendance of Menshikov, seven of the principal Polish Government officials, and Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, Chairman of the Polish Economic and Reconstruction Mission of North America, at the Third UNRRA Council Session in August 1945. While the Polish officials were receiving practical initiation into the purposes and machinery of UNRRA in London, the remaining members of the Delegation in tours through the ruined Polish countryside received impressive glimpses of the extent of the country's needs. The two groups met again in Warsaw on 1 September, and a fortnight later Menshikov and Stefan Jedrychowski, Minister of Navigation and Foreign Trade, signed the Agreement,

[15] Letter, Jan Ciechanowski (Polish Ambassador in Washington) to Lehman, 14 September 1944.

[16] Cable, Moscow to Montreal unnumbered (Edward Osobka-Morawski to "President, UNRRA Conference"), 17 September 1944.

[17] Letter, Captain Peter A. Golikov (Soviet Purchasing Commission) to W. G. Dominick (Ocean Shipping Division, Bureau of Supply, HQ), 17 January 1945.

[18] Monograph, "Supply Accounting and Statistical Division," p. 1.

[19] Cable, Washington to Moscow unnumbered, 12 March 1945.

[20] Memo, Lehman to Menshikov, 3 July 1945.

[21] Travel Section, HQ, files.

the text of which differed little from the standard draft brought from UNRRA Headquarters.[22]

3. *ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MISSION*

The Chief of the permanent UNRRA Mission in Poland, appointed in September 1945, was Brigadier Charles M. Drury, a lawyer who had had a brilliant career in the Canadian Army during the war.[23] Drury and such staff as could be collected at short notice in ERO were flown into Warsaw in mid-October without waiting for visa clearance so that Headquarters could truthfully assure the United States Congress, then considering further appropriations for UNRRA, that the Polish Mission was in full operation. They were a welcome sight to the remaining five members of the Temporary Delegation who for a month had been struggling with the ever-increasing arrivals of UNRRA supplies, explaining UNRRA to uninformed and suspicious Government officials, and worrying over a cable load which once totaled 93 in one day, all marked "Answer Soonest." [24] Not until 5 November were the formalities of visas and entry met and the hitherto incognito Mission Chief and his accompanying staff accepted by the Polish Government.[25]

During the first nine months of its existence the Polish Mission for several reasons suffered severely from the lack of imported personnel. The original difficulty arose from Menshikov's acceptance, not supported by the rest of his staff,[26] of the Polish Government's proposal to limit the Mission to thirty members, including local and imported personnel,[27] and from his assurance to the Polish Government that no regional offices would be requested.[28] Headquarters, however, particularly conscious of the necessity for adequate observation of distribution since the crucial hearings on United States appropriations were under way, pressed for removal of the limitation on the size of the Mission and inaugurated recruitment of a Chief of Distribution and ten observers.[29] All of Drury's persuasiveness was needed to induce the Polish

[22] See Part Four, Chapter I; Appendix Seven, Document 12*a*.
[23] Cable, London to Washington 3939, 17 September 1945.
[24] Monograph, M. E. Hays, "Early History of the Mission," p. 8.
[25] *Ibid.*
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] Notes of meeting with Jedrychowski, 1 September 1945.
[28] Monthly Report, February 1946.
[29] Cables: Washington to Warsaw 204, 12 September 1945; Washington to London 4749, 20 September 1945; London to Washington 5010, 16 October 1945.

Government to remove the limitation on Mission staff and to agree to the establishment of six (later seven) regional offices. Even thereafter, ERO recruitment for Poland was very slow, partly because of the rival claims of the mass recruitment campaign for China, and partly because of the difficulties in securing visas and making travel arrangements. At the peak of operations in Poland in the second half of 1946 the Mission was just adequately staffed [30]—162 Class I; 260 Class II [31]—and, more than most missions, it was obliged to rely on the services of consultants who remained only a few weeks or months.

The organizational scheme of the Polish Mission followed in general the pattern established in the earlier UNRRA missions. The Department of Transportation was, however, uniquely in Poland, headed by a Deputy Chief of Mission, separated from the Supply Department, and responsible to the Chief of Mission. Within its jurisdiction fell water- and rail-transport supplies, supervision of UNRRA port offices, and the arrangements for supplying other UNRRA countries with such indigenous Polish commodities as coal.[32]

4. *RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT*

When the Temporary Delegation reached Warsaw at the end of July 1945 the Polish Provisional Government had been in residence in the capital some three months and in its reconstituted form had been recognized by the United States and United Kingdom less than one month. It was still in the process of organization. Aside from the Vice-Premier, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who had been Premier of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London during the war, most of the principal ministers had had few Western contacts. The presence of UNRRA supplies, which had started arriving in Warsaw in early June, gave some earnest of the practical value of UNRRA, but there was little understanding that the goods were actually gifts from an international organization. As the supplies continued to arrive and Government representatives learned to know and respect the UNRRA staff, the purposes of UNRRA became more generally understood, and, once the questions of the size of the Mission and of the existence of the

[30] Monograph, Donald R. Sabin, "Office of the Chief of Mission," p. 7.
[31] As of 30 September 1946, Monthly Report, September 1946, Appendix B.
[32] Monograph, Sabin, "Office of the Chief of Mission," Appendix A, Organizational Chart of Mission, 3d quarter 1946.

regional offices had been settled, the Mission and the ministries worked together satisfactorily. The Mission staff, at Drury's insistence, was meticulous in remaining aloof from local politics, particularly during the January 1947 elections, and in consequence escaped the isolation in which the United States and United Kingdom Embassies were kept through their obligation to urge enforcement of the terms of the Yalta Agreement requiring immediate free elections in Poland.[33] The UNRRA Mission found the ministries generally responsive to suggestions and willing to accept complaints and act effectively to remedy them. The consensus in retrospect was that delays in carrying out promises nearly always arose from postwar conditions which could be changed but slowly, or from interministerial rivalries or deficient organization in a newly established government, conditions which individual ministers were unable to control. The Mission was above all impressed with the pervasive and heartening spirit of eagerness and enthusiasm everywhere animating the Government and the Polish people in their task of restoring their war-wrecked country and organizing their new industrial economy.

Although most of the Polish Government officials had by early 1946 come to accept UNRRA as a nonpolitical agency, the developing food crisis gave excuse to a minority to belabor UNRRA. Vice-Premier Wladyslaw Gomulka as early as February 1946 had voiced privately to the United States Ambassador his belief that UNRRA food was being used as a political weapon,[34] and on 30 April at a May Day celebration he gave public utterance to these charges. The reduction in the food program for Poland, which had, of course, been forced by the world shortage, was, he maintained, "mainly due to propaganda by the reaction," and he pointed invidious comparison with the food program for Germany (which was not an UNRRA responsibility) and that for Italy, where elections were about to be held.[35]

The statement drew immediate response from UNRRA in Washington, then concentrating every effort on meeting the food crisis. Nothing, said Jackson at his daily staff meeting, could be more unfortunate than for people "to bite the hand that is feeding them." [36] La-

[33] Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed* (Indianapolis, 1948), *passim;* statement by Drury at Poland Mission weekly staff meeting, 20 January 1947.
[34] Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, p. 220.
[35] Monthly Report, April 1946.
[36] Senior Deputy Director General's staff meeting minutes, item 3044 g, 3 May 1946.

Guardia at once dispatched a forceful personal protest to the Prime Minister of Poland, which read in part:

> This statement [by Gomulka] is regrettable. It is replete with inaccuracies. Such a misstatement, which could have been avoided, frankly is not helpful and I don't like it. Here I am fighting to get more help for Poland. This kind of talk may be good politics at home, but it is very bad for getting food. . . . This may be rough language, but the situation is so desperate that I need cooperation. I am too good a friend of Poland to stand for any kicking around like this.[37]

The cable, buttressed by the reports of the Polish Government representatives just returned from the Fourth Council and Drury's own conversations with Government officials, produced a minor crisis and an immediate *volte face*.[38] The Government began at once a campaign for the continuance of UNRRA aid beyond the end of 1946, gave wide publicity to Drury's explanation of the food situation and UNRRA's efforts to meet it, and agreed to allow the Mission to review before publication all subsequent statements concerning UNRRA supplies.[39] No further incidents of this kind occurred.

The Polish Government was, within the limitations of its own poverty, generous in providing for the UNRRA Mission. The Ministry of Post and Telegraph, even at the expense of the needs of Government officials, cannibalized what little telephone equipment remained after the systematic destruction by the Germans to provide for the UNRRA offices. Slow and inadequate as cable service was in the early months of the Mission, the staff at least had the satisfaction of knowing that the Government was faithfully giving to UNRRA cables priority equal with that of official communications. Although building materials and labor were exceedingly scarce in Warsaw, the Government repaired a centrally located office building for the Mission, using proceeds of sale of UNRRA goods for funds, and rebuilt three villas and furnished two others and a suburban rest center for the use of UNRRA personnel. By mid-May 1946 the Mission offices were under one roof.

The top-level point of contact for UNRRA in the Polish Government was the Bureau of UNRRA Affairs formed on the arrival of the Temporary Delegation by Stefan Jedrychowski in his Ministry of

[37] Cable, Washington to Warsaw unnumbered, 3 May 1946.
[38] Monograph, Sabin, "Office of the Chief of Mission," p. 9; Monthly Report, May 1946.
[39] Monthly Report, May 1946.

Navigation and Foreign Trade, and headed at first by Zygmunt Jan Modzelewski and later by K. Zaluski. Each ministry also had coordinating committees which, with a member of the UNRRA Mission, prepared preliminary supply requests. These lists were successively reviewed and screened by the UNRRA Bureau, by an interministerial subcommittee of which Jedrychowski was chairman, and then by the Council of Ministers, which was the final authority.

The UNRRA Bureau served as the clearinghouse for all major policy questions concerning UNRRA, but the ministries with which UNRRA had most frequent dealings also maintained their own UNRRA offices for day-to-day business in their particular fields. The Ministry of Social Welfare, for example, handled all UNRRA supplies given free distribution; the Ministry of Health, most medical supplies. The Clothing Section of the Ministry of Supply and the Central Boards of the Textile and Leather Industries in the Ministry of Industry dealt with new clothing and raw materials for textiles and footwear; the Ministries of Supply and Trade and of Agriculture handled food, tractors, and agricultural machinery.

UNRRA supplies on arrival at the ports became at once the responsibility of the Ministry of Navigation and Foreign Trade, which handled allocation to the appropriate ministries. Distribution was arranged by UNRRA Affairs Offices in each ministry in accord with general directions from the Central Planning Board of the Ministry of Supplies and Trade, and was then carried out in detail by regional representatives. District warehousing and actual distribution of food and new clothing, both under government-controlled sale, were done through SPOLEM (Economic Union of Coöperatives of the Republic of Poland) which maintained some 300 warehouses throughout the country and operated well over 3,000 retail coöperative stores.

5. *PREPARATION OF SUPPLY PROGRAMS*

The first shipments to Poland through Constanza [40] in the spring and summer of 1945 amounted to a little under 100,000 tons,[41] and in-

[40] See below, Section 6.

[41] Memo, Frank Weisl (Special Assistant to Chief Executive Officer), and Joel Gordon (Bureau of Supply), and Fred Chait (General Counsel's Office) to Rooks, 14 September 1946. A small portion was shipped to Odessa and by rail through Rumania to Poland.

cluded a miscellany of food, medical supplies, seeds, blankets, trucks and cars, and hand tools, chosen to meet imperative needs.

A program of operations was worked out in the Bureau of Supply at Headquarters in the autumn of 1945 on the basis of requirements prepared by the Government and the Poland Mission. These early estimates proved to have been overoptimistic, and the Program Subcommittee accepted the changes recommended by the Chief of Mission at the Washington Supply Conference in December 1945.[42] The major modification was a marked increase in the food budget at the expense of the very large items for industrial rehabilitation and livestock to which the Polish Government had given first priorities before it had realized how far short of actual needs the anticipated indigenous food production was likely to fall.

The tentative program of operations determined in the early months of 1946 remained the basis on which later revisions were made as newly discovered needs and the exigencies of procurement dictated. The amount of $435,000,000 was first taken as the rough total available; $477,927,000 was actually spent. In dollar value this was the largest European country program, 16.6 per cent of the total country programs of UNRRA, and a little over one fifth of the country programs for Europe. This was divided among the main commodities as follows:

TABLE 29

SUPPLIES DELIVERED TO POLAND BY UNRRA

Categories	*U. S. Dollar Equivalents*	*Gross Long Tons*
Food	$201,634,100	1,164,883
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	81,369,200	82,084
Medical and sanitation	24,875,800	33,826
Agricultural rehabilitation	74,851,200	495,052
Industrial rehabilitation	95,196,100	466,044
Total	$477,927,000	2,241,889

The question of ultimate responsibility for changes in the program of operations was an issue in the first six months of the UNRRA Mission. The Health Division in Warsaw in particular protested vigorously that the original medical supply program had been drawn up at the

[42] Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee (CC/P) (45) 20, Annex I, statement by Drury, 21 December 1945.

London Council and revised in Washington on the authority of Dr. Rajchman, who had formerly been Director of the Bureau of Hygiene in the League of Nations, without consultation with the Polish Ministry of Health or the UNRRA Mission.[43] Only in May 1946 was it agreed by all parties concerned that the UNRRA Mission in Poland should be responsible to Headquarters for developing in conjunction with the Polish Government specific programs of requirements and detailed justifications for all commodities and for advising Headquarters on program changes desired by the Government either because of reallocation of funds or changed conditions in Poland. The Polish Economic Mission in Washington, headed by Dr. Rajchman, was empowered to advise Headquarters on program variations made necessary by changing availabilities of commodities, to make necessary substitutions from items specifically requested by the Government, and to make emergency changes when time did not permit communication with the UNRRA Mission.[44] Confused lines of authority were subsequently infrequent.

6. *OBSERVATION OF DISTRIBUTION—REGIONAL OFFICES*

In accordance with the UNRRA–Polish Agreement the Government, as in most recipient countries, received UNRRA goods at shipside, and assumed responsibility for their distribution, while the UNRRA Mission undertook the observation of distribution to ensure, among other things, that no discrimination was made "because of race, creed, or political belief." [45] The first UNRRA supplies for Poland came by ship to Constanza and thence by rail across Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. When the first boat arrived on 8 April 1945 only two representatives of the Polish Government were at the port, and during the subsequent period when control of Constanza was being transferred from the Soviet military forces to the Rumanian Government little provision was made for guards on the trains. Only in August, after the Temporary Delegation had registered protests, were adequate arrangements made for Polish guards to accompany the rail shipments to protect them against pilferage.[46] The loss, mainly

[43] Monograph, Holle, "The UNRRA Health Program in Poland," pp. 89–90.
[44] Cable, Warsaw to Washington 532, 7 May 1946.
[45] Resolution 7, paragraph 1.
[46] Memo, Oscar Schachter (on loan from General Counsel's Office, HQ, to Temporary Delegation) to Menshikov, 30 August 1945.

of food, from the Constanza deliveries was, however, a negligible proportion of the whole Polish program.[47]

The question of payment of transit charges for UNRRA supplies landed at Constanza and sent by rail through Rumania and Hungary, raised by the Polish Government when the UNRRA–Polish Agreement was being negotiated, was not settled until October 1946. Headquarters then completed agreements to add $1 million in supplies to the Polish program to cover all claims which Poland might have incurred for freight charges on UNRRA supplies, mainly through Rumania.[48]

To avoid the long overland haul from Constanza UNRRA ships were routed to the Polish Baltic ports of Gdynia and Danzig as soon as these had been sufficiently cleared of wreckage to be usable. The first UNRRA ship docked at Gdynia on 5 September 1945. Unloading of the early shipments to these ports was a herculean task. Large ships could be handled in the relatively undamaged port installations of Danzig, but rail facilities had been so thoroughly destroyed that the 250-mile journey to Warsaw at first took three to five weeks.[49] Consequently, only enough supplies were off-loaded to permit the lightened vessels to enter the wreckage-strewn channel to Gdynia from which goods could be more speedily dispatched on the less damaged railways leading out of that city. The available stevedores were untrained, weak from malnutrition, and so hungry that the UNRRA official on hand found it hard to blame them for pilfering food. No locomotives were at the dock to move freight cars to the warehouses; there were no trucks; manpower, such as it was, constituted the only substitute. Until the Mission personnel began to arrive and the Polish Government port organization tightened, a former professor of agricultural education, representing UNRRA, in company with a Polish university professor coped as best they could with cargoes and longshoremen.

By early 1946 the situation at the ports had very materially improved. A Special Ports Commission, made up of representatives of the Polish Government, the United States War Shipping Administration, the United Kingdom Ministry of War Transport, and UNRRA, cooperated on port rehabilitation and organization and by February

[47] Cable, Warsaw to Washington 93, 5 September 1945.

[48] Cables: Washington to Warsaw 2340, 27 September 1946; Washington to London 15673, 16 October 1946.

[49] Monograph, Richard T. Baradel, "UNRRA Medical Supply Story—Polish Mission," p. 2.

agreed that berthing and internal transport were adequate in both ports to handle the entire UNRRA program.[50] Pilferage remained a problem for some months longer, but as arrangements were worked out with the trade unions for more efficient dock laborers who were given a bonus for speedy performance and fed on the job, and as guards and fencing were installed, the rate of loss dropped from 3 per cent to a negligible amount.[51]

The UNRRA regional offices were set up in January 1946 in Katowice, Krakow, Lodz, Poznan, Gdynia, and Warsaw, and in Stettin in September 1946 when that port was opened to UNRRA ships and selected as an entry port for Polish displaced persons returning from Germany. In addition, an UNRRA Port Office at Gdynia handled ship deliveries. From these key distribution points UNRRA observers followed UNRRA goods from warehouses to the recipients in the surrounding provinces, reported as required to Mission Headquarters on price control, wages, publicity for UNRRA, warehousing, and transport, and advised the provincial authorities on ways and means of improving distribution. In the early months of 1946, owing to a Government regulation which forbade the giving of information to foreign representatives, the regional observers experienced considerable trouble in securing statistics from local officials. A supplementary decree, however, made an exception of UNRRA supplies, and as the observers won the confidence of the provincial authorities this difficulty disappeared.[52] The observers were specially commissioned to investigate all reports of diversion of UNRRA goods to the USSR, but in the whole life of the Mission no such charge was ever substantiated.[53] Of the 5,000 varied complaints on misuse of supplies to the end of 1946, only 400 appeared well founded and were referred for prosecution by the Polish Government.[54]

The regional observers, furthermore, served the useful purpose of publicizing UNRRA in the hinterlands. As the supplies began to move out in quantity from the distribution centers in mid-1946, news of their sources spread rapidly. Newspaper coverage after May 1946 was generous, and UNRRA was further publicized by an eleven-page de-

[50] Monthly Report, February 1946, Appendix F.
[51] Monograph, "History of Food and Agriculture Division," pp. 10–11; Monthly Report, September 1946.
[52] Monograph, "History of Distribution Division," p. 17. [53] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[54] Poland Mission, minutes, weekly staff meeting, 27 January 1947.

scription of the organization in the widely distributed SPOLEM almanac and in a chart of UNRRA's work which reached a million school children.[55] The regional officers also often doubled as welfare officers during their journeys about the provinces by bringing to the attention of the Government officials who accompanied them the dire needs of individual families and local institutions.[56]

Although some members of the Mission felt that the regional offices were badly understaffed, the consensus was that, since distribution of supplies was rightly the task of the Government, UNRRA had taken the realistic and practicable approach and had fulfilled its duties in stimulating the Polish authorities to do their own work effectively.

7. *PROVISION OF UNRRA SUPPLIES*

As the Polish Government and the UNRRA Administration fully recognized at the outset, effective distribution in Poland of all types of relief supplies depended on the early rehabilitation of transport. Of the 14,800 miles of standard railways in postwar Poland less than one third was in normal operation even in mid-1946;[57] the inland river and canal systems were clogged by the wreckage of bridges and sunken barges; and the customary horse-drawn vehicular traffic had been drastically cut by the loss of more than two thirds of the horses. The many thousands of used trucks and trailers which UNRRA was able to buy in the Allied military surplus depots of Europe offered the only immediately available source for meeting the acute transport needs of European recipient countries. While the Temporary Delegation was still in Poland a series of truck convoys were rolling from Canadian Army centers in the Netherlands to Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, where Polish drivers took them over from the Canadian soldiers. Hundreds of other vehicles were shipped to Poland from army collection centers in France, Belgium, and England. While a few hundred new vehicles had arrived in the summer of 1945 from Canada and the United States, and several red double-decker busses from London plied the streets of Warsaw,[58] 84 per cent of the trucks and trailers supplied by

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] See, for example, monographs: J. W. Kent, "Regional Offices—Warsaw, Lublin, Bialystok"; T. F. Hoogkamp, "Regional Offices, Krakow."

[57] Monograph, Cohen, "UNRRA's Program of Industrial Relief and Rehabilitation for Poland," Chapter I, p. 2.

[58] Cable, Warsaw to Washington 158, 14 February 1946.

UNRRA to Poland came from military surplus stocks.[59] Although the whole task of delivery from military surpluses was carried on against the chaotic transport situation prevailing in Europe and the dislocations of rapid military demobilization, virtually all the UNRRA trucks for Poland had been delivered by the spring of 1946. Their prompt arrival thus made possible the rapid delivery of other vitally needed relief supplies to the most devastated provincial areas otherwise cut off from distribution centers. Of the 37,000 trucks in Poland in April 1947, UNRRA had provided 54 per cent.[60] The effect of this contribution was actually greater than this figure indicates, however, for most of the UNRRA vehicles were larger and heavier than those from other sources and provided approximately 70 per cent of the total available load lift.[61]

Enough petroleum products were also provided by UNRRA (nearly $60 million worth) to supplement the limited supplies from indigenous sources and imports from Rumania, the Soviet Zone of Germany, and the USSR, and to keep the trucks rolling.[62] Repairs and the provision of spare parts for the 121 models of 31 types of vehicles supplied by UNRRA [63] remained for Poland, as for all the other receiving countries, a major and largely insoluble problem. UNRRA secured for Poland, however, from military surplus stocks three fully equipped vehicle-rebuilding plants, a tire repair and retreading plant, and equipment for other such shops.[64] In any event, the trucks themselves were early in the field and, thanks to the continuous and concerted efforts of Government and Mission officials, were by mid-July 1946 being utilized to the limit of their capacities.[65]

The more long-range rehabilitation of railways and port facilities also figured large in the program for Poland, although the amount originally planned was cut at various times as the more immediate needs in food and medical supplies took precedence or as the procurement of rolling stock and heavy machinery proved difficult and, in some cases, too slow for completion during the life of UNRRA. Al-

[59] OAP 45, *The Impact of UNRRA on the Polish Economy*, p. 56; see *infra*, Part Three, Chapter VII, Section 2.
[60] *Ibid.*, p. 54.
[61] Monograph, Edward H. Rott, "Industrial Rehabilitation Division," p. 16.
[62] Monthly Report, May 1947, Appendix E.
[63] Monograph, Rott, "Industrial Rehabilitation Division," p. 13.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[65] Monograph, "History of Distribution Division," pp. 11–12.

though half the locomotives, more than half the passenger cars, and 10 per cent of the freight cars left in Poland were reported in March 1946 as immobilized for lack of repair facilities,[66] the provision by UNRRA of parts and machine tools for railway repair shops helped to put them back into operation. Up to 31 May 1947 UNRRA had, moreover, supplied 2,685 boxcars from military surplus and procurement in the United Kingdom, 871 gondolas, and 105 locomotives, some of which had been manufactured for UNRRA in the United Kingdom.[67] These constituted something under 3 per cent of the rolling stock estimated to be in operating condition in 1947.[68] Port facilities at Gdynia and Danzig were also improved by two unloading cranes, two seagoing tugs, and other port equipment.

Rehabilitation of the Polish railways not only served to better the general distribution of supplies within the country but was from the first aimed particularly at reviving the transport of coal from the rich mines of the Silesian basin, now almost entirely in Polish hands. Not only did the movement of coal provide an essential element in the restoration of Polish industries but it offered to Poland the most immediate hope for a revival of export trade, for all of coal-hungry Europe looked eagerly to the largest source on the Continent. Material for rehabilitation of the mines themselves was also included in the UNRRA program since the mines within prewar Poland had been badly damaged and those in the former German provinces systematically exploited during the war without regard to necessary repairs. Competition with more desperate relief needs, however, cut the total to $6,332,500, mostly for coal-cutting machines and conveyor belting.[69]

UNRRA, in turn, profited from the gradual revival of the coal industry, for the Polish Government in December 1945 offered as a contribution 100,000 tons of coal,[70] 75,000 tons of which were dispatched to Yugoslavia and the remainder to Austria.[71] Toward the end of 1946 the Poland Mission was also instrumental in pushing through an agreement for the sale of Polish coal to the Italian Govern-

[66] Monthly Report, March 1946, Appendix M.

[67] Monthly Report, May 1947. The total number of boxcars, flatcars, and gondolas programed was 8,186, OAP 36, *Transport Rehabilitation in Poland* (London, 1947), p. 42.

[68] OAP 36, *Transport Rehabilitation in Poland*, p. 46.

[69] Monograph, Cohen, "Industrial Relief and Rehabilitation in Poland," Chapter III, p. 4.

[70] Cable, Warsaw to Washington 5381, 24 December 1945.

[71] Monthly Report, May 1946.

ment, thus to some degree relieving the pressure on the UNRRA coal program for Italy.[72]

Almost as essential as transport and coal in the initial stages of rehabilitation of industries and urban life was the repair of key electric power systems. Not only had many power plants been destroyed but the Germans had removed most of the copper overhead and underground cables, replacing them with iron wire which had in time become almost useless from "copper action." [73] To spread the revival of industry as widely as possible the Polish Government specified in its UNRRA program the provision of copper bars to be worked into wire in plants within the country. By mid-1947 these products and UNRRA power plants were bringing light and electric power to at least ten large communities, some of which had been in darkness since the war. Transformer and accessory equipment also supplied by UNRRA was handling some 20 per cent of the prewar installed capacity, while fifteen transformer substations furthered the distribution of electricity in the Warsaw and Krakow areas, and UNRRA rectifier substations aided the rehabilitation of the Warsaw streetcar lines.[74]

Chemicals and other raw materials for key manufactories, heavy machinery for quarrying and building and construction industries, machine and hand tools, and such household needs as eating and cooking equipment, kerosene lanterns, and personal sanitation supplies made up the remainder of the industrial rehabilitation program. This totaled $95,196,100, the commodity category, next to food, highest in dollar value.

The largest item in the UNRRA program for Poland was food ($201,637,700; 1,164,883 gross long tons), principally bread grains and considerable quantities of fats, oils, dairy products, and meat. Poland in prewar years had produced enough food for substantial exports, and only toward the end of 1945 did the Government realize that the economy had been so seriously disrupted by the war and its aftermath that large quantities of staple foods had now to be imported to prevent widespread hunger or even starvation. The long-continuing drought which Poland, in common with most of Europe,

[72] Monthly Report, September 1946.

[73] Monograph, Cohen, "UNRRA's Industrial Rehabilitation Program for Poland," Chapter III, p. 3.

[74] Monograph, Rott, "Industrial Rehabilitation Division," p. 18.

experienced in the winter of 1945–1946 was only a final factor added to a series of adverse circumstances. Large areas in the devastated regions and the ex-German provinces had not been planted because the battle areas were as yet unreclaimed and populations were still being shifted; moreover, seed was very scarce and draft animals few. Even the planted sections yielded little, not only because of the bad weather but because the untended fields had become choked with weeds during the war years and fertilizers, customarily used in large quantities, were unavailable. The tremendous losses in cattle, pigs, sheep, and poultry had, moreover, severely cut the local supplies of fats and oils, meat, and dairy products.[75] Early in 1946, for example, the Planning Board of the Polish Ministry of Supply estimated the indigenous annual production of fats as about one fifth of the 213,000 tons required, and the total indigenous meat supply as one third of the 345,000 tons needed. These requirements were, moreover, based on the low annual allowance of 9.3 kilograms of fat and 15 kilograms of meat per capita (in comparison, the annual per capita consumption in the United States averaged 21.7 and 64.2 kilograms, respectively).[76] These facts were considered by the Program Subcommittee and the Central Committee in approving a substantial increase in the food budget for Poland,[77] and throughout the Administration's struggle to procure and deliver food during the spring of 1946 Poland's needs were recognized as among the most acute.[78]

In the whole of 1946 UNRRA provided over 10 per cent[79] ($150 million) of the food available from all sources including indigenous production and 300,000 tons of grain from the USSR. This total gave an average for the year of 1,700 calories per day for the nonagricultural population who prior to the war had had an average of 2,800.[80] Obviously, without the food provided by UNRRA, this meager ration would have fallen below the level usually estimated for bare subsistence.

[75] Monthly Report, March 1947, Appendix A, press conference by Sabin, 4 March 1947.

[76] Monograph, Gerard A. Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," HQ, pp. 206–207.

[77] Central Committee (CC) (46)33, minutes 23d meeting, 8 March 1946 (Compilation of Documents of the Central Committee of the Council) (CC Docs.), II, 143–145.

[78] For example, Senior Deputy Director General's staff meeting minutes, mid-April through June 1946, *passim*.

[79] United Nations, *A Survey of the Economic Situation and Prospects of Europe* (Geneva, 1948), Table X, p. 136.

[80] Monthly Report, March 1947, Appendix A.

The early months of 1947 brought another food crisis. Again the harvest had been very poor. Although a 20 per cent larger acreage had been sown and fertilizers had been supplied by UNRRA, the yield was no greater than in the preceding year because of bad weather and flood damage, and a plague of mice which devoured the unripe grain in the fields.[81] The United States and United Kingdom Embassies had from the beginning insisted that the UNRRA Mission estimates of indigenous production were too low. The UNRRA staff maintained, however, that their statistics represented broader and more thorough observation supplementing the data made available by the Polish authorities,[82] and the Central Committee was sufficiently convinced of the shortage of food that was sure to develop in 1947 so that it voted $11 million to Poland as part of the Emergency Food Program.[83] If the original UNRRA program had operated according to schedule, UNRRA shipments would have been completed by the end of 1946, and Poland would have had to face the crisis unaided. The shipping strikes in the United States had delayed deliveries in the final months of 1946, however, and the unprecedented freeze of the Baltic further delayed unloading in Polish ports, so that, with the supplies procured under the additional grant, a substantial quantity of grain finally arrived in April and May 1947 in time to avert a second threat of mass hunger.

The rationing system in Poland had been established before the arrival of the UNRRA Mission. It applied to the nonagricultural population only, that is, 8–10 million of the total population of 24 million. The numbers in the various categories changed considerably as groups were added or subtracted in the Government's efforts to fit available supplies to the most essential classes of workers. From 1,500,000 to 3,300,000 were holders of Category I ration cards. Included in this group were Government employees, workers in nationalized industries and transport, workers in private industries using low-wage scales, persons doing work considered socially important (artists, writers, editors, clergy, social workers), near relatives of members of the Polish Army. They were recipients of low, Government-controlled wages who were entitled to buy food, clothing, and household equipment at

[81] OAP 45, *The Impact of UNRRA on the Polish Economy*, p. 34.

[82] Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, pp. 223–224; monographs: "History of Food and Agriculture Division," p. 10; Sabin, "Office of the Chief of Mission," p. 10.

[83] CC(47)16, minutes 45th meeting, 3 February 1947; monograph, Allen T. Bonnell, "The Development and Fulfillment of the UNRRA Supply Programs," Part III, p. 106.

very low, Government-controlled prices. Those who labored in heavy industries and mines received, in addition, food by direct issue. Except in the months of greatest scarcity the quotas for Category I were fully met.

Category II card holders included workers in coöperatives and private firms engaged in purchasing or distribution operations for the State, war invalids, housekeepers, craftsmen and guild workers who had contracted to deliver their products at established prices. In Category III were workers in industrial, handicraft, and business establishments; widows supporting dependent children; repatriates, for one month after resettlement; persons over sixty not falling in other categories; and German prisoners of war. A fourth large category (designated as "IR") covered the families of holders of I and II cards; children in boarding schools and hospitals; widows and children of men killed during the war; and relatives of mobilized Polish soldiers without independent resources. Supplies were seldom sufficient, however, to meet in full the basic quotas of these groups.

The other source of supplies was the free market from which the urban population not on the ration lists were obliged to satisfy their needs and from which the entire population might purchase such supplementary foods as they could afford. Here there was no control on prices, which were 15–20 times the price of rationed goods.[84] The importation of UNRRA goods aided in preventing a runaway inflation by supplementing the indigenous supplies and indirectly increasing local production, but obviously the most needy among the population—mothers, children, the sick, aged, and indigent—could ill afford to pay free-market prices, and yet at first they were not included in the rationing scheme.

The peasants, it was assumed, would raise their own food. The Government, in addition, during the periods of greatest shortage, spurred on by suggestions from UNRRA consultants, promulgated various schemes for supplementary rations of the few indigenous surpluses, such as sugar, to farmers as a reward for their turning over to the Government substantial portions of their harvests.

The UNRRA Mission staff were keenly aware of the deficiencies of the rationing system, as indeed was the Polish Government, but they

[84] Report, Leo Gerstenzang (Deputy Chief of Mission, Distribution Division, Poland) to European Regional Office (ERO), 25 January 1946, note by Drury attached.

were obliged to recognize that available supplies were inadequate to provide even minimum rations for the entire population; the system was geared, moreover, to the unquestionably desirable purpose of rehabilitating the country's industries in the shortest possible time by building up the strength of the most essential workers. Clearly, no major revision was practicable without a decided increase in goods available for distribution.[85] The Mission staff, therefore, bent their efforts to attempting to prevent the direct use for the Army of UNRRA supplies and proceeds of sale and to emphasizing on all occasions the necessity for providing for those who were not included in the rationing scheme and who could not afford to purchase in the free market. The Temporary Delegation on their arrival in Poland were able to persuade the Polish Government to stop the official issue to the free market of UNRRA food supplies which did not fit into the rationing scheme either because they were regarded as relative luxuries, such as canned fruit juices or dried prunes or coffee, or because the quantities were insufficient for general distribution. Thereafter, such items were reserved for issue free or at low prices to welfare institutions and the needy.[86] No objection was ever made by the Mission, however, to the sale of UNRRA goods in the free market by individuals who had legitimately received them as rations or in free issue, on the principle that, as Drury emphasized, a person had every right to determine for himself whether he wished to use his rations or exchange them for some other needed article.[87]

Pursuing their concern for the people not included in ration categories, the Mission was able in June 1946 to secure the daily issue of a cup of milk, or the equivalent in milk powder or the like from UNRRA supplies, to all children under twelve years of age in Warsaw,[88] and a month later the establishment of supplementary rations for pregnant women and nursing mothers throughout Poland.[89]

The Polish Government, because of the grievous loss of agricultural workers and the manifest impossibility of rapidly replacing the horses lost during the war, placed heavy stress on the provision of tractors. UNRRA furnished a total of some 8,800 wheel tractors, a few crawlers, and 150 small garden tractors.[90] At least one fourth of these arrived by

[85] *Ibid.;* Monthly Report, April 1946.
[86] Cable, Warsaw to Washington 85, received 12 September 1945.
[87] Report, Gerstenzang to ERO, 25 January 1946, note by Drury attached.
[88] Monthly Report, June 1946. [89] *Ibid.;* Monthly Report, July 1946.
[90] Monograph, Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," p. 218.

the spring planting seasons of 1946 and the remainder by the spring of 1947. They were put to work by the State Tractor Board and the State Estates Administration and used in the winter for hauling coal, food, and building materials and during the planting periods for 18–24-hour service in the fields.

Distribution of tractors, farm machinery (horse-drawn and tractor attachments), and their spare parts was for some time a problem. Only as transportation gradually improved could machinery be shipped to the more remote areas. In many cases, also, the machine attachments and the spare parts arrived separately and were sent to widely scattered destinations; only in mid-1947, after constant urging by the Mission, were these divorced items rounded up and pooled in one warehouse, under the supervision of a single department in the Ministry of Agriculture. Early schemes for the outright sale of farm machinery to State farms, Peasant Self-Help and other agricultural organizations, moreover, foundered on the reluctance of these groups to invest their small resources in machines which they did not understand.[91] Not until early 1947 did the Government follow the Mission's recommendation and decide to hire out some of the equipment in order to hasten its full use.[92]

In a country little used to high-powered machinery it is not surprising that some of the tractors and other machines presently broke down from overwork and inexpert handling and were for some time immobilized awaiting repairs or replacement of parts. UNRRA, however, provided 100 tractor service units, 27 mobile repair units, 24 repair centers, and 238 blacksmith and wheelwright units; and by midsummer 1946 only about 10 per cent of the UNRRA tractors were reported temporarily out of action, a normal proportion considering the heavy use to which they had been subjected.[93] Efforts were, moreover, made from the start by the Government and later also by UNRRA experts to teach the drivers and mechanics the proper use of the machines and their repair. Classroom instruction was initiated by the Government in the winter of 1945–1946. The first UNRRA farm machinery specialist arrived during the spring of 1946 and at once set out to cover as much territory as he was able, instructing the men

[91] *Ibid.*, p. 221.
[92] Report by Drury at HQ Bureau of Supply staff meeting, 18 February 1947.
[93] Monograph, Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," pp. 228–229.

operating the tractors in the fields. By autumn three UNRRA experts were conducting Government tractor schools attended by representatives from the provinces who in turn were to teach their fellows. Demonstrations on the more advanced State farms also served to exhibit the uses of unfamiliar machines. Although the transformation to mechanized farming on a large scale was obviously to be a gradual development, UNRRA supplied both machines and instruction with which a beginning could be made. In terms of more immediate accomplishment, moreover, UNRRA tractors and attachments contributed much even in 1946–1947 toward compensating for the lack of draft animals, and many thousands of acres were sown which must otherwise have remained idle. It was estimated that the tractors supplied by UNRRA had a potential draft sufficient to cover 22 per cent (56,000 acres) of the land not under cultivation before their arrival, and the annual productive capacity of this area in cereals was calculated as equal to the yearly bread requirements of about 10 million people, or approximately the entire nonagricultural population of Poland.[94]

Clearly, UNRRA could not provide for Poland any substantial percentage of the 2,200,000 horses, 6,500,000 cattle, and 12,500,000 poultry lost during the war. Delivery was, however, made of 151,400 horses, 17,000 cattle (mostly cows), and 128,300 fowls and baby chicks.[95] Although most of the animals came across the Atlantic, 97 per cent of the horses and 98.9 per cent of the cattle through October 1946 arrived safely.[96] In early 1947, however, several shiploads of horses were kept from their ports of destination by the freeze of the Baltic, and 20 per cent of the animals died before they could be landed in Poland.[97]

Probably UNRRA livestock did more than any other part of the Polish program to publicize the organization throughout the hinterland, for the animals on their arrival in the country were all branded with "UNRRA," were principally allocated to small farmers, and were highly prized and proudly exhibited in the villages.[98]

A small but essential part of the agricultural rehabilitation program

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 219.
[95] *Ibid.*, pp. 222–224, 248; see also *supra*, Part Three, Chapter VIII, Section 3.
[96] Monthly Report, October 1946.
[97] Monthly Report, April 1947; monograph, "History of Food and Agriculture Division," pp. 13–14; see *supra*, Part Three, Chapter VIII, Section 3.
[98] Cable, Warsaw to Washington 244, 9 October 1945.

was the provision by UNRRA of $10, 842,300 of seeds, mainly wheat and rye, increased from a decidedly smaller requirement after the deficiencies in indigenous food production had been realized early in 1946. Seeds procured in the United States against the first requests arrived in time for spring planting in 1946 and substantially increased the fall harvest, while the prompt delivery in September 1946 of 57,500 tons of seed rye purchased by UNRRA in Czechoslovakia was sufficient to produce grain enough to meet the needs of the nonagricultural population for three months.[99] The entire UNRRA seed program for Poland was estimated to have sown 400,000 acres.[100]

Lack of fertilizers had been a major factor in the low yields of planted areas in 1945 and the first half of 1946. Not only had the destruction of livestock diminished the supply of natural fertilizer but the nitrogen plants of Poland had suffered heavy damage, the potash mines of prewar Poland had been lost in the shift in boundaries, and the customary imports of rock phosphate had been cut off by the war. UNRRA supplies of nitrogen and phosphate valued at $5,302,300, with potash from German reparations, imports from France and the USSR, and the revival of indigenous production of nitrogen had by the autumn of 1946, however, virtually overcome the shortage of chemical fertilizers.[101]

Through UNRRA supplies and the efforts of the Polish Government the fishing industry was substantially restored. In view of the very low protein content of the Polish diet the development of this indigenous source of food was recognized as particularly important. Most of the fishing fleet had been lost during the war. To the 150 small motorboats reconditioned or built by the Government in 1946, UNRRA added forty trawlers and converted mine sweepers estimated to be capable of supplying 85 per cent of the fish consumed annually in Poland before the war. To replace in part the 75 per cent of prewar fishing equipment destroyed, UNRRA supplied nets, tackle, and boat-repair material. Fish canneries and storehouses, left stripped of equipment during the war, or rebuilt by the Government in 1946, were provided by UNRRA with machinery and refrigeration. Through a relatively small contribution (6 per cent of the value of the agricul-

[99] Monthly Reports, August 1946 and September 1946. OAP 45, *The Impact of UNRRA on the Polish Economy*, p. 25.

[100] Monograph, Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," p. 226.

[101] *Ibid.*, pp. 210–215.

tural rehabilitation supplies for Poland) UNRRA thus aided materially in rebuilding an industry which had long-range potential value for the Polish economy.[102]

Important also in long-range effects were the instruction and advice on modern agricultural methods given by members of the Mission and visiting consultants, who as experts in farm machinery and tractors, fisheries, food preservation and mass feeding, and specialists in livestock research, nutrition, and pest control, brought to the Polish Government the developments and discoveries of recent years from which most of the Polish experts had been cut off during the war.

The earliest part of the UNRRA program for Poland to be completed was clothing and textiles. New clothing was handled by the Ministry of Supplies and Trade and, after midsummer 1946, rationed, on a system modeled after that used in the United Kingdom, to the working members of families holding food ration cards in Category I. Contributed clothing played a major role in supplying the destitute. Of the European recipient countries Poland received the second largest allotment, a little over 9,000 long tons.[103] Once the Government and the UNRRA Mission became aware of the heterogeneous baling and uneven quality, all the contributed clothing was, under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Welfare, unpacked at central warehouses and sorted and mended. It was then distributed free through the welfare organizations, and, from June 1946 on, one fourth was allocated the Office of Repatriation for issue to returning Polish displaced persons.

The textile factories in the Lodz area had suffered little damage compared to the other industries of Poland. The industry had always been dependent, however, on imports of raw wool and cotton, and the arrival by the first half of 1946 of 53,231 gross long tons of these commodities as part of the UNRRA program, with 17,000 long tons received in 1945 from the USSR,[104] made possible at an early date the partial revival of these essential manufactures.

The medical supplies program for Poland, although cut materially from time to time, still remained the largest for any of the European

[102] *Ibid.*, pp. 233–236. For deliveries of other categories of agricultural rehabilitation supplies, see *infra*, Appendix Ten, Section III, Document 15*c*.

[103] "Statistics on Clothing Drives Sponsored by UNRRA, as of 30 November 1946," p. 11.

[104] Monthly Report, January 1946, attached memo, Gerstenzang to Drury, "Report of Field Trip," 24 January 1946.

receiving countries, $24,875,800 (33,826 gross long tons). The distribution of medical supplies proved unusually complex. Trouble started at the ports. The lack of detailed lists of shipments and unfamiliar or inadequate labeling often led the untrained Polish Government representatives to fail to identify the goods correctly or to lay them aside for some future detailed inspection. When the Ministries were pressed by UNRRA to move goods out of the port warehouses, the unidentified boxes were often loaded at random, and the whole problem merely transferred to a number of provincial depots. In process, related supplies often became separated and could only be rounded up after months of search, or goods intended for another program were intermingled with medical supplies so that, for example, deep-sea diving suits for port clearance turned up at an inland hospital. The one UNRRA Medical Supplies Officer in Poland coped with the situation as best he could.[105]

During the early months of the Mission, medical supplies were stored in a central warehouse in Warsaw and distributed from there by the Ministry of Health. By May 1946 this had overflowed, and boxes were piled up without protection in the open. Protests from the UNRRA Mission resulted in the establishment of three other medical supply warehouses—at Gdynia, Lodz, and Bytom—and the rapid removal of 75 per cent of the Warsaw warehouse contents. Thereafter, the UNRRA Regional Delegates helped materially in urging speedy distribution in their several areas.[106] Decision that wholesale prices of drugs should be fixed by the Council of Ministers and retail prices by the Ministry of Health removed another cause of delay. Hospitals and other welfare institutions which for lack of cash had hitherto been unable to buy desperately needed medical supplies were in August 1946 enabled to secure long-term loans from local banks for such purchases.[107] By autumn UNRRA drugs and medicines were quite generally on sale in privately owned retail drugstores throughout the provinces.

A unique contribution by UNRRA to the rehabilitation of Polish medical services was the provision of complete modern apparatus for the Madame Marie Sklodowska-Curie Institute for cancer research

[105] Monographs: Baradel, "UNRRA Medical Supply Story—Polish Mission," *passim;* Holle, "The UNRRA Health Program in Poland," pp. 88–94.
[106] Monograph, "Distribution Division," pp. 7–10.
[107] Poland Mission, minutes, weekly staff meeting, 19 August 1946.

and treatment in Warsaw. This institution and most of its equipment had been burned during the war, but the buildings had not been demolished [108] and were rebuilt during 1946. Among the apparatus supplied by UNRRA were five X-ray machines for deep therapy, two for shallow therapy, one for diagnosis, and technical equipment for the operating room and histopathological laboratory. Most of the 17.7 grams of radium sent to Poland by UNRRA also went to the Institute, which had lost three of its four prewar grams to the Germans.[109]

8. *UNRRA SERVICES*

The UNRRA Health Division in Poland, under Dr. Henry Holle as Chief Medical Officer, unquestionably made the greatest contribution in point of services. The prevention of an impending typhus epidemic in the winter of 1945–1946 they counted their most important achievement. Not only were thousands of lives saved in Poland but the probable spread of the epidemic in the wake of the mass migration into Germany was averted. This was accomplished by the prompt provision of large supplies of DDT, demonstration of its use by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Greeley, of the United States Typhus Commission, in November 1945, and the thorough coöperation of Polish Government officials in carrying out a mass DDT dusting campaign in the early weeks of 1946. A threatened epidemic of typhoid in Silesia was also cut down as far as large-scale vaccination could affect it, although the rate of incidence remained more than normally high owing to bad sanitation conditions which could only be changed as water systems and sewage disposal improved in the general rehabilitation of the country.

The permanent staff of the Division was small (13 Class I, 9 Class II, at 30 September 1946), but it was supplemented by a succession of 18 consultants and lecturers of high caliber who aided the Ministry of Health by a series of expert surveys and recommendations covering the prevalence of tuberculosis, venereal diseases, the use of penicillin, the needs in sanitation, nutrition, maternal and child care, and training programs for doctors, nurses, and dentists. UNRRA itself, moreover, provided basic medical literature and a series of postgraduate

[108] Cable, Warsaw to Washington 42, 24 August 1945.
[109] *Ibid.*; OAP 31, *Health Conditions in Poland* (London, 1947), p. 18; interview, E. J. Howenstine with Leslie Atkins (Bureau of Supply, HQ), 26 March 1948.

refresher courses for Poland's doctors who had been cut off during the war years from knowledge of recent developments in medicine. These were given in the fall of 1945 and the summer of 1946 by visiting consultants and seven senior members of United States medical schools.[110] The value of these health services to Poland cannot, of course, be estimated in concrete terms, but, given the burning desire demonstrated by all members of the medical profession in Poland from the Ministry of Health to the local physicians in the country districts to improve their services to their people, it is to be expected that the methods and recommendations introduced by the UNRRA staff are being incorporated into the medical practices of the country.

By far the greater part of the work of the Welfare and Repatriation Division concerned displaced persons problems. The Polish Government had at first believed that no aid from UNRRA would be needed in this field, either for displaced persons within the borders of Poland or returning from other countries. The Mission staff, and particularly the head of the Welfare and Repatriation Division, were, however, successful in effecting a change in this attitude, and in the end the Division worked actively with the Government as well as with the UNRRA Central Headquarters in Germany in encouraging the repatriation of Polish displaced persons.

The welfare program in Poland was small. The Polish Government had at first requested no welfare personnel, and, although they agreed early in 1946 to make use of such services, recruitment by ERO was meager. Apparently, moreover, the elaborate plans made in Headquarters and ERO for welfare work in Poland were not passed on to the personnel destined for that country.[111] They suffered, therefore, from lack of certainty as to what they were supposed to do.

A major accomplishment of the Welfare staff was to stimulate the establishment in January 1946 of a Coördinating Committee of Foreign Voluntary Relief Agencies which worked with UNRRA during its lifetime and grew into a permanent independent organization in close liaison with the Polish Government, to be supported from local proceeds of sale of UNRRA goods through 1948. The Mission was also responsible for securing, in March 1946, the privileges and immunities for foreign voluntary agencies which the Polish Govern-

[110] Poland Mission, report by Dr. Norman D. Begg (Health Division, Poland Mission), weekly staff meeting, 13 January 1947.

[111] Poland Mission, talk by Drury, weekly staff meeting, 20 January 1947.

ment had not at first been ready to grant when the UNRRA-Polish Agreement was negotiated.[112] Another committee, set up at the suggestion of the Mission Consultant on Child Care, dealt with problems in that field. Established under the aegis of the Ministries of Education and of Social Welfare, the committee included representatives of the Ministry of Health, private Polish voluntary societies, some of the foreign voluntary agencies operating in the country, and UNRRA.[113]

9. *PROCEEDS OF SALE*

The net proceeds of sale of UNRRA goods in Poland were a substantial by-product of the UNRRA program, totaling 24,500 million zlotys.[114] As long as the UNRRA Mission was in operation its members kept a check on the purposes to which these funds were allotted. They were able, for example, to secure, for a time, exclusion of the Army, Militia, and Security Police as recipients of food purchased out of the Central Food Fund by the Ministry of Supply in the free market and resold at controlled prices as part of the campaign against inflation.[115] When these classes were again made eligible for such supplies, the Mission stopped the use of proceeds of sale for the Central Food Fund.[116] The Mission was also able to divert some of the funds originally planned for restoration of the cities of Gdynia and Danzig to the milk fund for mothers and children.[117]

10. *EVALUATION*

In recognition both of the urgent necessities and the constructive and enthusiastic approach to rehabilitation evidenced by its people, the UNRRA supply program for Poland was the largest in dollar value of the European country programs. It achieved both immediate and long-term results. The provision of food and trucks assisted in averting mass hunger during two periods of acute food shortage, while the prompt arrival of DDT and other medical supplies and the cooperation of UNRRA medical personnel enabled the Government

[112] Monthly Report, March 1946; notes of meeting of Temporary Delegation with Jedrychowski, 1 September 1945; see *infra*, Appendix Seven, Document 12*b*, *c*.

[113] Monograph, Madeleine Lay, "Child Care in Poland," p. 6.

[114] The official rate of exchange was 12 zlotys to $1.00. The actual exchange rate was 150 to $1.00 in October 1945, and the ratio subsequently increased.

[115] Monthly Report, February 1946.

[116] *Ibid.*, July 1946.

[117] *Ibid.*, May 1946.

health officials to save thousands of lives by preventing epidemics of typhus and typhoid. In addition to immediate relief, the UNRRA program furnished aid in the rehabilitation of transportation and electric power systems, the revival of coal production and export, a return to self-sufficient food production, and the beginnings of conversion to mechanized agriculture and a modern industrial economy. Granted that the limited resources of the Administration did not permit the satisfaction of more than a small percentage of the urgent needs in any of these fields, the supplies from UNRRA and the advice and information from the UNRRA staff and consultants did serve as the spark plug to start the process of reconstruction which the Polish Government gave every promise of being able to continue effectively. "While your supplies have been valuable," said one of the Polish Ministers, "the morale created by those supplies has been far more valuable"; [118] and as Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, then Vice-Premier, further elaborated,

> UNRRA's help came as a realization of all the promises given to Poland in the hardest time of German occupation. So UNRRA became for Poland not only a source for the most needed supplies, but an expression of the appropriateness and practicality of international agreements, and a symbol of mutual collaboration and protection.[119]

[118] Monograph, M. E. Hays, "History of Supply Department," p. 6.
[119] Quoted in monograph, Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," p. 201.

VII. Byelorussian and Ukrainian SSR

1. *THE NEED FOR AID*

THE UNRRA programs for Byelorussia and the Ukraine [1] must be viewed against the background of destruction wrought by the war on impressive agricultural and industrial development achieved by these western Republics of the USSR from their inception in 1919.

The campaigns in the Ukraine were headline news for the Western world, but the results in terms of devastation have been too readily forgotten. In this area of 181,000 square miles, stretching from the Byelorussian border in the north to the Black and Azov seas and the Crimea, some 50 per cent of the total war damage suffered by the USSR is estimated to have occurred.[2] Before the war the Ukraine produced 54 per cent of the coal, 60 per cent of the pig iron, 48 per cent of the steel, and 35 per cent of the manganese ore processed in the entire Soviet Union. Other large industries were sugar-refining, meat packing, flour milling, distilling, and dairying. The majority of the prewar population of 40 million worked on individual or collective farms which raised enough grain and livestock to help feed the rest of the USSR; about one fourth of the people lived in cities.[3] The end of the war saw most of the great industrial developments crippled or almost completely destroyed by Soviet scorched-earth tactics and German demolition. In the rich Donetz basin, for example, some 300 large mines had been blown up and flooded, and all the mining equipment factories and many of the metallurgical plants, the Kharkov

[1] Despite the fact that the UNRRA staffs in Byelorussia and the Ukraine were so keenly conscious of their individual differences as to believe that the two Missions should be treated separately, the many points of similarity which appear in restrospect in the history of these programs and the exigencies of space seem to justify their treatment in one chapter.

[2] Operational Analysis Papers (OAP) 39, *Economic Rehabilitation in the Ukraine* (London, 1947), p. 9, quoting Soviet State Commission.

[3] *Ibid., passim.*

tractor works, and the famous Dnieper dam ruined. In the industrial center of Stalino 75 per cent of the housing was destroyed, in Zaporozhye and Poltava, 40 per cent. Transportation was completely disrupted; out of some 20,000 kilometers of railways in the Ukraine about 1,500 remained operative. No less extensive was the damage in the agricultural districts. Hundreds of villages had been razed, and hundreds of thousands of farm buildings burned. More than half the tractors in the Ukraine and a vast quantity of livestock had been destroyed or carried off, and the fields lay unplanted and empty.[4]

Much less publicized but no less bitterly fought was the war in the Byelorussian SSR.[5] This area of 88,000 square miles, lying on the western borders of the USSR north of the Ukraine, was on the direct road from Berlin to Moscow and was continually fought over. The saga of the partisan warfare against the Germans by the peasants who made up some 80 per cent of its population of more than ten million [6] is one of the most dramatic chapters of World War II. Those who survived came back to villages which had been burned and looted of tractors, livestock, and even household equipment. In large sections only the land itself remained, grown up to weeds during more than three years of war.

Even to people who had witnessed the destruction in the rest of Europe, the rubble heaps of Minsk, capital city of Byelorussia, were a shocking revelation, comparable only to Warsaw; other large cities, such as Vitebsk and Gomel, had fared little better. Vitebsk, indeed, had changed hands eleven times, and in the province of Vitebsk alone the 300,000 civilians killed (a third of its population) equaled the total United States forces who died in the war.[7] Destruction, partial to total, had befallen many of the large modern factories which had produced prefabricated houses, paper, chemicals, pottery, glass, machine tools, agricultural machinery, or had processed meat, hides, dairy products, peat, and flax.[8]

[4] *Ibid., passim; Journal*, Third Council, p. 49, speech by Vasili A. Sergeev (head of Soviet delegation), addressing 5th plenary meeting, 10 August 1945.

[5] Byelorussia, literally "White Russia," has no connection with the term "White Russians," often applied to adherents of the Czarist regime at the time of the Revolution of 1917. The region has borne the name at least since the fourteenth century, supposedly in reference to its fair-haired inhabitants or the white garments which some of them traditionally wore.

[6] This figure includes the population of the area formerly in Poland; see map, Part Five, Chapter XI, Section 1.

[7] Monograph, Theodore Waller, "Introduction to Byelorussia," p. 5.

[8] OAP 48, *Economic Rehabilitation in Byelorussia* (London, 1947), *passim.*

Although on liberation in mid-1944 the two Republics found themselves almost back where they had started in 1919, they tackled the job of rebuilding their ruined economy with the same grim determination that had marked their fight against the Germans. Owing to lack of mechanical equipment, most of even the hardest labor had to be done by hand. The heavy loss of male population was evidenced by the predominance of women working in the fields, clearing rubble in the cities, and unloading ships at the Odessa docks. Although 75 per cent of the hospitals in Byelorussia had been destroyed,[9] a few were again in operation with salvaged beds, twisted and charred from fire, lining the corridors, the doctors' offices, and even the outdoor yards. The Minsk Medical School was endeavoring to teach its large enrollment of eager students with virtually no equipment and a few volumes rescued from the ruined library.[10] Farms which before the war had been cultivated by tractors were laboriously spaded by hand or plowed with a few cows for draft animals. Many families in country districts as well as in ruined cities were still living in cellars and dugouts or in small houses made of logs hewn by hand in the forests.

2. *NEGOTIATION OF THE AGREEMENTS*

It was with such facts as these in mind that the Soviet application to UNRRA for $700 million of relief and rehabilitation supplies was made just prior to the Third Council Session (August 1945);[11] and it was with full recognition of the damage suffered by Byelorussia and the Ukraine that the Canadian, United Kingdom, and United States representatives agreed on 24 August with the Soviet representative to substitute an UNRRA program of $250 million for the two Republics.[12]

The Subcommittee under Resolution 23 met on 25 September 1945 to consider the foreign exchange position of the two Republics, which had been admitted to membership in UNRRA during the Third Council Session.[13] The Subcommittee accepted the allocation of $61 million

[9] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, June 1946, quoting Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] Cables: London to Washington 2412, 26 July 1945; Washington to London 2891, 30 July 1945; letter, Hendrickson to Combined Boards, 30 July 1945.

[12] Letter, L. B. Pearson, Philip J. Noel-Baker, W. L. Clayton to Vasili A. Sergeev, 20 September 1945, confirming the understanding; see *supra*, Part One, Chapter V, Section 4; *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section II, Document 2*b*.

[13] Resolution 63. The United States delegation had strongly favored opening mem-

to Byelorussia and the remaining $189 million to the Ukraine and recommended that they be declared unable to pay, the Canadian, United Kingdom, and United States members supporting the decision in accordance with the understanding of 24 August.[14] The Subcommittee concluded that:

> Information supplied to the Subcommittee by the representatives of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [15] indicated that in accordance with the constitutional provisions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, this constituent republic has no foreign exchange assets of its own, such assets being entirely in the hands of the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Nevertheless, in view of the great destruction in the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Subcommittee recommends that the government of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic be considered at this time not to be in position to pay with suitable means of foreign exchange for relief and rehabilitation supplies which the Director General will make available.[16]

On 5 October the Director General confirmed the Subcommittee's recommendations.[17]

As soon as requests for the major categories of supplies were received in mid-September from the representatives of the two Republics, the machinery for procurement was started by the Bureau of Supply. Because of the delay in the United States appropriations for UNRRA, almost no procurement from United States funds was possible, but the Administration, nevertheless, proceeded with loadings, in some cases temporarily diverting cargoes allocated to other countries, and the first ship sailed for Odessa before the end of November 1945.[18]

Negotiation of the customary formal Agreements between the Administration and the two Republics, carried on in Washington, proceeded slowly. So little progress had been made by early November that Lehman on the sixth set the end of the month as a deadline after

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bership in UNRRA to all governments participating in the United Nations conference in San Francisco in April–June 1945, Harold E. Caustin (Special Assistant to the Director General), "Notes on Third Council," 12 August 1945.

[14] Subcommittee of Committee on Supplies (Ability to Pay), verbatim minutes, meeting, 25 September 1945.

[15] The recommendation for the Ukrainian SSR was identically phrased.

[16] Cable, Washington to London 5197, 2 October 1945.

[17] Letters: Lehman to A. M. Baranovsky (Council member for the Ukraine), 5 October 1945; Lehman to I. M. Timchouk (Council member for Byelorussia), 5 October 1945.

[18] Cable, Washington to London 7878, 6 December 1945.

which no shipments would be cleared if the Agreements had not been signed,[19] although the Soviet representatives continued to protest "in the most categorical manner" the linking of the signing of the Agreements with the shipment of supplies.[20] The Agreements were not signed until 18 December. Sufficient advance had been made by 30 November, however, so that Lehman agreed that the five ships then loading should sail and that all preparations up to actual clearance might proceed on further loadings.[21]

From the beginning of the negotiations a duplicate text for the two Republics was planned, and in the main the final form followed the usual lines of earlier agreements with receiving countries.[22] Several points were, however, argued at length between the Administration and representatives of the two Republics and the USSR. The size and functions of the UNRRA Missions were major issues. The Administration was adamant in refusing to include in the text of the Agreements any limitation on size. Lehman did, however, inform the Soviet representatives of his plan for staffs of fifteen plus an officer in each of the receiving ports and such clerical assistants as might be secured locally or imported at the request of the Mission Chiefs [23]—a slight increase over the five to ten members proposed by the USSR representative [24]—and this was embodied by the Administration in its covering letters of 18 December 1945.[25]

Discussions on the functions of the Missions centered on the observation of distribution. For this, the draft Agreement presented by the USSR representative made no provision,[26] and the Soviet negotiators at first insisted that the Governments' reports on distribution should constitute adequate evidence, and that the Governments could not accept the obligation to give the Mission personnel opportunity

[19] Minutes, meeting of Director General with V. A. Klentsov (Council member for the USSR), Baranovsky, Timchouk, and Caustin, 6 November 1945.

[20] For example, notes, meeting of Director General with Baranovsky, Alfred E. Davidson (General Counsel, HQ), Oscar Schachter (General Counsel's Office, HQ), and Caustin, 28 November 1945; Director General with Klentsov, Davidson, Schachter, Caustin, and David Weintraub (Bureau of Supply, HQ), 28 November 1945.

[21] Cable, Washington to London 7472 (p. 89), 3 December 1945.

[22] For texts, see Appendix Seven, Documents 3*a*, 14*a*.

[23] Meeting, Lehman with Baranovsky and members of General Counsel's Office, 28 November 1945.

[24] Draft Agreement presented by V. F. Teplyakov (General Counsel for Soviet Purchasing Commission), 9 November 1945.

[25] See Appendix Seven, Documents 3*b*, 14*b*.

[26] Draft Agreement presented by Teplyakov, 9 November 1945.

to travel for the purpose of observing.[27] On this issue the Administration would make no concessions in view of the Council resolutions. Not only did the final text provide that the Governments would "afford the Mission opportunity to observe such distribution at all necessary stages," but the Ukrainian representative, speaking for both Governments, explicitly stated that the phrase, "the Government will facilitate fulfillment of the duties of the Mission," meant that the Mission staff "would have complete freedom of movement in the receiving country to the extent required by the duties of the Mission under the Agreement." [28]

Other arguments centered on clauses governing the fulfillment of the UNRRA programs. The original Soviet application in July 1945 for UNRRA aid had requested that the program be completed within a year, and 1 July 1946 continued to be the target set by the two Republics.[29] The Administration, however, was determined not to make guarantees which it might be unable to carry out. The UNRRA negotiators insisted, therefore, on a realistic phrasing:

> The Administration will strive within the limits of its resources to procure before 1 July 1946 relief and rehabilitation supplies to meet the request of the Byelorussian [Ukrainian] SSR for assistance in the amount of $61,000,000 [$189,000,000], and, subject to available transport, to furnish such supplies as soon as possible to the Byelorussian [Ukrainian] SSR in accordance with Council policies.[30]

Several points not developed in the text of the Agreement were included by the Administration in explanatory letters designed both to meet Soviet demands and to state the position of the Administration.[31] The Ukrainian representative denominated this "unilateral" and not to be "considered as a document binding" his Government "in any respect," [32] but its terms were for the most part carried out without argument. In addition to the previously mentioned statement on the size of the Missions, the covering letters set forth *inter alia* the Administration's promise to furnish the two Governments by the fifteenth

[27] Memo, Schachter to Lehman *et al.*, 9 November 1945.
[28] Meeting, Lehman with Baranovsky *et al.*, 28 November 1945.
[29] Draft Agreement presented by Teplyakov, 9 November 1945.
[30] Agreements with the Soviet Republics, Article I.
[31] Letters: Lehman to Leonid I. Kaminsky (Council member for Byelorussian SSR), 18 December 1945; Lehman to I. Kozulia (Council member for Ukrainian SSR), 18 December 1945; see Appendix Seven, Documents 3*b*, 14*b*.
[32] Letter, Kozulia to Lehman, 28 January 1946, see Appendix Seven, Document 14*c*.

of each month with a schedule of supplies tentatively programmed for shipment during the following month; its agreement not to divert ships after sailing, without the consent of the receiving Republic; [33] the statement that the Director General's directives to the two Mission Chiefs were to be presented to the Government representatives for discussion prior to issue—but the Director General explicitly reserved his right to determine their final content and form; and the usual provision that UNRRA was to retain title to long-term equipment,[34] subsequently waived by the Administration for all receiving countries.[35]

The Agreements, like the other UNRRA-country agreements, made no mention of shipping costs. The Administration maintained that the intention in setting $250 million for the total programs of the two Republics had been to include these costs. The Soviet representatives, on the other hand, maintained that they had accepted the figure as representing the actual supplies they were to receive. The Central Committee members for Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR agreed on 31 January 1946 to support the use of the $250 million for supplies and the additional allocation by the Administration of an amount not exceeding $23 million to cover shipping costs.[36] This arrangement was confirmed by the Central Committee on 31 March 1946.[37]

The $23 million proved to be inadequate and was virtually exhausted by early 1947. The solution finally adopted had been proposed by the Missions in the two Republics. As of 1 April 1947 title to remaining deliveries of UNRRA goods was transferred to the Republics at the point of ship loading, subsequent shipments being made in so far as possible in Soviet vessels.[38] This arrangement accordingly removed

[33] Teplyakov had first proposed transfer of UNRRA supplies to the receiving Republics at the loading port to prevent subsequent diversion; memo, Schachter to Lehman, Davidson, Weintraub, 9 November 1945.

[34] Letters: Lehman to Kaminsky, 18 December 1945; Lehman to Kozulia, 18 December 1945; see Appendix Seven, Documents 3*b*, 14*b*.

[35] Cable, Washington to London 21982, 22 March 1947.

[36] Memorandum of Understanding, 31 January 1946, see Appendix Nine, Section II, Document 2*c*.

[37] Central Committee of the Council (CC) (46)33, minutes 23d meeting, 8 March 1946 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.] II, 144–145).

[38] Savingrams: Washington to London A-236, 4 April 1947; Washington to London A-252, 19 April 1947, giving text of letters exchanged between W. G. Dominick (Bureau of Supply, HQ) and Kaminsky and Kozulia.

from the Missions the necessity for collecting receipts within the countries and served to clear the way for closure of the UNRRA Port Office in Odessa and the Missions themselves.

The 31 January Memorandum of Understanding between the four Central Committee members formed the official justification for the Soviet insistence that their programs constituted an immutable figure which must be met to the last dollar—a view which came to be held also by the Bureau of Supply at Headquarters and which was in marked contrast to the carefully qualified wording of Article I of the Agreements quoted above. This categorical interpretation was given added confirmation by the Central Committee on 18 October 1946 in its decision not to impose the 2 per cent freeze on the programs for the Soviet Republics.[39]

The Missions had scarcely reached the Republics before the negotiations were under way for a renewal of the Agreements, due to expire on 1 July 1946.[40] Since the United States Congress was still considering the final appropriations to UNRRA, the exchange of letters extending the Agreements to 31 December 1946 [41] was given no publicity.[42] No further formal extension was made for the entire Agreements, but the articles covering equitable distribution and mission functions essential for the liquidation period were recognized as in force as long as might be necessary.[43]

3. *THE MISSIONS—STAFF AND FUNCTIONS*

The arrival of the Ukraine Mission, which was the first organized, was considerably delayed by the slowness with which Soviet visas were issued; Lehman was, in fact, obliged to threaten stoppage of shipments to the Republic before the Mission was given permission to enter.[44] The Ukraine staff did not reach Kiev until 20 March 1946, and their confreres for Byelorussia only arrived at Minsk a month later. Indeed,

[39] CC(46) 107, minutes 38th meeting, 18 October 1946 (CC Docs., IV, 43, 62); see *infra*, Part Three, Chapter II, Section 10.

[40] Cable, Washington to London 3371, 2 April 1946.

[41] Letters: Kaminsky to LaGuardia, 30 May 1946; LaGuardia to Kaminsky, 30 May 1946; Baranovsky to LaGuardia, 30 May 1946; LaGuardia to Baranovsky, 30 May 1946; see Appendix Seven, Documents 3*c*, *d*, 14*d*, *e*.

[42] Memo, A. H. Robertson (General Counsel's Office, HQ) to Rooks, 30 July 1946.

[43] Articles III–VII. This extension was in accord with Article IX and was confirmed by cable, Washington to Minsk 679, 24 February 1947.

[44] Letter, Lehman to Kozulia, 21 February 1946.

visas for Mission personnel were difficult to secure, especially after the first months, even in some cases for staff members returning from temporary absences outside the USSR. No dependable means of approach, either through the Governments of the Republics or the USSR, were ever discovered, and the Missions could only regard the whole process as an insoluble mystery.[45]

Recruitment of the Mission staffs, at the beginning and later, proved difficult. At first, it was hard to find suitable people who would accept an assignment expected to end in mid-1946. Then, as the life of the Missions was extended, it was even more difficult to secure replacements, acceptable to the Administration, the Missions, and the Soviet authorities, for personnel whose employment, as it developed, had been prematurely terminated, or who were obliged to return to the positions from which they had been temporarily released to UNRRA.[46]

Although Lehman had set fifteen as the expected total Class I staff for each of the two Missions, the Ukraine Mission at no time numbered more than ten and for a long period only seven, and the Byelorussian often fell below its peak of fifteen. In addition, instead of an UNRRA man in each Soviet receiving port, only one for Odessa was appointed on the Byelorussia staff but used jointly by the Ukraine Mission. The Byelorussia Mission had three successive chiefs: Richard B. Scandrett, Jr., Robert W. Frase, and Theodore Waller; the Ukraine Mission, two: Marshall MacDuffie and Paul F. White. All were Americans, as indeed, with three exceptions, were the staffs of both Missions.

The Republics' representatives in Washington had insisted that four Soviet technicians be added to the staff of each Mission on arrival. Actually, however, neither Government displayed much interest in furnishing personnel, and in the end the Byelorussia Mission had no Class II administrative or professional staff while the Ukraine Mission in September 1946 had one Ukrainian agricultural rehabilitation specialist and three port representatives in Odessa who gave only a fraction of their time to strictly UNRRA business.[47]

[45] Monograph, V. J. Tereshtenko, "Relations with the Government," Ukraine, pp. 45–51.

[46] Monograph, Theodore Waller, "UNRRA B.S.S.R. Mission History—Mission Administration," p. 9; monograph, Maurice Saiger, "History of UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine—Office of Chief of Finance and Administration," p. 5.

[47] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, May 1946; Ukraine Mission Monthly Report, September 1946. The two Missions seem to have differed in reporting local employees. Some of the unreported twenty Byelorussians who served that Mission ap-

The small staffs proved sufficient because, unlike most other receiving governments, the Republics had not requested various supplementary programs or aid with displaced persons, and the Missions were not concerned to the same extent with advising the two Governments on their program of requirements or revisions and substitutions. Instead, this responsibility rested with the Government representatives in Washington and London working in coöperation with, respectively, the Soviet Purchasing Commission and the Soviet Trade Delegation.

Since the Missions were so small and, both in Minsk and Kiev, were housed together, the customary UNRRA mission organization laid out in Headquarters before their departure was in practice largely disregarded. Business was conducted informally with everyone participating, and each person, whatever his official designation, took on other duties as necessary. Since the Mission Chiefs served as the focal points for relations with the Governments, by far the greater part of the work of the Missions, whatever its nature, channeled through them. Paul F. White in the Ukraine Mission, for instance, was recruited as Supply Officer and food expert, succeeded Marshall MacDuffie in July 1946 as Mission Chief, but continued to handle problems connected with food supplies and from September 1946 until closure also acted as Industrial Rehabilitation Specialist.[48]

When the Mission staffs arrived in the Republics they found preparations already made by the Governments for the conduct of UNRRA business. In the Ukraine the Department of UNRRA Supplies and in Byelorussia the UNRRA Supplies Administration[49] had been organized as agents of the respective Councils of Ministers, for liaison between the UNRRA Missions and the other Government ministries and for direction of distribution of UNRRA supplies. All phases of the Missions' activities were channeled through these offices. Housing, for example, had already been arranged before the arrival of the Mission staffs. The Byelorussia Mission was placed in a country house some four miles from the center of the ruined capital city of Minsk; the Ukraine Mission was given a floor in the only remaining good hotel

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parently held jobs comparable to the caretaker and drivers reported as Class II staff by the Ukraine Mission. In both countries they were hired, paid, and fired by the UNRRA Supplies Administrations.

[48] Monograph, Paul F. White, "Mission Supply Activities," Ukraine, pp. 4–5.

[49] For the sake of brevity these will hereafter be designated in the plural as "UNRRA Supplies Administrations."

in Kiev; while the Port Officer had rooms in an Odessa hotel. Servants and drivers were provided, disciplined, and paid out of proceeds of sale of UNRRA goods by these Government Administrations. Food for the Missions, except for supplementary UNRRA canteen items, also came from the Government.

The advantages and disadvantages of a centralized liaison with the Governments became abundantly clear. The heads of the UNRRA Supplies Administrations [50] were exceedingly hard-working, and generally coöperative in so far as the limitations of their authority and their physical capacities to execute their manifold tasks permitted. They were, however, in charge of large staffs, and all major policy matters and many of what seemed to the UNRRA Missions very minor problems had to pass through their hands. They were beset with all the complications arising from cramped offices, limited telephone and telegraph service, wrecked transport, inadequate numbers of experienced assistants and interpreters. They were, moreover, concerned with many duties in connection with the general warehousing, allocation and distribution of supplies, and accounting therefor, and UNRRA Mission affairs could claim only a small share of their time and attention. The UNRRA staffs attempted faithfully to develop understanding patience, although at times, when, for example, the Ukraine Mission had to wait days to put urgent telephone calls to Odessa or Moscow through the UNRRA Supplies Administration, their resolutions were sorely tried.

Personal relations between the Mission staffs and the UNRRA Supplies Administrations were good. The Ukraine Mission stated succinctly: "The cumulative effect of fifteen months of daily work and coöperation has resulted in an unusual degree of mutual understanding, even though, sometimes, the understanding only applied to basic disagreement." [51]

The Missions were not willing to accept the UNRRA Supplies Administrations as their sole contacts with the Governments, especially as it became evident that the heads were often unable to supply information which the UNRRA staff felt essential for their reports to ERO and Washington or for their own understanding of the complex Soviet economy. Neither Mission was able, however, to secure as

[50] Vladimir V. Khomyak in the Ukraine, and Konstantin L. Lastovsky, later Deputy under Ivan S. Bylinsky, in Byelorussia.

[51] Ukraine Mission Monthly Report, May 1947.

many conferences with other offices and ministries as were requested. It was, nevertheless, the judgment of both Missions that the Soviet reluctance was based in part on reserve and suspicion and that a determined and continuous effort on the part of the UNRRA staff from the beginning might have in some measure changed this attitude. This was to some extent borne out by the experience of both Missions. Not only were there social exchanges and recognition, but the Deputy Prime Ministers and occasionally the Prime Minister were accessible for conferences on major problems or the discussion of questions which could not be solved by the heads of the UNRRA Supplies Administrations and the UNRRA Mission Chiefs.[52] The Minister of Health in the Ukraine, furthermore, met several times with the UNRRA Medical Officer and provided a special liaison officer who conferred frequently with his UNRRA opposite and arranged inspection trips independently of the Department of UNRRA Supplies.

The Republic Governments had not asked for UNRRA services for displaced persons or welfare and consistently refused to accept UNRRA industrial or agricultural rehabilitation specialists on the grounds that their own technicians were well trained and far more accustomed to Soviet practices than any outsider could be. The only exception was the spontaneous request by the Byelorussian Prime Minister for an UNRRA specialist in penicillin manufacture. Unfortunately, the Administration was unable to find a suitable candidate.[53] Members of the Mission staffs at times offered advice in their own particular fields of technical experience, but this was generally not given serious consideration nor followed.[54]

The observation of distribution of UNRRA supplies was the major task of the Missions in the two Republics. Neither staff had received much briefing at Headquarters or ERO on detailed techniques to be followed nor did any directives on the subject reach the Byelorussia Mission until Part VII of the *Basic Field Manual* was received in February 1947.[55] The individual Mission Chiefs, therefore, used their own judgment in the light of local conditions and the attitudes of the

[52] Monograph, Tereshtenko, "Relations with the Government," Ukraine, p. 8.

[53] Monograph, Theodore Waller, "UNRRA B.S.S.R. Mission History—Supply Operation," p. 10.

[54] Monographs: Paul F. White, "Mission Supply Activities," Ukraine, p. 26; Theodore Waller, "Office of the Chief of Mission," Byelorussia, pp. 37–38.

[55] Monograph, Waller, "Office of the Chief of Mission," Byelorussia, p. 48. Part VII of the *Basic Field Manual* was issued by HQ in July 1946.

Republic Governments. The experience of the Byelorussia Mission varied from time to time. In the first few months the staff perhaps did less traveling than the Government was willing to arrange; on the other hand, Waller, who became Acting Chief in December 1946, had great difficulty in convincing the Government that observation trips were a necessity during the winter of 1946–1947. In the spring, however, just before the visit of the Director General in April 1947, field inspections were resumed.[56] Since the head of the Byelorussian UNRRA Supplies Administration felt obliged to accompany the Mission staff on all trips, or to send his deputy, Scandrett considered frequent journeys an unwarranted imposition on very busy men, especially in view of the extreme difficulties of transport.[57] As the Mission's elderly Lincoln, a light Studebaker, and three topless jeeps were needed for local trips into and about Minsk, the Government provided transport in the devastated countryside either by using its few official autos or, for longer journeys, special railway cars. Even when these difficulties were intensified by the severe weather of the winter season, Waller felt that such considerations were outweighed by the obligation resting on the Mission to observe distribution as extensively as possible.[58]

In the Ukraine the question of observation was not a major issue between the Mission and the Government. The latter often furnished motor transport, but, as the Mission gradually increased its contacts, the head of the Department of UNRRA Supplies no longer accompanied staff members except on major trips, and indeed some of the visits, especially those in and around Kiev, were arranged without his intervention, either directly or through the Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.[59]

In the end, however, staff members of the Missions had visited all the major centers in Byelorussia and in the Ukraine, had made frequent inspection trips to the port of Odessa, and one visit to Leningrad, which served as the supervisory center for all UNRRA shipments to northern Soviet ports. Complete freedom was allowed them to inter-

[56] *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.

[57] Letter, Scandrett to Richard R. Brown (Deputy Director General and Chief Executive Officer), 10 November 1947, p. 6, attached to monograph, Waller, "Office of the Chief of Mission," Byelorussia.

[58] Memo, Waller to George Woodbridge, 29 October 1947, p. 4, attached to monograph, Waller, "Office of the Chief of Mission," Byelorussia.

[59] Monograph, Tereshtenko, "Relations with the Government," Ukraine, p. 6.

view anyone—officials, storekeepers, and men in the street—and no evidence of evasion or reluctance to give full information was encountered at these lower levels. The places to be visited were selected in advance by the Missions as spots where UNRRA supplies were likely to be on sale or in use and the few cases in which requests to visit specific installations were not met did not materially affect the ability of the Missions to form a judgment as to the general pattern and effectiveness of the distribution system.[60]

As was customary in receiving countries, the Governments of the Republics during most of the period took title to UNRRA supplies at the end of ship's tackle in the port of delivery. The greater part of the UNRRA goods, largely from the United States, came into the Black Sea port of Odessa. Prior to the arrival of the UNRRA Port Officer, the United States Assistant Naval Attaché, who was also agent for the War Shipping Administration, acted for UNRRA. The entire port organization worked well despite the background of ruined installations and the shortage of experienced foremen and dock laborers. Checking of supplies by the receiving Soviet officials of Inflot, the Government port agency, was meticulous, and pilferage remained negligible. On telegraphed instructions from the UNRRA Supplies Administrations in Kiev and Minsk most goods were loaded directly in freight cars for immediate dispatch; only items likely to be damaged by exposure were placed in warehouses.[61] In August 1946 an unusual bunching of ship arrivals caused serious congestion in the port, but it was an episode which the Senior Deputy Director General was rightly convinced by personal observation was unlikely to recur.[62] Soviet documentation was carefully prepared, and the sole difficulty with this aspect arose from a disagreement between the two UNRRA Missions over what form of receipt was more acceptable.[63]

Most of the shipments from European sources and the United Kingdom, including industrial equipment, came into Leningrad and Soviet Baltic ports and were under the supervision of the Soviet representative of the Ministry of Foreign Trade at Leningrad. A visit by two members of the Byelorussia Mission in September 1946 confirmed

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 19–23; monograph, Waller, "Office of the Chief of Mission," Byelorussia, pp. 44–47.
[61] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, July 1946.
[62] Cable, London to Kiev 93, 2 September 1946.
[63] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, August 1946.

that the arrangement was working smoothly and that the only major delay in distribution resulted from the necessity of providing special freight cars for heavy and bulky machinery.[64]

The entire pattern by which the UNRRA Supplies Administrations and the other Ministries arranged the allocation and distribution of UNRRA supplies neither Mission was able to discover. It was clear that the Supplies Administrations worked out allocation decisions with the individual ministries which had jurisdiction over UNRRA goods, and, following approval by the Council of Ministers, issued directives to the port forwarding organizations for shipments to provincial warehouses, or, in the case of industrial rehabilitation equipment, direct to the ministry or organization concerned, such as the Ministries of Fuel Industry, Lumber Industry, and Civil Housing Construction, and the Machine Tractor Stations. Plans for distribution of food, clothing, and footwear were, for example, made by the UNRRA Supplies Administrations with the Ministry of Trade, and approved by the Council of Ministers. Actual distribution was then carried out in accordance with UNRRA Supplies Administrations directives from ports to provincial warehouses which, in turn, supplied ration stores and subdepots serving hospitals, children's homes, and other institutions. In the most devastated rural areas where UNRRA food was distributed free, it was furnished by provincial warehouses to the district soviets which determined the individual recipients on the basis of their knowledge of local needs. UNRRA seeds were distributed to provincial and district agricultural organizations which parceled them out to peasants and collective farms, or, in the case of vegetable seeds, sold them through village coöperatives.[65] The monthly reports supplied by the UNRRA Supplies Administrations indicated that about 55 per cent of all UNRRA goods were allocated for sale and 45 per cent for free issue, and Mission observation served to confirm that this proportion was maintained in actual distribution.[66]

Since most rural districts were considered to be self-supplying, UNRRA food was distributed mainly in urban areas, by sale at fixed

[64] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, September 1946; Ukraine Mission Monthly Report, August 1946.

[65] Monograph, Waller, "Office of the Chief of Mission," Byelorussia, pp. 41–43; Byelorussia Mission Monthly Reports, June 1946, May 1947; Ukraine Mission Monthly Report, September 1946.

[66] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Reports, September 1946, June 1947.

prices to ration-card holders through ration stores serving neighborhoods or factories or particular organizations or limited to special categories of customers such as pregnant women and nursing mothers, war veterans, professional and scientific workers; the kinds and amounts of food varied somewhat for the different types of customer. Most of the goods on sale in these outlets in 1946 were, except for bread, cabbage, and potatoes, provided by UNRRA, but, as the programs neared their end and indigenous and Soviet supplies increased, the proportion gradually changed. Since some of the UNRRA foods were not supplied in sufficient quantities to be given Republic-wide distribution and since such items as United States Army rations did not fit easily into the established ration scheme, an elaborate system of substitutions was worked out so that a customer might, for example, take his monthly entitlement of one kilogram of unavailable meat or fish in an estimated equivalent of eggs or powdered milk or *tushonka* (canned meat stew).

No UNRRA supplies were sold in the *gastronomes*, which carried unrationed luxury goods at high fixed prices, and very little UNRRA food found its way into the public markets (collective farm markets) where local products were sold at uncontrolled prices, since sale of rationed goods was forbidden by strictly enforced law. So far as the Mission staffs could discover, black markets, as differentiated from the legal public free markets, were virtually nonexistent in the carefully organized State economy.[67]

Ration scales in force in the Ukraine for certain major categories of the urban population, following the official reduction put into effect on 1 October 1946, are listed in Table 30 on page 247. The heavy workers group included molders, steelworkers, and miners; the light workers, railway workers, machine builders, etc.; the employee category, office workers, timekeepers, and caretakers. Dependents were defined as those past the age of fifty-five who were not employed and nonworking mothers who in addition received the special allowance—usually UNRRA dried milk or fats or meat—allotted all mothers. Children aged one to seven also received additional rations, mainly UNRRA supplies, through milk kitchens, nurseries, and kindergartens.

[67] Ukraine Mission Monthly Report, March 1946; Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, June 1946.

TABLE 30

UKRAINIAN RATION SCALES FROM 1 OCTOBER 1946 [a]
(In Kilograms per Month)

RATIONED COMMODITY	CONSUMER CATEGORY				
	Heavy Worker	*Light Worker*	*Employee*	*Dependent*	*Children up to 14*
Bread	36.0	18.0	12.0	7.5	9.0
Cereals	...	...	...	...	(0.8) [b]
Sugar	(0.5)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	0.3
Meat or fish	(3.2)	(1.8)	(1.2)	(0.5)	(0.4)
Fats	(0.9)	(0.4)	(0.3)	(0.2)	(0.3)
Butter or substitute	...	...	...	...	.06
Potatoes	(5.0)	...	...	...	...
Vegetables	(3.0)	...	...	...	(2.0)
Milk, fresh, dried, or evaporated	...	...	...	...	9.0
Vitamin juices	...	...	...	...	scarce
Approximate daily calories from rations only	3,527	1,682	1,144	704	973 plus 204 for infants

[a] OAP 39, *Economic Rehabilitation in the Ukraine*, p. 75.
[b] Figures in parentheses represent amounts authorized but very seldom available.

These ration scales permitted only a poorly balanced and inadequate diet, weak in fats and proteins. They were, moreover, targets rather than actualities, and as food became more scarce during the winter of 1946–1947 were only partially met, while at the same time the amount of food in the public markets also dwindled.

The October 1946 reduction in rations followed hard on an All-Union order raising prices on rationed goods and lowering prices in gastronomes as an optimistic approach to the abolition of rationing and the establishment of a unified State price for all goods. An accompanying wage increase on a sliding scale sought, however, to lighten the burden on less-well-paid workers.[68]

The bases for allocating UNRRA supplies for food rationing were never released to the UNRRA Missions since they were determined

[68] OAP 39, *Economic Rehabilitation in the Ukraine*, pp. 74–76.

on an All-Union basis and were considered as highly strategic data.[69] The monthly reports on distribution of UNRRA goods by geographical areas furnished by the UNRRA Supplies Administrations, moreover, apparently showed allocations rather than actual distribution and were consequently prospectuses rather than reports after the event.[70] Both Missions recognized that they had no influence on rationing, or on pricing which was also determined by the USSR. They were, however, convinced by their observations that distribution was fair and efficient and that the most devastated and needy sections of both Republics received the greater proportion of UNRRA food and other UNRRA supplies.[71] They, and visiting UNRRA officials as well, were, moreover, impressed with the careful over-all planning which spaced the issue of UNRRA food so that it formed part of the stock of ration stores straight through to the harvest of 1947 although deliveries of food under the UNRRA programs had been largely completed by the end of 1946.[72]

Certainly, there was no question but that welfare institutions received a fair share of UNRRA supplies, indeed some 10 per cent of UNRRA food imports into the Ukraine.[73] The Governments of both Republics were keenly aware of the necessity of raising a strong new generation; children's homes were given first priority in the allocation of food; in fact, the careful attention given by the Governments to the needs of children and mothers was to the Mission staffs one of the most impressive features of Soviet life.[74]

The UNRRA Missions had expected their duties to be relatively light inasmuch as advice to the Governments on program requirements remained the duty of the Republic representatives in Washington and London. They soon found themselves, however, occupying a complex liaison position between Washington and ERO on the one hand and the Government UNRRA Supplies Administrations on the other. They often received from Headquarters and ERO detailed and accurate information on programs and shipping at an earlier date than

[69] Monograph, White, "Mission Supply Activities," Ukraine, pp. 34–35.
[70] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, November 1946.
[71] Monograph, White, "Mission Supply Activities," Ukraine, p. 37; OAP 48, *Economic Rehabilitation in Byelorussia*, pp. 41–42.
[72] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, April 1947.
[73] OAP 39, *Economic Rehabilitation in the Ukraine*, p. 67.
[74] Cable, Minsk to Washington 36, 11 May 1946; Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, September 1946.

the Republics' Governments received it from their overseas representatives. They habitually passed on to the UNRRA Supplies Administrations such details as they received on shipments and the prospects of procurement on various items and attempted to counteract the usual optimism of the UNRRA home offices and the Government representatives by a pessimistic realism which gave them a reputation for toughness, a characteristic valued by the Soviets.[75] Even so, however, the Missions also were often in the dark as to the status of the programs, especially as ERO was but slowly persuaded to adopt the practice of sending information by cable rather than by savingrams or through the mails, which were often delayed many weeks because no satisfactory channel for delivery could be discovered.[76]

The Missions were also constantly busied with obtaining complete receipts for delivered supplies, securing from the Governments and transmitting to Headquarters and ERO regular reports on distribution and proceeds of sale, urging fuller information from UNRRA offices in return, pushing for faster delivery of supplies, and furnishing general information on the pressing needs of the two Republics. These reports were passed on to the United States Department of State, where careful scrutiny was given to all items programmed for the Republics to ensure that they were "essential for relief purposes," [77] and were of particular value to Headquarters since they "served to vindicate the strong justification" given the programs by the Administration.[78]

The Mission Chiefs began in the early fall of 1946 to urge on the Governments the provision of more publicity regarding the nature of UNRRA and its supply programs for the Republics. This subject, aside from a clause regarding UNRRA labels, had not been included in the Agreements. The Government officials, while personally appreciative of UNRRA and its contributions to their countries, habitually took

[75] Monographs: Waller, "Office of the Chief of Mission," Byelorussia, p. 9; Theodore Waller, "Supply Operation," Byelorussia, pp. 2–3; White, "Mission Supply Activities," Ukraine, pp. 2–3, 12, 25.

[76] Monographs: Waller, "Supply Operation," Byelorussia, p. 18; Theodore Waller, "Mission Administration," Byelorussia, p. 11; White, "Mission Supply Activities," Ukraine, pp. 13–14; Saiger, "History of UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine—Office of Chief of Finance and Administration," Ukraine, p. 17. See *supra*, Part Two, Chapter V, Section 1.

[77] Weintraub, draft notes for Director General's press conference, 4 May 1946.

[78] Monograph, Jack Cohen, "UNRRA's Program of Industrial Relief and Rehabilitation for Byelorussia," HQ, Appendix, letter, Gold to Scandrett.

the realistic view that UNRRA supplies were a very small proportion either of the total goods available in the Republics or of the needs of the countries, and were, therefore, entitled only to a similar proportion of mention. The Ukraine Mission on the whole gave somewhat more emphasis to the effort to get local publicity and did secure more, although both Missions were able to get some general articles in the press.[79]

4. *SUPPLY PROGRAMS*

The total UNRRA shipments to the Soviet Republics were:

TABLE 31

UNRRA SUPPLY DELIVERIES TO BYELORUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE

	Byelorussian SSR		*Ukrainian SSR*	
Categories	*U. S. Dollar Equivalents*	*Gross Long Tons*	*U. S. Dollar Equivalents*	*Gross Long Tons*
Food	$29,591,800	101,396	$99,437,700	315,748
Clothing, textiles and footwear	7,044,200	5,784	17,207,700	16,225
Medical and sanitation	991,100	646	2,445,500	1,037
Agricultural rehabilitation	5,412,100	8,050	16,988,900	38,069
Industrial rehabilitation	17,780,800	25,977	52,119,500	95,970
Total	$60,820,000	141,853	$188,199,300	467,049

Fats, oils, and meat were given top priority, since the tremendous destruction of livestock had almost removed these essential elements from the diet of the urban populations. In the Ukraine it was estimated that only 3,500,000 cattle out of 10,500,000 had survived; [80] in Byelorussia in May 1946 cattle numbered only 30–35 per cent of prewar totals, even including animals supplied after the war from other parts of the USSR.[81] The use of cattle for draft purposes, moreover, cut down the milk supply, while most of the donated cattle were young animals for breeding purposes, preserved from slaughter by law. Meat

[79] Monograph, Tereshtenko, "Relations with the Government," Ukraine, p. 84; monograph, Waller, "Office of the Chief of Mission," Byelorussia, pp. 50–52.
[80] OAP 39, *Economic Rehabilitation in the Ukraine*, pp. 33–34.
[81] OAP 48, *Economic Rehabilitation in Byelorussia*, p. 20.

from other sources was equally limited since a correspondingly large number of pigs, sheep, goats, and poultry had been killed or stolen.

Since fats, oils, and meat were the food categories which UNRRA found most difficult to supply, deliveries of such items to the two Republics stretched over the whole period despite the Governments' initial hopes that they might be completed by the summer of 1946. With substantial quantities of fish provided to increase the much-needed proteins, these categories made up more than half the food supplied by UNRRA to the Republics. UNRRA canned fruit juices, jams and marmalade, and whole dried milk pieced out the meager and unbalanced diet of children, mothers, and hospital patients, and in the Ukraine program vitamins were included for these groups in order to secure a maximum of results with a minimum of tonnage.[82]

Since the two Republics had always produced surpluses of grain—the Ukraine being commonly termed "the granary of the USSR"—no wheat or wheat flour was included in their programs, even though the Ukraine suffered severely from the bad harvest which afflicted most of the countries of Europe in 1946–1947, and Byelorussia had not yet recovered even three fourths of its prewar cereal production.

Although the food programs were at various times revised to meet current exigencies of budget or changed priorities for other commodities, their dollar value came to about half the total Byelorussian program and rather more than half the total for the Ukraine, and the gross tonnage to even more—71 per cent and 67 per cent respectively.

Next to food in tonnage and dollar value were the industrial rehabilitation programs. In view of the destruction of urban electric power, gas, and water systems, houses and public buildings, as well as mines and factories, emphasis was placed on equipment which would enable the restoration of indispensable public utilities and telecommunications, aid in rubble clearance, and stimulate production of a few basic industries such as peat extraction, and building and construction materials.

In terms of value almost half the industrial rehabilitation programs was devoted to so-called "protocol goods." These were principally electric power stations ordered by the USSR in the United Kingdom

[82] Although the requests apparently originated in the Ministry of Food, the vitamins were included in the medical supplies program, monograph, Dr. William P. Forrest, "Medical Program," Ukraine, p. 4.

under the Third War Protocol of 1942, but not yet completed. The plan to put these in the UNRRA program appeared advantageous to all concerned. For UNRRA it seemed to offer a means of completing the program at an earlier date than if new orders had to be placed, while the Soviet representatives for their part greatly preferred to receive equipment made to their specifications and already included in their plans for rehabilitating their industries.[83] Ultimately, the protocol category was stretched to enable UNRRA to assume financial responsibility for protocol items used in the Ukraine and Byelorussia which had been already shipped, even before UNRRA had been established. While the Missions were able to secure satisfactory documentation on the receipt of protocol goods delivered during their stay in the Republics, the problem of collection of documentation on items delivered earlier had to be transferred to ERO for solution with the Soviet representatives in London. After months of negotiation, satisfactory confirmation was achieved that the early items included had actually gone to the two Republics and so formed a legitimate part of their UNRRA program.[84]

Such parts of the industrial rehabilitation programs as did not have to be specially manufactured to meet Soviet requirements were largely delivered by the end of 1946. They included small locomotives for peat and lumber industries, and some $3 million worth of raw metals, mainly lead, copper, and zinc, to meet the imperative needs of the badly damaged telecommunications and electrical systems in such ruined cities as Kiev, Minsk, Vitebsk, and Gomel. Military surplus depots in France and the United Kingdom yielded trucks, bulldozers, and cranes for rubble removal and building operations. Actual installation of these was slow, since, as with much of the material from military surpluses, repairs or the provision of missing parts were necessary. In Minsk, however, once this equipment was in operation, more was accomplished in the way of rubble removal in the space of three months than had been achieved in the entire previous year when everything had had to be done with manual labor and wheelbarrows.[85]

Industrial rehabilitation equipment also included integrated plants,

[83] Cable, London to Kiev 55, 8 May 1946; memo, C. Hart Schaaf (Department of Supply, ERO) to Weintraub, 20 May 1946.

[84] Interview, E. E. Wasson (Supply Department, ERO) with History staff, 3 May 1948.

[85] Monograph, Theodore Waller, "Achievements and Results," Byelorussia, p. 1.

such as a brick-making factory, an asphalt factory, and a mineral wool plant for Byelorussia. Visits to the sites of some of these by the Mission staffs shortly before closure revealed a discouraging lack of progress in preparation of foundations, track sidings, and electric power provisions. Since the plants were being sent piecemeal as parts were finished and the shipments were not yet completed, their assemblage and erection posed a very real problem to the recipient ministries, particularly as substitutions and revisions had been made in the course of procurement so that original blueprints were out of date. The Government officials, therefore, might well have despaired of the eventual completion of the plants and have consequently hesitated to expend much preliminary effort on preparations for them.[86] As a matter of fact, shipment of these plants was not completed until after the departure of the Mission staffs.

Some late adjustments within the industrial rehabilitation programs were forced by the difficulty in securing long-term items because of the deadline of 31 March 1947 imposed by the United States Department of State for delivery of goods procured in the United States. Contracts for a gypsum plant and a wallboard plant for the Byelorussian Republic were accordingly transferred to the Soviet Purchasing Commission in exchange for locomotives and dumpcars of equivalent value, then ready for shipment.[87]

Clearly, the actual contribution made by the industrial rehabilitation programs to the revival of the economy of the two Republics could only be judged by observation many months after the departure of the UNRRA Missions when the plants and equipment had been put into actual operation, but unquestionably the items, though far below the actual needs, had been well chosen to mesh into the Soviet Five Year Plan for the rebuilding of the shattered cities of the two Republics.

In planning their agricultural rehabilitation programs the Republic Governments were, of course, anxious to restore as rapidly as possible the indigenous production of food after the three wartime years when virtually nothing had been grown. Seeds were, therefore, given as high

[86] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, April 1947; Ukraine Mission Monthly Report, May 1947.

[87] Monograph, Cohen, "UNRRA's Program of Industrial Relief and Rehabilitation for Byelorussia," Appendix, memo, Gold to G. E. H. Marshall (Clothing, Textiles, and Direct Procurement Division, HQ), 10 March 1947.

a priority as food itself. Both Mission Chiefs before their departure from Washington had worked with the UNRRA Bureau of Supply in urging the United States Department of Agriculture to expedite seed shipments,[88] and more than half of the originally programmed amount arrived in time for spring planting in 1946. These were primarily vegetable seeds, and grass and clover to be used in reviving the rotation of crops and to take the place of nitrogenous fertilizer. Although Lend-Lease levels of quality had been met and had been pronounced acceptable by the Soviet representatives in Washington, the experts in the Republics applied higher standards and condemned some of the shipments for weed-seed infestation. The infested portions were sent to the USSR for cleaning, since there was then no seed-cleaning equipment in the two Republics, and were, of course, only available for later planting.[89]

Further seed shipments arrived during the summer of 1946 and spring of 1947 and small lots purchased by UNRRA came in by rail from Hungary,[90] Czechoslovakia, and Finland.[91] By the end of the UNRRA program, the Ukraine had received 18,240 gross long tons of seeds and Byelorussia 5,276 gross long tons—a substantial and self-perpetuating contribution toward enabling the two Republics to revive food production.

Tractors were another fundamental need. Collective farms and individual peasants alike had been accustomed to make extensive use of the powerful tractors with multiple attachments loaned out from the State machine tractor stations. In the Ukraine, however, 56,000 tractors out of 90,000 had been wrecked or carried off during the war, and, although production had been started by June 1946 on a very small scale in the ruined tractor factory in Kharkov, its output, with such machines as were sent from other parts of the USSR, could supply but a small percentage of the needs.[92] In Byelorussia only 25–30 per cent of the prewar tractors were extant, most of them in bad condition.[93] Hand-spading and light horse- or cattle-drawn plows were

[88] Memo, Alexander Daderkin (Bureau of Services, HQ) to Abraham S. Boykoff (Bureau of Supply, HQ), 19 February 1946.
[89] Monograph, Horace W. Truesdell, "Agricultural Rehabilitation," Ukraine, pp. 2–5; see *supra*, Part Three, Chapter VIII, Section 2.
[90] Monograph, White, "Mission Supply Activities," Ukraine, p. 17.
[91] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, August 1946.
[92] OAP 39, *Economic Rehabilitation in the Ukraine*, p. 49.
[93] OAP 48, *Economic Rehabilitation in Byelorussia*, p. 18.

inadequate substitutes, especially where formerly cultivated acres had been overrun by weeds and brush. The Governments were, however, obliged to reduce their original requests for tractors to meet deficiencies in the food programs, inasmuch as the preservation of life and health had to take precedence over longer-range plans for food production. Nevertheless, they continued to place great emphasis on early delivery. The Administration combed depots of military surplus matériel for tractors, and diversions from Trieste and Piraeus were made to supplement new production for the Republic programs. By spring planting in 1947 virtually all the 1,500 for the Ukraine and 780 for Byelorussia had been delivered for distribution to the State tractor stations.[94] Obviously, as was the case with all phases of the Republic programs, these met only a small percentage of the vital needs, but the Missions were convinced that in the experienced hands of the Soviet mechanics full use would be made of the tractors for some time to come.

The need for clothing and footwear was everywhere evidenced by patched garments and the frequent sight of people going barefoot in summer or with burlap wrapped about their feet in winter snow. Other items which could less easily be produced within the country were, however, given priority, and the clothing, textile, and footwear program was, next to medical supplies, the smallest in tonnage. This was supplemented, however, by 2,875 long tons in the Ukraine and by 1,869 long tons in Byelorussia from the contributed clothing from Canadian and United States collections,[95] shipped even before the arrival of the Missions.[96] All the latter clothing, cleverly repaired locally, and much of the regular programmed goods were distributed free to children's homes and welfare institutions or through the local soviets to widowed mothers, war invalids, and factory workers. Textiles and hides were made into garments and shoes, mostly in small coöperative workshops, for sale within the rationing system.

In point of tonnage and dollar value alike the medical supply programs for both Republics were the smallest of the major commodity

[94] Monographs: Truesdell, "Agricultural Rehabilitation," Ukraine, p. 6; Waller, "Supply Operation," Byelorussia, p. 40.

[95] "Statistics on Clothing Drives Sponsored by UNRRA as of 30 November 1946," HQ, p. 11.

[96] Monograph, Henrietta W. Shaw (Clothing Division, HQ), "Comments upon History of Clothing Drives," p. 12.

categories and were, moreover, proportionately smaller than the average for all receiving countries.[97] Delivery of much of these programs was delayed; and, since many commitments had not been firmly contracted, they were most vulnerable to cutbacks in favor of other available commodities.

Observation by the medical officer in each Mission revealed repeatedly the excellent organization of the Governments' public health protection system, only temporarily interrupted by the war. Some evidence of a typhus epidemic in the war years was collected, but no serious epidemics occurred thereafter and tuberculosis seemed the only real threat, although the small prewar incidence of venereal diseases and of malaria had somewhat increased.[98] The destruction of medical equipment—more than 90 per cent in Byelorussia [99]—was, however, a tremendous handicap. The UNRRA program could not begin to meet the acute needs. By March 1947 UNRRA deliveries were virtually complete in drugs and chemicals, hospital and field equipment; [100] X-ray and dental equipment and supplies and major components of a penicillin plant for each of the two Republics arrived later.

By the close of operations the programs for the two Republics had been 99.61 per cent fulfilled ($982,700 short of the $250 million target), a result which represented much time, patience, and vigorous endeavor on the part of the UNRRA Supply personnel both in Headquarters and in ERO. Even though the UNRRA programs were small in relation to the imperative needs of these devastated countries, they had been scrupulously fulfilled during the immediate postwar years when the remainder of the USSR was least able to assist. The Chief of the Ukraine Mission could, moreover, point with pride to a final interview given circulation throughout the USSR in which the Chief of the Department of UNRRA Supplies stated that, on more than 99 per cent of the UNRRA supplies delivered, no questions of quality were ever raised.[101]

[97] Monograph, Forrest, "Medical Program," Ukraine, p. 4.
[98] Byelorussia Mission Monthly Report, June 1946.
[99] *Ibid.*, quoting Vice-Minister of Health.
[100] Monograph, Forrest, "Medical Program," Ukraine, p. 2.
[101] Ukraine Mission Monthly Report, June 1947.

VIII. Italy

1. *THE DECISION TO HELP*

AUTARCHY and Mussolini's "ten million bayonets" had created in Fascist Italy a brittle and artificial economy, poorly equipped to withstand the strains and stresses of total war; after defeat came harsh and contemptuous German occupation, followed by long and bitter fighting and its inevitable train of misery and havoc as the Allies advanced to the Pisa-Rimini line in the summer of 1944.

When the first UNRRA program began, early in 1945, Italy was still divided: the Allied armies held the south and the islands, and Kesselring and Mussolini ruled the north. This division lasted through the spring of 1945, and, apart from its consequences in terms of human misery and political disintegration, it meant economically that the peasant south, with its light industries, was separated from the main industrial centers and the fertile plain of the Po in the north. The closely knit economy evolved under Fascism broke down completely. The doles, provided by the Allied authorities under the "disease and unrest" formula,[1] could be ill spared from their strained transport and material resources, now extended to the maximum; and while these provided the south with its meager daily bread, they did not fill the economic vacuum left by the destruction of the old regime. In the midst of this destruction, disorganization, and understandable despair the UNRRA Observer Mission arrived in July 1944.

In the latter part of 1943 the Allies had showed concern for Italy's postwar economic problems.[2] That external economic assistance would be necessary soon became evident. By February 1944 the end of military responsibility was foreseen, and it was suggested that "thought should be given to the establishment of an Allied coördinating group to perform the present functions of the Combined Civil Affairs Com-

[1] See monograph, E. J. Howenstine, "An Analysis of UNRRA-Military Supply Relationships," Chapter V.

[2] Among other such signs of interest was the sending to Italy of a United States Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) Survey Mission in December 1943, headed by Adlai E. Stevenson (then Special Assistant to the United States Secretary of the Navy).

mittee and the Combined Chiefs of Staff after responsibility for Italian civilian affairs has been transferred from the military." [3]

At the same time, the possibility that UNRRA might become involved in the care of United Nations displaced persons in southern Italy was being discussed between the United States and United Kingdom authorities.[4] The Administration was also kept informally in touch with developments regarding postmilitary economic aid to Italy and was thus aware that the United States Government contemplated that UNRRA might become responsible for the "provision of supplies and services to Italy." [5] By August the Director General had been told that the United States Government with United Kingdom support intended to raise the matter at the approaching Second Council Session.[6]

In the meantime, the Administration had been considering sending an observer mission to Italy. Following a communication from Marshal Badoglio [7] in March 1944,[8] Lehman—while in Cairo in March and April—had discussed the possibility informally with General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.C.B., G.B.E., D.S.O. (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations).[9] The first request to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee for permission to send such a mission was made in May 1944, with the clear understanding that its members would not commit the Administration "to take any responsibility . . . but would serve solely as observers." [10]

In July 1944 the small UNRRA Observer Mission arrived in Italy.[11] Although they were to assess the needs for relief and rehabilitation and submit recommendations as to the extent and nature of the aid UNRRA might give,[12] the amount of such aid was clearly meant to be limited;

[3] Report, FEA Survey Mission to Italy, 5 February 1944, p. xii.

[4] Cable, London to Washington 2608, 28 March 1944; memo, Fred K. Hoehler (Director, Displaced Persons Division, HQ) to Sir Arthur Salter (Senior Deputy Director General), 31 March 1944.

[5] Note, meeting between the Director General and E. E. Hunt (FEA), 17 May 1944.

[6] Note, meeting between the Director General, Dean Acheson (United States Assistant Secretary of State), and Richard Law (United Kingdom Minister of State), 4 August 1944.

[7] Then Prime Minister of Italy.

[8] Letter, Badoglio to Lehman, 10 March 1944.

[9] Letter, Lehman to J. J. McCloy (chairman, Combined Civil Affairs Committee [CCAC]), 4 May 1944.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] S. M. Keeny (Head of the Mission), Guido Nadzo, A. A. Sorieri, and W. G. Welk.

[12] Memo, Lehman to Keeny, "Instructions—Functions and Scope of the Mission," 27 June 1944.

a total cost of $50 million was subsequently mentioned in the discussion between the United States Government and the Administration.[13]

The Observer Mission's report, submitted to the Second Council Session, proposed a total expenditure estimated at $94,800,000 on the provision of supplementary food for 2,500,000 needy, nursing women and expectant mothers, and children up to fifteen years of age; essential medical and sanitary supplies; assistance in rehousing and resettlement of Italian refugees displaced within Italy by reason of the war; and care and repatriation of the estimated 20,000 United Nations displaced persons in Italy eligible for UNRRA aid.[14]

Following the lead of the United States and United Kingdom Governments, the Council approved these proposals with the important proviso that the total program (excluding the care of United Nations displaced persons and epidemic control in Italy which had been provided in Resolution 57) was not to cost more than $50 million.[15]

It must not be thought, however, that this decision was easily reached. There was a strong feeling in the Council that no aid should be given to an ex-enemy country until the essential requirements of liberated Allies had been met; there were doubts—not to put it more strongly—by the Soviets and Yugoslavs regarding UNRRA aid to Yugoslav displaced persons in Italy who were opposed to the new regime in Yugoslavia.[16] Even within the Administration, Lehman's "general attitude towards an Italian operation was lukewarm," [17] and the majority of the senior officials had serious misgivings on the grounds that the proposed aid to Italy would amount to a dangerous dispersal of the Administration's already strained financial, personnel, and supply resources on a limited program of relatively little effectiveness; they also felt that the Administration's first responsibility was to succor the many member nations in need of help, and that public opinion in most of the United Nations would oppose aid to Italy at this stage.[18]

[13] Minutes, HQ staff meeting, 17 August 1944, and attached memo by H. E. Caustin (Special Assistant to the Director General), 18 August 1944.

[14] Summary Report of the UNRRA Observer Mission to Italy, 15 September 1944, pp. 11–17.

[15] Resolution 58.

[16] Memo, Michail A. Menshikov (Deputy Director General, Areas, HQ) to Lehman, 21 April 1944, protesting Keeny's proposal for UNRRA aid to anti-Tito Yugoslavs in Italy as "against the interests of Jugoslavia" and involving UNRRA in political issues.

[17] Note, meeting between the Director General and Keeny *et al.*, 24 June 1944.

[18] Minutes, HQ staff meeting, 17 August 1944, and attached memo by Caustin, 18 August 1944.

2. *THE FIRST AGREEMENT*

The Chief of the Observer Mission was, to use his own word, "condemned" to carry out his recommendations and was sent to Rome at the beginning of November 1944 as Chief of the Italy Mission. Spurgeon Milton Keeny remained Chief of the Mission to its end on 30 June 1947. An American Rhodes scholar, he had served with Hoover's American Relief Administration in Poland and the USSR after the first World War and in the interwar period had been on the staff of the United States National Council of the Young Men's Christian Association and had been active in the field of adult education. The second World War took him to OFRRO and FEA and then to UNRRA.

The Mission's first task was to get an Agreement with the Italian Government. This Agreement also had to be approved by AFHQ and by the Allied Commission (AC) [19] in Italy, and by UNRRA Headquarters and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.[20]

AC insisted that Italy's ability to pay—which Resolution 58 left to be determined by the usual procedure [21]—should be settled before submission of the Agreement to the Italian Government.[22] This delayed the opening of negotiations with the Government until 16 December 1944 when the Director General determined Italy "unable to pay." [23]

On 12 January 1945 Keeny had his first official meeting with Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi to consider a revised draft which had been cleared with AC.[24] Soon after this meeting Lodovico Montini [25] became the Italian Government's representative to negotiate with the

[19] When it was first established to exercise military government in Italy and ensure compliance with the 1943 Armistice terms, its name was Allied Control Commission. In 1945, in keeping with the development of more cordial relations with the democratic Italian Government, "Control" was dropped from the title.

[20] Monograph, Charlotte Lloyd, "First Agreement with Italy," p. 4.

[21] See Part One, Chapter III, Section 9.

[22] Monograph, Lloyd, "First Agreement with Italy," p. 6.

[23] Subcommittee of Committee on Supplies (Ability to Pay) (CS-CFC/AP) (44)13, minutes, 4th meeting, 6 December 1944; cable, London to Rome 12 (repeated to Washington 1279), 16 December 1944.

[24] Monograph, Lloyd, "First Agreement with Italy," pp. 8, 9.

[25] A brother of Monsignor G. B. Montini (Acting Papal Secretary of State), and a personal friend and political colleague of Prime Minister de Gasperi, Lodovico Montini was able to ensure close liaison both with the Italian Government and the Vatican.

Mission and remained the Government's liaison officer with UNRRA until the end of the Administration's activities in Italy.

By 6 February Keeny and Montini had initialed a draft Agreement, and on 17 February AC indicated that it would not object to signature by the Italian Government. After some puzzling hesitations, it became clear that the Government was most anxious to reformulate the draft in such a way as to underline the joint character of the Agreement, thereby emphasizing Italy's participation on equal terms in a United Nations undertaking.

On 8 March this first Agreement with Italy was signed; [26] though supplemented in January 1946 by a further Agreement, it set the pattern for the relationships between the Italian Government and the Administration. The Agreement provided [27] for the establishment of a Joint Committee, with Montini (now the representative of the presidency of the Council of Ministers) as chairman of the "Italian Government Delegation for Relations with UNRRA" (Delegation), and the Chief of Mission as head of the UNRRA representation. The two chairmen were authorized by the Government and UNRRA respectively to "conclude . . . all supplementary agreements necessary to the effectuation of the purposes of this Agreement" and were made responsible for "the fulfilment of the respective obligations of the parties under this Agreement." [28] Actual authority was vested in the two chairmen, but the meetings of the Committee gave an opportunity for the Italian officials from the various Ministries concerned to participate in developing, together with the divisional chiefs of the Mission, the details of the UNRRA program in Italy.

The financial provisions of this Agreement,[29] the principle of which was extended to the Supplementary Agreement, were perhaps the most distinctive and important. The Government undertook to contribute in local currency "a sum in lire corresponding to the cost in foreign exchange incurred by UNRRA for the services and supplies which it furnishes to Italy." [30] On the basis of the then rate of exchange of 100 lire to the dollar, this meant a commitment by the Government to make available up to 5,000 million lire to meet the Administration's

[26] Appendix Seven, Document 10*a*.
[27] UNRRA-Italian Agreement, 8 March 1945, Article IX.
[28] *Ibid.*, Article IX*d*.
[29] See also Part Four, Chapter I.
[30] UNRRA-Italian Agreement, 8 March 1945, Article V*a*.

expenses in Italian currency and, by agreement between the chairman of the Delegation and the Chief of the Mission,[31] to finance "additional relief and rehabilitation programmes in Italy." [32] The Agreement emphasized that the local currency contributed by the Italian Government would be "in addition to, and not in substitution for, the budget charges which the Government establishes for similar activities." [33] This concept of a "matching" contribution by the Italian Government stemmed from the expectation that there would be no appreciable net proceeds of sale from a program of relief, largely distributed free, to the most needy sections of the population.

3. *THE 1945 PROGRAM*

Without waiting for the Agreement to be signed the Mission had begun to work in conjunction with the other authorities involved—the Italian Government, AFHQ, and AC—on the development of a program.

The $50 million were allotted roughly as follows:

TABLE 32

TENTATIVE ALLOCATION OF FIRST PROGRAM FOR ITALY [a]

Purpose	*Amount*
Supplementary feeding of mothers and children	$36,000,000
Medical supplies	9,000,000
Aid in the care and return to their homes of Italian refugees	5,000,000
Total	50,000,000

[a] Operational Analysis Papers (OAP) 6, *UNRRA's Welfare Programme in Italy, Part I* (London, 1946), p. 4; *UNRRA Italian Mission Economic Notes* 3 (Rome, Italy, 30 January 1946).

The biggest initial difficulty in supply operations for Italy was that of shipping. The responsibility for importing essential supplies for the civil economy of liberated Italy rested with the Allied military authorities, and the supplies UNRRA proposed to import tended to be looked upon as "extras." Therefore, although AFHQ approved a program for the importation of nearly 100,000 tons of UNRRA supplies in the first half of 1945,[34] it was understandably reluctant to

[31] *Ibid.*, Annex III, Section 2*b*, iii. [32] *Ibid.*, Article V*a*, iii.
[33] *Ibid.*, Article V*b*. [34] Letter, Keeny to Menshikov, 16 December 1944.

provide shipping from its own exiguous resources for any civil supplies in excess of those required to meet the "disease and unrest" formula. By 12 December 1944, the Director General, then in London, felt it necessary to intervene personally and appealed directly to Roosevelt and Churchill.[35] As a result, one ship for February and one for March were promised "subject to military necessity";[36] and so deliveries were ready to start on signature of the Agreement.

Beginning with the loan of a month's supplies from AC, a total of 116,000 tons were imported by UNRRA in 1945. Of this, more than 101,000 tons had been transferred to the Italian Government by the end of the year. Under the terms of the first Agreement, supplies were received by the UNRRA Mission and title to them was only transferred to the Italian Government after their allocation had been determined by agreement between the Delegation and the Mission. This cumbersome arrangement was intended to give the Administration greater control over supplies; it is questionable whether in practice this was achieved, and there is no doubt that the day-to-day problems of reception and warehousing of supplies engaged too much of the time of the small 1945 Mission—time needed for the planning of the full-scale 1946 supply program.

The meagerness of the food rations, which, even including such supplies as were procurable on the free market, rarely allowed the ordinary Italian a daily intake of 2,000 calories, had since the war more than trebled the incidence of tuberculosis, and had greatly increased infant mortality rates. It was hoped that the $36 million feeding program would provide a continuous supplement of 750 calories daily to some 1,700,000 children up to the age of fifteen, and to 300,000 pregnant women and nursing mothers—approximately 20 per cent of the total numbers in these categories in Italy.[37] A survey made by the Mission's welfare staff, pending signature of the Agreement, had, as was to be expected, revealed that the Italian welfare organs had virtually ceased to exist, their organization had been disrupted, their funds and personnel dispersed; it was clear that the new Italy would need time to build up its public services in this field, as in most others.

[35] Cable, London to Washington 1273, 12 December 1944.

[36] Letter, William L. Clayton (United States Assistant Secretary of State) to Lehman, 19 January 1945.

[37] Operational Analysis Papers (OAP) 6, *UNRRA's Welfare Programme in Italy, Part I*, p. 7.

After signature of the Agreement the Mission, in collaboration with the delegation and the High Commissariat for Food, began to work on the establishment of a supplementary feeding program. From this developed the Provincial Committee system [38] which, starting in a few provinces, eventually covered the whole country and has become a feature of Italian social organization.

Each Provincial Committee was under the chairmanship of the prefect of the province, and included the bishop of the diocese, the provincial medical officer, the provincial representative of the Ministry of Finance, the provincial superintendent of schools, the Director of the Provincial Food Office, and the Director of the Provincial Federation of ONMI (Opera Nationale Maternita e Infanzia).[39] The Committees were responsible for the selection of the communes, institutions, and welfare agencies in each province to receive the supplies allotted to the province by the Delegation in consultation with the Mission. The Mission's district welfare officers participated as advisers and observers in the Committees' work, and the Committees were provided with full-time, paid executive secretaries.

In 1945 UNRRA's supplementary feeding program was restricted to the territory under the jurisdiction of the Italian Government,[40] the area south of the Pisa-Rimini line.[41] Various difficulties of distribution—transportation mostly—also made it impossible at first to reach all the people eligible for supplementary food. Until the Mission developed a proper regional organization in 1946, therefore, the district welfare officers devoted more of their efforts to expediting supply distribution than to welfare work. The number of mothers and children estimated to be receiving UNRRA supplementary feeding in central and southern Italy rose from 250,000 in June and 850,000 in September to 1,100,000 by the end of 1945.[42] After reaching a peak of some 2 million [43] during the preharvest months of May and June 1946, the figure at the end of 1946 was 1,770,295,[44] and by March

[38] In most municipalities there were also similar Communal Committees subordinate to the Provincial Committees.

[39] National Foundation for Maternity and Child Welfare.

[40] *Economic Notes* 3, p. 2.

[41] Even after the final defeat of the German forces in May 1945, the northern part of Italy remained under full Allied Military Government control till the end of the year.

[42] *Economic Notes* 3, p. 2.

[43] Italy Mission Welfare Division, Summary Report, Statistical Section, 24 March 1947.

[44] *Ibid.*

1947 had risen again to 1,900,000.[45] Before the Mission ended, provision was also made for the Government to continue the supplementary feeding program, on a basis of 2 million beneficiaries, with assistance from the proceeds of sale.[46]

The $9 million medical supply program was intended to meet the most urgent needs of southern and central Italy and included hospital supplies, medicines, sanitation supplies, instruments and equipment of all sorts, in addition to complete 40- and 200-bed hospital units, laboratory units, dental units, and ambulances.[47] However, this program was beset with the difficulties that plagued all UNRRA medical supply programs: [48] the supplies, both in respect to types and quantities, did not always arrive in accordance with plans and expectations.[49]

It was not until August 1945 that a first small distribution of 140 tons could be made, and it was not until October that supplies began to arrive in any quantity, but even then they were badly unbalanced.[50] The fact that no advance information could be obtained as to what was to be received and when, and that cases were not sufficiently labeled to permit proper identification of their contents without time-consuming examination by expert personnel, made impossible any advance planning of distribution.[51] With certain important exceptions, such as the timely supply of penicillin, the UNRRA medical supply program in Italy had a negligible effect in 1945.

By the use of UNRRA transport to carry refugees back to their homes in recent battle areas which they had had to evacuate, UNRRA assisted some 90,000 Italians to leave the camps in which they were miserably accommodated and resume their normal vocations.[52] In all too many instances, however, their homes had been partly or totally destroyed. Most rural Italian dwellings are built by their occupants, and the Mission, by providing free UNRRA transport for carrying bricks and other building supplies, assisted greatly in enabling the homeless to rebuild their own homes. It was from these small beginnings that the UNRRA–CASAS (Administrative Committee

[45] *Ibid.*, 27 March 1947.

[46] Lire Fund Appropriation 62, 11 November 1947, for 15,000 million lire; see also Italian Government-UNRRA Agreement on the Use of the Lire Fund, 12 November 1947, Annex II; (for text see *infra*, Appendix Seven, Document 10*f*).

[47] Monograph, D. T. Maton, "History of Medical Supplies," p. 1.

[48] See Part Three, Chapter V, Section 6.

[49] Monograph, Maton, "History of Medical Supplies," p. 2.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[52] *Economic Notes* 3, p. 1.

for Assistance to the Homeless) program developed after 1946.[53]

During 1945 the Italian Government's contribution in local currency, the so-called "Lire Fund," [54] was used largely for warehousing, transportation, and other internal distribution costs of the program as well as for financing various relief projects. Among these projects were the establishment of an organization for the repair of more than 3,000 tons of contributed clothing, assistance in the rebuilding of homes for Italian refugees, measures against tuberculosis and malaria in southern Italy, and the start of a special campaign in coöperation with the Rockefeller Foundation to eradicate malaria in Sardinia. In addition, roughly 2 per cent of the Lire Fund was spent on the administrative expenses of the Administration in Italy and some 13 per cent on the care of non-Italian United Nations displaced persons.[55]

4. *EXTENDING THE SCOPE OF AID TO ITALY*

By the summer of 1945 it was clear that Italy's need for economic assistance would continue. It was estimated that about $450 million would be required in 1946; [56] of this approximately half would have to be spent on food, and the other half would serve to get the country's industry and agriculture on the way to rehabilitation with Italy's economic independence as the eventual goal.

The Potsdam Conference and the resulting Berlin Declaration foreshadowed an international approach. In dealing with Italy, the Berlin Declaration said:

> The three Governments [57] have included the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she had made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the establishment of a democratic Government and institutions. The conclusion of such a peace treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfil their desire to support an application from Italy for membership in the United Nations.

[53] See below, Section 12.

[54] The "Lire Fund" consisted in the first place of the Government's lire contribution under the first Agreement. Later this was greatly increased by the net proceeds of sale of supplies sent to Italy under the 1946 program.

[55] *Economic Notes* 3, p. 1.

[56] *Journal*, Third Council, p. 101.

[57] USSR, United Kingdom, and United States.

It was against this background that, at the Third Council Session in London in August 1945, the United States Government proposed, and the Council approved, that UNRRA be "authorized and directed to initiate as soon as possible in Italy, and with respect to Italian nationals, a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance on the same standards and basis of priority as applied to liberated areas of the United Nations and their nationals." [58]

The Mission quickly began its negotiations with the Italian Government for a Supplementary Agreement to cover the expanded program. In the meantime "a minimum flow of basic supplies . . . [was] maintained through a special appropriation [59] . . . made by the United States Government for the purpose." [60] With the approval by the United States Congress on 28 December 1945 [61] of the first $750 million of its second contribution to UNRRA, the way was clear, and on 19 January 1946 Alcide de Gasperi, Prime Minister of Italy, and Keeny signed the Supplementary Agreement.[62]

The new Agreement preserved many of the features of the old, although in certain particulars it had to be adapted to the new form and scope of the aid being given.[63] Thus, for instance, the Italian Government was no longer called upon to match in Italian currency the value of the UNRRA supplies, but instead it accepted the usual undertaking to pay the net proceeds of sale of UNRRA supplies into a special Government account.[64] From this account the Government engaged to pay the Administration's expenses in lire [65] and to finance relief and rehabilitation programs "as may be agreed between the Government and UNRRA . . ." [66]

The Supplementary Agreement provided that the Government would "discuss and agree with UNRRA its policies and plans for the distribution of UNRRA supplies, in so far as may be deemed necessary by UNRRA in order to ensure that such policies and plans are consistent with the Agreement of 9 November 1943, with the Council resolutions and with the purposes of this Agreement." [67] With Leh-

[58] *Journal*, Third Council, p. 68; Resolution 73. See *supra*, Part I, Chapter IV, Section 4.
[59] The FEA $100 million program for Italy.
[60] *Journal*, Third Council, p. 66.
[61] Public Law 269.
[62] Appendix Seven, Document 10*c*.
[63] See Part Four, Chapter I.
[64] UNRRA-Italian Supplementary Agreement, 19 January 1946, Article V*a*; see also *supra*, Part Four, Chapter IV, Section 3.
[65] UNRRA-Italian Supplementary Agreement, Article V*b*.
[66] *Ibid.*, Article V*c*.
[67] *Ibid.*, Article III*d*.

man's support, gained despite misgivings at Headquarters and in ERO, the Mission insisted on this clause. In wanting to preserve the "principle of jointness," the Mission was influenced by the pattern of relations established by AC with the Government; on the other hand, there was understandable concern at Headquarters and ERO that such provisions might involve the Administration unduly in operations. This difference of attitude persisted throughout the life of the Mission; Headquarters and ERO felt that the Mission tended to "interfere" too much with Government operations, whereas the Mission staff—and especially some of those who had been taken over from AC—chafed at being limited to essentially advisory and observing functions. In this particular case, the clause in question was interpreted in Italy to mean that all Government allocation plans and the pricing of UNRRA supplies had to have prior concurrence by the Mission.

5. *THE MISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT*

The new program required a different organization and a larger staff to handle the much increased scope of the Mission's work, especially in the supply field. The Administration took over responsibility for economic aid to Italy from 1 January 1946, barely three days after it knew that it would have the funds; a detailed supply program had, however, already been worked out in anticipation of the approval by the United States Congress of the second contribution to UNRRA. The Mission was fortunate in being able to take over as a working organization most of the staff, including Harlan Cleveland,[68] of the Economic Section of AC which had been administering the stop-gap FEA program and which had previously administered Allied military aid. For a short period this group functioned in a dual capacity, clearing up the FEA program while at the same time working for the Administration, but by March 1946 they had been completely integrated into the Mission.

Whereas, under the 1945 program, district welfare officers had been able to observe the distribution of UNRRA supplies through the supplementary feeding program, it was clear that the new responsibilities would require the development of an expanded system of observation of distribution and at the same time would call for UNRRA representation throughout the country. Accordingly, eight Regions were set

[68] Acting Vice-President of the Allied Commission, in charge of the Economic Section.

up [69] with regional directors responsible to the Mission Executive Officer [70] for coördinating the activities of the various divisional representatives in their Regions. Similarly, in March 1946 a North Italy Industrial Rehabilitation Office was set up in Milan, the industrial center of Italy, to facilitate the carrying out of the industrial rehabilitation program.[71]

The Mission followed the usual pattern, with three Bureaus under the Chief of Mission. At its peak, in July 1946, the Mission staff numbered 4,012:

TABLE 33

ITALY MISSION STAFF, JULY 1946 [a]

	Class I	*Class II*	*Class III*
Mission, excluding displaced persons operation	417	3,334	111
Displaced persons operation	150		
Total	567	3,334	111

[a] "Statistics—European Region," Vol. I, Personnel.

The question of relations with the Government had been somewhat glossed over in making the Supplementary Agreement. The Delegation, still under the direction of Montini, had, however, in the absence of any special social welfare organ in the Italian Government, developed an important operating function, the administration of the supplementary feeding program. This welfare work of the Delegation tended to overshadow its prime function of representing the Italian Government in its dealings with UNRRA, and the Delegation's failure to achieve general recognition by the various Italian ministries concerned made it an inadequate channel for dealing with the Government on the many day-to-day problems of the supply program.[72] The Agreement was never altered, but in practice the Mission's supply offices dealt directly with their opposites in the various ministries, recognizing the Delegation's position by sending it copies of all correspondence. Although the Joint Committee established under the first Agreement remained in being with its powers unimpaired, it met only once [73]

[69] Italy Mission Administrative Orders: 51, 10 January 1946; 74, 26 March 1946.
[70] *Ibid.*, 122, 2 July 1946.
[71] *Ibid.*, 75, 25 March 1946.
[72] Monograph, Harlan Cleveland, "History, Bureau of Requirements and Distribution," p. 7.
[73] 8 March 1946.

after the signature of the Supplementary Agreement, and then dealt only with formal matters. It was, in effect, superseded by the two chairmen, Keeny and Montini, whose signatures always remained necessary for the official authorization of any actions requiring agreement between the Italian Government and the Administration.

Two other joint committees were, however, set up at the technical level to coördinate action between the Government and the Mission. The Joint Price Committee, set up in June 1946 under the chairmanship of the Chief of the Mission's Bureau of Requirements and Distribution, was in effect an advisory committee to the Chief of Mission and the President of the Delegation.[74] Following detailed discussions between the commodity specialists in the Mission and their counterparts in the ministries concerned, the Committee made recommendations regarding prices which became effective price decisions when they had been approved by the Chief of Mission and the President of the Delegation.

No single policy could be followed in price-fixing. It was necessary to fix prices sufficiently low to enable supplies to be distributed rapidly and to comply with the provisions of Resolution 7. At the same time, it was essential, particularly in the case of raw materials and fuel, for them to be high enough to deter purchase of supplies for speculative purposes and to prevent undue profits. There were endless discussions as to whether high prices encouraged inflation or whether, by "mopping up" cash resources, they combated it. Through this welter of theoretical and practical discussion, the Price Committee succeeded in bringing about a price structure which was broadly based on two principles: that consumer goods should be priced as low as possible to ensure their reaching the most needy categories of the population even when this necessitated pricing them below cost; and that raw material and fuel prices should be fixed to approximate estimated world prices at the end of the UNRRA program, thus gradually relating the Italian price structure to world prices.[75]

The Italian Government's fears of the development of two scales of prices, for commercial imports and indigenous production on the one hand, and for UNRRA supplies on the other, resulted in an agreement that there would be a single price policy for all commodities

[74] Italy Mission, Bureau of Requirements and Distribution, "Distribution Report Number One," 15 January 1947, pp. 2–5; Italy Mission, *The Lire Fund* (Rome, Italy, 1947), pp. 10–12; *Economic Notes* 23 (Rome, Italy, 21 June 1946), pp. 1–2.

[75] *Economic Notes* 47 (Rome, Italy, 6 December 1946), pp. 1–3.

regardless of provenance.[76] In practice, this was so interpreted that when UNRRA imports provided the bulk of any particular commodity, pricing was strictly in accordance with Mission policy, but where the UNRRA supplies represented only a small proportion of the total availability, every effort was made to avoid dislocating the existing price structure while adhering to UNRRA principles of distribution. In the result, and despite the constantly changing situation, a generally coherent price structure was evolved that helped to effect a smooth transition for Italy's economy from the UNRRA to the post-UNRRA period. Special problems were dealt with by special measures: to cope with the problems of raw cotton and wool the UNRRA-Tessile plan was developed; [77] and in connection with copra, rubber, and other products, the price control was extended to cover the goods manufactured, such as margarine and tires, from the raw materials supplied by UNRRA.

In addition to actual price-fixing, the Joint Price Committee also estimated maximum handling and distribution costs, thus agreeing upon the maximum amount which the distributing agencies could withhold from the gross proceeds of sale, which in turn determined the minimum net proceeds of sale that would accrue to the Lire Fund.

In addition to the Joint Price Committee, a parallel Lire Fund Control Committee [78] supervised the accounting of the Lire Fund and examined in detail the various projects developed for its expenditure.

6. *THE PROGRAM*

The basic UNRRA program was determined largely before UNRRA officially took over responsibility for economic aid to Italy. From August to November 1945 the AC staff in Rome and in Milan, in consultation with the Italian Government and the UNRRA Mission, developed a proposed program to meet Italy's anticipated requirements for foreign imports in 1946. After official clearance with the Italian Government and the Mission, this was published by AC as the famous "Green Book" [79] which, though necessarily often changed, remained the basis of the UNRRA supply program.

[76] See Appendix Seven, Documents 10*d*, *e*. [77] See below, Section 11.
[78] *The Lire Fund*, Appendix II *E*, Lire Fund Control Committee Terms of Reference.
[79] Headquarters Allied Commission (Italy), Economic Section, *Italian Import Requirements, 1946* (Rome, Italy, 1945).

The "Green Book" showed total Italian import requirements for 1946 at $1,100,104,000,[80] of which UNRRA was scheduled to provide $450 million [81] including cost of shipment to Italy. The UNRRA portion was primarily designed to provide the complete essential requirements for the early part of 1946 during which it was rightly anticipated that Italian commercial imports would not get under way to any significant extent.[82]

Although changing requirements and changing availabilities caused innumerable alterations and substitutions in the basic program, UNRRA shipped 10,225,450 gross long tons valued at $418,322,100, exclusive of shipping costs.

TABLE 34

UNRRA SUPPLIES FOR ITALY

Categories	*U. S. Dollar Equivalents*	*Gross Long Tons*
Food	$234,567,600	2,165,004
Clothing, textiles, and footwear	50,269,600	92,203
Medical and sanitation	9,477,900	10,672
Agricultural rehabilitation	13,320,500	172,211
Industrial rehabilitation	110,086,500	7,785,060
Takeovers from Allied Military Authorities	500,000	300
Total	$418,322,100	10,225,450

In terms of tonnage UNRRA's program for Italy was the largest to any receiving country. With the beginning of shipments under the UNRRA 1946 program, the Administration became the largest importer into Italy and took over from AC the responsibility for the organization of this vast undertaking until it in turn transferred the responsibility to the Italian Government in the spring of 1947.[83]

The shipping operation was aimed at achieving the lowest possible discharge costs, the minimum of loss, damage, and pilferage, proper documentation and recording, avoidance of congestion at ports, and, above all, the minimum strain on the disrupted internal transport system

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 27. [81] *Ibid.* [82] *Ibid.*, p. 19.

[83] Letter, Harlan Cleveland (Acting Chief of Mission) to Hon. Pietro Campilli (Vice-President, Interministerial Committee for Reconstruction), "Proposed Transfer of Certain UNRRA Operational Responsibilities to Italian Government," 3 January 1947.

and the maximum speed in getting imported supplies to their points of ultimate consumption.[84]

The UNRRA ports and shipping organization in Italy had a staff of nearly seventy people of whom some 10 per cent were imported personnel and the rest Italians with long experience in commercial shipping operations and knowledge of the Italian ports.[85] The UNRRA port officers established in the seven principal ports of Italy fed information regarding port capacity, availability of berths, port clearance facilities, and internal transport resources to Mission Headquarters daily. On the basis of this information, and in consultation with the Italian Government, ships were given their ports of destination while off Gibralter and in some cases—during periods of crisis—were rediverted when even nearer to Italian shores.

The Mission employed the firm of S. A. Sorveglianza as reception agents with responsibility for obtaining and preparing the necessary documents, acting as receivers of UNRRA cargo, guarding, tallying, and ensuring careful discharge of the supplies. By this means it was possible to use more than twenty Italian ports, although the Mission maintained port traffic officers in only seven. The success of these arrangements is evidenced by the very low proportion of losses and pilferage suffered by UNRRA supplies in contrast with the alarming proportions to which such losses had grown during the war.

In Italy UNRRA's slogan was "Three Ships a Day." Actually, about 100 ships per month discharged their UNRRA cargoes in Italian ports during the year that ended in March 1947. This naturally imposed a heavy strain on the physical and organizational resources of all concerned. Hard work—hard work most of all—experienced personnel, careful planning, close coöperation between the Administration and the Government and other agencies ensured the smooth and effective operation which dealt with the erratic volume of supplies and provided a steady flow of food and other essential commodities with the minimum of loss and waste of time and effort.

Under the 1946 program, all UNRRA supplies were transferred to the Italian Government at the end of ship's tackle, except those imported for UNRRA's displaced persons operations for United Nations nationals and the administrative needs of the Mission. The Isti-

[84] Monograph, C. C. Crooks and S. A. Regan, "History—Shipping," p. 1.
[85] Letter, Cleveland to Campilli, 3 January 1947.

tuto Nazionale per il Commercio Estero (National Institute for Foreign Trade), a Government organization under the Ministry of Foreign Trade, was responsible for the reception of supplies on behalf of the Italian Government. With the concurrence of the Mission, it appointed subagents for handling the various types of goods.[86]

Although the Mission was thus relieved of responsibility, it maintained a very close check on supplies: Mission officials frequently inspected warehouses and scrutinized stock situations and reports with the full and frank coöperation of the Italian authorities. In addition to this general inspection, special checks were made on particularly attractive cargoes. To answer criticism regarding the alleged leakage of UNRRA supplies into the black market, six grain ships discharging in various Italian ports were picked at random and a complete check was made on the movement of their cargoes from shipside, through silos or port warehouses to provincial warehouses, and down to the mills. The loss disclosed by this check was only .18 per cent.[87] Similarly, spoilage and loss amounted to but .067 per cent of the 150,000 tons of various food products, not including grain, received at Naples during 1946.[88]

7. *FOOD*

Wartime destruction and disorganization, with unfavorable weather and lack of fertilizers, had reduced Italian wheat production from the 8-million-ton peak of the 1939 harvest to 6,400,000 tons in 1944.[89] Even before the war, the Italians were never a well-fed people.[90] At the end of 1945 the average intake including unrationed food was below 2,000 calories daily,[91] over 60 per cent of this intake being in the form of cereals.[92] By 30 April 1947, UNRRA had provided more than 1,500,000 long tons of grain and grain products valued at over $130 million, 60 per cent in value of its total food shipments to Italy ($235 million).[93] Of course, these imports were supplementary to the internal

[86] Monograph, Gerd Lester, "History—Warehousing," p. 1.
[87] *Ibid.*, p. 2. [88] *Ibid.*
[89] UNRRA Italy Mission, *Survey of Italy's Economy* (Rome, Italy, 1947), Chapter III, Table 6, p. 34.
[90] The average food intake during the years 1933–1937 was 2,600 calories daily (*Survey of Italy's Economy*, p. 79).
[91] OAP 6, *UNRRA's Welfare Programme in Italy, Part I*, pp. 5–6.
[92] *Survey of Italy's Economy*, p. 41.
[93] *Economic Notes* 72 (Rome, Italy, 30 May 1947), p. 1.

production which, by the 1945 harvest, had fallen—largely owing to one of the worst droughts ever experienced—to 4,200,000 tons.[94]

The bread ration for the normal consumer was 200 grams (7 ounces) per day,[95] supplemented by a ration of *pasta* [96] which, while theoretically 2,000 grams per month, was at various times reduced to 500 grams (17.5 ounces) and in some months canceled completely.[97] UNRRA planned to bring in one million tons of cereals between January 1946 and the 1946 harvest in July. The world food shortage, however, led to a continuous fight to maintain the food ration. The Italian authorities and the Mission struggled together to eke out their tenuous resources, while UNRRA Headquarters did its best to secure for the Administration as much bread grain as possible and to allocate it equitably among the receiving countries.[98]

This struggle meant requests for diversions of ships, intelligent movement and manipulation of existing stocks in the country, the overcoming of internal transport difficulties, a day-to-day watch on provincial stock levels, and a prayer that the new grain would mature quickly and would be collected without delay.[99]

With the need to provide about 270,000 tons per month in order to maintain the reduced ration for the nonagricultural population, stocks at the beginning of January 1946 were barely sufficient for a month's supply. At the end of March they had fallen to twenty days' supply and at the end of May they were down to ten days' supply; by 10 June there were less than 50,000 tons of grain or six days' supply, including stocks in mills and bakeries. Inevitably, there were local breakdowns, but somehow, by good luck as much as good management, the system as a whole did not break down.[100] Fortunately, the harvest came early, and some 500,000 tons of the new crop had been collected before the end of June 1946.[101] Despite all the difficulties, UNRRA provided 685,000 tons during these six months, and 43 per cent of the bread and *pasta* ration was the Administration's share in the vital task of feeding Italy during the first half of 1946.[102] Inadequate as it was, it did succeed in preventing starvation and disorder.

[94] *Survey of Italy's Economy*, Chapter III, Table 6, p. 34.
[95] *Economic Notes* 72, p. 2.
[96] A generic term for spaghetti, noodles, and the various other forms of farinaceous food characteristic of Italian cuisine.
[97] *Economic Notes* 72, p. 2.
[98] *Ibid.*
[99] *Ibid.*, pp. 2–3.
[100] *Ibid.*
[101] *Ibid.*
[102] *Ibid.*

The new harvest permitted the restoration of the *pasta* ration, but the condition of chronic crisis returned once more as soon as the Government, yielding to popular clamor and political pressure, raised the bread ration to 235 grams daily.[103] It was evident that the world food shortage would make it no easy task to get through to the 1947 harvest. The second year of UNRRA's responsibility was largely a repetition of the first, although the situation was never quite so desperate. Before the 1947 harvest, however, Italy's bread changed color and content more than once as barley, oats, and maize in increasing proportions became its ingredients, when UNRRA scraped the world food barrel for anything that could possibly be made into bread. Diversions, loans, and frantic internal movement of stocks from one danger point to another, together with the use of soya flour and even dehydrated soup as bread ingredients, got the rationing system through March 1947 without any general breakdown, although some provinces remained breadless for periods ranging from three to fifteen days and the *pasta* rations again fell into arrears.[104]

The impact of UNRRA supplies on Italy's cereal consumption through the end of April 1947, by which time UNRRA's major shipments came to an end, is illustrated by Graph IV.

Although the food story in Italy is essentially the story of the struggle for bread, UNRRA supplies included over 85,000 tons of fats and oils [105] and 53,000 tons of sugar.[106] More than 77,000 tons of dairy products [107]—mostly milk—and 17,000 tons of meat and meat products,[108] together with nearly 54,000 tons of fish,[109] made a big contribution to the animal protein content of the meager Italian diet.

UNRRA also assisted in the development of margarine processing to make use of the copra which it was able to provide.[110] No means of obtaining food was ignored, and no foodstuff that could be procured was overlooked. The Government and the Mission together struggled from food crisis to food crisis, but they succeeded in the essential task of keeping the Italian population alive and, indeed, in a better state of nutrition than at the end of the war.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[104] *Ibid.*

[105] Domestic availability 310,000 tons. See *Survey of Italy's Economy*, Chapter III, Addendum, Table 21 (revised), p. 63. The figures also include soap.


[106] Domestic availability 250,000 tons. *Ibid.*

[107] Domestic availability of milk, cheese, and eggs 1,859,000 tons. *Ibid.*

[108] Domestic availability 427,000 tons. *Ibid.*

[109] Domestic availability 160,000 tons. *Ibid.*

[110] *Economic Notes* 69 (Rome, Italy, 9 May 1947), p. 3.



GRAPH IV

UNRRA AND FEA IMPORTS OF BREAD CEREALS COMPARED WITH MONTHLY CONSUMPTION, JANUARY 1946–APRIL 1947 [a]

(Metric Tons Wheat Equivalent, Excluding Rice)

[a] *Economic Notes* 72, p. 3.

8. *AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION*

Agriculture is Italy's most important activity. In normal times, nearly one half of the gainfully employed population is engaged in agricultural pursuits and more than 36 per cent of the national income is derived from agriculture and forestry.[111] Of the total population of 46 million, some 10 million were classified for rationing purposes as self-sufficient and therefore not entitled to ration cards,[112] but authorized to retain certain fixed quantities of their own production for themselves and their dependents.

While UNRRA's food program was designed to provide the essential imports immediately required to keep the Italian people alive, the agricultural rehabilitation program was intended as a start to the long-term rehabilitation of Italian agriculture with a view to increasing internal production and cash crops for export so that eventually Italy's food balance might be restored. At the same time, it was not the policy of either the Government or the Administration to attempt to revive Mussolini's autarchic concept of Italy as practically self-sufficient in food production.[113] Instead, it was hoped to put Italian agriculture on a sound economic basis and to develop it to a maximum of efficiency in conformity with the natural resources and climatic conditions of the country.

Looming over the whole question was a big political issue—the question of land tenure. UNRRA very properly avoided becoming involved in it, and a discussion of its merits would be out of place here; it can be said, however, that the general uncertainty created by the impending possibility of land reform delayed and complicated the rehabilitation of Italian agriculture. The repair of direct war damage was undertaken by Italian peasants with enthusiasm and success. Throughout the fighting in Italy the tenacity with which farmers cleared rubble and repaired their buildings, plowed their battle-scarred and, in some cases, mined fields and put them into production with the limited resources available, aroused general admiration, but the political uncertainty and the possible changes in land tenure discouraged any signifi-

[111] *Survey of Italy's Economy*, p. 25.

[112] *Ibid.*, Chapter III, Table 17, p. 52.

[113] At the outbreak of war Italian agriculture produced about 92 per cent of the admittedly low total food consumption and 93 per cent of the feed requirements. See *Survey of Italy's Economy*, p. 25.

cant capital investment and were a general deterrent to new enterprise.[114]

The immediate requirements of the situation, however, provided ample scope for the $13 million allocated to agricultural rehabilitation in UNRRA's Italy program. The largest item, both in tonnage and value, was fertilizer (120,000 long tons; $5 million). Almost entirely deprived of chemical fertilizers, and all raw materials for their manufacture in Italian plants, by the wartime blockade, Italian agricultural yields had fallen significantly.

The nitrogenous fertilizers were the most important because they normally provided the largest increase in yield per ton. Italy's yearly requirement of such fertilizers was 120,000–130,000 tons in terms of pure nitrogen.[115] As a result of war damage, restricted power facilities, and the shortage of coke, output for the 1946–1947 crop year was only a little over 50,000 tons.[116] High priority was given to fertilizer plants in the allocation of coal, coke, and electric power, but even so a deficit of 70,000 tons remained. Under the FEA program, some 14,600 tons in terms of pure nitrogen arrived in the early part of 1946, and UNRRA succeeded in importing a further 97,000 tons of nitrogenous fertilizer equal to approximately 21,000 tons of nitrogen.[117]

It was the policy of the Government and the Mission to prevent the use of nitrogenous fertilizers for any but the cereal crops; on the other hand, it was often more profitable from the point of view of the agriculturist to use them on less essential products. To avoid misuse, it became necessary to establish a system of distribution through vouchers. Each Provincial Inspector for Agriculture established the amount of nitrate required in his province on the basis of the area under cereal cultivation. The vouchers were then issued by provincial and communal offices to the actual farmers growing wheat and other bread grains, the farmers in turn signing a declaration that the fertilizer would be used for cereal crops.[118] Finally, the Provincial Agricultural Consortiums were required to keep a complete record, including the names and addresses of the farmers purchasing the nitrate, the total sales made, and the serial numbers of the vouchers against which the sales were effected.[119]

Despite this complicated, even cumbersome, system of control and a

[114] *Ibid.*, p. 38. [115] *Economic Notes* 73 (Rome, Italy, 6 June 1947), p. 4.
[116] *Ibid.* [117] *Ibid.* [118] *Ibid.*, pp. 4–5. [119] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

comprehensive system of inspection in which the Ministry of Agriculture, the local authorities, the police, and the Mission's own observers all coöperated, irregularities and diversions persisted. Fortunately, however, because of this combined vigilance the proportion of supplies misused remained insignificant.

Apart from nitrogenous fertilizers, UNRRA also provided basic slag (10,000 tons) and potash (12,500 tons).[120] Seeds, pesticides, breeding stock, food processing supplies, veterinary supplies, fishery supplies, bagging, and farm machinery made up the rest of the program. As for fertilizers, so for these many other items the Government and the Mission coöperated in developing *ad hoc* distribution arrangements that would ensure the best use of the supplies for the general good.

In addition to the actual agricultural supplies imported, one of UNRRA's most important contributions to the rehabilitation of Italy's agriculture was the provision of the services of highly qualified experts in various fields of agricultural and sylvan development,[121] who were able to bring to Italy the latest developments in agricultural and veterinary knowledge and practice from the outside world from which it had been cut off throughout the years of war.

9. *MEDICAL SUPPLIES*

From the beginning of UNRRA aid to Italy, medical assistance was an important item; amounting in value to $9,500,000, UNRRA medical supplies covered a wide field. The 1946–1947 program was a continuation and enlargement of the 1945 program and can claim some of the credit for the improvement in vital statistics achieved:

TABLE 35

VITAL STATISTICS, ITALY, 1940–1946 [a]

First Six Months of	*Death Rate per 1,000 Population*	*Infant Mortality Rate per 1,000 Live Births*	*Tuberculosis Death Rate per 10,000 Population*
1940	11.61	75.13	12.21
1941	11.01	60.93	12.77
1942	12.28	83.84	17.25
1943	12.27	88.54	20.42
1944	19.52	121.40	25.01
1945	12.54	108.95	18.05
1946	11.18	75.15	17.45

[a] *Economic Notes* 48, p. 2.

[120] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[121] See Part Four, Chapter II, Section 4.

In addition to importing the supplies, the Mission took an active part in advising and assisting the Government regarding their allocation and in the many problems of storage, identification, and internal distribution. The Administration also provided the essential components for a complete penicillin factory and sent two Italian experts to Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom to study the newest techniques and developments in the manufacture of penicillin.[122]

With materials and vehicles provided by the Administration, the Italian Government was able to resume the war against malaria, and, with the use of DDT, malaria in Sicily and on the mainland of Italy was once more effectively controlled. In Sardinia the ambitious scheme for total eradication of the scourge, started under the 1945 program, was developed during 1946, and a special Government agency—ERLAAS (Ente Regionale per la Lotta Anti-Anofelica in Sardegna) [123]—was set up with a technical expert provided by the Rockefeller Foundation as its chief and a mixed staff of Rockefeller Foundation experts, British, French, and United States ex-UNRRA employees, and Italians to undertake this unprecedented task. Despite difficulties of terrain and delays in securing vehicles and other equipment including the large tonnage of DDT required, the scheme was provided with all the necessary material and was well on the way by the time the Mission's operations in Italy ended.

In general, the UNRRA health program in Italy re-equipped existing hospitals and other medical institutions throughout the country and restocked them with medical supplies, linen, and the like. It provided sufficient penicillin and insulin to break the vampires' black market, which became unprofitable when all the urgent needs could be met through the Government distribution system at controlled prices. It brought Italy's endemic diseases, such as malaria and trachoma, under control; it provided new hospital, laboratory, and X-ray units in war-damaged areas where the existing facilities had been destroyed; [124] it set Italy on the way to becoming self-sufficient in the production of penicillin, and it took a pace forward in the history of hygiene as well as in Italian history by making possible the eradication of malaria in Sardinia. Aided by good fortune, it was able to prevent or localize

[122] *Economic Notes* 48, p. 2.

[123] Regional Agency for the Fight against Malaria in Sardinia. For UNRRA's responsibilities and functions in this work and its relations with ERLAAS, see Italy Mission Operation Order 1, 4 March 1946.

[124] *Economic Notes* 48, pp. 1–2.

epidemics of bubonic plague and typhoid fever; it provided more than 130 ambulances for areas without means of transporting sick people; [125] it provided some 300,000 layettes;[126] and, by means of the large proportion of the Lire Fund allocated to health projects,[127] laid the foundation for a progressive program of development of the public health and sanitation services, especially for the combating of tuberculosis.

10. *INDUSTRIAL REHABILITATION*

The Mission's Sub-Bureau of Industrial Rehabilitation was charged with the implementation, in conjunction with the various Italian authorities concerned, of the Administration's $110 million industrial rehabilitation program in Italy. So far as requirements were concerned, starting from the "Green Book" [128] program of fuels, asphalt, pig iron and steel, minerals and alloying elements, tin, copper, nickel, chemicals, colophony, rubber and allied products, asbestos, refractories and clays, raw cotton and wool, wool rags, raw hides, raw materials for a drug-manufacturing program, and transportation and telecommunication materials, the program was constantly being revised and refined as, on the one hand, availabilities of supplies and prices changed and, on the other, requirements varied as further exploration and investigation of the Italian industrial picture enabled more precise priorities to be established.[129]

In a country in which the administrative machinery had broken down and where "controls" were regarded as synonymous with the now discredited fascism, it was no easy task for a new and inexperienced Government to ensure the use of industrial supplies for the benefit of the community when the lure of immense profits attracted industrialists in other directions.

The Consiglio Industriale Alta Italia (CIAI) [130] had come into existence during the resistance period and had continued under the authority of the Allied Military Government. Its membership included representatives of the major industries in the north of Italy, and at the beginning of 1946 it still functioned effectively as an organization for

[125] *Ibid.*, p. 2. [126] *Ibid.*

[127] *The Lire Fund*, pp. 60–66.

[128] Headquarters Allied Commission (Italy), Economic Section, *Italian Import Requirements*, 1946.

[129] Monograph, Bruno Luzzatto, "History of Industrial Rehabilitation," p. 2.

[130] Industrial Council for Northern Italy.

the allocation of scarce supplies. On this pattern the Government developed under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce a similar Council for the whole of Italy with Subcommissions in Milan for the north (replacing CIAI), in Rome for the center and Sardinia, in Naples for the south, and in Palermo for Sicily. Thereafter, allocation plans for the various Regions were prepared centrally and approved by the Mission while local suballocation rested with the Industrial Subcommissions in their respective Regions. This machinery not only served as an allocating organization but provided a steady flow of information to the Government and the Mission on the basis of which programs for central allocation could be made. The Mission's influence pervaded the whole structure down to the Subcommission level: in Rome, the Mission Headquarters was in close and cordial daily consultation with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Commission, and the Central Subcommission; in Milan, the North Italy Industrial Rehabilitation Office maintained the closest possible contact with the Northern Subcommission; while in Naples and Palermo the regional staff carried out the same function. The system worked not only effectively but equitably, since the various industries and the various firms within industries in practice policed each other's claims and allocations and prevented preference or favoritism to any one group. It is significant that at no time throughout the process were any substantiated or serious complaints brought against the allocations made under this system.[131]

Probably the most important supplies UNRRA provided for the rehabilitation of Italian industry were coal and liquid fuel. Despite its industrial development, Italy had no known indigenous petroleum resources, and its coal production was little over one million tons a year.[132] Before the war, Italy imported approximately one million tons of coal a month, mostly from Germany and the United Kingdom.[133] Apart from small deliveries during the early part of 1945 by the Allied military authorities, Italy had virtually no coal imports till the FEA program provided some 300,000 tons per month from October 1945 through February 1946.[134] Italy's minimum annual requirement of

[131] Monographs: Cleveland, "History, Bureau of Requirements and Distribution," pp. 14, 16; Luzzatto, "History of Industrial Rehabilitation," pp. 15–16.
[132] *Survey of Italy's Economy*, p. 80. Oil has since been discovered.
[133] *Ibid.*, Chapter IV, Table 15, p. 80.
[134] *Economic Notes* 71, (Rome, Italy, 23 May 1947), p. 2.

imported coal, allowing no coal whatsoever for space heating except in hospitals, was estimated at 8,700,000 tons.[135] In March 1946 UNRRA planned to import over 5,500,000 tons of coal for the most essential purposes.[136]

Almost before they had started, UNRRA imports were suspended by the United States coal strike in April 1946. Since Italy's allocation of coal from the European Coal Organization (ECO) was almost entirely from United States sources, the whole UNRRA program in Italy was in jeopardy, and it seemed that complete industrial stoppage and widespread unemployment were inevitable. This calamity was fortunately avoided by the provision of small imports from other sources [137] and by the fact that in Rome the strike had been foreseen, and the distribution machinery devised by the Government and the Mission was sufficiently flexible to cope with the crisis. A reduced plan of allocations on an emergency basis for the months of April and May (subsequently extended to the end of June) was quickly implemented: the railways reduced their already meager passenger service by a further 15 per cent, and freight trains were authorized only for the transportation of perishable goods, for port clearance work, and for certain emergency purposes; gasworks reduced their supplies to one and a half hours per day—a great hardship in the urban areas of Italy where most domestic cooking is done by coal gas—and lignite and other substitute fuels, including dried olive oil cake, were used to the maximum.[138]

For industry generally, a joint Government-UNRRA Coal Emergency Committee was set up and met daily throughout the crisis to determine the allocation of coal and coördinate it with the supply of fuel oil, electric power, and lignite. By this means the supplies available were eked out through the period, and no major breakdown of a really essential service occurred. By August and September 1946 more liberal allocations were scheduled, but the vulnerability of the Italian coal position had been appreciated and emphasis was laid on the maintenance of emergency stocks to cushion any further violent fluctuations in arrivals.[139]

[135] Headquarters Allied Commission (Italy), Economic Section, *Italian Import Requirements, 1946*, p. 53.

[136] *Survey of Italy's Economy*, Chapter IV, Addendum, Table 14 (revised), p. 123; *Economic Notes* 71, p. 2.

[137] See Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3.

[138] *Economic Notes* 71, p. 3.

[139] *Ibid.*

In the autumn these carefully laid plans were again frustrated: the United States maritime strikes immobilized shipments for the greater part of September and October 1946. Once more the allocation plans had to be jettisoned and the same types of emergency measures taken. There was barely time for a short breathing spell when at the end of November a new United States coal strike and a United States Government proclamation of a state of emergency laid an embargo on coal exports from the United States and precipitated a fresh crisis in Italy.[140] Once more ECO rose to the occasion, and the organization in Rome succeeded in juggling its tenuous resources to meet the most urgent needs. Many industrial plants closed down, railway traffic was further reduced. Then, just as the United States ships, delayed by unusual gales and by the Christmas holiday period, started sailing at the beginning of January, shipments from the Ruhr were stopped by an exceptional freeze of waterways and canals leading to Antwerp and Rotterdam.[141] Coal stocks in Italy fell to their lowest ebb since 1945. From the middle of February 1947, however, the flow of imports from all sources began to improve, and by the end of March, when the Italian Government took over responsibility for the procurement of coal from the Administration, the outlook was satisfactory.[142]

Coal, however, was not only a procurement and distribution problem, but also a serious port clearance and internal transportation problem. In the light of the various difficulties encountered, coal arrivals did not represent a steady flow throughout the year, and supplies fluctuated widely from month to month. In June 1946, for example, only 111,000 tons arrived, but in August 1946 Italy's damaged ports and railways had to handle 900,000 tons of coal.[143]

UNRRA was also active in stimulating and increasing local production of coal. In Sardinia, after clothing and extra foodstuffs had been distributed to the miners as an incentive for greater output, a subsidy from the Lire Fund was granted to cover increased costs of production. The average monthly output from the Sardinian mines was increased from less than 60,000 tons in 1945 to about 100,000 tons in 1947.[144] Similarly, production of pitch lignite from the Ribolla mines was subsidized by the Lire Fund.[145]

UNRRA imports of petroleum and petroleum products amounted to nearly 2 million tons, valued at some $33 million exclusive of freight,

[140] *Ibid.* [141] *Ibid.*, p. 4. [142] *Ibid.*
[143] *Ibid.*, p. 5. [144] *Ibid.* [145] *Ibid.*

and from January 1946 through May 1947 equaled approximately 60 per cent of Italian prewar imports.[146] This high level of supply went some way toward neutralizing the shortage of coal and, by enabling road transport (including the many trucks provided by UNRRA) to be fully utilized, the consequences of the severe damage to the railway system were somewhat offset. The largest item in this program was fuel oil, which was considered complementary to coal. The allocations to industry were decided by the Coal Emergency Committee, and the bulk of the imports was assigned to Northern Italy. As the impact of the United States coal strike and the deterioration in the world coal situation foreshadowed both high prices and procurement difficulties in the post-UNRRA period, many industries changed from coal to oil,[147] and fuel-oil consumption reached a new peak.[148]

The Comitato Italiano Petroli had already been set up as a receiving and distributing organization under the aegis of the oil companies and the Allied military authorities in October 1943. It controlled all the available storage and distribution facilities, and was the sole distributor and receiver.

Toward the end of the UNRRA program, the progress on the repair of the damaged oil refineries [149] had advanced sufficiently to enable them to start operating again. UNRRA funds were then used for the procurement of crude oil for refining in Italy instead of the more expensive finished products, thus making UNRRA's money go farther toward meeting Italy's petroleum needs and at the same time assisting another of her major industries to resume production.

11. *UNRRA-TESSILE*

The end of the war left most of Italy's large textile industry in the north of the country intact but idle. The Government and UNRRA agreed, therefore, that the import of raw fibers should form a substantial part of the UNRRA program, with the purpose of rehabilitating this important industry and at the same time providing, with the minimum expenditure of hard currency, the essential clothing so badly needed by the population. It soon became evident, however, that

[146] *Economic Notes* 74 (Rome, Italy, 13 June 1947), p. 1.
[147] *Ibid.* [148] Equal to 115 per cent of prewar consumption.
[149] Naples, Bari, La Spezia, and Marghera (Venice).

while the importation of raw fibers would achieve the objective of rehabilitating the textile industry, the equitable distribution of the products at controlled prices would present a major problem.

During 1945, under the limited relief program, some 2,000 tons of raw cotton [150] were imported and manufactured under contract into sheeting, toweling, and shirting. These products were distributed, on an allocation plan agreed between the Government and the Mission, to hospitals and medical institutions and to displaced persons.[151] A similar approach to the problem of distributing the much larger raw-fiber supplies of the 1946 program ran into the stubborn opposition of the textile interests who, realizing that substantial shipments of UNRRA raw cotton were already at Genoa, hoped to gain untrammeled control over them with the intention of selling the products on the free market—abroad as well as in Italy—at free market prices.[152]

It was not until the stronger Government [153] established after the June 1946 elections had enacted a law enabling them to requisition textile plants [154] that, under this threat, UNRRA-Tessile came into being. A Government decree at the end of August 1946 [155] set up the UNRRA-Tessile Committee. Although under the aegis of the Delegation, it was in practice largely controlled by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, which provided its chairman.[156] The Mission was officially represented on the Committee [157] and, in effect, UNRRA-Tessile was a joint undertaking. After hard bargaining, reasonable prices were agreed upon [158] for the spinning and weaving of the raw

[150] Monograph, J. Sinclair, "Textiles and UNRRA-Tessile," pp. 1–4; Bureau of Requirements and Distribution, Italy Mission, "Final Distribution Report on UNRRA Supplies for Italy," Chapter V, Part 5, p. 29.

[151] *Ibid.* [152] *Ibid.*

[153] The Socialist Party made the enactment of such a law one of the conditions of their participation in the new Coalition Government; see monograph, Cleveland, "History, Bureau of Requirements and Distribution," p. 13.

[154] Decree Law of the Provisional Head of the State 301, 8 October 1946; *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 19 November 1946, "Compulsory processing and use of raw materials and manufactured goods provided by UNRRA to the Italian Government," in Italy Mission, "Final Distribution Report on UNRRA Supplies for Italy," Chapter V, Document 2.

[155] Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers, Rome, 25 August 1946, in Italy Mission, "Final Distribution Report on UNRRA Supplies for Italy," Chapter V, Document 1*a*.

[156] *Ibid.*, Article 1. [157] *Ibid.*

[158] Letter (Prot. 8190/1089/C/fa), President, Italian Cotton Association, Milan, to Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 30 July 1946, in Italy Mission, "Final Distribution Report on UNRRA Supplies for Italy," Chapter V, Document 1.

materials, and contracts were let for the manufacture of the raw cotton and wool on the Government's account. Despite the many difficulties and delays owing to the generally uncoöperative attitude of the textile industry and to electric power shortage,[159] the manufacturing program got under way by autumn 1946, but output was slower than had been hoped in the summer.[160]

It was agreed between the Government and the Mission that proceeds of sale in respect of textile fibers would be foregone and it was decided that approximately one third of the total end products would be distributed free to the most needy categories of the population while the other two thirds would be sold through controlled channels and at very low, controlled prices to other needy categories. Sale prices were established to equate to the total cost of manufacture and distribution within Italy the proceeds of the two thirds to be sold.[161] To finance this operation a revolving fund of 14,500 million lire was set up from the Lire Fund.[162]

In many ways this was one of the major achievements of the Administration in Italy in that it provided for the Italian people free, or at very low prices, 25 per cent of their prewar annual consumption of cotton cloth and 35 per cent of their prewar annual consumption of wool products while at the same time providing work for 20 and 30 per cent respectively of the annual production capacity of the cotton and wool industries.[163] In a country which at the end of 1944 had 44 overcoats per 100 men, 65 undershirts per 100 boys, 84 bed sheets and 37 blankets per 100 beds,[164] and where the average worker's family was spending over three quarters of its income for food alone, UNRRA-Tessile provided 20 million rations of cotton piece goods at low prices and 6 million rations free, 11 million rations of knitting

[159] In the month of February 1947 electric power was available only eight days.

[160] Italy Mission, "Final Distribution Report on UNRRA Supplies for Italy," Chapter V, Part 2, p. 7.

[161] Monograph, Sinclair, "Textiles and UNRRA-Tessile," pp. 8–10.

[162] Lire Fund Control Committee (LFCC), minutes 7th meeting, 14 August 1946; minutes 16th meeting, 28 February 1947; LFCC Loan Agreements, Number One, 3 September 1946; Number Two, 7 March 1946; see also "Financial Requirements for Carrying Out the Production Programs of the UNRRA-Tessile Committee," *The Lire Fund*, Appendix VI *A*, pp. 150–156.

[163] Lecture notes, J. Western (Chief, Campaigns Branch, Information Division, Italy Mission), March 1947.

[164] Allied Commission, "Survey of Living Conditions in Central and Southern Italy," autumn 1944.

wool and knitted underwear, 6 million wool dresses for women, and 7 million woolen suits for men, 300,000 ten-meter rations of flannelette for layettes, and blankets, shirting, and many other materials.[165]

The UNRRA-Tessile scheme was also an admirable example of how the proceeds of sale could be put to work and thus increase the value of the UNRRA contribution. The original cost of the 80,000 tons of raw cotton, wool, and wool rags, including freight, was $47 million, and with $133 million as the cost of processing and $40 million as the cost of distribution, the finished goods cost altogether the equivalent of $220 million.[166] The proceeds of sale at $180 million covered the cost of processing and distribution. The actual value at estimated free market prices of the supplies provided at the equivalent of $180 million was approximately $400 million. Thus, with an original outlay of $47 million in United States dollars, plus $180 million worth of lire, the Administration, with the aid of the Government and by the exercise of much ingenuity and hard work, was able to supply approximately $400 million worth of badly needed textile products free or at low prices to the most needy 25 million of Italy's 46 million inhabitants.[167]

The 2,500 tons of raw hides and the tannery supplies imported by UNRRA were, after protracted negotiations, allocated to manufacturers on the same basis to provide footwear for those who needed it most while giving employment to the plants and tanneries idle for the lack of imported raw materials.[168]

The success of the UNRRA-Tessile scheme is evidence that the Mission was not afraid to advocate and secure the adoption of novel measures to achieve distribution in keeping with UNRRA principles; it fought political and other difficulties and it achieved on the one hand a substantial rehabilitation of the Italian textile and leather industries and a maximum utilization of available supplies, and on the other hand substantial relief in the shape of much-needed garments, piece goods, and footwear—free or at accessible prices—for one half of the Italian population.

[165] Italy Mission, "Final Distribution Report on UNRRA Supplies for Italy," Chapter V, Part 2, p. 19; Part 3, pp. 24–25; lecture notes, Western, March 1947.

[166] At a rate of 375 lire per dollar, the free market rate in the autumn of 1946.

[167] Lecture notes, Western, March 1947.

[168] Monograph, Sinclair, "Textiles and UNRRA-Tessile," pp. 13–14.

12. *UNRRA–CASAS*

The 1945 program included "assistance in the care and return to their homes of [Italian] [169] displaced persons." [170] From the small beginnings of the 1945 program,[171] the need to provide assistance to the homeless led to the establishment [172] of the Administrative Committee for Assistance to the Homeless (CASAS).[173] Although UNRRA was not linked with CASAS in the title of the new agency till later, CASAS was from the beginning another of the joint undertakings between the Italian Government and the Mission characteristic of UNRRA's operations in Italy. The Executive Committee, which governed CASAS, consisted of representatives of the Council of State, the Delegation, the Ministries of Postwar Assistance and Public Works, the Treasury, the Court of Accounts, the National Council of Research and Reconstruction, and the UNRRA Mission.[174]

The CASAS program was divided into three parts: the repair of damaged dwellings; the construction of a limited number of houses of standard type with four apartments each (with a small vegetable garden for each apartment); aid in the rehabilitation of local production of building materials—the repair of brick and tile works, for instance. The emphasis was on repair rather than new construction to achieve most quickly the housing of as many of the homeless as possible. Initially, CASAS activity was concentrated in the specially badly devastated regions of Emilia, Tuscany, Latium, and Abruzzi, which had been the scene of the prolonged fighting on the so-called "Gothic" and "Gustav" lines.[175]

The tenth (and last) meeting of the Joint Committee [176] approved an allocation of 1,000 million lire from the Lire Fund and $5 million of the 1946 supply program. When it became apparent that vehicles could be obtained by the Government from Allied military surpluses for lire, the lire budget was increased, and more than half the

[169] Since Resolution 57 had provided for the care of United Nations displaced persons in Italy and other ex-enemy areas, the reference to displaced persons in Resolution 58 was clearly intended to denote Italian displaced persons and was so interpreted by the Administration. [170] Resolution 58, 1*b*. [171] See above, Section 3.

[172] Decree of 12 April 1946, published in *Gazzetta Ufficiale*, 8 May 1946.

[173] Comitato Amministrativo Soccorso ai Senzatetto.

[174] *The Lire Fund*, p. 31. [175] *Ibid.*

[176] Joint Committee, minutes of meeting, 8 March 1946.

dollar allocation was made available for other pressing needs.[177]

By the spring of 1947, after less than a year of existence, CASAS had rehoused 103,725 persons. In the worst damaged regions of Italy, CASAS interest-free loans, free transportation, tools, and direct building activity were helping the homeless to rebuild their homes.

By the autumn of 1946, housing was generally regarded by the Mission as one of the main continuing activities to be financed out of the Lire Fund. In the preliminary allocation of the Fund in November 1946 it was agreed between the Government and the Mission that no less than 40 per cent of the total available should be devoted to housing.[178] The discussion of plans for an enlarged housing program began in September 1946, and preliminary proposals on the lines of an expanded CASAS program were first submitted to the Government in October 1946. Draft proposals for the expenditure of the 18,000 million lire provisionally set aside in November 1946 for "housing and reconstruction of essential communal structures" were submitted to the ministries concerned on 26 February 1947.[179] On 19 December 1946, however, the Delegation had put forward a plan for the creation of a nonprofit-making corporation which would utilize the 18,000 million lire for making loans and providing other assistance to the homeless through associations of builders' merchants, contractors, and bombed-out persons. Under the Delegation's plan, CASAS, with the organization which it had already built up, would have disappeared and the housing activity financed by the Lire Fund would have been more directly integrated, not to say merged, in the general housing program of the Government. The expenditure of this large sum of money became a political issue within the Government, and negotiations and discussions continued throughout the spring and summer of 1947. In the meantime, CASAS continued with its old program and, through being authorized to use for current operations some funds earmarked for capital expenditures, managed to remain in existence.

Finally, a compromise was achieved whereby CASAS was abolished

[177] *The Lire Fund*, p. 32.

[178] The total proceeds were then estimated at 75,000 million lire of which 30,000 million were reserved "to cover failures to collect; rising cost; shrinkage in imports; possible losses from revolving funds . . . continuation of UNRRA functions [by successor agencies] . . . funds appropriated to date . . . Mission local currency requirements." This left 45,000 million lire available for allocation. Cable, Rome to Washington 2825, 24 November 1946.

[179] *The Lire Fund*, p. 56.

and a new UNRRA–CASAS was set up [180] under the Ministry of Public Works. Within this new organization there were two separate Boards, one for carrying out that part of the housing program dealing with actual building operations, and the other for carrying out "that part of the program directed toward facilitating housing and reconstruction through financial aid or contributions." [181] The ex-President of CASAS was appointed as President of the first of these Boards, and the President of the other was to be appointed by the President of UNRRA–CASAS after consulting the ex-President of the Delegation (now President of the Administration for International Aid). Thus, in effect, under the UNRRA–CASAS compromise, both the principal personalities involved in the long-drawn-out dispute arising from the conflict between the Mission's original proposal to expand CASAS, on the one hand, and the Delegation's plan, on the other, were permitted each to carry out his own recommendations under the ultimate authority of the Minister of Public Works. While the battle raged over how best to spend the money for housing—and who was to spend it—the total was cut to 14,000 million lire, about 25 per cent of the final Lire Fund allocations instead of the 40 per cent originally allocated.[182]

13. *UNRRA CONTINUES—THE LIRE FUND*

A tremendous amount of detailed work by the ministries and agencies concerned on the Italian side and by the Mission had resulted in the development of a considerable number of relief and rehabilitation projects. The possibility of allocating funds for comprehensive projects of regional rehabilitation which would practically amount to the complete reconstruction and rehabilitation of a few specific devastated areas was considered. This idea was dropped when it became clear that the resources of the Lire Fund [183] would be insufficient to meet the needs of more than a small number of such areas and that decisions as to the areas to be rehabilitated would therefore become major political issues; [184] furthermore, it was doubtful whether such unavoidable

[180] Decree of 30 December 1947. [181] *The Lire Fund*, p. 59/VII.

[182] Appendix Seven, Document 10*f*, Annex II.

[183] The original conservative estimate of a total of 75,000 million lire (cable, Rome to Washington 2825, 24 November 1946) was revised to 85,000 million lire (letter, Keeny to Campilli, 29 April 1947).

[184] *The Lire Fund*, pp. 47–48.

discrimination in the use of the Fund, rather than its expenditure for the benefit of the population as a whole, would be in keeping with UNRRA policy.

By the autumn of 1946 there were many specific projects hoping to be financed by the Lire Fund, and most of them had been worked out in meticulous and commendable detail. There was not, however, any general plan as to how the Lire Fund should be expended, nor were there any clearly established priorities among the various proposals. The fact that the Italian Government had remained curiously unaware of the importance of the Lire Fund and that most of the ministries had failed to grasp its possible use to assist in financing their programs had retarded competition for the resources represented by the Fund and had thus obscured the need for general planning. The Government was asked to agree, for the information of UNRRA Headquarters, to a tentative allocation from the Lire Fund to certain broad categories of relief and rehabilitation work. It was then provisionally decided that 40 per cent of the Fund should be allocated for housing, 25 per cent for welfare projects, 25 per cent for public health projects, and 10 per cent for projects to repair war damage, with particular emphasis on increasing food production.[185] With embarrassing suddenness, the Italian Government became aware of this hitherto overlooked 85,000 million lire. Inevitably, every ministry and many other agencies began to scramble for a share. Simultaneously, the Treasury, alarmed by the impetus that any new large-scale expenditure might have on an already inflationary situation, took a line that virtually amounted to saying that the Lire Fund should not be spent at all! In actual fact the Fund did not exist as a reality since the proceeds of sale were largely used by the Treasury to finance current operations, leaving what amounted to a paper obligation by the Government to find the money for Lire Fund projects when needed.[186]

To meet these fears of the Treasury, UNRRA agreed that the expenditure of the Lire Fund should be spread over six years from the signing of the Supplementary Agreement in January 1946[187] instead of the three years stipulated in the Supplementary Agreement itself.[188] On the other hand, the Mission, although agreeable to the expenditure

[185] Cable, Rome to Washington 2825, 24 November 1946.
[186] See, for example, letter, Campilli to Keeny, 20 May 1947.
[187] Letter, Keeny to Campilli, 29 April 1947.
[188] Supplementary Agreement, Article V*c*.

being spread over a longer period, was anxious to see the plans for the utilization of the Lire Fund crystallized before it left Italy.

Most of the projects, except the largest item, housing, had been agreed upon during the first half of 1947. When the UNRRA Italy Mission closed on 30 June 1947, Keeny remained in Rome as head of the operations in Italy of the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization and was appointed to represent ERO for completing the negotiations with the Government regarding the future of the Lire Fund. A Supplementary Agreement "on the use of the Lire Fund" [189] was eventually signed on 12 November 1947 between the Government and the Administration. This provided that the Lire Fund should be spent during a five-year period from 1 January 1947, allocated 55,000 million lire to projects, and set aside the remainder as a reserve. The final allocation was:

TABLE 36

ALLOCATION OF LIRE FUND [a]

Categories of Projects	*Lire*
Health	11,000,000,000
Welfare	15,000,000,000
Housing	14,000,000,000
Agriculture	5,000,000,000
Communal food agencies	5,000,000,000
UNRRA-Tessile (special reserve)	4,000,000,000
UNRRA successor agencies	1,000,000,000
Total	55,000,000,000

[a] Appendix Seven, Document 10*f*, Annex II.

By the end of June 1947, when the UNRRA Italy Mission came to its official close, AC and the Italian monarchy had followed Mussolini and the *Wehrmacht* into history, and a sovereign Italian Republican Government, under Prime Minister de Gasperi, uneasily ruled the reduced Italy left by the Paris peace treaty. The picture of Italy in the summer of 1947 was almost unrecognizably brighter than the gloomy canvas of 1944, and UNRRA can justifiably claim to have played no small part in painting in some of the high lights. It was still by no means an entirely happy picture, but it contrasted favorably with 1944 and, above all, cynical despair had given way to cautious hope.

[189] Appendix Seven, Document 10*f*.

IX. Austria

1. *DECISION TO HELP*

Although Austria had suffered less material damage than many of the other UNRRA receiving countries, it emerged from the war a geographical statement without political or economic unity. By the *Anschluss* in 1938 Austria had been absorbed directly into the German Reich, governed from Berlin, and its economy geared into the German war machine. In the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 it was accepted by the USSR, the United Kingdom, the United States, and, a few weeks later, by the French National Committee of Liberation, as the first victim of Hitler's aggression and hence an area to be liberated. This had been accomplished in the final weeks of the war in Europe by Soviet forces who fought their way through the province of Bergenland into Lower Austria and captured Vienna, and by Allied troops entering from Germany and Italy. Under agreements reached in the European Advisory Commission in early July 1945 the country was divided into four zones of occupation under the French, Soviet, United Kingdom, and United States commanding generals who were to constitute the Allied Council for Austria. The avowed aim of the Council was to secure as soon as possible the establishment of a central Austrian administrative machine under a freely elected civil government.[1] Only in November 1945 were elections held and a government acceptable to all the occupying powers set up.[2] It was obvious, however, that the new government could only gradually establish authority over the federal states of Austria which had for eight years taken orders from Berlin rather than Vienna. The Allied Council itself, moreover, developed its machinery slowly, encumbered as it was by the necessity for unanimous consent of its members to all measures promulgated.

Although only the Soviet Zone had been a battleground in the war,

[1] United States Department of State Press Release 590, 7 August 1945, detailing the Four-Power Agreements of 4 and 9 July 1945.

[2] The Peasants' Party was victorious, and a government under Chancellor Leopold Figl was recognized by the Four Powers on 7 January 1946.

the disrupted Austrian postwar economy was unable to furnish sufficient food for the nonagricultural population even if zonal barriers had not prevented the exchange of indigenous supplies between one section and another. Indeed, before the *Anschluss*, Austria had been obliged to import 24 per cent of the bread cereals, 20 per cent of the meat and animal fats, and 94 per cent of the vegetable fats consumed in the country.[3]

By November 1945 pressure was being brought to bear, especially by the United Kingdom Government, for the immediate initiation of an UNRRA supply program for Austria.[4] The possibility of eventual UNRRA aid for Austria had indeed been considered at the inception of the Allied Council for Austria,[5] and the door had been opened in August 1945 by the Third UNRRA Council Session which established that, since Austria was to be considered a liberated country, nothing in the UNRRA Agreement prevented relief and rehabilitation operations "on the invitation of and in agreement with the appropriate authorities exercising administrative control of that country." [6] In any case, no supply program for Austria could be undertaken until further funds were made available to the Administration.[7] In view of the confused political situation within the country, moreover, UNRRA Headquarters and ERO were in agreement "to handle this hot potato with care." [8]

In response to an invitation from the Allied Council,[9] a small UNRRA Working Party was dispatched to Austria at the end of November to obtain preliminary information on supply requirements for an UNRRA program. It was evident that the Austrian population in some of the zones was not being fed adequately despite the recom-

[3] Monograph, Gerard A. Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," HQ, p. 104.

[4] Cable, London to Washington 6371 (PP 147 from Sir Humfrey Gale), 16 November 1945; letter, Philip Noel-Baker (United Kingdom Minister of State) to Gale, 20 November 1945.

[5] Schaaf Working Party Report, discussions with General Mark W. Clark (Commanding General of United States Zone) and his political adviser, John G. Ehrhardt, 14 December 1945. The Four-Power Agreement of 4 July 1945 included a clause, "United Nations organizations will, if admitted by the Allied Council to operate in Austria, be subordinate to the Allied Commission and answerable to it," United States Department of State Press Release 590, 7 August 1945.

[6] Resolution 74.

[7] *Journal*, Third Council, 12th plenary meeting, 22 August 1945, p. 116.

[8] Cable, London to Washington 3149 (PP 29), 25 August 1945.

[9] Major General J. H. Hilldring (Director, Civil Affairs Division, United States War Department) to Lehman, 24 October 1945, transmitting Allied Council resolution.

mendation of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September that the zonal authorities raise the ration to 2,000 calories per day by importing what might be necessary to supplement indigenous supplies.[10] It had soon become clear that even the ration level of 1,550 calories was being met with difficulty. The United States Zone was obliged to assist the French, who lacked sufficient supplies even to feed their own people at home; [11] the United Kingdom Zone was only with great difficulty meeting its obligations from its meager resources; [12] while the Soviet Zone had from the first indicated its inability to provide adequately for its Austrian population.[13]

Shortly after the arrival of the Working Party in Vienna, UNRRA Headquarters, with further financial contributions from the United States and United Kingdom now assured, responded to a formal request for aid from the Allied Council, dated 11 December, by authorizing negotiations for an Agreement with the Austrian Government, subject to the approval of the Allied Council, for taking over responsibility for relief and rehabilitation supplies.[14]

2. *NEGOTIATION OF THE UNRRA-AUSTRIAN AGREEMENT*

Conduct of the negotiations was entrusted to Brigadier R. H. R. Parminter who since mid-September 1945 had been serving as Chief of the UNRRA Displaced Persons Operations in Austria and who on 1 January 1946 also assumed the duties of Chief of Mission. The negotiations with the Government and the Allied Council were interspersed with references to, and interjections by, UNRRA Headquarters, ERO, the UNRRA Council, and the war departments and foreign offices of the four occupying powers.

Although 1 March 1946 had from the beginning been set by UNRRA as the earliest possible date for its assumption of full re-

[10] Dr. A. P. Meiklejohn (Head of ERO Nutrition Section), Report on Austria, 20 March 1946, p. 7, appended to Monthly Report, March 1946.

[11] Schaaf Working Party Report, discussion with General Clark, 14 December 1945.

[12] Letter, Noel-Baker to Gale, 20 November 1945.

[13] The Soviets made no definite commitments at the September meeting of Foreign Ministers to feed their Zone, Senior Deputy Director General's staff meeting minutes, item 856, 2 January 1946.

[14] A. H. Robertson, "Summary of Negotiations for UNRRA-Austrian Agreement up to 28.2.46," p. 1.

sponsibility for delivery of supplies, the Administration acquiesced to the urgent request of the Allied Council for the earlier provision of a small program of emergency items—grain, medical supplies, trucks, and coal—to be diverted from other country programs or arranged with neighboring countries, primarily for the more needy French and Soviet Zones.[15]

The crux of the difficulties in negotiating the UNRRA-Austrian Agreement was the determination of the date for takeover from the military authorities of responsibility for delivery of supplies. Pressure at first was strong from all four occupying powers to adhere to the date of 1 March.[16] This the Mission's negotiators resolutely resisted, since, in view of the world food shortage, they were unwilling to commit UNRRA to full responsibility until sufficient food had been stocked within the country or definitely placed in the military pipe lines to ensure the maintenance of rations until UNRRA deliveries could arrive. Parminter was eventually able to secure the promise of each of the four elements of the Allied Council to do its best to hand over for its Zone one month's food supply already within the country. He was then instructed to propose 1 April as the date for assumption by UNRRA of financial responsibility for stocks on the ground, and 1 May and 1 June respectively for responsibility for loading and for actual delivery, with the proviso, however, that he might postpone these dates a month if he thought advisable. Parminter, who had hoped to hold out for the later dates, was forced by the insistence of the British Zone Commander to agree to the earlier, much against his better judgment and the advice of the United States Zone Commander.[17] As events developed, UNRRA was unable to meet the full June deliveries and was obliged to borrow food from the United States and Soviet elements.[18]

Other principles in connection with the Agreement were established with varying degrees of difficulty. There was early acceptance of the

[15] Cable, Vienna (Marshal I. S. Konev, President, Allied Council) to Washington unnumbered, 18 December 1945; Senior Deputy Director General's staff meeting minutes, item 856, 2 January 1946.

[16] Senior Deputy Director General's staff meeting minutes, item 1352, 5 February 1946.

[17] Monograph, Brigadier R. H. R. Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 11; Robertson, "Summary of Negotiations, 1 March–5 April 1946," pp. 1–2.

[18] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 14.

proviso that UNRRA supplies were to be distributed throughout Austria by a national distribution system without regard to zonal barriers; [19] it was adopted with high hopes that on this basis a unified Austrian economy might be constructed.[20] UNRRA Headquarters made a valiant effort to secure from the member governments of the Combined Food Board a guarantee to transfer to UNRRA the allocations made to the military authorities for Austria, but they were unsuccessful. Since the Austrian food supplies had, therefore, to come out of the general allocation to UNRRA, Parminter was instructed to make no commitments on the level of rations which UNRRA could provide; [21] and indeed on 23 March the Allied Council was obliged by the increasing seriousness of the general food crisis to lower the basic ration to the bare subsistence level of 1,200 calories per day.[22]

In the course of the negotiations, the Administration was unwillingly drawn into the question of the rumored requisitioning of land and other resources by the occupying forces in the Soviet Zone, the area richest in oil and agricultural land. This was a problem which had haunted the Allied Council from its earliest days. In the eyes of the United States Government particularly, the large body of Soviet forces was interpreting too liberally the Potsdam Agreement which authorized the USSR to take over former German possessions in their Austrian Zone in lieu of reparations.[23] The Mission's negotiators stated firmly from the start of negotiations that petroleum products would not be included in the Administration's Austrian program, on the ground that a sufficient supply was produced locally. They thereby avoided the problem of equitable distribution of these products among the four Zones. Many days of conferences were, however, required to obtain a guarantee from the Allied Council that enough oil and gasoline would be provided to service vehicles imported under the UNRRA program. This guarantee did not appear in the actual text of the Agreement since the Austrian Government was not concerned in the problem, but it

[19] Cable, Vienna (Marshal I. S. Konev) to Washington unnumbered, 18 December 1945.

[20] "Parity of feeding all zones with possibility of taking steps toward unification of Austria by uniform treatment of all zones was a material factor in the State Department's decision," Brigadier General Ralph H. Tate (United States Deputy Commanding General, United States Zone, Austria) to Parminter, 16 June 1946.

[21] Chief Executive Officer's staff meeting minutes, item 1693, 28 February 1946.

[22] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 11.

[23] Central Committee (CC), verbatim minutes meeting, 12 March 1946; Robertson, "Summary of Negotiations, 1 March–5 April 1946," p. 3.

was insisted upon by the Administration as essential before the Agreement would be signed by UNRRA. Finally, the United States Zone Commander limited his share in the general commitment to the month of April, pending further advice from his Government, but the other elements were sufficiently eager to put through the Agreement to promise to make up the petroleum products needed should the United States Zone fail to supply its quota after April.[24]

The consummation of the Austrian Agreement was still threatened, however, by the insistence of the United States Government backed by the United Kingdom on bringing up in the Central Committee and then in the Fourth Council Session the whole problem of the use of indigenous resources by the Soviet forces in their Austrian Zone. The draining off of such resources would, they argued, increase the needs UNRRA would be asked to meet and would, moreover, imperil equitable distribution within the country. The Administration contended, however, that, since UNRRA was not a signatory to the Potsdam Agreement and had neither power nor obligation to enforce it, questions of its interpretation were political problems to be settled directly between the governments concerned.[25] At the Council Session, the Administration was able to shift the emphasis of the discussions [26] from the specific case of Austria to a general statement of principles.[27] In addition, it was decided that the clause in the Agreement with Austria obliging distribution in conformity with "the policies of the UNRRA Council" [28] gave sufficient safeguards, and no specific mention of the use of indigenous resources need be inserted provided the text of Resolution 91 was formally called to the attention of the Allied Council.[29] With this last hurdle passed,[30] the Agreement was approved by the

[24] Robertson, "Summary of Negotiations, 1 March–5 April 1946," p. 4.

[25] CC, verbatim minutes 24th meeting, 12 March 1946.

[26] Council IV Document 238, General Committee (*Ad Hoc* /G) 20, minutes of meeting, 23 March 1946.

[27] Resolution 91.

[28] Article III *a;* see Appendix Seven, Document 2*a*.

[29] Robertson, "Summary of Negotiations, 1 March–5 April 1946," p. 7.

[30] Although the Preamble of the UNRRA-Austrian Agreement stated that the country had been determined unable to pay, the actual declaration by the Director General was not made until almost a month after the Agreement was signed, "Determination by Director General of Austria's Inability to Pay," 30 April 1946. Since even before the *Anschluss* Austria was self-supporting only by virtue of her invisible exports, the question was, of course, academic.

Allied Council and signed by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Parminter on 5 April 1946.

3. *MISSION ORGANIZATION*

The first months of 1946, when the Mission proper was being developed in addition to the original organization for displaced persons operations, were a difficult period. Not only had most of the necessary additional personnel not yet arrived but defects in the displaced persons section were becoming evident. Some of the senior officials had proved ineffective, and it required time and effort to establish control over teams scattered through the three Western Zones at the beck and call of the military authorities. After a thorough house cleaning in the spring of 1946, personnel problems subsided to a normal level, but the Mission, because of the dual nature of its work, was always hard to administer. The Mission Chief doubled as head of the Displaced Persons Operation and the relief and rehabilitation Mission until September 1946 when he was able to secure a deputy chief to relieve him of the burden of direct supervision of the former.[31]

Almost all the relief services personnel worked in the Displaced Persons Operations. At first, most of the administrative sections of the Mission served the whole Mission, but after the Fifth Council Session in August 1946 the two parts operated as independently as possible in order to prepare the way for the transfer of a well-integrated displaced persons organization to the International Refugee Organization at the close of the UNRRA Mission on 30 June 1947.[32]

At the Mission's peak in August 1946, the total staff numbered 1,368—596 Class I, 757 Class II, and 15 loaned from foreign voluntary agencies. Of these, 524 were stationed at the Mission Headquarters in Vienna,[33] and the remainder in displaced persons work in the three Western Zones. Twenty-eight nationalities were included, the British members outnumbering the American contingent, which was next in size, by two to one.[34]

[31] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," pp. 9, 17–18, 35.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 28.
[33] Monthly Report, August 1946, Attachment 11.
[34] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 35; Monthly Report, May 1946.

4. *RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ALLIED COUNCIL*

As was customary in most UNRRA receiving countries, an UNRRA Bureau was set up early in 1946 in the Federal Chancellery to coördinate the administration, port reception and transport, distribution, and control of UNRRA supplies.[35] This UNRRA Chancellery Bureau (Bundeskanzleramt Osterreich-Hilfe der Vereinten Nationen) was not inefficient, compared with other governmental sections, and its staff worked with reasonable conscientiousness in a general attitude of "amiable despair." The Bureau had, unfortunately, no authority to enforce and could only recommend and advise action to the various ministries and provinces.[36]

At the end of January 1946 a Combined UNRRA Committee was formed, consisting of the ministers concerned with the distribution of UNRRA supplies, the Chief of the UNRRA Chancellery Bureau, the UNRRA Director and Deputy Director of Supply and Transport, with the Chief of Mission as chairman. Representatives of the Allied Council attended regularly as observers. Here the broad policies for handling UNRRA supplies, and procedures to be followed by the Subcommittees, were decided, and recommendations to the UNRRA Mission, the Austrian Government, or the Allied Council determined. A Combined Working Party for Austria, made up of technical representatives of each of the Combined Committee members, worked out the detailed implementation of the Committee's decisions. This in turn was divided into Subcommittees on Food, Agriculture, Industry, Medicine, and Welfare. All these groups kept closely in touch with the Economic Directorate of the Allied Council and its corresponding Subcommittees.[37]

The anticipated difficulties of working with four Occupying Powers and a weak and inexperienced Government were amply borne out. The Allied Council was newly established and its machinery creaky. Its members, while not uncoöperative, were primarily concerned with

[35] Monthly Report, February 1946.

[36] Monograph, J. R. Symonds, "History of Field Observation of Distribution," Annex E, report by Symonds on operation of UNRRA Chancellery Bureau, 4 November 1946.

[37] Monthly Report, January 1946; Combined UNRRA Committee for Austria, minutes 1st meeting, 22 January 1946; Austria Mission, "Final Operational Report," [May 1947].

the needs of their individual zones rather than with the welfare of Austria as a whole.[38]

Fundamental to all the difficulties experienced by the UNRRA Mission in Austria was the prevalent paralysis from discouragement and uncertainty which beset the Austrian people. Liberation from the German Reich had meant for many only a decrease in rations, heavy expense, and a doubtful future under military occupation.[39] The Austrian Government, moreover, suffered severely from a lack of experienced personnel and an established administrative organization. Denazification had weeded out the majority who had served under the German Reich, and there remained only a few older men who had been officials prior to the *Anschluss* and young men of no experience. The nine federated states, or Länder, moreover, had grown used to looking to Berlin rather than Vienna during the previous eight years, and their separatist tendencies were often encouraged by the zonal authorities. The introduction of an all-Austria basis for allocation and distribution of UNRRA supplies, ration plans, and collection of indigenous products involved, therefore, not only a breakdown of zonal barriers but an establishment of central control over the semi-independent provinces. Clearly, this could be accomplished only gradually, but some progress certainly was made during the life of the UNRRA Mission.[40]

The complete unreliability of any official statistics, which was a cause of much confusion, was understandable since all the records of the Austrian Government had been destroyed or taken to Berlin, the material compiled by the Allied Council was available only on a question-by-question basis, and the new machinery for collecting facts and figures had to be built up bit by bit in the various Government departments.[41] Throughout the life of the Mission the UNRRA staff did much to assist in the preparation of statistical reports, program justifications, and allocation plans as well as more general policies and procedures.[42]

To the end, however, the Mission was obliged to struggle against

[38] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," pp. 31–32.

[39] Monthly Report, March 1946.

[40] Monographs: Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 29; R. L. Helliwell, "History of Austrian Food Supply," pp. 1–2.

[41] Monthly Report, March 1947, attachment, Pauline Callard, "Statistical Sources of Data on Austrian Economic Conditions," March 1947.

[42] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 29.

inertia, lack of organization, and divided authority within the Government. Letters went unanswered for weeks, and action, if any, came only after continual prodding. There was no evidence of dishonesty but gross inefficiency and maladministration persisted in both Federal and Provincial Governments.[43]

The Mission in itself had, of course, only the right to present advice or recommendations to the Government and, in extreme instances, to withhold supplies. This measure was occasionally used in the case of specific commodities, but in general the Mission felt that the needy Austrian populace should not be made to suffer because of the inadequacies of its Government. The Mission found in the Allied Council, however, a convenient stick with which to beat Government departments into action. It was usually enough to bring debatable points to the attention of the appropriate zonal observer at a Combined UNRRA Committee meeting, but occasionally, as in the matter of distribution of agricultural machinery, a direct letter from the Chief of Mission to the Allied Council was necessary to produce results.[44]

5. *DETERMINATION OF THE PROGRAM*

Before the Mission proper was established, and considerably before the Agreement had been signed, work had begun on the list of requirements for the supply program which UNRRA was to undertake. The continuous and increasing need for food imports proved to be the dominant feature as the program developed. The total of nearly $300 million requested by the Allied Council for all types of supplies, while admittedly justified, was beyond the resources of UNRRA.[45] A sum of about $64 million, reached by adjustment to the bases adopted at the Second Council Session and the over-all budget requirements,[46] was instead proposed by the Working Party which had visited Austria at the end of 1945. Of this, 44 per cent was tentatively allocated for food, 25 per cent each for agricultural and industrial rehabilitation supplies, and the remainder for medical supplies and clothing.

When the proposed program was discussed in the Program Subcommittee in January 1946, the United Kingdom representative was

[43] *Ibid.* [44] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[45] Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee (CC/P)(46)14, Annex I, Statements by Joel Gordon (Bureau of Supply) and Hart Schaaf (head of UNRRA Working Party), 18 January 1946, p. 1. [46] *Ibid.*

concerned that the $27 million allotted for food was inadequate.[47] His view was supported by the British element in the Allied Council which estimated that if all indigenous food could be distributed evenly over the country, the average number of calories available per person would be 990 per day. If the proposed UNRRA food imports were added, the total would still be but 1,600 calories per day, well below the current UNRRA target of 2,000 for European countries. Even the 1,600-calorie estimate excluded provision for displaced persons and was, moreover, premised on the consummation of a full agricultural rehabilitation program.[48]

The Program Subcommittee accordingly recommended,[49] and the Central Committee accepted,[50] a somewhat larger program for the period ending 30 June 1946, totaling almost $60 million of which $34 million was allocated to food. Even this increase in the food budget proved entirely inadequate, and the main object of the Austria Mission became the obtaining of sufficient supplies to prevent starvation. In view of this pressing need, the other commodity programs dwindled in urgency and importance. At the Third Supply Conference in Washington in April, the Chief of Mission forcefully presented both the immediate emergency and the necessity for a larger budget for Austria for the remainder of 1946.

It was already evident that, unless UNRRA could start a flow of food in May, the initial month of its responsibility for food loadings, the pipe line hitherto filled by the military authorities would run dry before the end of the month. Since the normal consumer was then living on 1,200 calories a day, failure to do this would mean for some areas possible starvation. Either UNRRA must get food into Austria, the Mission Chief emphasized, or turn the responsibility back to the military authorities. The total funds needed to cover loadings to the end of June amounted to $46 million against available funds of $34 million.[51]

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[48] CC/P(46)36, Annex II, letter, Roger W. Jackling (United Kingdom representative on Program Subcommittee) to Rolf Nugent (Bureau of Supply), 2 February 1946.

[49] CC/P(46)47, "Second Report of the Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee to the Central Committee," 1 March 1946.

[50] CC(46)33, minutes 23d meeting, 8 March 1946 (Compilation of Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.] II, 143–145); CC(46)41, minutes 25th meeting, 14 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 163–165).

[51] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 15;

To meet the immediate problem two grain ships were diverted to Austria—one from Italy and one from Yugoslavia; and over 20,000 tons of food were purchased from the United States and Soviet elements.[52] With the situation somewhat eased, Headquarters, pressed from all sides to tide the receiving countries over the difficult months prior to harvest, diverted from Austria two promised food ships.[53] Parminter, in desperation, asked LaGuardia to send a personal representative to check the accuracy of the Mission's estimates of need.[54] Simultaneously, the Burgomaster of Vienna, faced with food riots in the city, on his own initiative and without consultation with the Chancellor or the UNRRA Mission, also appealed to the Director General for his personal intervention.[55] An investigator was at once dispatched from ERO and, as a result of his confirmatory report,[56] one ship was rediverted.[57] With the appearance in the markets in July of fresh fruit and vegetables and the increased arrivals of UNRRA food, the worst of the emergency passed, and it was estimated that stocks on hand and current UNRRA shipments would provide enough grain and flour to last through October. The official ration scale remained, however, at the low level of 1,208 calories per day in Vienna and about 1,050 calories in Salzburg and the Tyrol.[58]

A further result of the Third Supply Conference was a recommendation by the Administration that a program of $110 million be approved to cover supplies already shipped and to be shipped to Austria in 1946. To this the Central Committee added $7,500,000 to ensure that "food imports of at least $35,000,000 can be available to meet the requirements of Austria in the last half of 1946." [59] This followed closely a clarification between the Administration and the United States Government that UNRRA should not be regarded as having

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Program of Operations (PO)/III, Document 8, "Conference with Representatives of the Austria Mission," 25 April 1946.

[52] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 15; cable, Washington to Vienna 525, 31 May 1946.

[53] Cable, Vienna to Washington (via United States War Department), 16 June 1946.

[54] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 15.

[55] Cable, Vienna to Washington unnumbered, 17 June 1946.

[56] Cable, Vienna to Washington 870, 25 June 1946.

[57] Cable, Vienna to Washington 932, 3 July 1946.

[58] Committee of the Council for Europe (CCE) (46)69, "Report on UNRRA Operations in the European Region, June and July, 1946," p. 5.

[59] CC/P(46)79, "Third Report of the Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee to the Central Committee," 24 July 1946.

assumed entire financial responsibility for relief and rehabilitation supplies for Austria since such expenditure was clearly beyond the limited funds available to UNRRA.[60]

By the end of the year, however, it was evident that Austria would be unable to finance its food requirements for the first quarter of 1947; moreover, no other receiving country had so low a calorie level. Austria was, therefore, the first country to be allotted a share in the Emergency Food Program approved by the Central Committee early in February 1947, and $20 million was added to the food budget for Austria.[61]

6. *COMMODITIES DELIVERED*

The UNRRA program for Austria was, then, primarily food. In this category UNRRA provided, exclusive of goods taken over from the military authorities, a total of 623,568 gross long tons valued at $81,206,600. Of these, 438,563 gross long tons ($37,292,400) were grain and grain products; 40,534 gross long tons ($12,411,100), fats, oils, and soap; 29,242 gross long tons ($12,926,900), meats and meat products; and varied miscellanea.[62] Goods transferred from, or sold by, the military authorities to UNRRA, largely food, came to 183,539 gross long tons ($25,500,000). From June 1946 until the new grain harvest reached the market in October, UNRRA supplied directly or paid for 80 per cent of the food consumed by the nonagricultural population of Austria (all food sold in authorized markets, even fruit and vegetables, was rationed); and UNRRA supplies continued to form a substantial part of the rations until the Mission closed at the end of June 1947.[63] Essential as was the actual food supplied, moreover, perhaps almost as important was the effect on the morale of the entire Austrian populace of this evidence that their survival was a matter of concern to the nations acting through UNRRA.[64]

Because the provision of food was UNRRA's primary responsibility in Austria, the limited funds available necessitated relatively small pro-

[60] Monthly Report, July 1946.

[61] CC(47)16, minutes 45th meeting, 3 February 1947; see also *supra*, Part Three, Chapter IV, Section 6.

[62] See Appendix Ten, Section III, Document 3*a*.

[63] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 16.

[64] Letter, Parminter to George Woodbridge, 1 November 1948, attached to monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria."

grams for the other commodity divisions. The amount originally allotted to agricultural rehabilitation remained comparatively stable ($18,878,600 in the end), since an increase in indigenous food production was obviously most immediately essential to the restoration of the Austrian economy. Seeds, farm machinery, and fertilizer made up 90 per cent of the total.[65]

Before the war two thirds of Austria's food consumption consisted of cereals and vegetables. During the last year of the war and in the period immediately following, the greater part of the seed reserves was used as food. The Austrian Government was, therefore, anxious to receive large quantities of seeds.[66] In view of these special conditions, the Austrian seed program was designed to sow 20 per cent of the total cropping area, instead of 10 per cent, which was the normal UNRRA standard.[67] Unfortunately, since procurement against this program was late in starting, some of the seeds did not arrive in time for the 1946 spring planting season. This was actually no great disadvantage, for some of the varieties procured were unfamiliar in Austria and time was needed for Austrian seed experts and the UNRRA seed specialist to sort out and identify the miscellaneous lots. The Austrian Government and the Mission tended to resent this extra work imposed on them, but their efforts were rewarded, for all the varieties except maize grew well in the areas to which they were allotted. The major portion, including 41,000 tons of seed potatoes, was distributed through commercial channels to the principal agricultural region, the Soviet Zone, where the need was greatest.[68]

Prior to the arrival of UNRRA shipments, virtually no artificial fertilizers were available in Austria. Substantial UNRRA imports for use in the 1946–1947 planting seasons were, therefore, a considerable contribution to increased production of foodstuffs.[69] Further UNRRA supplies of basic slag from Luxembourg and potash from the Soviet Zone of Germany arrived belatedly in mid-1947 after many months during which trains provided by the Austrian State Railways for their

[65] Monograph, Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," p. 128.
[66] Monograph, Jan Fudakowski, "Historical Report of the Agricultural Branch," Austria, p. 2.
[67] Monograph, Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," p. 127.
[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 125–127; monograph, Fudakowski, "Historical Report of the Agricultural Branch," p. 28.
[69] Monographs: Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," pp. 118–120; Fudakowski, "Historical Report of the Agricultural Branch," p. 30.

transport vanished somewhere in the German Zones or were long delayed by strikes and coal shortages.[70] The Administration succeeded in supplying enough fertilizer, with some nitrogenous fertilizer taken over from the United Kingdom zonal authorities, to approximate the country's rather low prewar imports.[71]

Most of the farm machinery supplied by UNRRA went to the Soviet Zone where wide fertile plains made the use of tractors and attachments more practical than on the small farms of the more mountainous provinces. In this region also had occurred the greatest loss in livestock, for the Germans in their retreat before the Soviet armies had driven westward most of the horses and cattle. At the war's end many of these animals were still within the United States and United Kingdom Zones of Austria, but redistribution proved exceedingly difficult to arrange, and, although surplus horses were being slaughtered in the United Kingdom Zone in the winter of 1945–1946, the Soviet Zone was almost devoid of draft animals. Considerable numbers of tractors had been brought into Austria by the Germans following the *Anschluss*, but they had been hard worked during the war and were largely immobilized for lack of spare parts. Ideally, the situation could best have been met if UNRRA had been able to provide the means for reconditioning these machines. Because of the difficulties of dealing with the various zonal authorities in Germany, and the complexities of financing such purchases, however, repeated efforts to procure spare parts failed. Since the major necessity was the rapid revival of local food production, the provision of new machines to replace the loss in animal and mechanical draft power seemed the only answer.[72]

Some 36,000 units of 34 different types and various makes of farm machinery,[73] valued at more than $4,500,000, had been delivered by UNRRA by June 1947. The 800 wheel tractors and 650 garden tractors were estimated to be capable of cultivating an area producing 10–16 per cent of the total annual Austrian grain crop. Also supplied were some 3,500 cultivators, 2,000 grain drills, 1,000 disk harrows,

[70] Monograph, L. E. Cloquette, "Historical Report of Rail Movement of Supplies," Austria, pp. 5–6, 11.

[71] Monograph, Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," p. 120.

[72] Monographs: Fudakowski, "Historical Report of the Agricultural Branch," pp. 2–3, 23; Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," pp. 122–123.

[73] Monograph, Fudakowski, "Historical Report of the Agricultural Branch," p. 20.

10,000 plows, and potato lifters, threshers, trailers, fertilizer distributors, and other tractor attachments.[74]

The industrial rehabilitation program was not finally determined until October 1946.[75] This was partly because of an intentional suspension during the first six months of the year on all except emergency items, such as trucks, to allow the diversion of funds to food,[76] and partly because of uncertainty during the summer of 1946 whether UNRRA would take over from the United States and the United Kingdom military authorities financial responsibility for coal for Austria.[77] The Administration actually assumed responsibility only for the cost of delivery of the 25,000 tons of coal allotted to Austria from the Polish contribution, and for the purchase of a substantial quantity of lignite from Czechoslovakia.[78] The industrial rehabilitation budgets, in the meantime, fluctuated on paper between something under $5 million and something over $14 million.[79] Final deliveries totaled $6,492,400.

As part of the initial emergency program 1,300 new trucks with spare parts and tires were allotted to Austria from Canadian military surplus in December 1945. These were delivered early in 1946, and their assistance in distributing food to the more inaccessible areas was invaluable.[80]

Although few of the manufacturing plants, except in the Soviet Zone, had been damaged during the war, they had been closely geared into the German economy and were in 1946 suffering severely from lack of raw materials.[81] Out of the limited funds for industrial rehabilitation, UNRRA could meet only a small percentage of the needs. The one nickel factory in the country was, however, enabled to operate throughout 1947 on ore supplied by UNRRA,[82] while here and there plants started operations with UNRRA imports of aluminum, tin, copper, zinc, chemicals, rubber, latex, carbon black, etc.[83]

[74] Monograph, Mahler, "UNRRA's Agricultural Rehabilitation Activities," p. 123.
[75] Monograph, Edward Rawson, "UNRRA's Program for Industrial Relief and Rehabilitation for Austria," HQ, pp. 3, 5.
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 1. [77] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[78] *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 3, 5–7; Monthly Report, April 1947.
[79] Monograph, Rawson, "UNRRA's Program for Industrial Relief and Rehabilitation for Austria," p. 1. [80] *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 3; Monthly Report, December 1946.
[81] Monthly Report, March 1946.
[82] Monthly Report, February 1947, Requirements and Distribution Report, p. 5.
[83] Monograph, Rawson, "UNRRA's Program for Industrial Relief and Rehabilitation for Austria," p. 9.

The medical supply program, budgeted at $2 million, was 85 per cent realized. About half of this was spent on amenity supplies (vitamins, layettes, personal comforts, etc.) for displaced persons.[84] The medical supplies were utilized to the full by the Austrian medical profession, which before the war was one of the most advanced in Europe, and were, though far less than had originally been requested, sufficient to carry the country past the period of worst scarcity and danger from epidemics.[85]

The clothing and textiles program was from the beginning small. Since Austria had been included in the German rationing system and the principal need anticipated was the replacement of worn-out garments, UNRRA imports of raw cotton and wool and leather were planned to provide a few new clothes and shoes for the Austrian people, and most of the finished clothing and footwear supplied was designed to meet the specialized needs of workers in heavy industries.[86] Ninety per cent ($1,789,400) of the amount allotted was delivered, plus some 1,600 long tons of contributed clothing for Austrians and displaced persons.[87]

7. *DISTRIBUTION MACHINERY*

Because food was the major item in the UNRRA supplies sent to Austria, the principal task of the Mission was to advise the Government on means for its distribution and to attempt to ensure that this was effectively carried out. The basic machinery for distribution was the same for all categories of UNRRA goods. Seventy per cent of the UNRRA program was landed at Trieste [88] where it was receipted by Austrian Government representatives and sent by the single-track railway to Vienna in trains provided and well guarded by the Austrian State Railways. Distribution plans were made for each commodity by the appropriate Ministry on the basis of needs certified by the Provincial chambers or trade associations. These were submitted to the UNRRA

[84] Monographs: L. H. Norrington, "History of Medical Supply Branch—Supply Program and Distribution"; Mildred Frye, "Austrian Medical and Sanitation Historical Report from a Programming Aspect," HQ.

[85] Letter, Parminter to Woodbridge, 1 November 1948.

[86] Monograph, Symonds, "History of Field Observation of Distribution," Austria, Appendix D, "Report of ERO Observers, 21 September–19 October 1946," p. 15.

[87] "Statistics on Clothing Drives Sponsored by UNRRA," p. 11.

[88] Monograph, Cloquette, "Historical Report of Rail Movement of Supplies," p. 7.

Chancellery Bureau, discussed in the Subcommittees of the Combined UNRRA Working Party, passed to the appropriate committee of the Allied Council, and thence to the Allied Council itself for final approval.[89]

When the UNRRA program was initiated, no country-wide channel of distribution existed, since the occupying authorities had used their own zonal machinery. A semipublic association of wholesalers in Vienna, the Import Vereinigung, was hastily authorized by the Government and the Allied Council to set up branches throughout the country to handle the distribution of food to local retailers and coöperatives. Similar groups of wholesalers were subsequently utilized to handle the other commodities in the UNRRA program.[90]

All food, even fruits and vegetables, was rationed and sold at Government-controlled prices to the nonagricultural population, which constituted about five sixths of the seven million people of Austria. Final allocations of other items were made on the basis of need or productive capacity by the Provincial chambers or trade associations, or, in the case of trucks and tractors, by the Minister of Agriculture himself.[91]

The whole distributive machinery worked with varying degrees of inefficiency, and all along the line the UNRRA Mission prodded and pushed. UNRRA Movements Officers, far exceeding their advisory obligations, followed shipments through from Trieste, checked supplies entering at other border points, continually pressed the Austrian State Railways (always coöperative to the limit of their abilities) to provide freight cars from their meager stock, and even badgered the European Central Inland Transport Organization to recover trains which had disappeared outside the Austrian borders.[92] UNRRA staff labored on distribution plans with the UNRRA Chancellery Bureau and in the Subcommittees, kept a watchful eye on the divergences between over-all plans and actual distribution, and patiently pressed for investigation when supplies disappeared in the provincial hinterlands or piled up in warehouses.

By an Agreement of 28 June 1946, published on 14 July, the direct

[89] Monthly Reports, March, May 1946.

[90] Report to Deputy Director, Supply and Transport, on 5 April meeting of Combined UNRRA Working Party, 9 April 1946; monograph, Helliwell, "History of Austrian Food Supply," p. 11.

[91] Monthly Report, May 1946.

[92] Monograph, Cloquette, "Historical Report of Rail Movement of Supplies," *passim.*

control by the Allied Council over the Government was reduced to cover only situations in which the latter might lack power to act, such as the maintenance of law and order, war crimes, and demilitarization. Ordinary legislative measures of the Government were now assumed to have the consent of the Allied Council unless vetoed by all four elements within thirty-one days.[93] The result for UNRRA was to remove the details of allocation, pricing, and distribution of UNRRA supplies from direct supervision by the Allied Council and to lessen delays by simplifying administrative machinery. While the Allied Council continued to pass judgment on distribution plans, this became a formality, and allocations and revisions were habitually made in the Combined Subcommittees with an information copy to the Council after decisions had been made. For example, a plan for distributing buckwheat seed was approved by the Council after the consignment had been planted and harvested.[94]

Despite the persistent efforts of the Mission staff to improve distribution, the actual food available in a given district for a given ration period often did not even approximate either the provincial ration plan or the over-all distribution plan. Part of the difficulty arose from the lack of any dependable population statistics.[95] Determination of eligibility for the various categories of ration card holders was, moreover, both genuinely difficult and subject to manipulation and connivance.[96] The number of "heavy workers," entitled to a sizable issue of food in addition to the basic ration, for example, fluctuated widely. The practice of making up the deficiencies of one ration period in the succeeding period greatly increased the complications of tracing the end distribution of specific UNRRA food deliveries.

The chief problem, however, was the enforcement of collection of the indigenous food estimated to be available in addition to UNRRA supplies and needed to make up the ration quota for the nonagricultural population. Part of the trouble stemmed from the Federal Government, which persistently held to the blithe assumption that UNRRA or the occupying forces would surely come to the rescue

[93] Monthly Report, June 1946; monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 31.

[94] Monograph, Fudakowski, "Historical Report of Agricultural Branch," p. 27.

[95] Monthly Report, March 1947, Attachment, Callard, "Statistical Sources of Data on Austrian Economic Conditions," p. 1.

[96] Monograph, Symonds, "History of Field Observation of Distribution," p. 6.

in case of shortage.[97] Another contributory factor was the low prices paid to farmers which often caused them to feed their produce to animals in the overstocked western provinces or to sell it in the black market. Indeed, in view of the absence of serious malnutritional diseases revealed by the UNRRA survey of Vienna in the summer of 1946, the Mission could only conclude that an average of 350 to 400 calories per capita must have been available to the nonagricultural population beyond their official rations, presumably from the black market.[98] Prolonged pressure from the Mission resulted in September 1946 in the transfer of responsibility for collection of crops from the Minister of Agriculture to the Minister of Food who was somewhat less politically dependent on the good will of the farmers and hence more inclined to enforce the collection quotas.[99] In connection with this problem, too, the inability of the Federal Government to control the provinces was particularly evident, since the amount of food collected depended not only on the farmers but on the ability or willingness of local officials to meet the conservatively estimated quotas set by the Federal Government. Collection of domestic food was particularly hard to secure from Salzburg and the province of Upper Austria South in the United States Zone and Lower Austria in the Soviet Zone.[100]

The vexing question of the use of indigenous supplies by the zonal authorities also arose. Although the very low basic ration of 1,200 calories per day per person, set by the Allied Council in March 1946, had been supplied with great difficulty, the Government had, nevertheless, repeatedly attempted to secure the Council's approval for a return to the earlier level of 1,550. By November the announcement of a 1,550-calorie ration for Germany, an ex-enemy country, had caused so much popular indignation that the Government, without Allied Council approval or consultation with UNRRA, suddenly announced a like ration for Austria. By implication, the only local source for the requisite additional supplies was the Soviet Zone, which was unwilling to share its local produce with the rest of the country, mainly from reluctance to reduce its reserves without guarantee of

[97] Monograph, Major A. MacDonald, "Food Procurement and Distribution in Austria, April–December 1946," p. 17.

[98] Monthly Report, December 1946, gives text of Dr. Harvey Collins's "Survey of Nutritional Health in Vienna," and comments thereon.

[99] Monthly Report, September 1946.

[100] Monograph, Symonds, "History of Field Observation of Distribution," Appendix D, "Report of ERO Observers, 21 September–19 October 1946," p. 9.

replacement. Controversy raged between the occupying powers in the autumn and winter of 1946, but the UNRRA Mission managed to keep out of the fight even though the UNRRA principle of equitable distribution was involved. Finally, the additional $20 million for food voted by the UNRRA Central Committee in February 1947, a loan to the Austrian Government from the United Kingdom Government, and the United States program of aid initiated in June 1947 promised to carry the country through to the 1947 harvest,[101] although this was achieved mainly by an increase in the bread ration at the expense of a balanced diet.[102]

Farm machinery, especially tractors and attachments and other mechanized equipment, posed other serious distribution problems. As was the case in many receiving countries, some of the machines provided were unfamiliar and at first often regarded as unsuitable for local farming methods. Only as they were demonstrated at the Vienna agricultural fairs in the autumn of 1946 and the spring of 1947 and as they became actually available in the provinces for examination was the sales resistance of the farmers gradually broken down.[103] In addition, the provision of proper fuel and lubricants from local sources was difficult to secure despite the promise of the military authorities at the signing of the Agreement that these supplies would be forthcoming. In October 1946 the UNRRA Mission for some weeks withheld distribution of tractors until a usable fuel mixture was made available.[104]

The major problem, however, was to get the machinery from the Vienna warehouses to the ultimate purchasers in the provinces. Although general responsibility for allocation and distribution lay with the Minister of Agriculture, the actual task of assemblage and transport had been entrusted to a working group of Vienna farm-machinery dealers. Contrary to the advice of the UNRRA Mission, unpacking and assembling were wholly centralized in Vienna. By early autumn it had become evident that this work was beyond the capacity of some of the firms; progress was very slow, assembling incorrectly done, and storage painfully inadequate. Vigorous protest by the UNRRA

[101] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," pp. 10, 26–27.
[102] Monograph, MacDonald, "Food Procurement and Distribution in Austria, April–December 1946," p. 14.
[103] Monograph, Fudakowski, "Historical Report of Agricultural Branch," pp. 21—23.
[104] Monthly Report, October–November 1946.

Mission led to the removal of the chairman of the group, but the advent of a severe winter and a shortage of coal for transport of all but immediately essential goods put a further stop to distribution. At the end of February the Mission formally appealed to the Economic Directorate of the Allied Council for its intervention with the added threat to the Government of rediversion of the machines to some other receiving country. By April the situation had considerably improved. An experienced official was appointed with full authority to direct assemblage and distribution; and nearly all the machinery reached the farms in time for use in spring planting in 1947.[105]

8. *OBSERVATION OF DISTRIBUTION*

The systematic observation of distribution of UNRRA supplies in the field was very slow in getting under way, largely for lack of staff. Until October 1946 the four or five observation officers available were stationed in Vienna and went into the provinces only on periodic visits. Thereafter, a staff of eight was permanently assigned to centers throughout the country where they worked in close coöperation with the control officers of the UNRRA Chancellery Bureau.[106] Only the officer assigned to the Soviet Zone but stationed in Vienna experienced any difficulty in arranging for field inspections, and even these delays apparently arose, not from any objection to the observation of distribution, but from the complexities of the Soviet bureaucratic machine and the Soviet tendency to regard the officer as an American rather than as an UNRRA employee and to seek to secure concessions from the United States zonal authorities in exchange for what they considered to be favors to a United States citizen. Certainly no hindrances were placed in his way once permission had been granted for him to enter, and the same was true of a special observation group of three who came from ERO in the early autumn of 1946.[107]

To the knowledge of the Combined UNRRA Working Party for

[105] Monograph, Fudakowski, "Historical Report of Agricultural Branch," pp. 31–32; Monthly Reports: October–November 1946, February, March, April 1947; Combined UNRRA Committee for Austria, minutes of meeting, 26 February 1947.

[106] Monographs: Symonds, "History of Field Observation of Distribution," pp. 1–2; Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 36.

[107] Monographs: Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," pp. 36–37; Symonds, "History of Field Observation of Distribution," Appendix D, "Report of ERO Observers, 21 September–19 October 1946." See also *supra*, Part Four, Chapter Three.

Austria no instances of maldistribution of UNRRA supplies from political motives occurred.[108] Evidences of poor management of distribution were, however, only too frequent. Certain cases haunted the Combined UNRRA Committee meetings for months. In Vienna, for example, flour was allocated to the bakers at the rate of 75 kilos for each 100 kilos of bread. The actual loaves were, however, made with but 72 kilos of flour. After three months of probing the Mission was obliged to be content with the explanation that the 6,000 tons of flour thus saved were used for extra issues to children, the sick, and heavy workers, and for accumulating a reserve for emergencies.[109] Other instances, such as the disappearance of 12,000 tons of indigenous grain in Upper Austria South in the United States Zone, remained unsolved when the Mission closed.[110] Nevertheless, the Mission and the Combined UNRRA Working Party concluded in June 1947:

> that the Austrian Government, so far as lay in its power, has carried out an impartial and reasonably well controlled distribution of UNRRA supplies. Such maldistribution as has taken place is attributable to factors outside the control of the Central Government. It is felt, therefore, . . . that the distribution of remaining UNRRA supplies can confidently be left in the hands of the pertinent Austrian authorities.[111]

A Protective Service unit was set up in the Mission in April 1946. Although an officer was budgeted for all the Zones except the Soviet, and for the Trieste-Vienna supply line, only two officers served the entire period and a third for five months (July–November 1946), mainly in the United States Zone. Manifestly, they could not hope to maintain a thorough check on the criminal misuse of UNRRA supplies or the misdeeds, minor and major, of the entire UNRRA staff in the Mission and the Displaced Persons Operations. They worked closely, however, with the UNRRA field observation officers, the control officers of the UNRRA Chancellery Bureau, the Austrian civil police, and the Allied military authorities, ensuring investigation by the proper authorities of all reports which reached them from any source. They were able, for example, to secure, by most energetic pressure from the Mission, the imprisonment of a Viennese food wholesaler who had failed to declare a large warehouse full of UNRRA

[108] Austria Mission, "Final Operational Report," p. 5.
[109] Monthly Report, March 1947; Monthly Report, May 1947, Attachment, Report of Distribution Officers on Food, p. 2.
[110] Monthly Report, May 1947.
[111] Monthly Report, June 1947.

supplies. They broke up repeated black market operations, particularly in displaced persons camps in the United States Zone; and they served also to protect UNRRA personnel from undue punishment for ignorant or trivial violations of the innumerable military and civil regulations as well as to prosecute major misdeeds.[112]

9. *PRICING*

During the UNRRA period Austria was largely cut off from normal trade relationships with the rest of the world. Until mid-1946 all foreign trade was on a barter basis and subject to the approval of the Allied Council. Government-controlled prices had risen only 20 to 30 per cent over prewar levels and were but one-third to one-half of world prices, and the foreign exchange rates inaugurated by the occupying powers and adopted by the Government in October 1946 bore no relation to actual purchasing power parities. Heavy subsidies were, therefore, necessary when private firms began buying goods in markets outside the country.[113] The large UNRRA contribution of free supplies enabled the Austrian Government to postpone the day when it would be obliged to purchase extensively in the world market until its internal finances could be more thoroughly stabilized, a gradual rise in prices within the country achieved, and the subsidy payments to importers reduced or eliminated.[114]

With the removal by the 28 June 1946 Agreement of price control by the zonal authorities, uniform prices for the entire country became possible, and the Austrian Government at once embarked on an upward revision of rates on most basic commodities. Although this was essentially a policy of controlled inflation and was partly motivated by a desire to win political favor with the farmers, the Mission felt that the Government's action was justified and within the vague and permissive wording of Resolution 7.[115]

The UNRRA-Austrian Agreement provided that "the Government will inform the Administration and receive its views regarding . . .

[112] Monograph, Major H. F. á Brassard, "History of the Protective Service in the UNRRA Austrian Mission," *passim.*

[113] Ernest Knobloch, *Economic Report on Austria* (Vienna, 1947), p. 17.

[114] *Ibid.*, p. 19; monograph, Ruth L. Sivard, "Pricing of the UNRRA Supply Programme in Austria," p. 21.

[115] Paragraph 6. See monograph, Sivard, "Pricing of the UNRRA Supply Programme in Austria," pp. 1–2, 5, 13.

price policies and specific prices for such [UNRRA] supplies and their relationship to prices for similar supplies produced domestically." [116] The Mission confined itself in this regard mainly to securing the Government's agreement in principle that UNRRA goods should be sold at the top domestic prices for similar items, and to objecting when Government-determined prices were set too high for purchase by the ordinary consumer. Although wages were, in general, relatively low in relation to prices, the long period of scarcity had enabled most workers to accumulate substantial savings, and the price rises apparently caused little hardship. Some effort was made by the Government to increase relief allowances for indigents to correspond with the rising cost of living.[117]

Distribution of medical supplies was for some time hindered by resistance in the Subcommittee on Medicine to a schedule of high prices proposed by the Government consultant who was also a member of the medical wholesalers' association. Although his schedule was finally adopted, the Mission felt that, since most of the items were sold to Government-supported hospitals, the people themselves were little affected. On some medical supplies sold through retail pharmacies the Mission was finally able to secure price reductions.[118]

10. *PROCEEDS OF SALE*

Price lists on all UNRRA goods were a necessary preliminary to an estimate of the proceeds of sale, and the UNRRA Pricing Officer and the *Preisreferent* in the UNRRA Chancellery Bureau were busy at compilation through the autumn of 1946.[119] Accounting for proceeds of sale was not urgently pursued at first since from the beginning of the UNRRA program the Mission and the Government had agreed to hold all such funds not needed for the usual Mission expenses and distribution costs in a blocked account known as the Schilling Fund. The sum came to a little less than one fifth of the total annual budget of the Austrian Government, and the decision to defer spending it to

[116] Article III, *c*, iii.

[117] Monograph, Sivard, "Pricing of the UNRRA Supply Programme in Austria," pp. 1–2, 10, 18.

[118] *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 3, 9, 17; monograph, Norrington, "History of Medical Supply Branch —Supply Program and Distribution," p. 1.

[119] Monograph, Sivard, "Pricing of the UNRRA Supply Programme in Austria," p. 17.

a five-year period following the closure of the Mission (30 June 1947) had an appreciable anti-inflationary influence.[120] Responsibility for approval of expenditures from the fund was placed in a Central Committee [121] composed of a representative from each Government department concerned and from the National Bank or Ministry of Finance plus three independent members.[122] It was hoped by the Mission that the relatively nonpolitical composition of the Committee would ensure wiser uses than a Government exposed to political pressures might have been expected to authorize.[123]

11. *ESTIMATE OF UNRRA'S WORK IN AUSTRIA*

In the judgment of the Chief of Mission for Austria, "there is no possible shadow of doubt that the Austrian nation owes its survival to UNRRA aid." [124] Even if the occupying authorities had been able to import an adequate supply of food, it was evident from the early experience of the Allied Council that some sections would have suffered under the zonal arrangements. The military authorities, moreover, were empowered to provide only to the point of preventing unrest and disease and could not have furnished additional medical supplies or clothing and footwear, and particularly the agricultural and industrial rehabilitation supplies sent by UNRRA. Admittedly, Austria, like all the receiving countries, could have made good use of much larger quantities of relief and rehabilitation supplies than UNRRA was able to finance. Agricultural production was, however, very considerably increased, and a few basic industries were started on the way to full production. The principal need—food for the nonagricultural population—UNRRA met. The populace was enabled to get through the critical period in 1946 and early 1947 without serious malnutrition and even with a marked improvement in health. This assistance was fundamental and, without it, aid toward rehabilitation would have had little point.

[120] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 40; CC(48)2, memo, Director General to Central Committee, "Final Report on Proceeds of Sale," Appendix IIC, pp. 69–71.

[121] Letter, Chancellor to Austria Mission, 10 May 1947.

[122] Since it proved impossible to find nominees acceptable to all, these three members were in the end chosen by the Chancellery; monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 40.

[123] Letter, Parminter to Woodbridge, 1 November 1948.

[124] Monograph, Parminter, "Office of Chief of UNRRA Mission to Austria," p. 42.

X. The Dodecanese Islands

1. *UNRRA'S DECISION TO HELP*

THE SOUTHERN SPORADES, or Dodecanese Islands, appear on a map as twelve small dots [1] clustered round the larger island of Rhodes off the southwest coast of Asia Minor. Ethnically Greek, they were conquered by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1523 and remained under Turkish rule until 1912 when, as a result of the Turko-Italian War, they, together with the outlying islet of Castellorizo (off the southern coast of Asia Minor), became an Italian colony. At the outbreak of World War II, in addition to the native Greeks, the population of 135,000 [2] comprised small numbers of other Levantine races, such as Turks, Armenians, and Jews, and a number of Italians—mostly in official status.

During the war the Dodecanese endured more than many areas that have had their sufferings more amply publicized. Bombed, blockaded, shelled, and invaded by the Allies, mined both on land and sea by their Italian and German occupiers, they had more than their fair share of modern warfare at its worst.

For the most part barren and rocky, the Islands have no mineral resources and no industry in the modern sense. Their prewar economy was based on meager agriculture and fishing, Italian military and naval expenditure, and tourist trade. With 70 per cent of their draft animals gone,[3] virtually without seeds, agricultural implements, fishing equipment, or fertilizers, with all normal commercial activity at a standstill, and with life generally disrupted, the badly damaged towns and villages were derelict and their people unemployed.

It was in September 1944 [4] that the Dodecanese came to the official

[1] Calchi, Calino, Caso, Coo, Lero, Lipso, Nisiro, Patmo, Piscopi, Scarpanto, Simi, and Stampalia, plus a large number of small islets.

[2] Census of 1936.

[3] Operational Analysis Papers (OAP) 15, *UNRRA Assistance to the Dodecanese* (London, 1947), p. 7.

[4] The Director General had also discussed the matter informally and inconclusively with Dean Acheson (United States Assistant Secretary of State) and Richard Law (United Kingdom Minister of State) in August 1944. The Administration had decided

attention of UNRRA. With the exception of Castellorizo, which had been occupied and held by the British forces from 1943, they were still under German occupation. The general feeling that the restrictive provisions of Resolution 1[5] should not be applied to the Dodecanese and that, although technically ex-enemy territory, they should be regarded as eligible for UNRRA aid led to the unopposed approval of Resolution 59.[6]

With the collapse of enemy resistance in Europe, the garrison in the Dodecanese capitulated on 8 May 1945, and British forces entered to take the German surrender, liberate the sorely tried population, and provide them with succor and temporary government pending the formal determination of their status and their handover to Greece. On 1 August 1945, Lehman and Major-General A. V. Anderson, C.B., M.B.E. (Director of Civil Affairs, United Kingdom War Office) signed at the War Office in London the "Memorandum of Agreement between British Military Administration (Dodecanese) and UNRRA for Relief and Rehabilitation in the Dodecanese Islands."[7] Effective immediately, the Agreement provided that UNRRA would assume financial responsibility for civilian supplies from 1 August 1945, but that the British Military Administration (BMA) would continue to arrange procurement and shipping until UNRRA could take over. In fact, however, both the provision of supplies and the administration of the program developed as an essentially combined BMA–UNRRA operation.[8]

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to leave the early relief work to the military authorities and then raise the matter later if necessary.

[5] See Resolution 1, I, paragraph 3.

[6] *Journal*, Second Council, pp. 70, 85, 117.

[7] With the exception of Article VII which provided on the one hand for UNRRA's continued assistance in the event of a change in the political status of the Islands and on the other for BMA's undertakings vis-à-vis UNRRA to end with their responsibility for the government of the Islands, the Memorandum followed the lines of the Agreement between UNRRA and the Greek Government. Article VII, therefore, provided for the Agreement to end automatically in the event of a change in the government of the Islands, but clearly envisaged that UNRRA would hope to make a new agreement on similar lines with whatever authority assumed responsibility for the Dodecanese after the British Military Administration (BMA); in fact, however, no such transfer of authority took place during the UNRRA period. For text see Appendix Six, Section II, Document 1.

[8] During the 14 months, 1 August 1945 to 30 September 1946, BMA procured 60 per cent of the $3,500,000 worth of supplies financed by UNRRA; OAP 15, *UNRRA Assistance to the Dodecanese*, p. 11.

2. *THE MISSION*

With the arrival in Rhodes on 16 October 1945 of the first Chief of Mission, Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Toby (United Kingdom), the UNRRA Dodecanese Mission started. It came to an official end on 31 January 1947.

The principal administrative problems of the Mission arose from the nature of the terrain. Although small in total land area, the Islands are widely scattered, and regular communication between them was difficult, especially under postwar conditions. This not only led to delays in collecting and distributing mail and information, but also necessitated the wide dispersal of personnel through the Islands,[9] and gave rise to great difficulties in the distribution of supplies. Communications were bad not only within the Islands but also between them and UNRRA Headquarters in Washington. The food crisis in the middle of 1946 was in no small part due to the excessive delay in cables from Rhodes to Washington and the complete loss of some key messages.

BMA, as a temporary government without local political interests, was concerned primarily with the administration of the Islands, and in this practical sphere the Mission and BMA collaborated in what developed into an effective working partnership. Typical of this relationship was the fact that it was never thought necessary by either side to set up any formal organization or procedure for liaison between the two. Members of the Mission staff dealt with their opposite numbers in BMA informally, and, whenever necessary, joint meetings of several sections were arranged *ad hoc* to deal with problems requiring action by more than one division of the Mission and BMA. General meetings were also called when it was necessary to set up or review an UNRRA program.

Although in drawing up the Agreement with the United Kingdom War Office in the summer of 1945 it had been thought that the Mission might outlive BMA, the latter was, because of the long delays in completing the peace treaty with Italy under which the Islands were eventually transferred to Greek sovereignty, still responsible for the Dodecanese when the Mission withdrew with its program virtually

[9] In June 1946 12 of the 38 Class I employees were stationed on islands other than Rhodes.

completed. However, as it had always been understood among the major Allied Powers that the Dodecanese would be transferred to Greece, a Greek Liaison Mission was stationed in Rhodes from the autumn of 1945. With it the UNRRA Mission maintained cordial relations throughout.

3. *THE PROGRAM*

A basic ration was the first essential, and BMA established it at 1,850 calories [10] and imported the necessary supplies from military stocks in Egypt. A rationing system was developed, and by October 1945 BMA had succeeded in bringing the nutrition of the Islanders nearly up to their normal rather austere standard. By importing seeds and fertilizers BMA also made possible the sowing of a fair acreage of wheat in the late summer of 1945. When the UNRRA Mission was set up in October 1945 BMA's stockpile in the Middle East was sufficient to meet requirements through 31 January 1946.[11] The bad communications and consequent slowness of distribution among the Islands meant that food supplies had to reach the main ports sixty to ninety days [12] before they were to be consumed. In order to give the Administration sufficient time to establish a regular flow of deliveries, BMA undertook additional procurement to supply the Islands through 31 March 1946.[13]

The first task was that of developing a program of relief and rehabilitation requirements in accordance with the UNRRA bases. BMA's original program for the first half of 1946 had been submitted through ERO to UNRRA Headquarters in September 1945,[14] before the Mission was established. As this BMA program had not been prepared in accordance with the UNRRA bases, however, no action was taken by Headquarters, which merely noted it as an indication of the probable requirements of the Dodecanese.[15]

[10] Monograph, W. Wankowicz, "Historical Record of the UNRRA Dodecanese Mission," p. 2.

[11] Letter, Chief of Mission to Deputy Director General, Supply, European Regional Office (ERO), 24 October 1945.

[12] Cable, Cairo to Washington 896, 22 September 1945.

[13] Mission Narrative Report for 1 August–30 November 1945, p. 3.

[14] Memo, Nicolai I. Feonov (Deputy Director General, Supply, ERO) to Roy F. Hendrickson, 14 September 1945.

[15] Memo, Abraham S. Boykoff (Director, Country Programs Division, HQ) to Commodity Division Directors, "Dodecanese Island Program," 3 November 1945.

The Mission now urgently reviewed this program in close consultation with BMA and, after revision to UNRRA bases, it was forwarded late in November 1945 to ERO and to Headquarters where it became the basis for the Dodecanese supply program. At the end of that month, space was secured on the SS "Constantinos H" and nearly 2,000 tons of food (1,850 tons of wheat) were shipped, the first UNRRA shipment to the Islands. The ship was delayed by repairs and diversions, however, and did not reach Rhodes until 20 February 1946.[16]

The physical problem of shipping supplies to the Dodecanese now obtruded itself. Originally, it was intended to load a Liberty ship with mixed cargo every third month. Headquarters decided in the light of the information available regarding the condition of the port of Rhodes that a fully loaded ship of that size could not be effectively discharged in that war-damaged harbor, and various other possibilities had to be considered, such as bottom-loading ships for the Dodecanese and letting them discharge their top cargo in Greece, or transshipment at Piraeus or at an Egyptian port. Finally it was decided, but not until near the end of January 1946, to use smaller ships [17] and send them direct to the Dodecanese.

In February 1946 the Mission learned that a financial limit had been set to the Dodecanese program by the Central Committee and that it would have to be restricted to $3,600,000 in all, including the BMA procurement for which UNRRA was financially responsible. This faced BMA and the Mission with the problem which bedeviled nearly every receiving country, the conflict between relief and rehabilitation.

From April 1946 it became clear that the Dodecanese would be in grave difficulties until the local harvest could ease the food situation. Apart from other difficulties of procuring supplies, the budget of $3,600,000 had been virtually spent, or committed, for nonfood items and there seemed to be no way out of the problem. In May the Deputy Chief of Mission, W. Wankowicz (Poland), attended the Third Supply Conference at UNRRA Headquarters with a long shopping list but little money in his budget.[18] In June the Chief of Mission went to London to participate in negotiations with the United Kingdom War

[16] Monthly Report, February 1946.

[17] Memo, Grant Tolley (Bureau of Supply, HQ) to Bureau of Supply divisional directors, "Dodecanese Program," 23 January 1946.

[18] Monthly Report, April 1946.

Office to see if anything could be whittled off the bill for supplies procured by BMA. These negotiations were successful, and by August 1946 the War Office had agreed to reduce its bill by £235,000, an imperative addition to the budget,[19] on the basis of which the Mission immediately called for 2,000 tons of wheat and 180 tons of sugar.[20]

The food situation had in the meantime deteriorated, and by June the ration was down to the appalling level of 1,000 calories per day—less than the ration in Germany and a little more than half the BMA ration. On top of these setbacks the harvest, including the olive crop in Rhodes and Scarpanto, was disappointing, as was the collection of crops. The daily ration was raised in September, after the harvest, from 1,000 calories to 1,400, but the prospects for even this miserable regimen were very precarious.

Now that the £235,000 released by the United Kingdom War Office in August was available for the procurement of the desperately needed food, the feelings of the Mission, when it learned that the supplies would not arrive when needed, can be imagined. In order to avoid widespread starvation through a complete breakdown of the meager ration, BMA in October had to obtain 2,000 tons of flour on loan from the Greek Government. The bitter and puzzled comment of Wankowicz (Chief of Mission from July 1946) in October 1946 that "for some reason, however, all during the month of September, no action seems to have been taken by [UNRRA Headquarters] Washington to meet UNRRA's obligations in regard to the Dodecanese" was understandable.[21] It produced a long and detailed explanation: various cables had been lost or delayed in transmission, and over $100,000 of the amount released by the United Kingdom War Office had already been committed irrevocably for agricultural and other rehabilitation requirements scheduled in the original program. Of the $100,000 left, $70,000 had been caught in the 2 per cent "freeze" [22] imposed on all mission budgets.[23]

Now UNRRA was also faced with a further bill from the United Kingdom War Office for $257,000 for the supplies procured in Oc-

[19] *Ibid.*, August 1946.
[20] *Ibid.*, September 1946.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] See Part Three, Chapter II, Section 10.
[23] Memo, Rooks (then Deputy Director General and Chief Executive Officer, HQ) to Wankowicz, 2 December 1946.

tober 1946. In this situation the United Kingdom suggested that the Dodecanese program be increased by $700,000, and the Central Committee authorized an increase of $500,000 as recommended by the Administration.[24] This brought the Dodecanese budget up to a total of $4,100,000 and left $243,000 free for the purchase of additional food supplies after the United Kingdom War Office had been paid. This was spent on 2,250 tons of flour, and the program was thus completed.

The extent to which BMA and UNRRA shared the responsibility for the procurement of the supplies paid for by UNRRA is illustrated in the following table:

TABLE 37

SUPPLIES RECEIVED IN THE DODECANESE, AUGUST 1945–SEPTEMBER 1946 [a]

	BMA	*UNRRA*
Food	$1,600,000	$ 775,730
Clothing	60,000	399,000
Medical and sanitation	60,000	95,000
Agriculture and fisheries	90,320	72,000
Industrial rehabilitation	...	20,000
Petroleum products	288,000	62,000
Total	$2,098,320	$1,423,730

[a] OAP 15, *UNRRA Assistance to the Dodecanese*, Table IX, p. 11; see *infra*, Appendix Ten, Section III, Document 7, for statistical information regarding the full supply program.

4. *DISTRIBUTION*

The first problem that faced BMA when it assumed the administration of the Islands in May 1945 was that of devising a method of distributing urgently needed food to a largely indigent population in a scattered area in which all communications and distributive channels had been completely disrupted. The problem was solved by the development of the cash relief system which UNRRA took over in November 1945. The initial object was to provide indigents with cash with which they could buy the ration provided by BMA at fixed and controlled prices. Administratively, this arrangement was easier to

[24] Central Committee (CC) (46) 120, minutes 40th meeting, 13 November 1946 (Compilation of Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], IV, 129–130).

implement and control than any distribution of free food would have been. Financially, it came to much the same thing since BMA, in effect, gave the people the cash with which to buy food and then sold them the food.

The cash relief scheme was inaugurated, in Rhodes only, by BMA on 9 May 1945, the day after liberation. Initially, cash relief at a flat rate of 400 lire per month was paid to the sick and to cripples, to children under ten with no wage earner in the family, to widows and the destitute over sixty-five, and in special cases.[25] Supplementary cash relief equal to the difference between their earnings and 400 lire per month plus 10 per cent of the difference (as an incentive to work at their own calling) for themselves and their dependents was paid to physically fit persons. Those employed on public works projects received from 70–100 lire per day (according to skill), so-called "work relief." The principle followed was that a man should be given as many days' work as would enable him to earn 400 lire per month for himself and each nonworking member of his family.[26]

This was, broadly, the system that UNRRA inherited. The cash relief was not really enough to meet the minimum costs of living; this was evidenced by the fact that, although at this time there were virtually no black market or other sources of food, and though the ration of 1,850 calories was hardly luxurious, a significant proportion of the ration was not purchased.

Distribution of food, petroleum products, and clothing and footwear was carried out by BMA's Controller of Civil Supplies, through carefully chosen wholesalers and retailers, at prices fixed by BMA in consultation with the Mission. A system of ration cards was established by BMA and remained in force throughout the period; it is to the credit of BMA that the system worked effectively and that serious abuses never developed despite the growing stringency.

The Mission took over the administration of the cash relief system in Rhodes and extended it to the other islands. The proceeds of sale were the sources of the cash, and thus a large proportion of the proceeds was being spent continuously throughout the program.

With the installation of UNRRA welfare officers in the smaller islands, and with the agreement of the Central Relief Committee (rep-

[25] Monograph, Wankowicz, "Historical Record of the UNRRA Dodecanese Mission," pp. 31–32.

[26] *Ibid.*

resenting the Greek, Italian, Turkish, Armenian, and Jewish communities) in Rhodes, Relief Subcommittees were established in the Islands in January 1946. The registration and determination of eligibility for cash relief and a large part of the administration of the system were undertaken by the UNRRA welfare officers with the coöperation of BMA, the Relief Subcommittees, and the mayors and other local government authorities. The cash relief system, while admirably suited to meet the immediate needs after liberation, inevitably had a demoralizing effect by developing what might be called a "relief economy." From every point of view it was preferable to make people work for the relief supplies rather than to distribute them free and thereby encourage the indolent and demoralize those willing to work. By combining both relief and rehabilitation, work relief through the public works program became one of the most important activities of the Mission.

Starting from a conference held with BMA on 7 December 1945, a program of public works was undertaken, including repairs to essential roads; repairs to bomb-damaged houses for the accommodation of the homeless; repairs to bomb-damaged schools, hospitals, and other essential buildings; repairs to drainage systems, public baths, and other sanitary and public health facilities. The actual work was carried out by BMA's Department of Public Works, and UNRRA provided a large proportion of the imported materials needed and supplied from its proceeds of sale the local currency required for the payment of labor (work relief) and for the purchase of local supplies.

By January 1946 the rate of cash relief was altered to 450 lire per month for adults and 300 lire for children in order to meet the increase in the price of the basic ration. Later, in May 1946, following the reduction in the ration due to the unfortunate diminution in supplies and the consequent drop in revenue from sales, the rates were cut to 300 lire per month for adults and 150 lire for children.[27]

As a continuation of the Friends' Ambulance Unit's supplementary feeding program the Mission developed a free milk distribution sys-

[27] This rate was irreducible, as will be seen from the following table, and remained in force from then on:

	Lire
Cost of basic monthly ration (1,200 calories)	236
Amount available for supplementary food items, rent, etc.	64
Total monthly allotment (adult)	300

tem. Because of the limited supplies available, UNRRA-sponsored distribution centers were established first in the two most needy islands—Rhodes and Lero. Free issues of 250 centimeters of reconstituted [28] milk were made initially to children up to four years of age, plus pregnant women and special medical cases. Later, as supplies improved, the scheme was extended to all the islands and to cover children up to six years of age. In all, some 12,000 children, about 1,000 pregnant women, and 1,000 special medical cases were given this supplementary feeding until the end of the Mission. Through the Dodecanese Welfare Association (DWA) this program has become a permanent feature of the newborn social services in these Islands.

The Dodecanese Islanders are almost wholly dependent on imports for clothing and footwear supplies, and their need was indeed desperate at the time of liberation. The principal contribution of UNRRA in this field was the supply of secondhand clothing and repaired shoes, the former obtained largely from contributed clothing drives in the United States and Canada, and from the Greek War Relief. By May 1946, 75 per cent of the population had received a first free issue of clothing.[29] From a bulk store in Rhodes employing more than fifty people on sorting, repairing, reconditioning, baling, and dispatching to the Islands the clothing went to the Committee set up in each island for the purpose of determining, with the UNRRA welfare officer, individual entitlement and local distribution.[30]

UNRRA's main contribution to the health of the Dodecanese Islanders was the assuring of a ration which, though meager, prevented starvation. When UNRRA withdrew, the most urgent health need was still the assurance of a balanced and adequate diet.

In addition, UNRRA provided medical supplies (about $60,000 worth from the Balkan Stockpile and $100,000 worth from a stockpile in Rhodesia), seven forty-bed hospital units, and a portable X-ray apparatus; and the four existing hospitals were rehabilitated through

[28] "Reconstituted" milk is powdered milk already mixed with water and ready for drinking. The practice of distributing reconstituted milk was followed in order to insure that the milk would be drunk by the person for whom it was intended and to avoid any possibility of its being bartered or sold.

[29] Monthly Report, May 1946.

[30] Monograph, Wankowicz, "Historical Record of the UNRRA Dodecanese Mission," pp. 34–35.

the public works program.[31] A system was also developed whereby paupers and other indigent people unable to pay for medical attention and hospital fees received treatment which was financed from the proceeds of sale. This extension of cash relief provided the best medical attention available for people who would otherwise have been unable to receive treatment in the absence of any government medical service.

Other than Italians waiting to return to Italy, who were the responsibility of BMA, there were few foreign displaced persons on the Islands. UNRRA took over two camps in Rhodes where bombed-out Islanders were accommodated until housing and transportation home could be found for them. These camps were also used as transit accommodations for the 12,000 Dodecanesians who returned from the Middle East and other places.

The difficulties of the farmers and fishermen were aggravated by the absence of any effective banking or other arrangements for providing credit to finance the purchase of seed, pesticides, and equipment. Therefore, from the spring of 1946, through the Relief Subcommittees, loans from the proceeds of sale were made to farmers and fishermen,[32] and this system developed so successfully that in the final distribution of the proceeds of sale, provision was made for its continuation by DWA.[33]

The artificial rate of exchange of 400 lire to the BMA pound deterred remittances from abroad and prevented any significant resumption of trade with Turkey and other neighboring countries, although barter transactions encouraged by BMA did result in some small imports of rice and other foodstuffs.[34] So long as the Islands remained under BMA government this artificial rate of exchange did help considerably in combating inflation, but at the cost of their virtual economic isolation from the rest of the world. BMA's financial policy resulted, therefore, in the suppression rather than the prevention of inflation, and, consequently, when the Islands resumed commercial relations with the world, the unavoidable adjustments were correspondingly severe and painful.

[31] OAP 15, *UNRRA Assistance to the Dodecanese*, p. 18.
[32] Monthly Report, April 1946.
[33] CC(48)2, "Final Report on Proceeds of Sale," pp. 84–85.
[34] Monthly Report, September 1946.

5. *THE DODECANESE WELFARE ASSOCIATION*

Probably the most permanent result of UNRRA's assistance to the Dodecanese Islands is DWA. The method adopted by the Mission of entrusting the administration of UNRRA's relief activities to UNRRA-sponsored Relief Subcommittees in each island brought about a system of close coöperation between the population and the Mission. As the Mission staff was reduced during the second half of 1946, responsibility was increasingly transferred to these Subcommittees, and the evident need for a more permanent and continuing organization led to the establishment—largely inspired by Wankowicz—in November 1946 of DWA.[35]

Following the first meeting of the DWA Executive Council in that month the Association organized itself to start operating by the time the Mission withdrew at the end of January 1947. Staff was appointed, arrangements were made with the various municipalities and other local government bodies, and DWA became legally incorporated. By the end of January 1947 DWA was ready to fall heir to the residual proceeds of the sale of UNRRA supplies and, by the agreement made between the Mission and BMA on 31 January 1947, 49,200,000 lire were allotted to DWA; in March this was increased by a further 16,400,000 lire.[36] It was also agreed that any further balance of proceeds of sale, then estimated at not less than 32,000,000 lire, would be allotted by BMA, in consultation with DWA, for relief and rehabilitation purposes.[37]

Financially well endowed, imbued with the spirit of UNRRA relief methods, DWA soon became a going concern representing in a practical manner the newly awakened social conscience of the Islands, and it lived and grew in strength through the remaining period of BMA government, through the period of temporary Greek military government, and still remains as an important social instrument under the permanent Greek regime established in the Islands in March 1948.

Despite the substantial aid [38] given by the Administration and the good use to which BMA and UNRRA put the funds and supplies available, it cannot be claimed that the Dodecanese were left eco-

[35] Monthly Report, November 1946, pp. 4–5.
[36] CC(48)2, "Final Report on Proceeds of Sale," pp. 84–85.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] At $34.60 per capita it was second only to Greece.

nomically self-supporting. UNRRA came to the Islands when, although their desperate situation on liberation had been relieved to some extent by BMA, they were still in a hopeless condition. For nearly two years thereafter UNRRA supplies kept the Islands going—no mean achievement. UNRRA, moreover, in coöperation with BMA, was able to develop welfare services and a program of public works and agricultural and fisheries rehabilitation which, though inadequate, provided immediate work and some hope for the future. Furthermore, through DWA, the aid UNRRA brought is still continuing as a reminder of the international assistance which came to the Islands at a time of great need.

XI. Ethiopia

THE WORK of UNRRA in Ethiopia was concentrated on the development of training projects in health, welfare, and agricultural rehabilitation, and the supplies provided were for the most part related to these. Although the program for Ethiopia was the smallest next to that for San Marino—1,551 long tons valued at $884,900 [1]—the size of the program is not a true measure of the contribution made by UNRRA.

Since Ethiopia had been one of the first battlefields of World War II and had suffered six years of Italian occupation until liberation by British forces in 1941, it fell without question into the category of United Nations eligible for UNRRA aid. The Ethiopian Minister to the United States, Blatta Ephren Tewelde Medhen, in his initial discussions with UNRRA Headquarters in the summer of 1944, stated as his country's most pressing needs the care and education of Ethiopian youth, particularly the thousands of boys made homeless during the Italian invasion; assistance to agricultural workers driven from their lands in the course of the war; and the provision of agricultural tools, fertilizers, and insecticides.[2] An exploratory UNRRA Mission of four specialists in health, welfare, and agricultural and industrial rehabilitation was sent into the country in December 1944, commissioned to investigate in particular the first two of the Ethiopian Minister's proposals.[3] Dr. Alfred L. Frechette, the Mission Chief, recommended, in addition to these projects, services and supplies for rehabilitation of agriculture and of transportation, and a medical program, at an estimated total cost of $3 million.[4] Since he was obliged to return to the United

[1] This figure does not include some $300,000 worth of items secured from surpluses through the Middle East Office; see below.

[2] Memo, Mieczyslaw Sokolowski (Financial Adviser) reporting conference with Blatta Ephren and the Governor of State Bank of Ethiopia, 29 July 1944; notes, meeting John J. Corson (Deputy Director General, Finance and Administration), George Xanthaky (Bureau of Areas), and Sokolowski with Blatta Ephren, 17 August 1944; letter, Lehman to Blatta Ephren, 6 October 1944.

[3] Letter, Director General to Alfred L. Frechette (Chief, Ethiopia Mission), [early November 1944].

[4] Frechette, "Report of First UNRRA Mission," 15 February 1945.

States after a stay of less than three weeks, his report was, however, of necessity based largely on the conclusions of others, notably the United States FEA Mission in Ethiopia, headed by Perry Fellows.

Lehman at first gave his assent to this plan,[5] but disquieting contrary advice at once began to arrive from Colonel H. Van Zile Hyde, Chief of the UNRRA Middle East Office in Cairo, Senior Deputy Director General Jackson, and Hendrickson then on tour of the Mediterranean regions, Gerard Price, member of the UNRRA exploratory Mission who had remained in Ethiopia some three months longer than his Chief, and other UNRRA staff in the Middle East.[6] Their combined opinions served to point out the difficulties of a supply operation in Ethiopia, already experienced personally by Jackson in his efforts, as head of the Middle East Supply Center, to provide supplies to that country during the war. Both the conditions within Ethiopia and the political difficulties seemed to them well-nigh insuperable. The Italians, during their period of occupation, had systematically exterminated the few Ethiopians who, with the encouragement of Emperor Haile Selassie, had secured advanced education abroad. The people, generally regarded as among the least advanced in all Africa, were therefore left with no leaders except the Emperor and his immediate entourage who had lived out the war in exile. This deficiency was to some degree hopefully remedied by the presence under treaty proviso of a British adviser in each ministry and a British Military Mission, along with a few councilors of other nationalities, and foreign voluntary agency personnel engaged in health and welfare projects.[7] Ethiopian official circles, however, manifested a deep distrust of outsiders, bred of past foreign invasions, and a strong desire to run the country themselves without external interference. These attitudes, while readily understandable, made effective provision of outside assistance, however actuated by humanitarian motives, exceedingly difficult.

The plan for rehabilitation of transportation the UNRRA Middle East experts rejected as impracticable in view of the fact that the mechanical equipment brought into the country by the Italians and the roads which they had constructed during the occupation were

[5] Memo, Kenneth Dayton (Treasurer) to Corrington Gill (Deputy Director General, Finance and Administration), 29 March 1945.

[6] Cables: Cairo to Washington 326, 15 March 1945; Cairo to Washington 416, 30 March 1945; London to Washington 760, 12 April 1945.

[7] Americans, Swedes, and Russians.

alike falling rapidly into disrepair from lack of experienced personnel to maintain them.[8] Any attempt by UNRRA to contribute to the repair of the one single-track railroad running from Djibouti to Addis Ababa seemed to them equally unwise, especially as its control lay undetermined among the Ethiopian Government, the British Military Mission, and the French company which had built the railroad and still operated the section in French Somaliland.[9]

The most pressing need was obviously for the establishment of all branches of professional education for the youth of the country, even though the beginnings must necessarily be at an elementary level. It was clear, however, that, given the brief life allotted to UNRRA, there was no point in embarking on programs which had no promise of continuance in the post-UNRRA period. In the judgment of the UNRRA Middle East experts, a small health training program seemed the "most practical approach and one in which money [would] be least wasted." [10]

By May 1945 all members of the UNRRA exploratory Mission had been withdrawn, and the whole problem of an UNRRA program in Ethiopia lay virtually dormant until the Third Council Session in August, when the authorization of a full-scale supply program for Italy [11] brought the claims of Ethiopia again to the fore.[12] Willard Z. Park, erstwhile liaison officer with UNRRA in FEA in Washington, was appointed in the following month as Chief of Mission [13] with the expectation that, with a small staff, he would initiate a health and welfare training program.[14] A long delay followed until in November 1945 the Ethiopian Government had submitted documents on the basis of which it could be pronounced unable to pay for supplies in foreign exchange.[15]

The second UNRRA Mission arrived at Addis Ababa on 12 January 1946. At its peak in November 1946 the staff numbered nineteen Class I and eight Class II personnel.[16] Under the directive to the Mission Chief they were to

[8] Frechette, "Report of First UNRRA Mission," 15 February 1945, p. 42.
[9] Cable, Cairo to Washington 536, 3 May 1945.
[10] Cable, Cairo to Washington 326 (from Hendrickson), 15 March 1945.
[11] Resolution 73. [12] Cable, London to Washington 3193, 27 August 1945.
[13] Memo, Hendrickson to heads of bureaus and offices, 18 September 1945.
[14] Cable, Washington to London 5642, 13 October 1945.
[15] Cable, Washington to London 7330, 4 November 1945.
[16] Monthly Report, November 1946.

prepare and put into operation a program of aid and assistance to the population of Ethiopia in the provision of personnel and equipment for the training of local instructors in the fields of essential health, welfare, agricultural and other occupational services, according to the basic relief needs of that country [and also] a program of aid to homeless and other needy children, including those having medical and other needs resulting from the effects of the war.

They were, moreover, to be responsible for relations with any welfare or relief agency which might continue these activities in the country after the termination of UNRRA.[17]

The UNRRA-Ethiopian Agreement was not signed until 4 July 1946. The draft prepared at Headquarters contained, in view of conditions within the country, the unusual provision that UNRRA supplies were to remain the property of the Administration and were to be "subject to its control and supervision until consumed or furnished to the ultimate consumer or otherwise disposed of to the satisfaction of the Administration." [18] The Government was for some time hesitant lest the cost of UNRRA operations might exceed their value to Ethiopia inasmuch as no UNRRA supplies were to enter normal commercial channels and the expenses of the Mission could not, therefore, be covered by the proceeds of sale but must be provided from ordinary Government revenue. In view of the long delay in commencing operations and considering that only some $10,000 of supplies had thus far reached the country, their suspicions were understandable.[19] The Agreement was finally signed on the eve of Park's departure for a supply conference in Washington, with the reservation that the terms would come into full force only if the specific UNRRA programs to be determined at Headquarters met with the approval of the Government.[20]

Park returned in August with the sanction of the Central Committee for $700,000 in supplies for the medical, welfare, and agricultural programs; $300,000 for operational and administrative supplies for training projects; and $300,000 for purchase of surplus items previously charged to the Middle East camps.[21] Rehabilitation of

[17] Memo, Sir Humfrey Gale to Willard Z. Park, 27 November 1945.
[18] Article II, see Appendix Seven, Document *6a*.
[19] Monthly Report, May 1946.
[20] Monthly Report, June 1946; see Appendix Seven, Document *6b*.
[21] Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee (CC/P) (46)77, "Third Report of the Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee to the Central Committee,"

transportation, communications, and general education had been definitely refused.[22] On Park's assurance, based on the word of Director General LaGuardia, that "the program of operations approved by the Administration and the Central Committee will be met fully and completely," the Ethiopian Government confirmed the Agreement with UNRRA.[23]

The principal accomplishment of the second UNRRA Mission to Ethiopia was the successful inauguration of training programs for dressers [24] and sanitary inspectors. This work was subsequently transferred to the Interim Commission of the World Health Organization (WHO–IC) with specific insurance of a share in UNRRA funds, turned over by UNRRA to that organization.[25] It constituted, therefore, a small but continuing contribution to the education of Ethiopian youth in a field in which trained workers were desperately needed. In fact, when the Mission entered the country, the only Ethiopians trained in health were a nonpracticing physician, a graduate nurse, a sanitary inspector, and a few dressers who had received from Italian or British troops very elementary instruction in the care of hospital patients. These, with sixty doctors and forty graduate nurses from Sweden, Great Britain, and various foreign voluntary agencies were serving a population of twelve million in a country as large as France.[26]

The training program for dressers began on 1 July 1946 at Menelik II Hospital in Addis Ababa with twelve boys in the elementary course and twelve young men with some preliminary experience registered in a more advanced class. The program for sanitary inspectors was started a month later. Instruction was of necessity mainly by demonstration. The instructors—UNRRA and hospital staff and a volunteer from one of the foreign voluntary societies—spoke French, Italian, Greek, or English but knew little Amharic,[27] while the students spoke Amharic

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22 July 1947; Central Committee (CC) (46)85, minutes 33d meeting, 23 July 1946, p. 7 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], II, 98).

22 Monthly Report, August 1946.

23 Cable, Addis Ababa to Washington unnumbered (from Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs), 22 April 1947.

24 Dressers were male hospital aides who performed simple tasks, such as dressing wounds, bathing the patients, cleaning the wards, etc.

25 For text of Agreement, see Appendix Eight, Document 3; see also Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 2.

26 Monograph, Dr. D. A. Messinezy, "Historical Report for Health Division," p. 2.

27 The native language in the Addis Ababa region.

and a little Italian and the patients nothing but Amharic. Simple manuals were eventually translated into Amharic, but the students had such slight command of the written language that instruction and examinations had to be largely verbal. The first classes graduated in November and December. Up to that time few UNRRA supplies for these training programs had been received. The Government had provided such hospital supplies as could be found in its meager stores, but improvisation was the order of the day. Coincident with the transfer of the UNRRA medical staff to WHO–IC, at the end of the year, substantial UNRRA shipments, including supplies for the health training programs, began to arrive at Djibouti—a good omen for the further development of these projects.[28]

The greater part of the UNRRA supplies for Ethiopia did not arrive until the first half of 1947, delayed partly by the late date at which the program had been launched, partly by slowness in procurement, and again by shipping strikes in the United States in the final months of 1946. The dire forebodings earlier voiced regarding their fate once they reached Djibouti were only too completely borne out. During the months of February and March no supplies could be moved by rail from Djibouti because the railway employees were on strike. Two weeks after this had been settled one of the main railway bridges collapsed. The UNRRA Mission, already reduced in personnel, joined forces to take an inventory of such goods as had reached Addis Ababa. In the confusion, supplies were issued from UNRRA warehouses to voluntary agencies and Government ministries, sometimes without records or receipts of any description. The goods from the Middle East surpluses, mainly trucks and medical items, proved, moreover, to be in bad condition and in large measure unsuited to the needs of the UNRRA programs. The Government ministries, faced with the impending termination of UNRRA, grew more and more apprehensive that the full quota of promised supplies would not be delivered and hence increasingly suspicious and difficult to deal with, so that the Closure Officer, Anne Laughlin, sent in May 1947 to replace the Chief of Mission, had great difficulty in establishing amicable relations.[29]

[28] Monographs: Messinezy, "Historical Report for Health Division," *passim;* "Report of Nursing Section," *passim.*

[29] Monograph, Anne Laughlin, "Comments on the Closure Period of the UNRRA Mission to Ethiopia, 21 May–23 November 1947," pp. 1–4.

One of her first acts was to secure revision of Article II of the UNRRA-Ethiopian Agreement [30] so that supplies arriving at Djibouti would be at once transferred to the Government through its agent, the manager of the Ethiopian State Bank in that city. Pressure on the UNRRA staff was thereby somewhat lightened since transport into Ethiopia and warehousing until distribution became the responsibility of the Government.[31] The Mission, however, still endeavored to enforce distribution to the foreign voluntary agencies and Government departments whose institutions for homeless boys and displaced agricultural workers had been selected to receive aid through UNRRA supplies. By the end of November 1947, when the Mission closed, 60 per cent of the UNRRA supplies in Ethiopia were in the hands of their ultimate users and acceptable plans had been submitted for the distribution of the remainder.[32] Even this moderate success was achieved only by extraordinary exertions, inasmuch as the physical possession of goods spelled power in Ethiopia and the aim of each ministry was a well-filled warehouse. Humanitarian motives were little understood in that primitive society, and the distribution of supplies to the more needy provincial regions was stubbornly resisted. The UNRRA staff had one trump card, however. They represented an international agency and had, therefore, no incentive to take sides in the complex political activities of the other foreign residents of the capital.[33]

In accordance with the determination made before the second Mission entered Ethiopia, UNRRA assistance was limited, in so far as it could be controlled, only to projects likely to continue after the termination of UNRRA. Supplies and technical advice were, therefore, given to hospitals, institutions for homeless children, and agricultural training schools already established in the country either by foreign agencies or Government ministries. Supplies included trucks (sometimes used as ambulances), walking plows and other agricultural tools and equipment, welfare supplies for schools, and medical supplies and equipment for hospitals. The Mission staff and visiting UNRRA agricultural experts made surveys and recommendations on the improvement of farming methods and the development of cash

[30] See Appendix Seven, Document *6c, d.*

[31] Monograph, Laughlin, "Comments on the Closure Period of the UNRRA Mission to Ethiopia, 21 May–23 November 1947," p. 5.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 7–12.

crops such as cotton, coffee, and tobacco in place of wheat.[34] Improved varieties of seed were distributed to agricultural institutions, and the use of pesticides was demonstrated in the Emperor's orchards.[35] Assisted by UNRRA the United States Brethren Service Committee brought in some 300 purebred heifers and other livestock[36] as a start toward the improvement of the cattle which constituted the chief wealth of the agricultural population. With the arrival of a representative of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations at the end of 1947 there was hope that these initial steps in the agricultural rehabilitation of the country might be continued.

[34] For example, George A. Gillespie (Farm Machinery Expert, UNRRA Field Services Branch), "Final Report," 21 February 1947.

[35] Monthly Report, March 1947, "Report of Agricultural Rehabilitation Division."

[36] Cable, Washington to Addis Ababa 256, 14 March 1947; monograph, Laughlin, "Comments on the Closure Period of the UNRRA Mission to Ethiopia, 21 May–23 November 1947," pp. 13–16.

XII. The Northwest Europe Emergency Supply Program

THE NORTHWEST EUROPE Emergency Program, while negligible in terms of supplies, was productive of much discussion both within and outside the Administration at a time when UNRRA was not yet launched on full operations and the exact extent of its work was as yet uncertain. In the autumn of 1944 the governments of Northwest Europe were still struggling to establish themselves in their newly liberated countries, to determine their supply lines, and to clarify their status in relation to UNRRA. Although in theory these governments wished to maintain their independence of UNRRA as paying countries, they were nevertheless confronted with the necessity of meeting the really desperate conditions within their borders with more speedy assistance than they believed could be secured through the intricate and uncharted channels of aid from the Allied military authorities, allocations by the Combined Boards, and procurement through the United States and United Kingdom supply agencies. They looked to UNRRA, therefore, as a possible immediate source of clothing, food, and medical supplies, and found champions in the United Kingdom Government and ERO.

UNRRA, with the war in Europe still in progress, had not yet, of course, been able to embark on actual deliveries of supplies. As a cable of 3 November from ERO pointed out, however:

> Certain scepticism was only too evident in the liberated countries with regard to UNRRA's usefulness. . . . Populations look upon UNRRA as [a] great international relief organization in which their governments participate and created for immediate relief after liberation. The Governments feel they will be held responsible by their peoples for failure of UNRRA to live up to expectations.

ERO proposed, therefore, that the Administration, as a token of willingness and ability to provide material aid, offer to furnish limited emergency clothing, shelter, and welfare supplies for refugees and

homeless nationals up to perhaps $10–20 million per country, without regard to prior arrangements for payment or even free.[1]

The proposal was discussed in Headquarters,[2] and at length in London and Paris during the Director General's visit in November–December 1944 where the conversations focused on the relief needs of the French *sinistrés* in Normandy who had suffered the Allied invasion.[3] Hendickson remained unalterably opposed to the idea as inherently a reversion to the pre-Atlantic City concept of UNRRA as the universal middleman representing all its member governments before the allocating boards, a concept which he felt had been once and for all rejected by the governments themselves in the First Council Session.[4] Lehman, too, while admitting the psychological value of a token delivery of supplies, was convinced that the responsibility lay with the governments of the liberated countries and with the Allied military authorities who were committed to provide civilian aid to prevent disease and unrest and who, moreover, controlled shipping. He proposed, therefore, that UNRRA, while investigating possible sources of emergency supplies, await formal requests for aid from the governments of Northwest Europe.[5]

Sir Frederick Leith-Ross was, however, unwilling to let the matter rest. He accordingly enlisted the aid of members of the United Kingdom Government. At the 28 December meeting of the Technical Subcommittee on Welfare in London, Sir Arthur Rucker, a member of the Subcommittee and of the United Kingdom Ministry of Health, stressed the emergency in France, which, he pointed out, the French Government was trying to meet through voluntary agencies independent of coördination by UNRRA. The Committee chairman, A. Kunosi of Czechoslovakia, who had planned the Subcommittee

[1] Cable, London to Washington 1030, 3 November 1944.

[2] Notes, meeting of Lehman with senior staff, 9 November 1944.

[3] Administrative Council, European Regional Office (ERO), minutes of meetings, 14 and 21 November 1944; notes, discussions with Pierre Fresnay (French Minister of Prisoners and Deportees) and Hervé Alphand (French member of the Committee of the Council for Europe), 27, 28 November 1944; notes, meeting of Lehman with Raoul Dautry (French Minister of Reconstruction), 27 November 1944; notes, meeting of Lehman with Lieutenant General Sir Humfrey Gale (Chief Administrative Officer, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force), 29 November 1944; note, meeting of Lehman and UNRRA staff in Paris, 3 December 1944.

[4] Notes, meeting of Lehman with senior staff, 9 November 1944.

[5] Administrative Council, ERO, minutes of meetings, 14, 21 November 1944; note, meeting of Lehman and staff in Paris, 3 December 1944; notes, telephone call, Lehman (London) and Hendrickson, 8 December 1944.

meeting with Sir Frederick Leith-Ross,[6] added a plea for emergency supplies for displaced Czechoslovaks in France. He then yielded the floor to Sir George Rendel, of the United Kingdom Foreign Office, the United Kingdom member of the Committee of the Council for Europe but not a member of the Welfare Subcommittee, who urged that UNRRA combat the rising tide of distrust in the organization by action regardless of the "military period." [7]

At the next meeting of the Technical Subcommittee on Welfare a resolution presented by Sir Arthur Rucker was adopted, declaring "that the relief of this distress is an urgent necessity" and suggesting that "relatively small quantities of supplies . . . can be made available even though the general supply problem of the country is complicated by transport shortages, military requirements and other factors. . . . It is essential that a beginning should be made without delay." [8]

Out of heated arguments, Lehman and the majority of his advisers concluded that emergency aid to displaced persons in paying countries could be provided under existing resolutions but that supplies for citizens of a paying country could only be authorized by further action of the Council or Central Committee.[9] Pressure from London continued. The Committee of the Council for Europe on 13 February adopted the Welfare Subcommittee's resolution and sent it to the Director General for submission to the Central Committee.[10] A cable from the United Kingdom Government, passed on to Hendrickson by the United Kingdom Embassy in Washington, spoke out strongly:

> The general opinion amongst [the] British public is that UNRRA is virtually dead. His Majesty's Government are continually being asked in the House of Commons what has happened to the corpse. . . . If this general inaction taken in the face of known distress in many countries

[6] Letter, Mary Craig McGeachy (Director, Welfare Division, HQ) to Viscount Alain du Parc (Belgian member of Standing Technical Committee on Welfare), 10 April 1945, quoting letter from Kunosi.

[7] Cable, London to Washington, State Department 16 (Winant to State Department), 1 January 1945; Technical Subcommittee on Welfare for Europe (TWE/E) (44)28, minutes 5th meeting, 28 December 1944.

[8] TWE/E(45)2; TWE/E(45)3, minutes 6th meeting, 10 January 1945.

[9] Memo, L. R. Franck (Bureau of Areas) to Michail A. Menshikov (Deputy Director General, Bureau of Areas) and Victor I. Rodnov (Bureau of Areas), reporting staff meetings of 12, 13 January 1945; notes, telephone call, George S. Mooney (Executive Secretary, Secretariat, ERO) and Hugh Jackson (Deputy Director General for Regional Liaison), 25 January 1945.

[10] TWE/E(45)6; Committee of the Council for Europe (CCE) (45)18, draft minutes 10th meeting, 13 February 1945.

continues many more weeks, we shall probably be faced with a request in Parliament that money voted for UNRRA should be withdrawn and put in the hands of some more virile organization.[11]

The Administrative Council in ERO sent its Executive Secretary, George S. Mooney, by air to Washington to present the case in person.[12]

Very reluctantly, Lehman and the majority of his advisers yielded to the extent of recommending to the Central Committee a limited program of emergency supplies, with the stern reminder, however, that "we cannot go out and commandeer shipping. . . . UNRRA's activities must always be contingent upon military and political decisions of the governments of the United Nations." There was, moreover, to be no departure from the distinction between paying and nonpaying countries; the sole concession was that the supplies should not be held up while financial arrangements were being worked out.[13] Hendrickson, meantime, pointed out that UNRRA had not been ineffectual but had enabled the paying countries of Northwest Europe to purchase millions of dollars worth of supplies for which it had arranged allocation and procurement:

> The helpful job [he suggested] is to educate those who are criticizing UNRRA unjustly, [adding] I have viewed with great admiration the infinite capacity for education possessed by your associates in your Government in understanding rather complicated things like rationing, price control, and even the uses of dried eggs. Certainly UNRRA . . . offers no very serious challenge compared with those.[14]

The Central Committee on 26 February, with the exception of the United Kingdom member, evinced no enthusiasm for the project but, feeling that, in view of the action of the Committee of the Council for Europe, a negative attitude would be unfortunate, adopted a resolution permitting the provision of limited emergency relief supplies and services in any region "in which immediate distress exists" even though its government had not applied to be adjudged unable to pay,

[11] Letter, A. D. Marris (Counselor, United Kingdom Embassy, Washington) to Hendrickson, 1 February 1945.

[12] Comments, George S. Mooney, "Weaknesses of Administrative Organization of ERO," p. 7.

[13] Cable, London to Washington, State Department 1644, 15 February 1945; Central Committee (CC) (45)9, minutes 12th meeting, 26 February 1945 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], I, 100–106).

[14] Letter, Hendrickson to Marris, 14 February 1945.

the terms of payment to be decided by the Director General within the meaning of Resolution 14.[15]

The conversion of Headquarters was obviously halfhearted. Ten million dollars was allotted for the program, but responsibility for procurement was at once passed to ERO, ostensibly to save time and transportation.[16] Since the articles most needed—food, clothing, shelter materials, and medical supplies—were everywhere in short supply and especially scarce in wartime Britain, the amounts sent were, therefore, inevitably very small. An emergency stockpile of replacements was, to be sure, planned to be set up in the United States, but, through Hendrickson's failure to act, this never materialized.[17] ERO at once sent a mission to survey the emergency needs in Normandy, the Netherlands, and Belgium,[18] and even prevailed on the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, to relinquish shipping space for 100 tons a month to Belgium and the Netherlands and 50 tons to France; [19] but, although the London Office scoured the British Isles for supplies, it was unable to fill even these small allotments.[20] The potentially receiving governments were, moreover, very slow in presenting official detailed requests, partly from failure to understand the nature of the program and partly because by spring 1945 they had largely succeeded in establishing their own supply lines.[21] Delivery was for the most part made by UNRRA to the governments or the military authorities, who arranged the shipping; [22] and distribution was carried out by the Entr'Aide in France or by similar indigenous agencies in the other countries.[23]

As Lehman had warned the representatives of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway at a meeting on 1 March 1945, the supplies available were indeed extremely limited.[24] By June

[15] Central Committee, verbatim minutes 12th meeting, 26 February 1945, CC(45)9 (CC Docs., I, 100–106). See Appendix Four, Section III, Document 1.

[16] Cable, Washington to London, State Department 460, 7 March 1945.

[17] Committee of Review, minutes 22d meeting, 11 May 1945.

[18] Note, Sir Hubert Young (Welfare Division, ERO), "Emergency Relief Program," 7 April 1945.

[19] Letter, H. Jackson to Lehman, 9 March 1945.

[20] Letter, Roscoe Herbert (Supply Department, ERO) to David Weintraub (Bureau of Supply, HQ), 5 March 1945.

[21] Letter, Herbert to Jackson, 8 June 1945.

[22] Progress Report on Emergency Relief Supplies, 26 July–27 August 1945.

[23] Welfare Division, ERO, "Relief Supplies," Vol. II, Welfare Supplies—France, *passim;* Netherlands Government documents, "Some Particulars about Distribution of Relief Goods Collected by UNRRA and Sent to the Netherlands."

[24] Note, meeting of Lehman and Government representatives, 1 March 1945.

1945 Jackson was characterizing the program as almost a failure,[25] and in September the Committee of the Council for Europe declared it ended except as special requests might be received in the event of new emergencies, concluding regretfully that the effort had been "too little and too late." [26] In addition to gifts from voluntary agencies and 115,890 long tons of UNRRA contributed clothing, in the final accounting 4,458 gross long tons of food, clothing, medical supplies, and miscellaneous household goods, valued at $1,801,800, were debited to this program. Actually, however, UNRRA was paid for these supplies in local currency made available by the receiving governments for the expenses of the UNRRA recruiting and procurement missions maintained in the five countries.[27]

[25] Memo, "Points Raised by Com. Jackson in Director General's Staff Meeting," 19 June 1945.

[26] CCE(45)108; CCE(45)117, draft minutes 21st meeting, 28 September 1945.

[27] Cable, Washington to London 7667, 1 December 1945; CC(47)32; CC(47)46, minutes 50th meeting, 12 March 1947.

XIII. Finland

1. *FINLAND'S NEED*

In the winter of 1944–1945 the sparsely populated northwestern area of Finland—Finnish Lapland—was painfully reminded that even remoteness and the absence of economic prizes are not sufficient safeguards against the devastation of modern war. A condition of the armistice concluded on 19 September 1944 between Great Britain and the USSR on the one hand and Finland on the other was that the remaining German troops must be withdrawn from Finnish territory at once. The German army in Lapland, a not inconsiderable force comprising elements of nine divisions and amounting to some 200,000 men, refused to leave. It was therefore necessary for the relatively small Finnish army, already weakened by recent war, to undertake their eviction. The struggle in the darkness of the Arctic winter between the Finnish forces and the *Wehrmacht* was bitter and long—it was not until 26 April 1945 that Finnish territory was freed of German troops.

During this period of fighting the whole area of hostilities was evacuated of its civilian population. Somewhat more than 50,000 square miles (39 per cent of the total area of Finland), with a population of about 170,000, was cleared in September 1944.[1] In a generous gesture of neighborly aid,[2] Sweden took some 56,000 of the *évacués* (mostly from the western part of Lapland), and the other 114,000 were absorbed temporarily into the southern parts of Finland.[3] As military operations progressed, *évacués* were allowed to return to the southern districts of Lapland. As late as 15 June 1945, however, there were still nearly 40,000 *évacués* in southern Finland and Sweden.[4]

[1] Central Committee (CC) (45)31, report by Suomen Huolto, May 1945 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], II, 15).

[2] Sweden had already helped Finland in many ways, notably through the activities of the Relief Committee for Finnish Children which collected some six million kroner ($1,430,000) and gave approximately 50,000 Finnish children the opportunity of spending lengthy periods in Swedish homes during the war; Henrik Beer (Secretary General of the Swedish Committee for International Relief), *Sweden and Post-War Humanitarian Relief* (Washington, D.C.), p. 5.

[3] CC(45)31, Report by Suomen Huolto (CC Docs., II, 15).

[4] *Ibid.*

The conditions under which this mass evacuation of Lapland was carried out can be imagined. In a far from mild climate, without sufficient transport or other resources, this sudden trek greatly increased disease and mortality, especially among the children, the aged, and the sick. Fortunately, the most lethal epidemics were prevented, but the incidence of tuberculosis increased materially and gastroenteritis claimed many victims. The greatest need, however, became apparent when the *évacués* returned to Lapland. Not only were their homes in ashes and ruins, but their small stores of clothing, their household effects, their tools, agricultural equipment, fishing nets, and boats were all gone. These unfortunate people certainly needed help before they could start to help themselves.

On 14 August 1945 the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Karl Enckell, submitted to the Director General a formal request for assistance in the "relief and rehabilitation of the regions in Northern Finland." [5] In this same letter the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs intimated that he had discussed the matter with the Soviet chairman of the Control Commission in Finland who had advised the Finnish Government to apply directly to UNRRA and had informed him that his application would receive the support of the USSR. As justification for the request for aid, the Finnish Government enclosed a report and schedule of requirements by Suomen Huolto.[6]

When Finland's application was first considered by the Central Committee [7] on 2 November 1945, the United States delegate asked that the list of proposed supplies be made available for study because in the United States Government's view "it would be important . . . to avoid the inclusion in the Finnish requirements of any goods included in the list of reparations being demanded from Finland." [8] At the next meeting of the Central Committee, on 29 November 1945, the United States representative recommended the adoption of an emergency program similar to that undertaken in Northwest Europe fol-

[5] CC(45)31 (CC Docs., II, 11).

[6] A relief and welfare agency, Suomen Huolto is largely dependent on voluntary contributions but operates under the aegis and general supervision of the Government.

[7] Abraham H. Feller (General Counsel, HQ) explained to the meeting (see CC(45)35, minutes 17th meeting, 2 November 1945 [CC Docs., II, 33]) that the Central Committee was "empowered to act, if it so wished, for the Council upon matters which were judged to be of an emergency character . . . although [in accordance with Council Resolution 1, I, paragraph 3] the giving of relief to an ex-enemy country was an issue which had hitherto been acted on only by the Council."

[8] CC(45)35, minutes 17th meeting, 2 November 1945 (CC Docs., II, 34).

lowing the Central Committee's unanimous resolution of 26 February 1945.[9] He also proposed that the program be limited to $2,500,000 landed cost. Vlas Andreevich Klentsov (USSR representative) suggested that no precise limit be set on the size of the program, but the Director General felt that the Administration's financial position did not warrant such open-end commitments, and the United States proposal was accordingly adopted.[10]

On 18 December 1945 the Director General addressed a letter to the Finnish Minister to the United States informing him of the action of the Central Committee. The Government of Finland confirmed its acceptance of aid, subject to the terms of UNRRA principles and practice, in a reply dated 11 January 1946 from the Minister to the Director General. This exchange of letters served in lieu of an agreement to regulate the relations between the Government of Finland and the Administration.[11]

2. *THE MISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT*

Corresponding with the small volume and scope of UNRRA aid to Finland, the UNRRA Mission sent to that country was small. Irving J. Fasteau, an American citizen and a graduate of the New York School of Social Work, with previous experience in the United States Social Security Board and in UNRRA's Italy and Yugoslavia Missions, was Chief of the Mission for the whole time. He was assisted by two observers and an administrative assistant, plus a locally recruited staff [12] never exceeding seven in number. Mission Headquarters was established at Helsinki, and one observer was stationed at Oulu and the other at Rovaniemi. By means of written reports to the Chief of Mission and frequent visits to Mission Headquarters at Helsinki, the observers were able to watch and evaluate the progress of the program and at the same time offer useful suggestions and advice.

The Finnish Ministry of Supply was the authority within the Government of Finland responsible for determining requirements, for arranging shipment, for reception and warehousing of supplies, and for their internal transportation and distribution. It was also re-

[9] CC(45)9, minutes 12th meeting, 26 February 1945 (CC Docs., I, 104).
[10] CC(45)38, minutes 18th meeting, 29 November 1945 (CC Docs., II, 44).
[11] Appendix Seven, Document 8, Document *7a, b*.
[12] At the request of the Mission Chief, these were employed only after screening as to suitability by the UNRRA Committee of the (Finnish) Ministry of Supply.

sponsible for the collection of the funds accruing from sale of UNRRA supplies. To discharge these functions, the Ministry created the UNRRA Committee of the Ministry of Supply on which were represented all the other ministries of the Government (with the exception of the Ministry of War) and Suomen Huolto. In addition, technical and other specialists, together with local representatives from the two Lapp provinces, were called in whenever necessary. The Chief of Mission was also frequently requested to attend meetings of the UNRRA Committee; indeed, some of the meetings were convened at his request.

The control and utilization of the proceeds of sale of UNRRA supplies were the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry delegated this responsibility to the Foreign Relief Control Board consisting of the Minister of Supply, the two Ministers of Social Welfare (one of whom was chairman of the Board), the Minister of Agriculture, and the Minister of Transport and Public Works, plus the chairman of Suomen Huolto and a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Director of Suomen Huolto served as Executive Secretary of the Board.

Perhaps the best evidence of the good relations between the Mission and the Government lies in the fact that relationships between the two are hardly ever mentioned in the Mission Reports and never became a problem. The Government on the one hand and the Mission on the other did not constitute two "sides"; they tackled the problems together.

The Public Relations Officer at the Ministry of Supply assisted the Mission in obtaining publicity through the press and radio. UNRRA activities always received good coverage in this way, and with the exception of two or three complaints [13] made by individuals concerning the distribution of clothing and blankets, there was never anything but praise for the Mission in the Finnish press.

Friendly relations were maintained with the United States and United Kingdom Legations, both of which allowed the Mission to make use of their diplomatic couriers to Washington and London and

[13] These complaints in the press were vigorously investigated by the Ministry of Supply, the provincial administration, and the Mission itself, and the findings of these investigations were published in the press immediately. This had the salutary effect of disposing of the complaints and at the same time showing that the distribution of UNRRA supplies was being carefully supervised and observed.

assisted the Mission in any way they could. Unfortunately, however, the efforts to establish similar relations with the Soviet Legation to Finland met with no response.[14]

In Finland UNRRA was not, as it was in most other assisted countries, the major contributor of foreign relief and rehabilitation aid. Several foreign relief agencies—some with programs of greater money value than UNRRA's—were already operating in Finland before UNRRA decided to give aid. Outstanding among those giving help to Finland was the Swedish Committee for International Relief, the agency responsible for the foreign relief activities of the Swedish Government. In the period 1 January 1944 to 1 May 1946 Finland got over 12 million kronor [15] ($2,850,000) from this source; during this same period Swedish voluntary funds provided no less than 120 million kronor ($28,560,000), not including the costs of maintaining refugees and children in Sweden, for aid to Finland; and Swedish Government credits of 312 million kronor ($74,280,000) played a large part in the reconstruction of Finland and the rehabilitation of its foreign trade.[16]

The Don Suisse [17] with a program of 4,129,750 Swiss francs [18] (nearly $1 million), the Lutheran Church of the United States of America with about $1 million, the American Red Cross with $459,000,[19] and the American Friends Service Committee were among the many others already helping Finland when UNRRA arrived on the scene. The importance of coördinating the work of these agencies was appreciated from the start. The Chief of Mission had a preliminary meeting with the President's War Relief Control Board before leaving Washington, and shortly after arriving in Finland he arranged for a conference with representatives of the various foreign relief agencies

[14] The Chief of Mission made several unsuccessful efforts to establish contact with the Soviet Minister. An attempt was also made through one of the observers who happened to be a Soviet citizen, but to no avail; monograph, Irving J. Fasteau, "UNRRA Mission to Finland," p. 19.

[15] The rate of exchange then current was 4.2 Swedish kronor to the U.S. dollar.

[16] Swedish Embassy, Washington, D.C.

[17] The Don Suisse was organized in 1944 under the aegis of the Swiss Government, which gave an initial donation of 100 million Swiss francs (nearly $25 million); this was supplemented on a generous scale by voluntary contributions from all sections of the population. Its function was to assist victims of the war, and it operated in eighteen European countries.

[18] Legation of Switzerland, Washington, D.C.

[19] American Red Cross National Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

operating in Finland.[20] The program of each agency was presented and it was decided to continue the exchange of information regarding operations and plans. Several meetings were held subsequently as a result of which changes were made when necessary in the various programs to prevent overlapping or—equally important—to avoid overlooking any particular group or area. Since, by the terms of the Central Committee's decision, the UNRRA program was restricted to Lapland,[21] the general tendency was for the other agencies operating in Finland to leave that region to UNRRA and to concentrate on the other areas.

3. *THE SUPPLY PROGRAM*

As soon as the Central Committee had approved aid for Finland at the end of November 1945, the Bureau of Supply at Headquarters entered into active negotiation with the Finnish Legation in Washington regarding the program of relief supplies to be sent to Finland, on the basis of the list of requirements[22] submitted with Finland's original request for aid.

The Mission found a well-organized distribution system already operating through controlled commercial channels consisting of wholesale distributing companies and large coöperatives, with branches and retail stores covering the Lapland area. The price-fixing organization, which had been functioning for more than six years, was well established and effective, and the majority of the people had sufficient money for the purchase of essential requirements.

Clothing and footwear ($1,386,000; 407 gross long tons), the supply of which was regarded by the Finnish Government as the most urgent requirement for the population of Lapland, constituted over half the value of the UNRRA program and consisted mostly of finished garments including such useful items as men's sheepskin mackinaws, children's fur-lined jackets and coats, and heavy winter underwear. Although in certain cases—notably, 100,000 pairs of men's shorts[23]—items unsuitable for the climate were provided, the provision of garments rather than cloth enabled the supplies to reach the users more

[20] Monograph, Fasteau, "UNRRA Mission to Finland," p. 20.
[21] Subject to the later relaxation referred to in Section 3 below.
[22] CC(45)31 (CC Docs., II, 11).
[23] Monograph, Fasteau, "UNRRA Mission to Finland," p. 25.

quickly than if they had had to be processed in Finland. In fact, most of the clothing was distributed when it was most needed, before winter came in 1946.

The programmed clothing was supplemented by contributed clothing amounting to 470 tons and valued at $1,050,000. Over 90 per cent proved very useful, and arrangements were made to hand over unsuitable items to commercial firms in exchange for an agreed value of items such as traveling bags and suitable hats, which were then distributed in Lapland.[24] In this way the usual criticism of contributed clothing in receiving countries was avoided as the recipients got only articles which they could really use.

The distribution of the contributed clothing was carried out by Suomen Huolto through its member agencies and township committees. These committees received applications, assessed needs, and then made allocations of clothing to individual families. The committees represented all political factions, the churches, and various local organizations. Close observation of the Mission staff confirmed that, although they made occasional errors of judgment, they carried out to the full the nondiscriminatory UNRRA policy on distribution. The distribution of noncontributed textiles and footwear began on 1 September 1946 through the retail stores and coöperatives, in much the same way as the distribution of food, against special UNRRA ration cards issued to certified residents of the Lapland area.

The UNRRA clothing program enabled inhabitants of Finnish Lapland to face the winter of 1946 with adequate clothing, except for certain deficiencies in footwear and infants' wear. A sufficient number of sorely needed blankets had also been provided although, of course, more could have been used. There was an apparent anomaly in the fact that although the supplies of clothing were not sufficient to meet all the needs of Lapland, some of the supplies were distributed in areas outside Lapland. There were inevitable surpluses of certain types of garments among the contributed supplies, and to have insisted rigidly upon their being distributed in Lapland would probably have brought about their appearance on the black market. A ruling [25] was therefore obtained from Headquarters that, although UNRRA aid was primarily intended for the Lapland area, supplies "acutely needed" could

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[25] Cable, Washington to Helsinki 7, 23 April 1946.

be distributed to other parts of Finland if they could be spared from Lapland. On the basis of this ruling, a proportion of the contributed clothing was distributed, through Suomen Huolto (on the same basis as applied in Lapland), in other parts of Finland.

The Government decided that in agricultural rehabilitation UNRRA should concentrate on providing fish-net twine, rope, and boat nails which would serve to rehabilitate the important fishing industry, plus hand tools, and a small quantity of agricultural machinery. Although fertilizers were not included in the original program, delays in the delivery of other agricultural rehabilitation supplies gave an opportunity for a revision of the program to include a substantial amount ($103,500; 2,460 gross long tons) of nitrogenous fertilizer, most of which was supplied from Norway.

With most of the boats on which Lapland relied for communications and transport destroyed, with the railways completely disrupted, there was an urgent need for motor transport to enable the devastated area to be opened up. It was estimated by Suomen Huolto that "at least 600 motor trucks would absolutely be needed." [26] UNRRA actually provided 101 three-quarter and one-and-a-half-ton trucks, and these were invaluable. Evidence of the desperate need for them and the good use to which they were put can be found in the fact that they were working most of the time for twenty-four hours a day with shifts of drivers. Fortunately, the trucks were among the first supplies to reach Finland and were thus available for the internal transportation of later arrivals.

The Government, with the agreement of the Mission, sold the trucks in the spring of 1946 to coöperative agencies and to private transport organizations on the following conditions: that the trucks be used exclusively for essential transport services in Finnish Lapland; that the trucks be used exclusively for such services for a minimum of two years; and that each truck be marked clearly and prominently with a sign indicating that it had been provided by UNRRA.[27]

By supplying saws, hammers, and the all-important nails, UNRRA was able to make a substantial contribution to the reconstruction of buildings in Lapland. Once they were given the tools, there was no need

[26] CC(45)31 (CC Docs., II, 17).

[27] Finland Mission, "Final Report on Distribution of UNRRA Supplies," 31 January 1947, p. 14.

to urge the Finns to finish the job. When the handles of 5,000 hammers were burnt in a warehouse fire they were quickly replaced from local sources and the hammers put to work without delay.

Penicillin, insulin, and diphtheria antitoxin, together with a large variety of other raw and finished drugs, were supplied to a total value of $56,000. These were distributed through the Government medical services, mainly in Lapland but also in other parts of Finland. It was estimated that the UNRRA contribution provided the Lapland area with the essential supplies needed for a period of nine to twelve months.[28]

The program included shipping costs, which were tentatively and conservatively estimated by UNRRA Headquarters for the original program at $400,000.[29] The Finnish Government, however, elected to take the full program in supplies and make its own arrangements for shipping. It is estimated that the cost to the Government was about $250,000, including the cost of insurance and warehousing at the ports of loading. This saving was in no small part due to the change in program by which nearly half the tonnage consisted of nitrogenous fertilizer brought from near-by Norway.

Some twenty-two ships brought UNRRA supplies to Finland, mostly to the port of Helsinki. The port of Åbo also received several cargoes, and the port of Oulo was used for the fertilizer from Norway. The Finnish Government took title to supplies at the port of loading and gave the necessary receipts and clearances to the Administration there rather than at the Finnish port of receipt. The Mission received copies of these receipts and was saved a great deal of work and much expense since it did not have to arrange for transfer of title in Finland.

There was only one serious mishap involving UNRRA cargo for Finland, when the S.S. "Lord Delaware," carrying about $800,000 worth of textiles and clothing, struck a mine off the coast of Denmark and had to be run aground near Copenhagen. Happily, however, only about 25 per cent of the UNRRA cargo was damaged, and most of this was eventually salvaged.[30]

The reception and warehousing of UNRRA supplies were excel-

[28] Monograph, Fasteau, "UNRRA Mission to Finland," p. 44.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[30] Finland Mission, "Final Report on Distribution of UNRRA Supplies," 31 January 1947, pp. 8–9.

lent. The only known loss was of 147 pairs of shoes.[31] For the handling of medical supplies, pharmacists supervised the off-loading and arranged their immediate removal to warehouses where they could be kept under proper conditions.

On 3 July 1946 the Government of Finland addressed a "request for further assistance from the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration for the relief of the devastated regions in Northern Finland." [32] This request was accompanied by a draft program of suggested additional supplies amounting to a further $2,500,000. The largest item ($500,000) was for agricultural machinery and equipment, and the other principal items were transportation, earth-moving machinery, and building materials. This request came at a time when the Administration's resources were already committed [33] and, though viewed sympathetically, it was never approved.[34]

Imported food was an essential requirement. Although there was no actual starvation, there was undernourishment, and it was evident that the food ration could not be maintained without external aid. Under the 1945 and 1946 Trade Agreements between Finland and the USSR, the latter undertook to supply sufficient grain to maintain the bread ration.[35] UNRRA supplies of sugar (818 tons) and fats (556 tons) balanced the ration and were used as a basis of the special child-feeding program and for distribution to other vulnerable categories.[36]

At an early date the Mission drew the attention of the Finnish Government to the special needs of children. A school feeding program throughout the country had already been established by legislation some years before, but, although the program existed on paper, it had not been possible to implement it in most parts of the country because of the lack of food and, where it was being put into execution, the meals served consisted of a meager supply of bread and potato soup. The equipment and organization, however, were there ready to hand, and the Government willingly acceded to the Mission's proposals and reserved for this program approximately 10 per cent of the wheat and

[31] Monograph, Fasteau, "UNRRA Mission to Finland," p. 31.

[32] Letter, Olavi Munkki (Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Finnish Legation, Washington, D.C.) to LaGuardia, 3 July 1946.

[33] See Part Three, Chapter II, Section 10.

[34] CC(46)107, minutes 38th meeting, 18 October 1946 (CC Docs., IV, 63).

[35] Operational Analysis Papers (OAP) 5, *UNRRA Aid to Finland* (London, 1946), p. 7.

[36] Monograph, Fasteau, "UNRRA Mission to Finland," p. 39.

edible fats and 5 per cent of the sugar provided by UNRRA. This sufficed for one hot meal per day for the total school and preschool population in Lapland, and some 50,000 children were given this valuable supplementary diet for seven months.[37]

Prices for UNRRA supplies were fixed by the Ministry of Supply, and the Government received payment for these supplies from the wholesalers and coöperatives at the time of delivery. A very small allowance was made for distribution expenses and profit—a smaller percentage than is normally allowed for such purposes—and the net proceeds were placed in a separate account to await disposal by the Foreign Relief Control Board.

Although the lack of supplies rather than the lack of money was the main cause of hardship, there were, of course, resourceless and indigent people who lacked money to obtain the supplies even at the low, controlled prices. To meet the needs of these people, a system was adopted whereby Suomen Huolto issued so-called "purchase certificates" [38] to war widows and their families, invalids, families with four or more children, persons rebuilding their homes, persons reestablishing themselves on the land, and others not able to support themselves.[39] These certificates were used in lieu of money for the purchase of supplies in stores and coöperatives and were then redeemed by Suomen Huolto which, in turn, was reimbursed by the Foreign Relief Control Board out of the proceeds of sale of UNRRA supplies.

For a population living in the sunless Arctic winters of Lapland, it is very important to fortify the vitamin A and C intake, especially among children and pregnant women and nursing mothers. The 54 tons of cod-liver oil provided by UNRRA were distributed as a daily ration, through maternity and child welfare centers, school kitchens, children's hospitals, welfare institutions, and pharmacies, to some 65,000 children and pregnant women and nursing mothers, from 1 November 1946 through April 1947, free of charge.[40]

[37] OAP 5, *UNRRA Aid to Finland*, p. 8.

[38] The value of certificates issued was nearly 29 million Finnmarks (approximately $215,000).

[39] Memo, Fasteau to Charles H. Alspach (Acting Director, Repatriation and Welfare Division, HQ), "Welfare Services Provided with UNRRA Resources," 30 September 1946.

[40] Finland Mission, "Final Report on Distribution of UNRRA Supplies," 31 January 1947, pp. 5–6.

4. *PROCEEDS OF SALE*

The exchange of letters between the Director General and the Finnish Minister to the United States made no special mention of the disposal of the proceeds of sale, but by June 1946 the question had arisen in Helsinki as to whether these proceeds could be used only for relief and rehabilitation projects in the Lapland area or whether they could be applied to the whole of Finland. In response to a request for a ruling on this point, Headquarters indicated that, if the expenditures of the Finnish Government for relief and rehabilitation in Lapland exceeded the total anticipated proceeds of sale of UNRRA supplies, the use of these proceeds need not be subject to control by UNRRA.[41] As the Finnish Government had allocated over two billion Finnmarks for relief and rehabilitation in Lapland, a sum far in excess of the anticipated proceeds of sale of UNRRA supplies, this ruling left it to the Foreign Relief Control Board to determine the use of these proceeds and to apply them to any part of Finland. Nevertheless, the Board decided that it would be in the spirit of the Agreement with UNRRA to spend the money in Lapland and invited the Chief of Mission to assist the Board in evaluating and selecting the projects to be financed by this fund.

All UNRRA supplies, from clothing to buckets, were labeled by the Government with the letters "U.N.R.R.A." and the statement, "The funds received from the sale of supplies will be used by the Finnish Government for social relief and rehabilitation." [42] Newspaper and radio publicity was given to the establishment of the fund being accumulated from the proceeds of sale, and local authorities and organizations of all kinds were requested by the Government to study the needs of their communities and present projects for consideration by the Foreign Relief Control Board.[43] There was an enthusiastic response, and an invaluable stimulus was given to community organizations and planning, though, of course, many of the projects suggested could not be financed from the proceeds of sale.[44]

[41] Cable, Washington to Helsinki 31, 13 June 1946.
[42] Monograph, Fasteau, "UNRRA Mission to Finland," p. 40.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 41.
[44] See Part Four, Chapter IV, Section 5; CC(48)2, memo, Director General to Central Committee, "Final Report on Proceeds of Sale," 15 January 1948, pp. 27–29, Appendix VI, for final arrangements and agreed uses.

Although in money value one of the smallest, the Administration's program of aid to Finland, carried out with the full and active co-operation of the Finnish Government, had a considerable effect in assisting Finnish Lapland to recover from the legacy of war. UNRRA did not purport to do more than give Finland emergency relief for the alleviation of immediate distress. In fact, however, the aid given by UNRRA was a substantial contribution not only to the relief but also to the rehabilitation of the areas devastated as a result of the fighting with the German Army.

XIV. Hungary

HUNGARY, having sided with the Axis, fell within the category of ex-enemy nations. An insurrection against the Nazis early in 1944 had, however, resulted in German occupation. In January 1945 a provisional government set up in the liberated sector of Hungary signed an armistice with the Allies, although Budapest, still occupied by the Germans, withstood besieging Soviet forces for seven weeks, capitulating only in mid-February. News of the desperate plight of the Jews within Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, who had suffered Nazi-inspired persecution, had been reaching the UNRRA Administration during the winter of 1944–1945. Since UNRRA was authorized to give aid to ex-enemy countries in the control of epidemics and for the assistance of "persecutees" and United Nations nationals,[1] an offer of help was made by the Administration to the Allied Control Commission (USSR, United Kingdom, United States) in Hungary as soon as it took charge in March 1945.[2] This was promptly refused on the grounds of "no necessity." [3] Opposition on the part of the Soviet element of the Allied Control Commission to assistance from UNRRA continued for some months.[4]

In November 1945 the first postwar general election in Hungary resulted in the victory of the Small Landholders Party over the Communists and the formation of a Provisional Coalition Government, which was promptly given provisional recognition by the United States and the United Kingdom. The new Government faced a difficult task. The country had been rigorously exploited during the year that it had been under direct German control; and in the subsequent Soviet

[1] Resolution 57.

[2] Cable, Washington to Moscow unnumbered, 3 April 1945, sent to Moscow through United States Department of State as the best available route. A letter and cable also went out from European Regional Office (ERO); see memo of conversation, Carl B. Spaeth (Diplomatic Adviser's Office) with Cavendish Cannon (United States Department of State), 4 April 1945.

[3] Telephone conversation, Hugh Jackson (Deputy Director General for Regional Liaison, then in London) and Lehman, 5 April 1945.

[4] Letter, A. Matagne (Public Relations Officer, Paris) to Morse H. Salisbury (Director, Public Information Division, HQ), 9 November 1945.

invasion the capital had suffered heavily from bombing and street fighting. Agriculture, which was the mainstay of the Hungarian economy, had been seriously disrupted by the drafting of workers into the army and their subsequent scattering as prisoners of war and refugees, by the abrupt shift early in 1945 from feudal estates to small individual landholdings, and by the loss of livestock. Transportation was almost at a standstill, and Pest, the industrial part of the capital, was cut off from the principal agricultural regions by the destruction of key bridges. A dangerous currency inflation was mounting rapidly.

Appeals for UNRRA aid in clothing, food, and medical supplies began to pour in from Hungarian relief organizations in the United States and the United Kingdom and from members of the United States Congress,[5] then involved in the crucial debates on further appropriations to UNRRA. Appeals also came from the new Hungarian Government itself, through the hands of the Hungarian delegation to the International Labor Office Conference in Paris,[6] ERO,[7] and to the United States War and State Departments.[8]

By 20 December 1945 the United States Government was reported to be considering an approach to the Central Committee for authorization of a limited UNRRA program beyond that possible under Resolution 57, to cover mainly the provision of medicines and concentrated food.[9] Precedent lay in the authorization by the Central Committee in the previous month of an emergency supply program for Finland (also an ex-enemy country) [10] similar to those permitted under the terms of the Central Committee resolution of 26 February 1945.[11]

The United States representative on the Allied Control Commission in Budapest promptly secured the approval of his United Kingdom and Soviet confreres for such a program [12] and the dispatch of a formal

[5] General Counsel's file, Hungary, 1945, *passim.*

[6] Letter, Matagne to Salisbury, 9 November 1945.

[7] Letter, Lt. General Sir Humfrey Gale (Personal Representative of the Director General, ERO) to Lehman, transmitting letter from Hungarian Prime Minister, 14 December 1945.

[8] Notes of meeting of Alexander B. Hawes (General Counsel's Office, HQ) with committee of United States Hungarians, 10 December 1945; cable, London to Washington 7422 (PP 184), 13 December 1945.

[9] Cable, Washington to London 8630 (PP 112), 20 December 1945.

[10] See Part Five, Chapter XIII.

[11] See Appendix Four, Section III, Document 1.

[12] Cable, Budapest to Washington through United States War Department (Major General William S. Key [United States Representative, Allied Control Commission for Hungary] to Lehman), 5 January 1946.

request from the Hungarian Government for UNRRA aid.[13] The Central Committee at its meeting on 8 January 1946, having before it these documents, and a resolution drafted by the United States State Department in consultation with UNRRA Headquarters and supported urgently by the United States member, authorized the Administration to go ahead with immediate arrangements.[14]

The formal resolution was passed at the next meeting of the Central Committee on 4 February.[15] By its terms the Director General was authorized to expend $4 million for an emergency relief program limited to "(*a*) the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies and (*b*) the provision of other emergency relief supplies for persons in greatest need such as children and nursing and expectant mothers," in addition to such operations as might be undertaken under Resolution 57.[16] Since the Hungarian Government preferred to leave shipping arrangements to UNRRA, part of the $4 million was subsequently reserved to cover these costs, and $3,333,000 remained for procurement of supplies.[17]

Two exchanges of letters between the Director General and the Hungarian Minister to the United States took the place of a formal agreement and embodied the usual provisions for equitable distribution,[18] for reporting and observation of distribution, the granting of privileges and immunities to the UNRRA Mission staff, and the payment of Mission expenses in local currency.[19]

The UNRRA Mission, with Stanley L. Sommer as Chief, arrived in Budapest on 11 April 1946, and a month later the first UNRRA supplies reached the city. From the beginning it was evident that UNRRA must work closely with the local welfare groups and the foreign voluntary agencies already operating in Hungary. Since these organiza-

[13] Cable, Budapest to Washington unnumbered, 2 January 1946, from Tildy Zoltan (Prime Minister).

[14] Central Committee, verbatim minutes 19th meeting, 8 January 1946.

[15] Central Committee, verbatim minutes 20th meeting, 4 February 1946; see *infra*, Appendix Four, Section III, Document 4, for text of resolution.

[16] Central Committee (CC) (46) 17, minutes 20th meeting, 4 February 1946 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], II, 90–91).

[17] Letter, Abraham S. Boykoff (Bureau of Supply, HQ) to Stanley L. Sommer (Chief, Hungary Mission), 28 February 1946.

[18] Drawn from Resolutions 2 and 7.

[19] Letters: Lehman to Aladar Szegedy-Maszek (appointed Minister of Hungary in the United States), 31 January 1946; Szegedy-Maszek to Lehman, 6 February 1946; Lehman to Szegedy-Maszek, 13 February 1946; Szegedy-Maszek to Lehman, 19 March 1946; see *infra*, Appendix Seven, Document 9.

tions were providing a total of money and supplies greater than the UNRRA program, the Chief of Mission did not attempt to secure agreements regulating their activities but endeavored instead to enlist their coöperation in concerted planning to eliminate overlapping and ensure that all types of welfare institutions and needy people received a fair share of relief supplies. At his insistence, a coördinating committee was set up under his chairmanship with a membership of representatives of the ministers most concerned with relief supplies—the Prime Minister, Ministers of Supply and of Welfare—the major indigenous and foreign welfare agencies, and three prominent Hungarian citizens. This committee was in turn divided into subcommittees on food, clothing, and drugs, and a project subcommittee which made recommendations on the welfare supply programs to be developed by the member agencies.[20] Out of this organization later grew an Association of Foreign Voluntary Agencies designed to continue coördinated planning in the post-UNRRA period.[21]

In accordance with the emergency character of the initial UNRRA program for Hungary, only food, medical supplies, clothing and footwear, and a few trucks were requested.

The food rationing system in Hungary, already established when the UNRRA Mission arrived, was formulated with a basic ration for the nonagricultural population supplemented by additional issues to miners, workers in heavy industries, children, and pregnant women and nursing mothers. Indigenous supplies were, however, usually inadequate to fill these allotments, and the fate of these special groups would have been hard without the additional food brought in by the foreign agencies and UNRRA. Since the UNRRA program had originally been authorized to provide for persons in greatest need, UNRRA Headquarters was at first loath to approve the issue of UNRRA food to miners and to industrial and white-collar workers. ERO and the Mission, however, explained that such special groups as pregnant women and nursing mothers, children, and the aged were receiving food beyond the level of minimum subsistence; the vital need was to maintain the health of heavy workers, particularly coal miners, and to offer incentives for increased industrial production. This, in turn, would pro-

[20] Monthly Report, April–May 1946.
[21] Monthly Report, December 1946, Welfare Division Report.

vide more goods for farmers to purchase and would encourage greater production of food and its sale in commercial rather than black market channels.[22] So eloquently did they plead their cause that Headquarters withdrew its objections [23] and 70 per cent [24] of the UNRRA-supplied fats, canned meats, and occasionally soup and jam were issued at low, controlled prices as part of the regular supplementary rations for these classes, with special attention to the workers in Budapest who had least ready access to indigenous supplies.[25] The remainder of the fats and meat and the other UNRRA food items—principally milk products and sugar—were issued as supplementary rations for children and expectant and nursing mothers and free to hospitals and welfare institutions and local voluntary agencies.

All UNRRA medical supplies went to hospitals, allotted for the most part on the basis of percentage of bed occupancy, and no charge for UNRRA medicines was made to patients.[26]

Clothing, it rapidly became apparent, was the paramount need in Hungary. Although comparatively little (274 gross long tons) new clothing, textiles, and footwear were supplied by UNRRA, this was supplemented by nearly 800 long tons of contributed clothing plus Hungary's share in the UNRRA allotment of some 1,700 long tons to the American Joint Distribution Committee for the victims of persecution in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania.[27]

The UNRRA Mission and the Hungarian Government were from the beginning eager to secure an increase in the amount of UNRRA aid. Since Hungary was an agricultural country, possessed of fertile plains which were a potential source of food for adjoining UNRRA receiving countries, substantial UNRRA aid for agricultural rehabilitation was requested. The plea was passed from the Central Committee

[22] Cables: London to Washington 6602, 28 May 1946; London to Washington 6749, 30 May 1946.

[23] Cable, Washington to London 8132, 11 June 1946.

[24] Monograph, Frank S. Curtis, "History of Welfare Division, Hungary Mission," p. 2.

[25] Committee Controlling International Relief Actions (Hungary), minutes of meeting, 21 June 1946; Subcommittee on Food (Hungary), minutes of meetings, 29 August, 13 November 1946, 28 January, 13 March 1947.

[26] Monograph, Dr. Arthur E. Brown, "History of the Medical Section of the Mission to Hungary," p. 24.

[27] "Statistics on Clothing Drives Sponsored by UNRRA as of 30 November 1946," pp. 11–12.

to the Fifth Council Session, August 1946, to the Program Subcommittee, and back to the Central Committee.[28] The Administration concluded that it did not have sufficient resources for the additional program of $3 million which it believed to be justified.[29] The other receiving countries feared that an increase to Hungary might result in their getting less from UNRRA, and only the United States gave positive support.[30] Ultimately, a further $1 million of supplies was allotted as payment for the transit costs of UNRRA goods shipped through Hungary to other recipient countries,[31] and in February 1947 an additional $207,000 [32] was allowed to cover subsequent transit shipments. No limitations were placed on the type of goods to be procured with these funds, but the severe winter of 1946–1947 necessitated their expenditure primarily on food. Even the several thousand tons of wheat originally intended for planting were diverted to help meet the bread ration in Budapest in the spring of 1947.[33]

The original expectations that a program for displaced persons under Resolution 57 might be included did not materialize. The number of United Nations nationals displaced in Hungary was small, and the persecuted groups were receiving substantial aid from foreign voluntary agencies. By December 1946 when the Government and the Mission began pressing for UNRRA assistance along these lines, Headquarters ruled that the termination of UNRRA was too near to warrant the initiation of any new programs.[34]

The distribution of UNRRA supplies was the most difficult problem with which the UNRRA Mission had to contend. Since the staff at its peak numbered only ten Class I and fifty-three Class II employees,[35] it could obviously do little except seek to put across its recommendations through the committee machinery. Actual observation

[28] Monograph, "Agricultural Rehabilitation," p. 2.

[29] Program Subcommittee of the Central Committee (CC/P)(46)81, 24 September 1946.

[30] Council V Document 152, *Ad Hoc* Committee on Policy (*Ad Hoc*/P)39, verbatim minutes of meeting, 14 August 1946.

[31] CC(46)102, minutes 37th meeting, 3 October 1946 (CC Docs., IV, 26).

[32] Program of Operations (P/O) Amendment 127, 28 February 1947. The actual sum granted was $282,000 out of which $75,000 was subtracted for the cost of shipping the supplies procured. The Administration assumed the shipping costs of the $1 million program.

[33] Monograph, "Food," p. 5.

[34] Cables: London to Budapest 303, 25 November 1946; London to Budapest 310, 5 December 1946.

[35] Monthly Report, September 1946, Personnel Report.

of distribution by UNRRA staff was extremely limited, but the various foreign voluntary agency representatives kept a weather eye on the use of UNRRA supplies while carrying out their own programs throughout the country, and the press and the populace were not reticent about registering complaints.[36] The Mission was satisfied, however, that considering the intensity of political rivalries, distribution was carried out with remarkable fairness.[37]

Most of the UNRRA supplies were shipped via Trieste where they at times suffered pilferage and delays in the riots and strikes which afflicted that turbulent area.[38] Once the goods were loaded in sealed trains with Hungarian guards, however, their transit to Budapest was usually undisturbed, and their storage in city warehouses safe.[39]

The major part of the UNRRA supplies was distributed in greater Budapest, whose 1,369,000 people constituted about one half of the nonagricultural population.[40] During June and July 1946, when inflation had reached astronomical proportions and the farmers were holding their produce until the new currency was issued, UNRRA food enabled the Government to meet the city's ration quotas,[41] while the 100 new UNRRA trucks which arrived in June were immediately put to work bringing such food as could be purchased in the surrounding country into the hungry capital.

When the stabilization of currency, initiated on 1 August, had been successfully accomplished and the crisis in Budapest had passed, the UNRRA staff turned their attention to the needs of the rural areas. The capital had by now, however, developed a proprietary attitude toward UNRRA supplies; and lack of transport, bad roads, and the severe winter of 1946–1947 combined to delay distribution to the provinces. Even the development of plans for distribution was slow, for the machinery of a coalition government of four rival parties was extremely complicated. Responsibility for hospitals was, for example, divided between the Ministries of Welfare, Education, and Defense. Because the need for clothing and footwear was so universal and the supplies inadequate, distribution plans for these categories were par-

[36] Monographs: "Distribution and Observation," p. 2; "Public Information," p. 1.
[37] Monograph, "Distribution and Observation," p. 1.
[38] See Part Three, Chapter IX, Section 7.
[39] Monograph, "Shipping, Warehousing and Protective Services," pp. 1–3.
[40] Operational Analysis Papers 33, *Agriculture and Food in Hungary* (London, 1947), p. 34.
[41] Monograph, Michael Hawkin, "UNRRA Mission to Hungary—Foreword," p. 2.

ticularly difficult to achieve, and actual deliveries of the 60 per cent allotted to the country districts did not take place until the spring of 1947 although shipments had been completed the previous fall. As a consequence, many children missed a season of schooling for lack of clothes and shoes suitable for winter weather. Canned meat distribution was also long delayed but with less serious results since the market was temporarily supplied during the winter by an unprecedented slaughter of cattle for lack of fodder to keep them alive.[42]

Local committees, patterned on the committees in Budapest, were set up in the country districts to handle the distribution of clothing and shoes supplied by UNRRA and foreign voluntary agencies. These committees operated with varying degrees of impartiality and efficiency; such complaints as reached the Mission staff were investigated and if apparently well founded were referred to the Ministry of Welfare.[43]

The total UNRRA program for Hungary came to 19,127 long tons valued at $4,386,500.[44] Food, principally grain, meat, fats, and oils, was by far the largest item (18,140 long tons; $3,445,200). The remainder was divided among clothing, textiles, and footwear (274 long tons; $328,600), medical supplies (471 long tons; $465,800), and trucks (242 long tons; $146,900). The whole intent of the program had been to help Hungary through an emergency, and this purpose was successfully accomplished. The supplies arrived in time and were used, even though in some cases belatedly, where they were most needed; the Hungarian Government survived the crisis of inflation and stabilization, and the later reports from the Mission record a steady improvement in conditions throughout the country, thanks not only to the will toward recovery inherent in the Hungarian people but also to the morale-building effect of foreign aid.

[42] Monograph, "Distribution and Observation," p. 3; Food and Clothing Subcommittees (Hungary), minutes of meetings, *passim*.
[43] Monograph, "Distribution and Observation," p. 1.
[44] The 1 per cent "freeze" cut $33,000 from the original program.