

PART SEVEN

The Displaced Persons  
Operations

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# I. Responsibilities

## 1. THE PROBLEM

AS ONE war month followed another after September 1939, thousands and thousands of people either fled from their homes as advancing armies drove toward them or, in even greater numbers, were forcibly removed by the invaders. Many were taken to Germany, many to other parts of Europe, and still others were moved about within their own countries. By the middle of 1943 these displaced persons were estimated to number in Europe about 21 million.<sup>1</sup> Of this huge total, about 8 million had been taken to Germany or Austria, and nearly 8 million had been internally displaced within their own countries. It was assumed that the first impulse of all displaced persons, when enemy control was removed, would be to return to their homes, even during the period of actual fighting. Such an unorganized, large-scale, mass movement would interfere with the war effort, spread disease, and increase social and economic confusion by shifting the burden from countries of location, where some sort of accommodation was in existence, to the home countries, where facilities might be inadequate.<sup>2</sup> To handle this problem would be needed: special arrangements for food, shelter, and medical care; special arrangements for transport and temporary housing and feeding facilities; and adequate advance arrangements for reception of the people in their home countries.<sup>3</sup>

Though coördinated effort by military authorities, national governments, and private agencies was considered to be essential for the successful provision of all these necessities, it was widely believed that, as soon as military conditions would permit, the work of repatriation should be handled by a civilian, international organization.<sup>4</sup> That UNRRA would be this organization was assumed in the basic Agreement, wherein the member governments expressed their

<sup>1</sup> Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, "Report of the Technical Advisory Committee on Displaced Persons, October 1943," Appendix I.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 13.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 30.

determination "that preparation and arrangements shall be made for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes."

It was, then, with the knowledge of the existence in Europe and elsewhere (the United Kingdom Government was at the time caring for about 60,000 displaced persons in the Middle East, East Africa, and India) of millions of displaced persons, with the fear that their rapid, uncoordinated attempts to get home might hamper the military effort, spread disease, and create economic and social difficulties in their home countries, and with the belief that an international organization, specifically UNRRA itself, must coordinate the return home, that the delegates of the member governments met at the First Council Session in November 1943.

Since an UNRRA role was assumed, the principal questions to be answered were: What, specifically, was the role to be, and which displaced persons were to be eligible for help?

At the time, perhaps, it did not seem too difficult to supply answers. Yet no questions were to take up so much time in successive Council meetings and to cause so much controversy as these two. No operations of the Administration were to get so much publicity—good and bad—as those arising from the answers supplied by the member governments. No other field operations were to require the employment of so many people. Yet in no operation was so small a portion of the funds of the Administration used. No operation was so misunderstood within the Administration, by member governments, and by the public. In no operation was the early organizational control of the Administration so unsatisfactory. Yet again in no operation did the members of the Administration show such individual initiative and, it may justly be said, display such heroism.

## 2. DECISION OF THE FIRST COUNCIL SESSION

At the First Council Session the displaced persons aspect of UNRRA's work was considered primarily by the Subcommittee on the scope of UNRRA (Subcommittee 1 of Committee II) and by the Subcommittee on Policies with Respect to Assistance to Displaced Persons (Subcommittee 4 of Committee IV), and briefly by the Committee on General Policy (Committee II), the Committee on Relief and Rehabilitation Policies (Committee IV), and by the Committee on *Ad Hoc* Committees. Formal resolutions were, of course, adopted

and Committee reports approved in plenary sessions of the Council.

It was suggested<sup>5</sup> without much discussion by the Subcommittee on Scope that the Administration's activities should include assistance in caring for displaced persons and, in agreement with appropriate government and military authorities, in securing their repatriation or return to former places of residence. This recommendation was formally adopted by the Council.<sup>6</sup> The members of the Displaced Persons Subcommittee accepted it and, throughout their discussions,<sup>7</sup> assumed that the Administration's activities would be limited to assisting in the repatriation of displaced persons. They devoted themselves primarily to determining which persons should receive such help and, to a lesser extent, to suggesting what specific tasks should be performed to make such assistance successful.

The definitions of eligibility for UNRRA assistance suggested by the Subcommittee<sup>8</sup> were adopted by the Council.<sup>9</sup> It was decided, after some discussion, that UNRRA should not normally have any responsibility for the repatriation of prisoners of war but that, subject to the concurrence of the government of origin, the Administration would assist in the repatriation of the following groups of citizens of member governments:

[1] Those . . . who have been obliged to leave their homes by reason of the war and are found in liberated or conquered territory; [2] those . . . displaced within their own (liberated) countries; [3] those . . . in other countries who are exiles as a result of the war, and whose return to their homes in liberated territories is regarded as a matter of urgency; [4] those . . . and [also] those stateless persons who have been driven as a result of the war from their places of settled residence in countries of which they are not nationals, to return to those places; [5] other categories of persons which can be shown to fall within the proper scope of UNRRA's activities.<sup>10</sup>

To facilitate this work it was recommended that the member governments and the Director General exchange information on all phases of the problem and consult together so that the Director Gen-

<sup>5</sup> Committee II, Subcommittee 1, Secretary's notes.

<sup>6</sup> Resolution 1, II, paragraph 2.

<sup>7</sup> Committee IV, Subcommittee 4, Secretary's notes.

<sup>8</sup> *Journal*, First Council, "Report of the Subcommittee on Policies with Respect to Assistance to Displaced Persons," pp. 159-162, paragraphs 5-6.

<sup>9</sup> Resolution 10, paragraph 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Journal*, First Council, "Report of the Subcommittee," paragraph 5.

eral might plan, coördinate, administer, or arrange for the administration of orderly and effective measures for the return home of these displaced persons.<sup>11</sup>

The problem of persons of enemy or ex-enemy nationality (generally referred to as persons "intruded into") in the territories of member governments was considered, and it was decided that this should be treated as a separate issue in an early meeting of the Council.<sup>12</sup>

The Subcommittee also drew<sup>13</sup> attention to ten of the many specific duties which it considered would fall on the Administration and recommended that UNRRA funds and supplies be used where necessary to permit their fulfillment:

- (1) The collection and dissemination of information;
- (2) The issue of preliminary instructions to civilian displaced persons prior to their assembly in centers;
- (3) The securing of agreement on a unified system of registration;
- (4) The dispatch of special missions, authorized to take the necessary measures, to areas where displaced persons might be found;
- (5) The provision of adequate shelter for displaced persons pending repatriation;
- (6) The issue of detailed instructions to displaced persons on such matters as registration, movement, and medical examinations;
- (7) The negotiation with competent authorities, national or international, for the transport of displaced persons;
- (8) The creation of emergency stocks of food to supply returning populations at stages of their journeys;
- (9) The necessary arrangements to ensure the supply to displaced persons of food, clothing, temporary shelter, medical care on return home;
- (10) The establishment of priorities for the repatriation of various categories of displaced persons.

Out of the First Council Session there came, then, either in resolutions or in the officially adopted Report of the Displaced Persons Subcommittee, a definition of the role of UNRRA—the Administration was to assist in repatriation; a definition of eligibility; and suggestions as to the specific duties to be performed by the Administration.

<sup>11</sup> Resolution 10, paragraphs 1-2.

<sup>12</sup> Resolution 10, paragraph 4; *Journal*, First Council, "Report of the Subcommittee," paragraphs 11-12.

<sup>13</sup> *Journal*, First Council, "Report of the Subcommittee," paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22.

As these were to guide the work of the Administration and the thought of the member governments for some months to come, it is important to consider whether these concepts proved well founded.

It is evident that almost exclusive emphasis was placed on assistance to repatriation. On what may be called the Council level this activity continued to be considered the principal task. As late, for example, as the Fifth Council Session, August 1946, it was stated that "the Administration in the course of the performance of its functions in respect of displaced persons should bear in mind that the main task to be performed is to encourage and assist in every way possible their early return to their country of origin."<sup>14</sup> This view was reiterated in the resolutions<sup>15</sup> adopted in the six Council sessions. Nevertheless, as the situation developed amid the ruins of Europe, repatriation was not the primary work of the Administration; its major role, although not seriously considered by the First Council nor admitted in later Council sessions, proved to be the care of displaced persons who did not choose to be repatriated.

The lack of clear knowledge of the Administration's precise future role, understandable enough in the conditions of November 1943, was shared both by the national delegates and the Administration officials. It led, during the following months, to the expenditure of time and effort on projects that proved unprofitable but had no other adverse effects.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, the continued emphasis at later Council meetings on repatriation to the neglect of the real problem of care undoubtedly did confuse and make the tasks of the UNRRA field workers more difficult and did also upset and disturb the displaced persons.

Furthermore, the emphasis was placed not only on repatriation but especially on assistance to be given in the home countries of the displaced persons. In fact, little such assistance was rendered as part of the displaced persons operation; none at all in Western Europe; and elsewhere only as a minor part, if at all, of the normal country operations.

The problem of care, especially care of those who did not wish to

<sup>14</sup> Resolution 99, paragraph 7a.

<sup>15</sup> Resolutions 10, 57, 71, 92, 99, 112.

<sup>16</sup> For example, Standing Technical Subcommittee on Displaced Persons for Europe (TDP/E) (44) 18, "Communication between Displaced Persons and their Families—Enquiries, Tracing and Registration of Missing Persons;" TDP/E(44) 19, Expert Commission on Supplies, draft report, "Food"; TDP/E(44) 27, "Technical Report on Arrangements for Dealing with Currency in the Possession of Displaced Persons"; TDP/E(44) 59, "Welfare Services for Displaced Persons in an Assembly Area."

be repatriated either immediately or at all, was not entirely overlooked. One government, at least, informed its delegation that "to assume that all displaced persons may desire to return to their countries of origin will undoubtedly prove to be an over-simplification of the problem."<sup>17</sup> But if not overlooked, this problem, which was to be the major problem, was certainly neglected. The Displaced Persons Subcommittee only slightly touched on it. It was suggested that the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) would assume responsibility for the resettlement of those displaced persons who, for one reason or another, could not be repatriated. This was accepted without comment.<sup>18</sup> This view was expressed in the Report, wherein the need for coöperation with IGCR was stressed, and it was added that "it should be the responsibility of the relief organs of UNRRA to assist, for a reasonable period, in the care of such refugees as cannot be repatriated, until the Intergovernmental Committee is prepared to remove them to new places of settlement."<sup>19</sup> On the other hand, in the recommendations made in the Report it is merely said that the Administration should coöperate closely with IGCR "with a view to invoking . . . collaboration in the work of the repatriation of displaced persons,"<sup>20</sup> which version was included in the Council resolution.<sup>21</sup>

The definitions of eligibility proved to be correct and workable as far as they went but altogether inadequate. They had, in the light of hard experience and difficult cases, greatly to be elaborated and refined, partly by Council resolutions and partly by Administration decisions.<sup>22</sup>

Many, if indeed not most, of the specific duties to which the Subcommittee called particular attention proved, no doubt for reasons that could not in November 1943 have been foreseen, to be inapplicable. The two major factors making them inoperative were that more was accomplished in the military period by the military authorities than was expected and that, as a result of the decision not to send UNRRA supplies to countries with foreign exchange resources,<sup>23</sup> such countries preferred to care for their own returning displaced persons.

<sup>17</sup> United States Department of State, *Handbook, United States Delegation* (First Session of the Council, Atlantic City, 1943), Section P, Document II, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> Committee IV, Subcommittee 4, Secretary's notes 3d meeting.

<sup>19</sup> *Journal*, First Council, "Report of the Subcommittee," paragraph 10.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, paragraph 24.

<sup>21</sup> Resolution 10, paragraph 6.

<sup>22</sup> See Part Seven, Chapter II, Section 5.

<sup>23</sup> Resolution 14, section 16.

The role, then, planned for the Administration at the First Council Session was largely illusory, and the real role—the care of displaced persons, mostly in enemy territory, who either did not wish to return home or did not wish immediately to do so—was not foreseen. The instructions given by the member governments to the Administration bore little relation to the work that lay ahead. As is hardly surprising under the circumstances, some of the early Administration plans, though fundamentally sound, covered activities that did not actually come under its jurisdiction or control.

### 3. EARLY PLANS AND OPERATIONS

Without much delay displaced persons divisions and committees on displaced persons were established in Washington and London.<sup>24</sup> As with other parts of UNRRA these divisions and committees had, obviously, in the spring of 1944, when the bulk of Continental Europe was still under German control, little or no opportunity to initiate and develop practical operations. All they could do, in addition to waging the inevitable jurisdictional wars with other branches of UNRRA, was to plan, and plan they did. But the problem was: plan what? They suffered to even greater degree than the rest of UNRRA from the nebulous nature of the work which they were supposed sometime to supervise. The guidance given by the Council was, at the best, vague. Plans might be and indeed were elaborated for the construction of buildings in which displaced persons might be sheltered;<sup>25</sup> but, with no indication that the Administration would ever be able to get or control the necessary materials—as indeed it never was—the inability to implement such plans must have been fairly clear from the beginning.

The first actual displaced persons operation in which the Administration became involved was in the Middle East. There, following an exchange of letters with the United Kingdom Government, the Administration assumed control on 1 May 1944 of the displaced persons camps in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria, and other operations formerly conducted by the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> For details, see Part One, Chapter IV, Section 9; Part Two, Chapter I, Sections 2, 3.

<sup>25</sup> For example, "Guide to Camps Requirements," Vols. I and II, Headquarters, Washington.

<sup>26</sup> See Part Five, Chapter I.

Since this was a going concern, its acquisition, while creating administrative and personnel problems and adding substance to the jurisdictional disputes within the Administration, gave little scope to the planners. The bulk of the displaced persons involved were Greeks and Yugoslavs. Immediate repatriation was clearly out of the question, so the first practical work of the Administration—the care of displaced persons—contradicted the Council emphasis on repatriation but did foreshadow the real work that lay ahead. This Middle East operation differed, however, in two major respects from the work to be done in Germany, Austria, and Italy: in the Middle East the Administration financed, as a charge against its funds, the cost of food, clothing, and other so-called “basic” supplies, as well as amenity supplies, and also transport for repatriation; and from these Middle East camps most displaced persons were ultimately repatriated.

In an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the European future, two things were soon clear to the planners: close relations with the military authorities were essential; and working agreements with the governments involved were necessary. It also became increasingly evident to some in the Administration that the major activity would be in Germany. In May 1944 the Director, Displaced Persons Division, European Regional Office (ERO), recorded that discussions with representatives of the governments concerned “made it clear that the biggest and most absorbing problem of all, both for the allied authorities and for UNRRA, will be the problem of Germany.”<sup>27</sup> The will-o’-the-wisp of work in the home countries had, however, by no means vanished. It continued to muddle the planning and confuse the activities of the Administration for some months to come. As late as April 1945 one of the deputy directors general indicated that he thought the movement of displaced persons homeward would be completed during the military period and that “the real problem as far as UNRRA was concerned would be that of caring for displaced persons on their return home.”<sup>28</sup>

The establishment of close relations with the military authorities, at least so far as areas under Anglo-American supervision or control were concerned, was conditioned by the decision of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to place responsibility for shipping

<sup>27</sup> ERO, Displaced Persons Division, Report of Work, January 1–May 6, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>28</sup> Sir Frederick Leith-Ross (Deputy Director General, Finance and Administration, ERO), notes, meeting with the Director General, 10 April 1945.

and distribution of supplies with these authorities.<sup>29</sup> The specific negotiations dealing with displaced persons operations, particularly as they related to Northwest Europe and Germany, were conducted sometimes in Washington with the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and sometimes in London and later in France with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) (primarily with the Displaced Persons Branch of G-5, Civil Affairs Division). As the Administration could suggest little that was concrete, except the principle that UNRRA personnel should be associated with the work in hand so as to gain essential experience, and as there were no actual operations in progress, negotiations achieved few definite results in the summer of 1944. UNRRA personnel, by the end of June 1944<sup>30</sup> and thereafter in slowly increasing numbers, were attached to the Displaced Persons Branch of SHAEF and there took some part in the preparation of military instructions for conducting displaced persons operations. In November 1944 UNRRA personnel were attached to the headquarters of the 21st, the 12th, and the 6th Army groups. The negotiations, though proceeding slowly and not always satisfactorily,<sup>31</sup> did permit the slow infiltration of UNRRA personnel into the military planning groups and did ultimately lead, in late November 1944, to the signing of a definite agreement.

The Administration concurrently carried forward negotiations with the interested member governments. Here again the Administration suffered from certain disadvantages; it had little or nothing to offer these governments. Control of supplies and transport was to be vested in the military authorities for a period of about six months after liberation, the very period during which it was hoped repatriation would be completed. Furthermore, most of the interested Western European countries (France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, for example) were classed as paying countries and could never, therefore, expect to receive UNRRA supplies.<sup>32</sup> It was one thing for resolutions and reports to talk of cooperation and the need for one controlling organization; it was quite another thing for sovereign governments, seeking for prestige while re-establishing themselves, to place the care

<sup>29</sup> See Part One, Chapter I, Section 4.

<sup>30</sup> Letter, Fred K. Hoehler (Director, Displaced Persons Division, HQ) to Lehman, 4 July 1944.

<sup>31</sup> Memo, Leith-Ross to Senior ERO staff, 4 August 1944, as an example.

<sup>32</sup> See Part One, Chapter IV, Section 3.

and control of their citizens in the hands of some foreign organization that could return no material advantages. Nevertheless, here again some progress was achieved. The Administration was helped by its committees, particularly by the Standing Technical Subcommittee on Displaced Persons for Europe, which worked actively in London. This Subcommittee, consisting of representatives of the governments on the Committee of the Council for Europe,<sup>33</sup> held its first meeting on 30 May 1944<sup>34</sup> and its final and twenty-fourth meeting just over a year later on 31 July 1945.<sup>35</sup> It was one of the most active of UNRRA committees. In addition to the work done in the Subcommittee proper, it appointed six Expert Commissions to study certain specific aspects of displaced persons operations, such as supplies (including food and clothing), movement, policies and practices, services, currency, and publicity.<sup>36</sup> The papers and reports, generally produced in collaboration with officials of the Administration, influenced the preparation of SHAEF and UNRRA instructions on operations. As many of them, however, dealt with matters that never came under UNRRA control (basic supplies and movement, for example), they were not, despite their generally high quality, as directly useful in actual operations as they might have been.

While almost continuous discussions, in committees and out, had proceeded between the Administration and the interested European governments, the Administration, on 2 June 1944, formally asked<sup>37</sup> the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, USSR, and Yugoslavia, and the French Committee of National Liberation whether they desired UNRRA assistance in the care and repatriation of displaced persons during both the military and the postmilitary periods.

Though some replies were noncommittal, most of the governments indicated that they desired assistance within their own territories but generally only in the form of supplies and, outside their territories, in the form of care for their citizens in enemy and other territories.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See Part One, Chapter III, Section 13.

<sup>34</sup> TDP/E(44)2, draft minutes 1st meeting, 30 May 1944.

<sup>35</sup> TDP/E(45)33, draft minutes 24th meeting, 31 July 1945.

<sup>36</sup> TDP/E(44)2; TDP/E(44)10, draft minutes 3d meeting, 16 June 1944; TDP/E(44)21, draft minutes 4th meeting, 27 June 1944; TDP/E(44)44, Report of Expert Commission on Publicity Services for Displaced Persons.

<sup>37</sup> Letters, Leith-Ross to governments listed above, 2 June 1944.

<sup>38</sup> Letters to Leith-Ross: Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgium, 8 July 1944; Frantisek Nemeč,

The USSR Government, however, implied that it did not wish UNRRA assistance in Soviet-occupied territories.<sup>39</sup>

CCAC did not, however, consider that the replies gave sufficient evidence that the interested governments wanted UNRRA assistance.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, a further letter was sent to all the above-listed governments, except that of the USSR, on 12 October 1944.<sup>41</sup> Replies considered satisfactory by the military authorities were received from all the governments, thus paving the way for the formal agreement on operations concluded between the military authorities and UNRRA.<sup>42</sup>

#### 4. DECISIONS OF THE SECOND COUNCIL SESSION

In the meantime, the Council, at its Second Session, had added somewhat to the formal regulations governing the activities of the Administration and to its tasks by adopting four resolutions specifically concerned with displaced persons operations.<sup>43</sup> One of these, completing some of the unfinished business of the First Council Session, authorized the Administration, under certain circumstances, to return intruded enemy nationals.<sup>44</sup> Only a very few were so repatriated, principally Italians from Albania.<sup>45</sup> Another, influenced by the one operating task then being performed by the Administration in the Middle East, further defined and limited the tasks of the Administration in territories never occupied by the enemy.<sup>46</sup> As a guide to such operations it was suggested that the Administration allot its resources mainly to congregated groups rather than to individuals; that it assume responsibility

Czechoslovakia, 20 June 1944; Kyriakos Varvaressos, Greece, 16 August 1944; Arnold Lamping, the Netherlands, 14 June 1944; Anders Frihagen, Norway, 4 July 1944; Jan Kwapinski, Poland, 6 June 1944; Ivan A. Iliuschenko, USSR, 21 June 1944; B. Jeotic, Yugoslavia, 6 June 1944; P. Rauzan, French Committee of National Liberation, 9 June 1944.

<sup>39</sup> Letter, Iliuschenko to Leith-Ross, 21 June 1944; note, Leith-Ross, conversation with Iliuschenko, 22 June 1944.

<sup>40</sup> Cable, Washington to London 714, 7 October 1944.

<sup>41</sup> Letters, Leith-Ross to the governments, 12 October 1944.

<sup>42</sup> Letter, Lieutenant General Arthur E. Grasett (Chief of G-5, SHAEF), to Chief of Staff, SHAEF, 9 November 1944, approved by Lieutenant General W. B. Smith (United States Army Chief of Staff), 19 November 1944, announcing approval of Combined Chiefs of Staff, 4 November 1944.

<sup>43</sup> Resolutions 46, 47, 57, 60.

<sup>44</sup> Resolution 47.

<sup>45</sup> Monograph, Edna Boorady, "Displaced Persons," Albania, Section D, Italian Nationals.

<sup>46</sup> Resolution 46.

only for those individuals who could not support themselves and who lacked resources to return to their homes; and that it assume such responsibility only in areas where the resources for maintenance of such persons were inadequate.

The third and most significant of these resolutions<sup>47</sup> had its genesis long before the Council Session. At the First Council it had been decided that,

if it appears necessary for the Administration to operate in an enemy or ex-enemy area in carrying out the purposes of the Agreement, it will do so only . . . provided that the Council approve the scale and nature of the operations . . . and that all expenses . . . should be carried by the enemy . . . country concerned.<sup>48</sup>

Since it was early evident that much of the displaced persons operations would have to be performed in Germany and since it was likewise clear that such operations might have to be undertaken suddenly, it was felt that this restriction might seriously hamper the freedom of action of the Administration. In the proposed agenda for the Second Council Session, as approved at the fourth meeting of the Central Committee,<sup>49</sup> it was indicated that such operations would be necessary in respect of displaced persons and should be approved by the Council.

At the sixth meeting, 15 June 1944, of the Central Committee, the Director General asked the informal advice of the members. He indicated that he interpreted the limitation on operations in enemy territories as applying only to assistance granted to enemy peoples and not to displaced nationals of member governments found in such territories. After some discussion, the members accepted this interpretation.<sup>50</sup>

Nevertheless, to the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Policy at the Second Council Session, the United Kingdom member proposed a resolution that "notwithstanding the provisions of Resolution 1, Part I, the Administration shall be authorized, without the necessity of obtaining prior approval by the Council, to carry out operations in enemy or ex-enemy areas for the care and repatriation or return of displaced per-

<sup>47</sup> Resolution 57.

<sup>48</sup> Resolution 1, I, paragraph 3.

<sup>49</sup> Central Committee (CC) (47)7, draft provisional agenda for the Second Session of the Council (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], I, 15-16); CC(44)9, minutes 4th meeting, 19 April 1944 (CC Docs., I, 20-21, 24-29).

<sup>50</sup> CC(44)13, minutes 6th meeting, 15 June 1944 (CC Docs., I, 35).

sons.”<sup>51</sup> Although it was pointed out that in view of the Central Committee discussion (mentioned above) such a resolution was not necessary, it was generally felt wise to eliminate any possibility of doubt. Two changes were proposed. The Soviet representative suggested that for the phrase “without the necessity of obtaining prior approval of the Council” there be substituted “such measures in every case shall be carried out with the approval of the Central Committee.” The Belgian member wished to add “provided that the competent regional committee concurs in any measures contemplated.” Several members and the Director General indicated that they believed such additions might seriously cripple the Administration’s ability to act rapidly and effectively. As an alternative, the United Kingdom member suggested the addition of “in agreement with the government of the country of which they are nationals,” so placed as clearly to govern not only the word “repatriation” but also “care.” This limitation, the changing of which in the following summer was to cause one of the first and most bitter disputes between member governments, was apparently added accidentally. It was immediately accepted by the Belgian as a satisfactory alternative, which it was not in any sense, to his proposal. The Soviet member pressed for a vote on his proposal, which was defeated, and then the United Kingdom amendment was accepted with no further discussion.

The United States member proposed the addition of “or other persons who have been obliged to leave their country or place of origin or former residence or who have been deported therefrom, by action of the enemy, because of race, religion, or political belief.” He explained that he had in mind primarily “persons of the Jewish race and religion” and that he felt that they should get UNRRA assistance whether or not they were nationals of a member country. The Yugoslav member’s suggestion to substitute the words “activities in favor of the United Nations” for “political belief” was accepted.

Although the United Kingdom member thought this extension of UNRRA responsibilities should be made in a separate resolution, it was, nevertheless, adopted.<sup>52</sup> Later he stated that, if such persons were to be made eligible for UNRRA assistance, they ought to be eligible

<sup>51</sup> Council II Document 32.

<sup>52</sup> Council II Document 252, *Ad Hoc* Committee on Policy (*Ad Hoc/GP*) 27, minutes 3d meeting, 21 September 1944, pp. 3-15.

wherever they might be, not just if they happened to be in enemy or ex-enemy areas. His proposal of a fourth resolution,<sup>53</sup> extending eligibility for UNRRA assistance to such persons if found in liberated territories, was accepted.

Finally, the United States member said that, in talking with some of his colleagues on the Council, he had found some concern that the resolution did not preserve proper governmental authority. He, therefore, proposed an additional clause stating that, in carrying out the purposes of the resolution, the Administration should do so only as might be agreed upon with the military authorities and "subject to such control as the military command or the established authority may find necessary." This was adopted without discussion.<sup>54</sup>

At the Second Council Session, then, the Administration was given some advice on the care of displaced persons. It was also authorized: to assist in the repatriation of intruded persons; to assist in the care and repatriation from enemy areas of displaced nationals of member governments, if their governments agreed and subject to the control of the military authorities; and to assist in the care and repatriation of a group of people, who came to be known as "persecutees," whatever their nationality, if found in enemy, ex-enemy, or liberated territories.

##### 5. THE SCAEF AGREEMENT

On 25 November 1944, the Director General, then in France, and General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, signed an agreement generally called in UNRRA the SCAEF Agreement.<sup>55</sup> The Agreement was conditioned by certain factors: Council decisions (the Administration, for example, was to operate "subject to such controls as the military command . . . may find necessary"); the decision that there was to be a "military period" (the fact that food, clothing, and shelter for the displaced persons were to be supplied by the military authorities); the past negotiations between the Administration and the military authorities and the governments of the European countries; and the continuing existence of military operations.

<sup>53</sup> Resolution 60.

<sup>54</sup> Council II Document 254, Ad Hoc/GP29, minutes 5th meeting, 22 September 1944, pp. 2-5.

<sup>55</sup> For full text, see Appendix Five, Document 1a.

The Agreement provided on the one hand that UNRRA "personnel will . . . act in all matters under the orders of the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, and through military channels." On the other hand, it recorded as desirable that UNRRA should "undertake specific tasks"; it recognized UNRRA as the agency that would assume control of the operation in the postmilitary period; and it stipulated that UNRRA personnel would currently participate in planning and in subsequent operations. It provided, furthermore, that, when asked to do so, UNRRA would coördinate and supervise the activities of the voluntary agencies.<sup>56</sup> Six months later the United Kingdom representative<sup>57</sup> on the Standing Technical Subcommittee on Displaced Persons/Europe expressed the views of many in and out of the Administration when he commented that "at present by virtue of the UNRRA-SCAEF Agreement, UNRRA was little more than a recruiting agency."<sup>58</sup> This view, however, did not take into consideration the circumstances affecting the nature of the Agreement nor give recognition to the very real advance that the Agreement marked in the UNRRA position. Prior to it, the UNRRA role had been uncertain; by it, UNRRA became quite clearly the chosen instrument and could at last begin to make realistic plans.

The call to action came almost immediately. On 2 December 1944 the military authorities asked for 200 teams of 13 members each (2,600 persons), beginning with 25 on 1 January 1945 and finishing with the final 50 on 1 April.<sup>59</sup> The request specified that these teams should be equipped with transport. Although the Administration had, during the autumn of 1944, given the military authorities reason to believe that these teams could be supplied as requested,<sup>60</sup> it was an almost impossible task, which was beyond the resources of the Administration. The transport presented a particular difficulty. Unfortunately, responsibility for this aspect of the work had not been clearly settled at the conference at which the UNRRA-SCAEF Agreement had been

<sup>56</sup> Provision for such supervision was made by SHAEF instructions, Administrative Memorandum No. 39 (revised), Annex G, 7 May 1945, see *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section V, Document 1.

<sup>57</sup> Sir George Rendel, K.C.M.G.

<sup>58</sup> TDP/E(45) 14, minutes 18th meeting, 18 May 1945.

<sup>59</sup> Letter, Brigadier General S. R. Mickelsen (Chief, Displaced Persons, Refugees and Welfare Branch, G-5, SHAEF) to Hoehler, 2 December 1944.

<sup>60</sup> For example, letter, Fletcher C. Kettle (UNRRA Liaison Officer, SHAEF) to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, SHAEF, 8 November 1944.

signed. The military authorities had at first insisted that the teams must be fully equipped with their own transport. The Director General acknowledged that they "required" their own transport but correctly pointed out that it could not be secured without military assistance. The military authorities conceded that they did have "some" responsibility for its provision.<sup>61</sup>

The Administration, in fact, did not formally acknowledge the request of 2 December 1944 until 15 January 1945.<sup>62</sup> It then undertook to do everything in its power to supply the 200 teams, subject, however, to two conditions: energetic backing by SHAEF for the acquisition of essential equipment (practically all of which was controlled by the military authorities), and coöperation of SHAEF in the establishment of an adequate and appropriately located mobilization and training center.

The teams were not made available by the dates proposed nor, on the other hand, did the Administration get the support it had requested. Not until March 1945 was a center made available at Granville, Normandy. It was neither adequate nor well located nor, on the Administration side, well run. The delays and the undoubted administrative inefficiencies there and elsewhere throughout the operation created some friction with the military authorities, brought disrepute on the Administration, and unquestionably imposed some unnecessary hardships on the field workers who were frequently unpaid for weeks, ill equipped, without instructions, and generally out of touch with the Administration.

These factors, however, did not prevent the military authorities from requesting, on 1 February 1945, 250 additional teams,<sup>63</sup> nor did it prevent teams from going into action. The first moved forward to participate with Army officials in the practical work of caring for displaced persons before 1 April 1945. By the end of April 15 teams had gone into the field; by the end of June, 322.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>61</sup> Minutes, meeting of Director General with representatives of SHAEF, 25 November 1944.

<sup>62</sup> Letter, Thomas T. Scott (Director, Displaced Persons Division, ERO) to Mickelsen, 15 January 1945.

<sup>63</sup> Letter, Mickelsen to Scott, 1 February 1945.

<sup>64</sup> SHAEF, G-5, Displaced Persons Branch, Report No. 36, 2 July 1945.

## 6. THE ZONAL AGREEMENTS

Long before this the Administration had begun to consider with what authority or authorities it would have to deal on the dissolution of SHAEF. As an international organization it preferred, wherever such relations were appropriate or possible, to make arrangements with other international bodies rather than with specific national authorities. Specifically, in relation to Germany, it hoped to be able to deal on a country-wide basis rather than on a zonal basis. As there was no United Nations military authority during the active fighting period, there was no alternative to the Anglo-American SHAEF. In January 1945, after informal discussions, the Administration wrote to the chairman of the European Advisory Commission asking with which authorities the Administration would work in Germany and Austria in the event of its being entrusted with the supervision of displaced persons after the dissolution of SHAEF.<sup>65</sup> The reply merely acknowledged receipt of this communication.<sup>66</sup> No further reply was ever received.

In June 1945, shortly before the liquidation of SHAEF, the United States, the French, and the United Kingdom Governments, in practically identical letters, informed the Administration that on 4 April 1945 the Soviet representative had told the European Advisory Commission that his Government did not propose to invite UNRRA to work in the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany and that in his view the question raised in the Administration's letter of 12 January 1945 should be settled directly among the three Governments and the Administration.<sup>67</sup> Accordingly, each Government requested that UNRRA continue its work in its respective zone. The Administration in all cases agreed.<sup>68</sup> Confirming letters were exchanged with the United States and United Kingdom military authorities, who indicated that operations should continue under terms of the UNRRA-SCAEF Agreement "until such time as another agreement is concluded."<sup>69</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Letter, Leith-Ross to chairman, European Advisory Commission, 12 January 1945.

<sup>66</sup> Letter, John G. Winant (United States Ambassador to Great Britain, then chairman of the European Advisory Commission) to Leith-Ross, 17 January 1945.

<sup>67</sup> Appendix Five, Document 2a.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, Document 2b.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, Document 2c, d.

Negotiations looking forward to the establishment of such agreements began almost at once. They were, however, delayed and affected by the decisions taken at the Third Council Session, August 1945. In so far as the displaced persons problem was concerned, this Session differed in one important respect from its predecessors: displaced persons already had been and were currently being given help in Continental Europe (the locale of by far the largest number of displaced persons and, therefore, the area whose conditions and practices exercised an overwhelming influence on all discussions and plans).

Prior to this Session the Administration had pointed out that there was an apparent contradiction between Resolution 57 (authorizing the Administration "to carry out operations . . . for the care . . . of displaced persons . . . in agreement with the government of the country of which they are nationals") and Resolution 1 (authorizing the Administration to assist "in caring for . . . persons . . . displaced from their homes"). The Administration requested clarification and proposed a resolution that would make it clear that care could be given without agreement; that is, that care could be given to "displaced persons otherwise eligible for care even though they are unwilling to be repatriated or returned to their homes."<sup>70</sup>

The debate at the Session on the Administration proposal gave rise to perhaps the first clear disagreement that emerged after the war between the Slav nations and the other United Nations. The sharp division of opinion on how most effectively to handle the problem was to be reiterated almost endlessly, not only in the deliberations of UNRRA Council sessions, committees, and the Administration, but also later in the discussions of many of the organs of the United Nations. In essence, this division, which was to occupy much time of many people connected with UNRRA and which certainly troubled both the displaced persons and the Administration field workers, was simple. On the one hand, the Slav nations believed that there were two classes of displaced persons: good and bad. The good should be helped; the bad should not. The test of whether an individual was good or bad was whether he wanted, actively and quickly, to return to his area of origin. The other nations, on the contrary, believed that there were three classes: good who wanted to return to their areas of origin; good who did not, for legitimate reasons, wish to return; and bad (col-

<sup>70</sup> Council III Document 4, C(45)3, 2 July 1945.

laborators, criminals, etc.). They were prepared to help both the first two groups; that is, they were prepared to help some who did not wish to return home. To this, the Slav nations objected.

The debate during the Council Session occupied five full meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on Policy and a large part of one plenary session.<sup>71</sup> Two important decisions were taken: care could be given without agreement with the country of origin; and the Administration was authorized "to make agreements with the . . . occupying authorities in control of areas of Germany for the care or transport of displaced persons provided that the basic supplies, equipment and transport . . . shall not be a charge on the resources of the Administration."<sup>72</sup>

In order to meet as far as possible the desires of the Slav nations and the claim that the promise of care would delay repatriation, the permission to provide care was limited to six months;<sup>73</sup> it was stated to be a temporary activity, and the Administration was required to "make every effort . . . to encourage repatriation" and to "discuss with the governments concerned the operations."

The prohibition on the use of Administration resources was proposed by the United States delegation with the explanation that "it was intended that the cost of the care of these displaced persons in Germany should be a charge on the German economy. They were merely proposing by this amendment to adopt a method which would be more effective than if UNRRA itself paid out the money."<sup>74</sup> This important restriction which more than any other factor affected and controlled the relations of the Administration to the military authorities in Germany was not otherwise officially debated or discussed.

After the Council Session the hardly interrupted negotiations between the Administration and the military authorities controlling the American, British, and French Zones were continued. The restriction

<sup>71</sup> Council III Document 57, *Ad Hoc* Committee on Policy (Ad Hoc/P) 3, minutes 1st meeting, 10 August 1945; Council III Document 68, Ad Hoc/P 6, verbatim minutes 2d meeting, 13 August 1945; Council III Document 125, Ad Hoc/P 13, verbatim minutes 3d meeting, 16 August 1945; Council III Document 126, Ad Hoc/P 14, verbatim minutes 4th meeting, 17 August 1945; Council III Document 129, Ad Hoc/P 15, verbatim minutes 5th meeting, 18 August 1945; *Journal*, Third Council, pp. 86-92.

<sup>72</sup> Resolution 71.

<sup>73</sup> Extended, after expiration, to the next Council session by Resolution 92, paragraph 1.

<sup>74</sup> Council III Document 202, Ad Hoc/P24, minutes 5th meeting, 18 August 1945, p. 4.

placed by the Council on the use of UNRRA resources made it quite clear that the responsibility for making basic supplies available would continue to rest on the military authorities. This naturally affected the areas in which, and the degree to which, these authorities would insist on retaining control or would be prepared to concede control to the Administration.

The negotiations proceeded, now smoothly, now with interruptions. At last the British Agreement was formally signed on 27 November 1945, the French on 18 February 1946, and the United States on 19 February 1946.<sup>75</sup> These Agreements apportioned responsibility as follows: <sup>76</sup>

1. Military responsibilities:
  - (a) Full responsibility for all basic supplies;
  - (b) Coördination of movements, plans, and the provision of transport facilities in connection with repatriation;
  - (c) Security and maintenance of law and order.
2. UNRRA's responsibilities:
  - (a) Internal administration of assembly centers housing United Nations' displaced persons; <sup>77</sup>
  - (b) Coördination and supervision of voluntary agencies working in displaced persons assembly centers;
  - (c) Provision of amenity supplies (includes items such as tobacco, cigarettes, razor blades, candy for children, recreational equipment and educational supplies);
  - (d) Operation of the Central Tracing Bureau;
  - (e) Coöperation with military and governmental authorities in arranging repatriation of displaced persons including their reception in their home countries.

The British and French Agreements provided that "nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as derogating or detracting from or limiting the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, or as imposing on UNRRA obligations inconsistent with resolutions of the UNRRA Council."<sup>78</sup> This was omitted from the United States Agreement which instead provided that

<sup>75</sup> For full texts, see *infra*, Appendix Five, Documents 3a, 4, 5.

<sup>76</sup> CC(46)47 (CC Docs., II, 170).

<sup>77</sup> In fact somewhat wider, for stateless persons, persecutees (see *infra*, Part Seven, Chapter II, Section 5), etc., were included; see paragraph 2 of the respective agreements.

<sup>78</sup> See Appendix Five, Documents 3a and 4, paragraph 1.

The Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater retains overall responsibility for the care, control and movement of displaced persons in the U.S. Zone; UNRRA, subject to the laws, general orders, rules and regulations, directives, and over-all supervision of the Commanding General, USFET, will to the extent permitted by the resolutions of the UNRRA Council perform designated functions relating to displaced persons.<sup>79</sup>

All the Agreements provided that UNRRA would maintain zone headquarters, district headquarters, and subordinate offices at lower levels as might be agreed upon.<sup>80</sup> In general, the United States Agreement was considered to have retained greater power for the military authorities and to have granted less to UNRRA than the other two, though it may be doubted whether in practice these distinctions made any difference. To the French Agreement were attached letters: from the French, requesting assistance in the supply of basic foodstuffs; and from the Administration, indicating it would do all that it could, within the limits of its resolutions, to assist and stating that it was "prepared to interpret UNRRA obligations to furnish supplementary amenity supplies in a liberal and humanitarian spirit."<sup>81</sup>

The actual, as distinguished from the legal, assumption by the Administration of responsibility for administering assembly centers of displaced persons had been gradually proceeding during the summer and autumn of 1945. A special Subcommittee, created by the Central Committee to investigate the displaced persons operation,<sup>82</sup> reported on 21 March 1946 that "despite the delay in finalizing these agreements [with the Military Authorities], it was understood . . . that UNRRA for all practical purposes assumed its responsibilities in the field in the United States Zone on 1 October 1945, and in the British Zone on 1 November 1945."<sup>83</sup> On 1 October 1945, the total Class I personnel in assembly centers was about 3,369<sup>84</sup> (equivalent to about 260 teams of 13 each), a number more than sufficient for the tasks.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, Document 5, paragraph 3.

<sup>80</sup> See *ibid.*, Documents 3a and 4, paragraph 3; Document 5, paragraph 4.

<sup>81</sup> See *ibid.*, Document 3b, c.

<sup>82</sup> CC(46)23, minutes 21st meeting, 7 February 1946 (CC Docs., II, 94-96).

<sup>83</sup> CC(46)27, minutes 22d meeting, 4 March 1946 (CC Docs., II, 120).

<sup>84</sup> "Statistics, European Region," Vol. II. For full personnel statistics see *infra*, Appendix Ten, Section I.

<sup>85</sup> By 31 December 1945 the number had decreased to about 2,957 and never thereafter exceeded 3,000.

## 7. THE FINAL DECISIONS

At the Fourth Council Session, March and May 1946, the displaced persons operations again gave rise to prolonged and heated discussion during which the ground covered at the Third Session was again trampled upon, but in a much less temperate fashion. By this time the delegates could comment, not only on actual operations, but, also, unlike in the earlier sessions, on actual UNRRA participation in the operations. The Slav nations used UNRRA as a convenient means of attacking, with ill-supported evidence, the United States and United Kingdom Governments, but primarily the latter,<sup>86</sup> as at the Fifth Session they were to use the same means with the same lack of supporting evidence for attacking the two Governments, but primarily the former.<sup>87</sup> Authority to assist persecutees was somewhat enlarged,<sup>88</sup> and authority to supervise the care of displaced persons, even without the permission of the country of origin, was extended, but a further attempt was made to meet the desires of the Slav nations by emphasizing heavily the paramount importance of aiding and encouraging repatriation by removing handicaps, making information available to governments of origin, ascertaining which displaced persons wished to return home, and by reporting every two months to the Central Committee on the problems and progress of repatriation and/or other aspects of the operation. In addition, the existence of displaced persons who could not or would not return home and the consequent need for resettlement were formally recognized, and member governments were urged to consider these matters and "to do all in their power to expedite the early creation of a United Nations body capable of dealing in an effective manner with" the whole problem.<sup>89</sup>

At the Fifth Council Session, August 1946, there was a repetition of the disputes and decisions of the Third and Fourth Sessions. Once again, authorization to the Administration to supervise the care of displaced persons was extended. Again it was insisted that the main task was to assist repatriation. A series of detailed suggestions, including the removal of Administration personnel who discouraged repatriation, was made. There was, however, one important new decision. The Administration was to turn over its responsibility, as

<sup>86</sup> *Journal*, Fourth Council, pp. 82, 93-95, etc.

<sup>87</sup> *Journal*, Fifth Council, pp. 79, 90-91, etc.

<sup>88</sup> Resolution 90.

<sup>89</sup> Resolution 92.

soon as possible but in no case later than 30 June 1947, to the International Refugee Organization (IRO), to be formed under the auspices of the United Nations, or other appropriate organization. In this connection the Administration was permitted to adjust its eligibility regulations so that they might coincide with those developed by IRO, and it was also permitted to participate in resettlement activities.<sup>90</sup>

The formation of the Preparatory Commission of IRO (PCIRO) was in the spring of 1947 sufficiently far advanced to permit discussions during which the Administration made available to the officials of PCIRO much detailed information and personnel. On 30 June 1947 the operation and the personnel conducting it were formally transferred,<sup>91</sup> and UNRRA work and responsibility were at an end.

#### 8. THE OPERATION

Though only a small part of the Administration's resources was expended on the operation, and though its activities were for the most part limited to supervising the care of only a part of the total of displaced persons, a large percentage of its personnel was engaged in this activity and was able, in spite of national conflicts and other difficulties, in spite of the earlier uncertainties, in spite of certain administrative weaknesses and inefficiencies, to render immense service and help to many in dire need of assistance.

As a result of Council decisions and force of circumstances the Administration engaged in substantial displaced persons operations in five areas: the American, British, and French Zones of Germany; the American, British, and French Zones of Austria; Italy; the Middle East; and China.

In Germany and Austria the Administration supervised the care in assembly centers of only those displaced persons who were eligible for UNRRA assistance in accord with resolutions and Administration decisions. As of 31 December 1945 this amounted, in Germany, to the supervision of about 263 out of a total of 323 assembly centers, 81.4 per cent of persons in centers, and 57.4 per cent of all displaced persons in Germany.<sup>92</sup> In Austria<sup>93</sup> the percentage of displaced persons

<sup>90</sup> Resolution 99.

<sup>91</sup> For text of the Agreement between PCIRO and UNRRA, see Appendix Eight, Document 5; see also Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 6.

<sup>92</sup> CC(46)47 (CC Docs., II, 171).

<sup>93</sup> UNRRA Displaced Persons Operations in Austria were conducted under pre-

whose care was supervised by the Administration was smaller. In neither case did the Administration pay for or make available basic supplies or pay for the transportation cost of repatriation.

In Italy similar operations were conducted until the UNRRA-SACMED (Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations) Agreement became effective on 1 August 1946.<sup>94</sup> After that, the operations remained nearly the same. Although basic supplies were thenceforth made available by the Italian Government out of what were technically Italian resources, much of the food and clothing came from the UNRRA Italian supply program and was separately handled and routed more or less directly from the importing ships to the assembly centers under the direction of Administration officials. As in Austria, the displaced persons whose care was supervised by the Administration were a minority of the total in the country. Unlike those in Austria or Germany, over 50 per cent of the displaced persons receiving UNRRA assistance did not live in assembly centers.<sup>95</sup> To those outside such centers, goods were issued from stocks dispensed by Administration officials but technically supplied by the Italian Government, and cash, again dispensed by Administration officials from proceeds of sale.

In the Middle East the Administration maintained camps and made available, as a charge against its funds, basic supplies (the sites for the camps were made available by the Egyptian and Palestine Governments). The Administration also defrayed the cost of repatriation (principally by sea to the Dodecanese Islands, Greece, and Yugoslavia).

The operations in China involved four categories of persons: internally displaced Chinese; overseas Chinese in China; Chinese outside China; and Europeans in China. About one million of the first group were assisted by the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA) through the maintenance of transit centers. About 21,000 overseas Chinese were repatriated, principally to Singapore, Malaya, and Burma. About 8,600 Chinese were repatriated to China. About 15,500 Europeans in China received help, and of these some 5,500 were repatriated or resettled.<sup>96</sup>

liminary agreements with the military authorities of the British, French, and United States Zones; no final agreements were made; see monograph, W. Cox, "Relations with the Military: Agreements and Negotiations Covering DP Operations," Austria.

<sup>94</sup> See Appendix Five, Document 6.

<sup>95</sup> "Statistics, European Region," Vol. V.

<sup>96</sup> UNRRA China Office, Monthly Report, June 1947.




In addition to these, there were Poles in the Middle East, East Africa, and India who were eligible for UNRRA assistance but who did not receive it, being maintained instead by the United Kingdom Government. Negotiations for their handover to the Administration were never successfully completed because of difficulties regarding the method of maintaining them (many lived not in assembly centers but widely scattered in small groups) and for other reasons. The Administration did, however, contribute between 1 August 1946<sup>97</sup> and 30 June 1947<sup>98</sup> to the care of about 17,000 living in camps administered by the United Kingdom Government and to the cost of repatriating those who chose to return to Poland.

Almost all the receiving country missions engaged in some displaced persons activities, assisting either internally displaced persons, returning nationals, or nonnationals found in the country. Generally, however, these were considered part of the work of the mission and not a separate operation.

The displaced persons operation as such, so far as the Administration was concerned, did not involve internally displaced persons, though these often, through the country missions, did receive UNRRA help. The Administration was not responsible for the care or even for the supervision of the care granted to all externally displaced persons but only for those individuals specifically eligible in accord with UNRRA resolutions. At the beginning of 1946 when probably about three quarters of the externally displaced persons had been repatriated, UNRRA responsibility extended to only about one half (approximately one million) of those still requiring assistance. By far the greater number of these was in Germany. The operation there, in terms of numbers, time devoted to its consideration, publicity accorded it, or by any other standard, was certainly more significant than all the others combined. The numbers under UNRRA supervision or receiving UNRRA care were approximately:

<sup>97</sup> *Report of the Director General (DGR)* 12, p. 75.

<sup>98</sup> DGR 13, p. 43.



**MAP VIII. DISPLACED PERSONS OPERATIONS, AUSTRIA**

TABLE 43<sup>a</sup>

## DISPLACED PERSONS CARED FOR OR SUPERVISED BY UNRRA AT PEAK PERIODS

<i>Location</i>	<i>Numbers</i>
Germany	715,000 <sup>b</sup>
Austria	46,000 <sup>c</sup>
Italy	26,000 <sup>d</sup>
Middle East	37,000 <sup>e</sup>
China	45,000 <sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> These figures, given in even hundreds, represent the number assisted at approximately the peak period.

<sup>b</sup> As of May 1946, Report of the Director General (DGR) 14, p. 161.

<sup>c</sup> As of April 1946, *ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>d</sup> As of July 1946, "Statistics, European Region," Vol. V.

<sup>e</sup> As of May 1944, DGR 14, p. 159.

<sup>f</sup> UNRRA China Office, Monthly Report, June 1947.

## II. The Work

### 1. SCOPE

DISPLACED PERSONS in Europe came from every part of the world.<sup>1</sup> In the summer of 1945 UNRRA teams participated in the repatriation of Russians, Frenchmen, Italians, North and South Americans, Chinese, and many others. By the autumn of 1945 there were six main groups of displaced persons with which the Administration was concerned: Poles, Polish Ukrainians, so-called "Balts" (actually Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, who in spite of their different languages and religions were generally lumped together), Yugoslavs, Jews, and, in the Middle East, Greeks. There were other major groups in the care of which the Administration was not involved. These included the so-called *Volksdeutsche*<sup>2</sup> (Germans from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and former German territories placed under Polish administration), Hungarians, and others. With the exception of the Jews, many of whom came to Germany from Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere after the conclusion of hostilities (the "infiltrates"), practically all the other displaced persons were in Germany or Austria when the fighting stopped. Their approximate numbers were as follows:

<sup>1</sup> This chapter is based on a very large body of material relating to the displaced persons operations. This material, in part consists of the following types: (a) general descriptive reports, prepared each month by each UNRRA team, covering the assembly center or centers under the supervision of the team, and also reports, usually monthly, likewise prepared by the teams, dealing with specialized subjects such as assembly center population; nutrition; medical, nursing, dental activities; welfare activities; educational and training activities; etc.; (b) reports, prepared by the field inspectors operating out of the district headquarters, dealing with activities in individual assembly centers; (c) reports, prepared monthly by the district, zone, and Central Headquarters, dealing with all aspects of the operation; (d) military inspection reports dealing with specific assembly centers; and (e) more than 100 monographs describing individual assembly centers; employment policy, nutritional standards, or medical activities in a particular zone; or eligibility or repatriation policies of the Administration. See also *supra* Part Two, Chapter I, Section 11, for organizational structure of UNRRA displaced persons operations; Part Two, Chapter VII, Section 6, for transfer to PCIRO; and *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section IV.

<sup>2</sup> Cables: Washington to London 9638, 12 January 1946; London to Arolsen 332, 29 January 1946; London to Vienna 190, 29 January 1946.

TABLE 44  
DISPLACED PERSONS UNDER UNRRA CARE OR SUPERVISION

	December 1944	December 1945	September 1946	June 1947
Germany:				
Poles	...	427,407	302,725	136,180
Polish Ukrainians <sup>a</sup>	...	...	...	99,078
Balts	...	132,098	176,362	148,776
Yugoslavs	...	18,029	14,439	9,324
Jews	...	14,000	120,849	134,864
Others	...	85,874	81,255	30,629
Austria:				
Poles	...	677,468	695,650	558,851
Polish Ukrainians <sup>b</sup>	...	11,236	9,239	2,899
Balts	...	9,190	...	7,471
Yugoslavs	...	1,594	2,270	1,841
Jews	...	14,877	8,479	6,959
Others	...	4,361	10,400	5,723
Italy:				
Jews in camps	...	8,524	9,808	3,166
Jews out of camps	...	49,782	40,196	28,059
Others	...	10,265	...	9,356
Middle East, East Africa, and India:				
Greeks	5,361	451	123	9
Poles <sup>c</sup>	1	6	30,004	27,007
Yugoslavs	27,399	8,166	762	647
Others	6,391	201	73	42

<sup>a</sup> Included under Poles and/or others in December 1945 and September 1946.

<sup>b</sup> Reported mainly under Poles, partly under Yugoslavs and others in September 1946.

<sup>c</sup> In September 1946 and June 1947 includes Polish displaced persons in East Africa, Palestine, India, and Lebanon, for whom UNRRA assumed responsibility (on a reimbursable basis) as of 1 August 1946.

In the practical day-to-day work with these unhappy people, the representatives of the Administration were restricted to the specific tasks authorized by the Council and were guided by the policies, determined by that body, which, however, were so broadly expressed that far more precise definition of policy was essential. The necessary elaboration came from two sources: from the various levels of the Administration itself; and from the military and national authorities

with and under whom the Administration had to work.<sup>3</sup> Whereas the refinements developed within the Administration were more or less—but never precisely—consistent, there was no necessary agreement between the decisions made by one government authority in one place with those made by another in another place at a different time. Since, in spite of protests, sometimes successful, the Administration had to accept the orders issued by such authorities, even if they were not in accord with the views of the Administration, it inevitably followed that policies and the practices stemming from them—nutritional standards, definition of eligible displaced persons, numbers of displaced persons engaged in camp work paid by the German authorities—differed in detail from region to region and from time to time.

The significant areas of policy and practice—no real separation should be made—may be conveniently divided as follows:

(1) Areas in which authorities other than UNRRA (generally American and British military, either combined or separately, but occasionally national governments) had the determining voice: care and maintenance (housing, clothing, and especially nutrition); health and medical care; and resettlement.

(2) Areas in which UNRRA had the determining voice but in which implementation depended to a large extent on others—areas, therefore, in which there tended to be considerable controversy: eligibility; repatriation; employment.

(3) Areas in which UNRRA had the determining voice and was able, without much let or hindrance, to carry out with its own personnel and resources its own policies and practices: displaced persons self-government; education and vocational training; and recreation and welfare. This area also included certain aspects of policies falling for the most part in either of the other areas, especially those aspects of health and employment which were closely related to vocational training.

The determining factor as to where decisions lay was, of course,

<sup>3</sup> The Central Committee, perhaps surprisingly, made little or no contribution to this process of elaboration of fundamental Council decrees. Prior to the Fourth Council Session (March 1946) the Central Committee in 26 meetings considered the displaced persons operations in only 7, and never significantly. At its 27th meeting it received an important report on the operations and thereafter it considered reports submitted in terms of Resolution 92 but made no important decisions and initiated no new policies.

the control of supplies, funds, and power. The decision that Administration funds were not to be used for basic supplies (housing, clothing, food) <sup>4</sup> necessarily left decisions regarding the standards of maintenance with those who did make such supplies available, that is, in most regions, the military authorities. Since the resources and power to provide and control transport and movement and to maintain law, order, and security <sup>5</sup> rested with the same authorities, it was inevitable that the implementation of eligibility and repatriation policies was dependent upon them.

## 2. CARE AND MAINTENANCE

The basic standard of accommodation was 30 square feet of sleeping space per person,<sup>6</sup> that is, an area 6 feet by 5. In practice, however, as space for other activities—meals, work, recreation—had to come out of this allowance, the space available for sleeping quarters was smaller, and inevitably very crowded. The actual physical accommodation varied from tents on Egyptian deserts to castles (not modern or well equipped) in Germany. In general, however, at least in Germany, Austria, and Italy, it fell into three main types: caserne camps, consisting of permanent buildings (brick and stucco or stone) of three or four stories, which had generally been German army centers; barrack camps, consisting of one-story wooden buildings, which had usually been concentration camps or centers of forced labor or were newly built for the purpose; and dwelling-house camps. For purely physical purposes the first of these types was generally the most satisfactory and the best equipped—the German Army and SS units had not lived too badly.

The location of these types, of course, varied considerably. The first two might be in or very near cities, such as the S. S. Caserne in Munich, Lyssenko Camp in Hanover, or Hanau Camp in Hanau (all caserne type); Adriatico in Milan, Hellbrun in Salzburg, Schleissheim in Munich, Spittal in Spittal (all barrack type). They might, on the contrary (and this made a very real difference in, for example, the employment practices), be in the country relatively far from any con-

<sup>4</sup> See Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 6.

<sup>5</sup> See *ibid.*, Sections 3, 6.

<sup>6</sup> Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), "Guide to Assembly Centre Administration," September 1944, revised May 1945, Part II, Section 4.

centrated centers of population, such as Wildflecken, Landsberg, Leipheim, Hohne, better known as Belsen (all caserne type); or Augustdorf (barrack type).

The dwelling-house camps might consist of several entire villages, such as Lahde, which included a cluster of eight complete villages but not the farm land between; one complete village, Meerbeck; a completely integrated part of a town, Lampertheim; part of a town but with shops used by Germans mixed among the dwellings occupied by the displaced persons, Zeilsheim; relatively few houses scattered through a town, Blomberg; a complete unit of houses in or by a city such as Haunstetten in Augsburg, Neu Freiman Siedlung in Munich, or New Palestine in Salzburg. The houses, of course, varied considerably one from another. This type, therefore, with its much less uniform accommodations presented more difficulty, for example, in respect of fair distribution of living quarters than did the caserne or barrack types in which one room was much like another. In general, the typical house, formerly occupied by two German families but assigned to six displaced person families, each of which was crowded into one room, had two floors with three rooms and a kitchen on each floor, one toilet between floors (no bath or shower).

Every effort was made to place families together, single men in one part, and single women in another. This, however, was not always possible, and a couple might have to share a room with another couple or with two single men or women. Separate rooms within very large ones were frequently formed by flimsy partitions of hanging sheets or papers. Since some cooking was done in these, and since they were generally heated separately, there had to be stoves with piles of wood or coal in addition to the beds, which were frequently in two tiers. It is evident, therefore, that there was much overcrowding and little or no opportunity for privacy. These types by no means, however, exhaust the variety of accommodations supplied. In Cremona, for example, the camp was located in a requisitioned school.

Most camps housed relatively static groups which, if they moved to their country of origin or to some new country, moved by very gradual stages. Some, on the contrary, were especially maintained for groups in transit, such as Luitpold, Munich, which served as a temporary shelter for Jewish infiltrators before they were assigned to more permanent homes, or Funk Caserne, Munich, which was a transit center for

displaced persons who were being either repatriated or resettled. The camps, or assembly centers, varied in population from about 500 (New Palestine) to over 15,000 (Wildflecken). The average size was about 2,000-3,000.

Many displaced persons lived out of camps altogether, finding rooms in the homes of the resident population. This was particularly true in the southern half of the French Zone, in Germany, and in Italy.

UNRRA representatives, and also sometimes outside observers, continually reported on the overcrowded conditions and demanded or begged more accommodations. The military authorities were, however, responsible for the government of the region in which the camps were located (this applies primarily to Germany), and housing in all such regions was very scarce so that the appeals generally went unanswered.

The displaced persons had some sort of roof over their heads; they had reasonably adequate washing and sanitary facilities; by crowding the sleeping quarters, space was created for educational, training, and recreational activities; but there was little or no comfort, no approach to privacy, and the living space was, in normal terms, altogether inadequate. Over this, UNRRA certainly had no control though occasionally it could effect some improvement.<sup>7</sup>

The number of camps supervised by UNRRA varied continually. Repatriation and the tendency to consolidate small units into large ones served to decrease the number, but this was to some extent offset by the steady infiltration of additional displaced persons (mostly Jews).

TABLE 45  
NUMBER OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS  
IN GERMANY<sup>a</sup>

	<i>American Zone</i>	<i>British Zone</i>	<i>French Zone</i>	<i>Austria</i>	<i>Italy</i>
December 1945	134	78	15 227	25	
June 1946	154	98	36	38	
December 1946	400	443	78 921	30	
June 1947	416	272	45	21	8

<sup>a</sup> "Statistics, European Region," Vols. III, IV, V.

<sup>7</sup> There is no intention here to blame or criticize other authorities for not providing more space; without still further cramping the already cramped indigenous populations—which any responsible authorities would have hesitated to do—no more space was available.

The clothing goal was at least one complete set of clothes per person per year. No displaced person went naked, but they frequently used strange and worn garments. UNRRA and the voluntary agencies added to the clothes made available by the military authorities, but the supplies at best were not more than enough for the barest needs.

Of all items connected with physical care, food was probably the most important. As elsewhere, the theoretical UNRRA goal for the normal consumer was 2,650 calories per day, but nowhere was this achieved. The original SHAEF scale allowed for 2,000 calories per day for the normal displaced person consumer and additional amounts for special groups. In practice, however, the supply varied from area to area. In the United States Zone, Germany, the normal displaced person consumer received 2,300 calories a day until May 1946 and thereafter 2,000. Workers received an extra 1,100 per day, pregnant and nursing women 700, children 500, and persecutees (mostly Jews) 200. In the British Zone, the normal consumer received 2,170 calories per day from 1 October 1945; 1,850 from 1 March 1946; and 1,550 (the standard German ration in the same area) from 1 August 1946; heavy workers received approximately 1,000 extra calories, pregnant and nursing women 1,100, and children 400.

In the French Zone, in October 1945, the authorities agreed to a 2,300-calorie ration. This, however, could never be achieved, and after a period of considerable difficulty a 1,685 level was established in October 1946. In Austria the same level was established as that for the indigenous population.

In most camps there was at least one central kitchen in which one hot meal was prepared each day. This meal was usually soup containing potatoes and a suggestion of meat. It might be eaten in a communal hall or taken in containers to rooms. The practice varied, not only from camp to camp, but also within the same camp. Frequently, single men ate in a dining hall and families in their rooms. In Italy, due to the abundance of flies and the danger of disease especially in the summer months, an effort was made to forbid cooking and eating in rooms; elsewhere it was condoned or even encouraged as a contribution to the restoration of normal family life. The cooking was usually done by the displaced persons. For other meals, dry rations—bread and perhaps some cheese—were issued for consumption in rooms. The worst feature of the diet was the heavy concentration on carbohydrates—

bread and potatoes—which usually constituted about two thirds of the total. Some supplementary food, such as Red Cross parcels, supplied by the voluntary agencies did expand and vary the meager fare.

The UNRRA contribution to the food problem was the supervision of internal distribution, aid and advice in effective preparation, and especially a constant battle to make sure that what was due from the military and local authorities was actually supplied. Food reached a particular camp in various ways from various sources. Bulk products—grain, canned and powdered milk for children—frequently came from Army stocks, while more perishable foods were obtained from local sources. These products might be delivered by the Army authorities or the local suppliers direct to a camp, or to a warehouse from which they were delivered by UNRRA trucks to the consuming camp; or UNRRA trucks might collect them direct from the suppliers on orders issued by the Army authorities or local government officials. The UNRRA supply officer was required to prepare countless forms, week by week, indicating the camp population, special groups, stocks on hand, etc. Since the indigenous populations resented the giving of food to the displaced persons, although they had brought them there and had enjoyed their labor during years of success, and since the military authorities frequently sympathized with the indigenous populations, for whom they were responsible, it required unremitting efforts by the UNRRA officials to keep their charges from starvation.<sup>8</sup>

UNRRA also contributed to the care of the displaced persons in an amenity supply program:

TABLE 46

## UNRRA AMENITY SUPPLIES FOR DISPLACED PERSONS

	<i>U.S. Dollar Equivalents</i>	<i>Gross Long Tons</i>
Food	\$2,427,500	5,046
Clothing, textiles, footwear	1,177,700	1,034
Medical and sanitation	677,700	789
Agricultural rehabilitation	37,500	406
Industrial rehabilitation	3,210,800	5,578
Total	\$7,531,200	12,453

<sup>8</sup> Again, the intention is not to be critical of the military authorities, who did make the food available and who were faced with a difficult problem and short supplies.

The main items included under "food" consisted primarily of cigarettes, candy, and soap; under "clothing," layettes and other garments for children; and under "industrial rehabilitation," household goods (pots, pans, etc.), recreation supplies, and some supplies for the vocational training centers.<sup>9</sup> In addition, any able camp director got what he needed and what he could by any means available to him. In Austria, where camp gardens were essential to supplement the thin diet, when seeds were not supplied, camp cigarettes, with the full approval of the displaced persons, were used to get them. Ruined factories, barges, hospitals, were searched for machines and tools, for refrigerators, and for X-ray and other apparatus. The methods used were a combination of the devious and the bold and the opportunistic, but the end was the same: to get equipment vitally needed for the welfare of the displaced persons.

### 3. *MILITARY MEDICAL PROGRAM*

The Army medical and sanitation program was simple and clear: camps should be clean, persons should be deloused and immunized against such diseases as smallpox, typhoid, and typhus, in order to control and prevent the spread of epidemics. Practical responsibility for the program rested with the military authorities until about the end of 1945.<sup>10</sup> During that year, UNRRA doctors and nurses were arriving in steadily increasing numbers and were gradually assuming supervision of the working camps, but no organized UNRRA program had been developed. Direction and control rested with the Army doctors. The program of this period succeeded within the limits that had been established. Epidemic diseases were kept firmly under control. The development of the program to include wider aims—more general attention to all aspects of the health of the displaced persons and the training of doctors and nurses—fell within the area of activities which UNRRA could pursue on its own.

### 4. *RESETTLEMENT*

Resettlement, in the nature of things, lay altogether outside the control of UNRRA; it depended almost exclusively on the individual ac-

<sup>9</sup> Monograph, K. Winklerova, "Miscellaneous Commodities Section," ERO Section II, P. 3.

<sup>10</sup> Central Committee (CC) (46)47 (Compilation of the Documents of the Central Committee of the Council [CC Docs.], II, 170, paragraph 3).

tions of national governments which had to advance such schemes and authorize immigration. By Council resolution the Administration was supposed to carry out operations for the care and maintenance of displaced persons on a purely temporary basis pending repatriation.<sup>11</sup> Theoretically, then, even care could not be given to anyone clearly wishing resettlement. While it is true that the Council had insisted on the closest coöperation with IGCR, the international body specifically charged with the problem of resettlement, it was to be for the purpose of invoking collaboration in the work of repatriation.<sup>12</sup> At its Fourth Session (March 1946) the Council directed the Administration to compile data concerning skills, previous experience, and other qualifications for employment and permitted it to make such data available, in summary form without specification as to particular individuals, to intergovernmental organizations.<sup>13</sup> In a limited way this was bound to be of some assistance to IGCR in its work of resettlement. Finally, at the Fifth Session (August 1946) the Council authorized the Administration to enter into agreements with a view to assisting the work of resettlement.<sup>14</sup>

In December 1946 the Administration defined<sup>15</sup> the role its staff was to play in resettlement and stipulated that its funds were not to be used for such purposes, that it would not officially sponsor any scheme, select individuals, or suggest to any displaced person resettlement as an alternative to repatriation. In practice, field representatives of the Administration had, long before this, given minor assistance to resettlement activities by explaining immigration laws and requirements to individual displaced persons, by covertly aiding various Jewish organizations, particularly the American Joint Distribution Committee, to move people to Palestine, and by coöperating at all times with IGCR.

From the end of 1946 onward resettlement activities were somewhat more active but were still largely confined to examining proposed schemes and deciding, in order to protect the displaced persons from exploitation and to make certain that the schemes did not too obviously conflict with repatriation plans, whether to place them before the

<sup>11</sup> Resolution 71, paragraph 2c.

<sup>12</sup> Resolution 10, paragraph 6.

<sup>13</sup> Resolution 92, paragraph 2c.

<sup>14</sup> Resolution 99, paragraph 4c.

<sup>15</sup> Material furnished by UNRRA to the Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization (PCIRO), Document 116, "UNRRA's Responsibility with Regard to Resettlement of Displaced Persons," 4 December 1946.

displaced persons. The UNRRA staff also gave technical and administrative assistance in carrying out such schemes, some of which gave promise of involving substantial numbers.<sup>16</sup> The guiding principle was always that such efforts should be directed primarily toward those persons least likely to choose repatriation (that is, toward the Jews and Balts and not toward the Poles). The Director General wrote to all member governments asking their coöperation in developing opportunities for resettlement. The replies, however, were not very encouraging.<sup>17</sup>

### 5. ELIGIBILITY

Eligibility, that is, the entitlement of a person to receive UNRRA care as distinct from care rendered by other organizations, was something that could be and was determined by the Council of UNRRA. The efforts, however, to translate such determinations into practical, workable definitions and to implement them led to conflicts within UNRRA and with other agencies and organizations.

During the period when the UNRRA employees were, to all practical purposes, agents of the military authorities, that is, from the time they first went into the field in March 1945 until at least October 1945, during which period operations were being conducted in terms of the SCAEF Agreement,<sup>18</sup> the military officials assigned UNRRA workers to camps where they were needed, giving scant if any consideration to whether the residents of such camps were or were not eligible in UNRRA terms. At a later time, when relations had been more fully defined by the zonal and other agreements<sup>19</sup> and when UNRRA had developed its own field organization, the military authorities naturally felt that, since they were making available the basic supplies—the camp sites, food, etc.—they should decide who ought to receive aid.

<sup>16</sup> Operation "Balt Cygnet," a movement of Baltic women to the United Kingdom for domestic duties in hospitals; "Westward Ho," a plan for employing displaced persons in the United Kingdom; Operation "Black Diamond," a movement of displaced persons to Belgium to work in the mines; Operation "Grand National," a movement of Jewish displaced persons to Palestine on Palestinian certificates; "Northern Lights," a movement of 397 Jewish displaced persons to Norway; a movement of 1,400 displaced persons from the French Zones of Germany and Austria to France; a movement of 699 displaced persons to Brazil.

<sup>17</sup> CC(46)89, minutes 34th meeting, 9 August 1946, "Second Report on Operations under Resolution 92" (CC Docs., III, 109-110).

<sup>18</sup> See Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 5.      <sup>19</sup> See *ibid.*, Section 6.

to March 1945  
to October 1945

Basically, in relation to the actual operations which confronted the Administration, a succession of Council resolutions<sup>20</sup> had made eligible: nationals of the United Nations, stateless persons, and Italian nationals, if they had been displaced by the war; and nationals of other countries if they had been compelled to leave their former residences by action of the enemy because of their race, religion, or activities in favor of the United Nations. In applying these general regulations to specific cases the Administration was confronted by the following major problems: German Balts and *Volksdeutsche*; discharged soldiers and prisoners of war; and posthostility refugees including unsuccessfully repatriated individuals.

The German Balts (properly the Balts) had formed the German-speaking groups in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the other nationals of which countries were considered as being undoubtedly eligible for UNRRA assistance. The *Volksdeutsche*—the term was used loosely to cover German-speaking groups in Czechoslovakia (the Sudetens), Poland, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere—were or had been nationals of United Nations countries and were certainly displaced by the war. On the other hand, these groups had certainly sympathized with and had generally actively aided the German invaders. They had often opted for German citizenship and were no longer recognized as nationals by the governments of their countries of origin. While aid to them might have been within the letter of the law, it seemed clearly contrary to the spirit. It was therefore formally determined by the Administration that they should not be considered eligible for UNRRA assistance.<sup>21</sup>

While nowhere specifically forbidden by resolutions to do so, it was never contemplated that the Administration would give aid to discharged soldiers of United Nations (quite obviously, discharged soldiers of other nations would not be eligible), since it was naturally supposed that the countries would themselves arrange for the return home of their own soldiers. Nevertheless, the problem did arise—principally in the Middle East and Italy—in respect of Polish and Yugoslav soldiers who had fought with the United Nations but who did not wish to return to their countries of origin. The unquestionably strong antirepatriation outlook of these groups was certainly contrary to the

<sup>20</sup> Resolutions 10, 46, 57, 60, 73, 90.

<sup>21</sup> European Region Order 40K, 14 August 1946.

Council emphasis on repatriation, and to have aided them might well have given rise to justified criticism by certain member states. On the other hand, other member states felt that these individuals deserved help, and that denial of it to those who had risked their lives for the United Nations cause would be an injustice. The Administration, therefore, struggled for some months to find a compromise and ultimately decided that help could be given to soldiers demobilized as individuals but not to those disbanded in groups.<sup>22</sup> To confuse the issue, perhaps, the Italian Mission was told that "no members . . . of any . . . military formation are eligible for any type of assistance from UNRRA."<sup>23</sup>

Though there was nothing in the resolutions forbidding UNRRA to extend its care to prisoners of war, it was again not expected that this would be necessary.<sup>24</sup> From time to time aid was, indeed, given to former prisoners of war without any difficulties being created. Nevertheless, a problem did arise, although not with United Nations prisoners but with prisoners of the United Nations. In July 1946 the United States Forces European Theater asked the Administration to accept Balts and Poles who had served in the German Army, had been captured by the United Nations forces, and were being held as prisoners of war. This request was referred to UNRRA Central Headquarters, Germany, which ruled that aid might be given to such persons provided the military authorities certified that each individual had not been a collaborator, war criminal, or traitor, was not a *Volksdeutsche* or German Balt, had been compelled against his will to enter the German armed forces, and had been completely discharged from all military connections. This ruling, subsequently embodied in a Central Headquarters order,<sup>25</sup> was in turn revised by both ERO and Headquarters without, however, alteration to this part, which would imply concurrence, though no other indication of approval by the higher offices was ever given.

The most serious problems arose in connection with posthostility

<sup>22</sup> Letters: Administration (ERO) to United Kingdom Foreign Office, 25 May 1946; Selene Gifford (Director, Displaced Persons Division, ERO) to Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan (Chief of Displaced Persons Operations, Germany), 14 June 1946; cables: London to Rome 1053, 26 April 1946; London to Cairo 841, 29 May 1946; London to Vienna 1361, 13 June 1946; London to Arolsen 2659, 26 July 1946.

<sup>23</sup> Cable, London to Rome 129, 13 January 1947.

<sup>24</sup> See Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 2.

<sup>25</sup> Central Headquarters, Germany, Eligibility Order 52, 24 June 1946.

refugees. After the end of the war large numbers of people left Poland and Yugoslavia; others fled from Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania. Most of them moved to Germany, Austria, or Italy and there claimed displaced person status. The great majority of these were Jews; ultimately, they constituted over 60 per cent of the Jews who were accorded aid. Every humanitarian argument was on the side of extending help to these unfortunate people who had suffered so much. Nevertheless, the Administration was confronted with a problem because it was only authorized to assist United Nations nationals if they had been displaced by the war, and ex-enemy nationals if they had been persecuted by the enemy. Superficially, neither of these classifications seemed to cover the posthostility refugees. In December 1945 the Administration solved the problem by invoking the doctrine<sup>26</sup> of "internal displacement"; that is, it was decided that, if a person had been "displaced" by the war, it was immaterial when external displacement occurred. It was safe to presume that all Jews had been "displaced" by the war; in fact, the Administration ruled that all Jews were automatically to be considered eligible under this ruling unless positive proof to the contrary was produced.<sup>27</sup>

This solved the Jewish problem quite satisfactorily—at least so far as UNRRA was concerned—but in turn it gave rise to another, for the ruling was equally applicable to posthostility political refugees from UNRRA member countries. To have given succor to these would certainly have been to go far beyond the intention of the governments which had established UNRRA. The dilemma was solved<sup>28</sup> by insisting that posthostility refugees produce "concrete evidence" of internal displacement caused by enemy persecution, except that in the case of groups who were victims of "discriminatory Nazi legislation" (the Jews, that is) no evidence was required. This solution—an attempt to provide some appearance of legal plausibility to the humanitarian policy of helping Jews and the practically wise policy of not helping posthostility refugees—was only achieved after months of discussion and even conflict between various offices of the Administration.<sup>29</sup> In spite of efforts<sup>30</sup> to obtain a ruling, by way of the Central

<sup>26</sup> Cable, Washington to London 8855, 28 December 1945.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*; CC(46)7 (CC Docs., II, 81); Council IV Document 89.

<sup>28</sup> European Region Order 40 I, 3 July 1946; see *infra*, Appendix Nine, Section IV, Document 3.

<sup>29</sup> Cable, London to Washington 1075, 9 February 1946, and others.

<sup>30</sup> CC(46)7 (CC Docs., II, 81); CC(46)47 (CC Docs., II, 176)—"It is, therefore, be-

Committee or the Council, from the member governments, the Administration was left, not in this case alone, to grapple with the nettles.

Another, if minor, aspect of this problem was raised by those (mostly Poles) who, having been repatriated, decided to return to Germany: were they displaced persons eligible for aid, or posthostility refugees ineligible? After a period of uncertainty and shifting<sup>31</sup> policies, it was decided that a person who had once reached his country of origin could no longer be considered eligible for aid.<sup>32</sup>

There were many other troublesome, if minor, questions: When did the war start? (For example, was a United Nations national displaced from Ethiopia by the Italian invasion of 1935 entitled to aid?) What happened if a husband were eligible and his wife were not? This type of problem, which developed from no academic discussion but from real cases, arose endlessly. Furthermore, the mere issuance of a decision by some higher echelon of the Administration brought no final settlement: there were still both the field levels of the Administration itself and the military authorities to be reckoned with. A meeting of UNRRA field representatives in London revealed that many in Germany believed that decisions regarding eligibility were settled, not by UNRRA, but by the military authorities.<sup>33</sup> Though it was later amended<sup>34</sup> as a result of instructions<sup>35</sup> from Displaced Persons Headquarters, Paris, the Administration officials in the United States Zone, Germany, even went so far as to issue a formal order to their personnel stating that "in any case of conflict in policy between military and UNRRA, military directives will control."<sup>36</sup> Most of the alterations—perhaps it would be better to say adjustments—made, often unconsciously, to policy directives by the field workers were insignificant, as were many of the disagreements that arose with the military authorities. A major disagreement, however, developed in connection with the Administration's policy in respect to posthostility refugees.

lieved that the forthcoming Council session will wish to consider this matter and to furnish further guidance to the Director General"—which it did not.

<sup>31</sup> Compare cable, London to Vienna 1496, 27 June 1946, with cable, London to Vienna 1584, 13 July 1946.

<sup>32</sup> Cable, London to Arolsen, Vienna, Rome, Cairo, 19 November 1946.

<sup>33</sup> Relief Services Conference, ERO, minutes special session IV on displaced persons, May 1946.

<sup>34</sup> United States Zone HQ, Administrative Order 181, 18 October 1946.

<sup>35</sup> Letter, Myer Cohen (Acting Chief, Displaced Persons Operations, Germany) to J. H. Whiting (United States Zone Director), 13 September 1946.

<sup>36</sup> United States Zone HQ, Administrative Order 146, 31 August 1946.

The authorities in the British Zone refused to accord displaced person status to individuals who arrived in the Zone after 30 June 1946.<sup>37</sup> The Administration long protested this decision. The Director General even raised the matter with the United Kingdom Prime Minister in August 1946 and followed it up with a letter to the United Kingdom Government in October.<sup>38</sup> First he defended the UNRRA policy against the possible charge that it was not sanctioned by any Council resolution by reference to Resolution 99 which permitted UNRRA to adjust its rules of eligibility to those adopted by PCIRO. This, however, gave the United Kingdom Government the opportunity to point out that at the same time the Administration was refusing to accept responsibility for certain other displaced persons who were, in terms of PCIRO regulations, equally eligible.<sup>39</sup> In spite of these Administration protests and in spite of the fact that the matter was raised in the Central Committee,<sup>40</sup> the United Kingdom authorities remained adamant. Later, the authorities in the United States Zone also established a limiting date; <sup>41</sup> to this, however, the Administration did not object.

The rules of eligibility having been established, there then arose the question of how to implement them. Theoretically, an individual's right to care was established before he was admitted to a camp. In practice, of course, most camps were fully established before the rules. It became necessary, therefore, to screen the residents to make certain that they were entitled to help. This process was carried out in different ways in different areas and almost always involved close, and occasionally unsatisfactory, relations with the military authorities. If the decision was to remove someone and if this had to be done forcibly, it had to be done by the military authorities. The determination that an individual was a collaborator (which rendered him ineligible) could only be made by these authorities. They were, therefore, heavily involved in the entire process. In Italy most of the work was done by the Administration; in Austria, by UNRRA screening teams with the right of appeal by the displaced persons to a military board. In the French Zone, Ger-

<sup>37</sup> Control Commission for Germany, Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons Division, Technical Instruction 6, 21 May 1946.

<sup>38</sup> Letter, LaGuardia to Hector McNeil (United Kingdom Minister of State), 14 October 1946.

<sup>39</sup> Letter, United Kingdom Foreign Office to Dudley Ward (General Counsel, ERO), 13 November 1946.

<sup>40</sup> CC(46)107, minutes 38th meeting, 18 October 1946 (CC Docs., IV, 58).

<sup>41</sup> European Command message SX. 4301, 21 April 1947.

many, the work was done by the Administration with responsibility for determining collaborators and traitors resting with the French authorities.<sup>42</sup> In the British Zone the disagreements between the Administration and the authorities on the rules delayed the screening operation, which was, however, ultimately carried out by nine boards, each consisting of one representative of the United Kingdom authorities and two of UNRRA.<sup>43</sup> The greatest difficulties occurred in the United States Zone,<sup>44</sup> perhaps because the UNRRA officials took a lenient view at a time when the military authorities were inclined to be strict and then shifted to a strict approach when the military authorities had become lenient. The UNRRA attempts to screen were abandoned<sup>45</sup> because of objections raised by the authorities, whereas the military screening, once interrupted, was considered unsatisfactory by the Administration.

These investigations, not conducted in the case of Jewish camps, were of course most upsetting to the displaced persons. It was obvious that the results could not be wholly satisfactory since clear proof of identity and background was something which, in the nature of things, few displaced persons could produce. In order, however, to meet the claims of some of its members that UNRRA was harboring individuals not entitled to aid, the Administration could hardly have done less than it did.

#### 6. REPATRIATION

Repatriation was the one activity on which the Council insisted. However unrealistic the field workers may have thought it, the Administration was bound to honor its instructions. The impact differed from one area to another. There were relatively few difficulties in the Middle East, where all the Greeks and all but a very small handful of Yugoslavs wanted to return. The Poles there, who were at least uncertain, were not under direct UNRRA supervision, so daily, practical operations were not much affected. In Italy there was no problem, for practically all the UNRRA assisted displaced persons were Jews, and

<sup>42</sup> Bulletin 9, "Categories of Eligible Displaced Persons," 26 April 1946; Bulletin 19, "Determination of Eligibility."

<sup>43</sup> Zone Directive 3, "Eligibility for UNRRA Assistance," 14 October 1946, amended 13 January 1947.

<sup>44</sup> Zone Administrative Order 51, 23 April 1946.

<sup>45</sup> Cables: United States Zone HQ to Districts 05/14, 14 February 1947; United States Zone HQ to Districts 12/6, 3 March 1947.

no one seriously expected them to return to their lands of origin. In Germany and Austria the problem was real. Of the major groups in those areas, there was little or no chance that the Jews, Balts, and Polish Ukrainians would return. The Poles and Yugoslavs, on the other hand, were, both theoretically and practically, likely to consider repatriation. A fully realistic effort should have been concentrated on these two groups, but unfortunately it was felt that a policy—particularly a Council policy—should be applied to all, with the possible exception of the Jews, for whom a special status was tacitly accepted by everyone. Much the same efforts directed toward the Poles were, therefore, likewise adopted—even if frequently halfheartedly—for the Balts and Polish Ukrainians.

These efforts cut across all other policies, and all other schemes for working with the displaced persons were judged in terms of their probable effect on repatriation. Unfortunately, as the field workers had no reliable means of judging how and why the human mind and emotions functioned as they did, there existed no way of judging what did in fact encourage or discourage repatriation.

One deputy director general insisted that no person would return home unless conditions (affecting accommodations, food, and recreation) in the camps were clearly worse than conditions in the home countries. Another deputy director general as vehemently insisted that the displaced persons having suffered so much would not return until they had been, physically and psychologically, built up so that they would have the strength to face the undoubtedly difficult life that awaited them. Some people felt that vocational training, by instilling confidence and giving an individual a means of supporting himself, aided repatriation; others were convinced that such activities held the students away from their home country. Some, including quite naturally the Polish Government, were certain that the presence in camps in any official capacity of individuals connected with the so-called "London" Poles delayed repatriation—as it undoubtedly did in some cases. Others concluded from close observation that many Poles would only believe what they were told by their traditional leaders and would and did return only if such leaders assured them it was desirable to return—as many leaders, attached to the London Poles, though personally unwilling to return, did assure the farm workers and mechanics. It was easily possible to point to certain camps where London Poles had prom-

inent positions and where the rate of repatriation was high to prove this thesis.

The unfortunate aspect of all this was that practically everything was considered desirable or undesirable in terms of its effect on repatriation—something about which everyone could and did have violent opinions but, necessarily, little or no knowledge.

Official policy and actual practices were subject to certain changes. From the collapse of Germany until the autumn of 1945, when the military authorities were in charge, the number actively desiring repatriation outran the physical means. During this period about six million people returned home. There was no need to urge anyone to go. It was, perhaps, unfortunate that the limited transport facilities then available did not permit the mass return of Poles (understandably enough, those returning to the USSR had first call on transport to the east); for, with the first flush of enthusiasm on liberation, practically all might have gone, thus eliminating one of the dire problems of 1946 and 1947.

During the winter of 1945 and 1946 repatriation dwindled to very low levels. At first this did not greatly disturb anyone since transport facilities and conditions in the home countries were not such as to make movement in the winter season very attractive. With the coming of spring in 1946 the problem, however, became acute. Conflicting prophecies had been made. The actual movement was certainly disappointing and therefore gave rise to a spate of criticism and accusations. The Council, at its Fourth Session,<sup>46</sup> and even more at its Fifth,<sup>47</sup> tried to recommend specific action, but the results never satisfied the governments of the home countries. In the summer of 1946 the Director General conceived and secured the adoption, with some reluctance, by the Governments of the three Western zones in Germany of what was known as the Sixty-Day Ration Scheme<sup>48</sup> (dubbed, perhaps derisively, by the United States Army as "Operation Grubstake" and by the British, "Operation Carrot"). This provided that any Pole who, during a period of three months (October through December), decided to return, would be given on arrival at certain points in Poland food enough for sixty days. The food and transport, as always, were supplied by the military authorities; the distribution was arranged and

<sup>46</sup> Resolution 92; see *supra*, Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 7.

<sup>47</sup> Resolution 99; see *supra*, Part Seven, Chapter I, Section 7.

<sup>48</sup> United States Zone, Administrative Order 158, 23 September 1946.

administered by UNRRA. There was during this period a marked increase in repatriation. It was generally believed that the scheme and the attendant publicity had contributed to this; but again there were not lacking those, intimately concerned in the work, who felt that this apparent result was a coincidence and that other factors—the season, news from home, a somewhat new approach by the Polish Government, different leadership within the camps—were primarily responsible.

On certain policies there was general agreement: segregation of national groups; removal from camps of leaders and others actively opposed to, and working against, repatriation; appointment of official spokesmen for the home countries by the governments of such countries; removal of UNRRA representatives opposed to repatriation.<sup>49</sup> As usual, however, it was easier to agree on these policies than to implement them, however simple they might sound. The Polish Government, for example, was anxious that Polish Ukrainians should be separated from Poles. While this was generally not difficult to do, there were instances when the Polish Ukrainians for local reasons (generally an unwarranted but nonetheless real fear of forcible removal to the USSR) insisted that they were Poles (Wildflecken, the largest of all camps, furnished a conspicuous example of this). Under such circumstances it was not easy to make any clear division. There were other occasions when the military authorities could not or did not supply the accommodations necessary to carry out complete segregation. Nevertheless, in spite of some grumbling, the policy was nearly everywhere successfully carried out.

The removal of camp leaders was much more difficult. Although many leaders had been appointed at the beginning of the operation by UNRRA or military officials, by the summer of 1946 almost all had been elected by the camp residents. Those who were actively opposed to repatriation were seldom foolish enough to be too open about their views. Accusations were frequent; proofs, meager. The UNRRA officials were hesitant to request the removal of elected leaders doing a competent job unless the case against them was very clear, and likewise the military authorities, on whom the responsibility rested, were equally reluctant to carry out removal without absolute proof. Since

<sup>49</sup> Cables: Washington to London 3965, 10 April 1946; London to Arolsen 1354, London to Vienna 994, London to Rome 1097, 1 May 1946; letter, Chief of Operations, Germany, to three Zone Directors, "Implementation of Resolution 92," 3 May 1946.

Eastern and Western concepts as to what constitutes proof differ, this led to frequent accusations that this particular policy was not being enforced.<sup>50</sup> Much the same situation was, of course, true concerning UNRRA personnel accused of working against repatriation. One camp leader, attacked in public statements by the Yugoslavs, was formally investigated by UNRRA and found not guilty. Such trials, however, were not good for the Administration and seldom gave any satisfaction to anyone—the accusers were not satisfied unless the verdict was guilty.

Liaison officers—though the policy adopted seemed obvious enough—were a cause of irritation. The Western military authorities were frequently skeptical of granting free access to their Zones to army officers of the Eastern powers. They particularly disliked admitting USSR officers, recognized by the Administration as the official representatives, to camps of Balts, since unpleasant incidents often resulted. The Administration, in view of the Council resolutions,<sup>51</sup> felt bound to fight for the free movement of the liaison officers, even though such action troubled relations with the very authorities on whom the whole enterprise depended.

There was less agreement but just as much trouble on other aspects, such as propaganda likely to influence repatriation. It was generally accepted—perhaps reluctantly by the Eastern members—that the Administration should not itself attempt to influence the displaced persons but that it should aid in the dissemination of views emanating from the home countries—newspapers, periodicals, official bulletins and statements. Since these sometimes contained attacks on the Western powers, who were taking care of the displaced persons, this occasionally led to difficulties. It was also accepted that the Administration would not permit the distribution in camps of papers prepared outside by groups clearly opposed to the established governments of the home countries. A more difficult problem arose in connection with papers prepared and printed by the residents of camps: should they be censored? The

<sup>50</sup> In some cases it undoubtedly was not. One very competent and highly respected camp leader told the Executive Assistant of the Personal Representative of the Director General that if he had in his camp a man acting and working in a thoroughly creditable manner, whom he knew had been a collaborator, he would not call this fact to the attention of the military authorities. Though this involved a collaborator rather than someone opposed to repatriation, the natural human reluctance to get people behaving decently into trouble caused many officials to hesitate to request the removal of those under their care.

<sup>51</sup> Resolution 92, paragraph 4; Resolution 99, paragraph 7*b*.

advocates of free speech thought not; the advocates of repatriation-before-all believed that antirepatriation statements should be forbidden—also on the grounds of free speech, by arguing that the literate element which produced the papers represented only a minority of the residents.

There is no doubt that some UNRRA officials placed more emphasis on pushing repatriation than did others. This fact led to confusing changes in directives. In the United States Zone, for instance, an UNRRA order, soon withdrawn, was issued to discontinue all educational, recreational, and other cultural activities as detriments to repatriation. It is quite impossible to assess the effectiveness and sincerity of the work of the Administration and its officials. One minority, within and without the organization, was certain that the Administration had failed in its obligations and could have done more; another minority was equally certain that the Administration had gone too far and had even helped or condoned forcible repatriation; the majority felt that, allowing for minor diversions in both directions, the Administration and its staff had done all that they reasonably could to implement the will of the Council. It is certain, at any rate, that the policy of encouraging repatriation colored all policies, attitudes, and personal relations.<sup>52</sup>

During the periods<sup>53</sup> when UNRRA had a high degree of responsibility the following were repatriated:

TABLE 47  
DISPLACED PERSONS REPATRIATED

<i>Area of Displacement</i>	<i>Poles</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
Middle East	3,583	50,383	53,966
Austria	11,676	190,361	202,037
Germany			
British Zone	318,883	40,665	359,548
French Zone	45,013	2,171	47,184
United States Zone	186,102	149,153	335,255
Italy	4,265	13,756	18,021
Other	205	31,066	31,271
Total	569,727	477,555	1,047,282

<sup>52</sup> See Appendix Ten, Section II, Document 4, for Polish repatriation.

<sup>53</sup> From 1 April 1945 in the Middle East, from 1 November 1945 in other areas, to 30 June 1947 in all areas.

## 7. EMPLOYMENT

Though employment within camps was largely under the control of the Administration, employment outside involved the concurrence of the military authorities. The basic policy was that employment should be voluntary and paid but that it should be encouraged and stimulated by every possible means, provided, of course, that it did not interfere with repatriation.<sup>54</sup> It was clear to anyone with practical camp experience that the higher the level of employment, the better the camp and the happier the residents. Employment within camps was closely related to proper camp maintenance and development and to the trade-training schemes, but such employment could not provide real work for all. It was necessary to find jobs outside. The military authorities had officially established the policy that displaced persons were to be given priority over Germans.<sup>55</sup> In practice, however, it was difficult for them to implement this policy: the displaced persons often did not have the required skills; camps were frequently so located (Wildflecken was a notable example, with 15,000 people near no center of population or work) that displaced persons could not be employed, or employed only with great difficulty through special arrangements for transport, feeding, billeting; on the other side, the military authorities inevitably had some feeling of responsibility for the German workers. As a result, the Administration had frequently to hunt and prod and push to find work for the displaced persons. In spite of obstacles the employment rate in some camps surpassed, by 1947, 98 per cent of the employables, and throughout all camps in Germany, in spite of the unavoidably low rate in certain camps, it was about 70 per cent.<sup>56</sup>

Even though there was general agreement, complications and even some conflict were not, however, avoided in this sphere, especially in respect of remuneration and compulsion. It was early proposed by SHAEF that 7.5 to 10 per cent of the residents of any camp would be paid by the German authorities at prevailing German wage rates for

<sup>54</sup> Central Headquarters, Germany, Administrative Order 18, "Employment Program," 24 November 1945.

<sup>55</sup> SHAEF Administrative memo 39, Appendix D, "Employment of Displaced Persons in Germany," revised 16 April 1945.

<sup>56</sup> Final Statistical Report on UNRRA Displaced Persons Operation, June 1947.

work performed within camps.<sup>57</sup> Throughout the UNRRA period nearly 14 per cent were, in fact, so employed in the British Zone.<sup>58</sup> In the United States Zone 7.5 per cent were so employed until December 1946 when, after months of appealing by UNRRA, the military authorities increased the amount to 10 per cent.<sup>59</sup> Compulsion, however, since it was contrary to Administration principles, caused greater difficulties. In February 1946 work was made compulsory in the French Zone by the military authorities.<sup>60</sup> Provision was made both for safeguards (employment in usual skills, employment by Germans elective but not obligatory, etc.) and for disciplinary action by French, not UNRRA, officials. The sanctions were applied with great moderation.

In June 1946 the United States Government submitted to the Central Committee a resolution which was adopted and which provided that able-bodied displaced persons in Austria, other than persecuted groups (Jews), those about to be repatriated, and those engaged in vocational training and administrative work in camps, must accept employment under conditions at least as favorable as for the local population or become ineligible for further assistance.<sup>61</sup> The Austrian Government thereafter took from the pay of each person so employed a fixed amount designed to pay at least in part the cost of his maintenance.

In spite of this decision, when the British Government, toward the end of 1946, informed the Administration that it intended to establish a compulsory labor law in the British Zone, Germany, the Administration raised certain objections before the Central Committee, principally that the proposed law provided no specific safeguards for persecuted groups. This the British Government considered unnecessary, and the Central Committee refused to support the Administration's objection.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>57</sup> SHAEF, "Guide to Assembly Centre Administration," September 1944, revised May 1945, Part I, Section 5, paragraph III *c*; Part II, Section 11.

<sup>58</sup> Monograph, British Zone HQ, "Report for History Project, Division of Employment."

<sup>59</sup> Monograph, Benjamin Horowitz, "History of Employment Division, United States Zone."

<sup>60</sup> Circular 5857, DGAA/Dir. P.D.R., 1 February 1946.

<sup>61</sup> CC(46)68 (CC Docs., III, 33); CC(46)70, minutes 30th meeting, 17 June 1946 (CC Docs., III, 41-44).

<sup>62</sup> CC(46)137, "Aspects of Proposed DP Policy in the British Zone of Germany," 18 December 1946; CC(47)1, minutes 43d meeting, 6 January 1947; CC(47)6, letter,

In all areas the Administration sought "to promote the performance by displaced persons of useful work."<sup>63</sup> In Austria and the French and British Zones, Germany, the authorities eventually established compulsory labor laws. In all cases the displaced persons received remuneration in local currency at locally prevailing wage levels. In all places the number that could be employed in camp work was severely limited. In all cases the Administration tried to protect the displaced persons from exploitation, tried to have individuals so employed as to use their normal skills, and tried particularly to protect persecuted groups. Almost everywhere the actual employment levels were high, particularly from the middle of 1946 onward. If they did nothing else, the displaced persons did work—and this with the full help and encouragement of the Administration, which was certainly opposed to the maintenance of these unfortunate people in a state of idleness.

#### 8. THE ROLE OF UNRRA

At this point the question may be asked: What did UNRRA do for the displaced persons? It did not house, clothe, or feed them; it did not repatriate or resettle them. Its policies regarding eligibility, repatriation, and even employment led to controversy between the member states, between the Administration and some of the governments of these states, and between the Administration and the authorities responsible for the care of the displaced persons. Did UNRRA make any valuable contribution to the care of these people? This question was asked within the Administration as well as outside. There were not lacking many, again within as well as outside the organization, who felt it was unfortunate that the Administration had ever become involved in a task to which it could, apparently, contribute so little.

The problem was high-lighted by a letter to the Personal Representative of the Director General, received early in 1946, from a former comrade-in-arms who quite obviously had a sincere admiration for the concept of UNRRA and for most of its works. He stated—undoubtedly correctly—that he knew of a displaced persons camp that had been efficiently operated by one British corporal and two privates.

Roger Makins (British Embassy, Washington) to Director General, 7 January 1947; CC(47)9, minutes 44th meeting, 17 January 1947.

<sup>63</sup> CC(46)137.

When UNRRA assumed responsibility, these three were replaced by eleven UNRRA employees, all more highly paid than their predecessors. Why, he wanted to know, was this necessary; did it really represent a wise use of funds given by many nations to aid in the relief and rehabilitation of stricken countries and people?

The explanation lay, of course, in the difference between the UNRRA and the military objectives. No one should doubt that the corporal and his two assistants ran their camp efficiently. UNRRA, however, while anxious for efficiency, also wanted to rehabilitate the individuals in the camps; it wanted to achieve the objective so often and so sincerely expressed by its first Director General—to help people to help themselves; it did not want to run the camps, it wanted the residents to run them. Any mother who has tried knows that, when she first teaches her children how to perform simple household tasks (bed-making, dishwashing, cleaning), it requires far more time to teach the children to do such work and to supervise their doing it than to do the work herself. That was precisely the situation that confronted the Administration. It was in the field of human rehabilitation that the Administration made its contribution to the care of displaced persons.

#### 9. SELF-GOVERNMENT

Camp self-government in the fullest sense was one of the goals of UNRRA camp administration; it is, indeed, no exaggeration to say that it was the goal toward which all activities were pointed. The concept, at least in a limited sense, did not originate with the Administration. The SHAEF planners had indicated that "displaced persons should be encouraged to organize themselves as much as is administratively possible."<sup>64</sup> The basic reason for this suggestion was quite clear. It was expected that the outside staff (whether military or UNRRA) controlling a camp would not be more, at the very most, than 13 for a camp of 2,000-4,000 residents. It was evident that such a small group, more than likely not knowing the languages of the residents, could only exercise control through the residents. The authors of the Guide, therefore, continued:

<sup>64</sup> SHAEF "Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons in Germany," May 1945 revision, Part I, Section 1.

National group leaders should be *selected* and small national committees be formed to speak for their nationals, make suggestions and enquiries, and to act as a *channel* for disseminating instructions and information from the Central Staff. These leaders should always be persons who command the respect and confidence of their compatriots: the advice of the appropriate liaison officer should be sought on this point and the opinions of the displaced persons *as far as possible* be taken into account. Advisory committees on specific questions, e.g. accommodation or Center regulations and discipline may prove useful.<sup>65</sup>

While this no doubt provided for a start in the direction of self-government, it was very far both in aim and suggested practice from the goals and practices of UNRRA. Instead of selected, there were to be elected leaders; for a committee, acting as a channel for the directives of outside governors, there was to be a governing committee; for advisory committees dealing with specific questions, there were to be executive committees. In all phases of camp life, the Administration worked to have the resident assume responsibility. Progress was, of course, frequently slow and uneven; but progress there was.

In each camp there was usually a camp committee elected by the entire population, either at large, by nationality (if in a mixed camp), by area or block within the camp, or by some other means. This committee usually selected a chairman or camp leader, although in some camps he was directly elected.<sup>66</sup> This committee supervised all activities and represented the population in all dealings with outside authority, whether UNRRA or military. The camp police and fire departments, formed from the residents, usually reported to this committee. The camp court was generally under its jurisdiction. The legality of this court was questionable, but the UNRRA officials were generally wise enough not to raise that question. It was permitted to handle all minor offenses and infraction of rules and to impose sentences: no cigarettes, labor, even a day or two of detention (major offenses were tried before official military courts). Under this committee there were various departments: food, billeting, clothing, labor, administration, education and recreational activities, technical, etc. Billeting, clothing, and recreational departments might be together under "welfare." Sometimes supervision of plumbers, painters, wood carvers, was placed

<sup>65</sup> Italics added.

<sup>66</sup> Monograph, "U.S. Zone History Report, Camp Self-Government," Appendix a, R. Taylor, "Camp Self-Government, District I."

with the labor rather than the technical department, while barbers and tailors (whose work was essential to life in the camp) were attached to the administration department. Variations were endless but in no way affected the fundamental situation. Generally there was a camp committee corresponding to each department, a committee either elected by the camp as a whole or by those concerned with the particular activity.<sup>67</sup>

The food department, for example, kept watch on the amount of food issued, the ration cards, methods of food preparation, cleanliness of the kitchens and dining halls, and listened to complaints concerning food and related matters. The billeting committee allotted rooms and space. This was particularly important in the dwelling-house type of camp where the quality of accommodation was uneven. Decisions by the residents may have been made more slowly than by outside officials, but decisions of this sort were of the greatest importance in persuading the residents that they were receiving fair treatment, that they were human beings treated like other human beings, not just work animals arbitrarily assigned to stables. There was a natural tendency for committee members to assign the best houses to themselves and their friends. Against this type of decision the Administration had to guard. In the long run, however, by patience and persuasion, but not by order and command, committees could be taught to act fairly; rooms were properly assigned; and human beings were rehabilitated.

The clothes committee assigned the meager stock to heavy workers (the shoes, for example), to children, to those who were in the greatest need. The Administration committee controlled directly, or through a subordinate committee, the sanitation and cleanliness of the camp. Here again the Administration could have assigned the task of cleaning different parts of the camp to specific individuals who could have been made directly and personally responsible. This would have been easier; it would have required very little expenditure of time by the officials of the Administration; the results would have been excellent from the point of view of cleanliness; this is just what the corporal and his two privates did. Instead, however, the Administration required the residents to choose a committee; the committee was supposed to select individuals, on a rotating or other basis, to clean the various parts of the camp. Of course, at first, the camp was dirty; but gradually the resi-

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, Appendix b, Virgil Payne, "Camp Self-Government, District III."

dents came to realize the importance of cleanliness; gradually they became willing and able to accept responsibility. Ultimately, not even the corporal and his two privates were needed; the residents could and did run camps without any outside assistance. They had learned to govern themselves; they had been rehabilitated.

All of this took time, and progress was uneven. In general, it was among the Balts, who were usually the most economically advanced group and the most capable of democratic action, and the Jews, who, by virtue of the existence of strongly organized *kibutzim*<sup>68</sup> and for other reasons, had the strongest leaders, that camp self-government developed most rapidly. The Administration was not content merely to enunciate the principle once; it was repeated in various orders and forms and for various reasons (reduction of UNRRA staff, among others).<sup>69</sup> From time to time the Zone directors conducted investigations and surveys to determine how much progress had been made and to prod those directors of camps where development was lagging.

Allowing for all discrepancies and failures, it may be said that the policy and its practice were successful. By the end of June 1947, when UNRRA's mandate came to an end, most displaced persons in most camps and assembly centers were capable of governing themselves with little or no outside supervision. Two years earlier that would not have been possible, nor would it ever have been possible if UNRRA had pursued a policy of efficient command in the camps.

#### 10. EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The other major aspects of the work of UNRRA officials—supervision of education and vocational training and development of welfare and recreational activities—were, in a sense, an extension of the same policy.

In the field of academic education UNRRA did little but encourage. The displaced persons were themselves extremely anxious to have their children educated in their own national traditions. With no urging at all, elementary and secondary schools sprang into existence in most camps. Teachers and texts were everywhere a problem. Here

<sup>68</sup> Tightly organized groups, held together by acceptance of a common religious or economic or political doctrine, functioning under strong leadership.

<sup>69</sup> ERO Administration Orders: 156, 20 September 1946; 228, 18 February 1947; 233, 13 March 1947, etc.

UNRRA did what it could, but its activities were restricted by the fact that there was considerable reluctance in the United States to use UNRRA funds for educational or religious programs.<sup>70</sup> Trained teachers not required in one camp were shifted to another; typing and reproducing facilities and paper were made available for the preparation of textbooks; space was provided for schoolrooms. The voluntary agencies could do and did much more, providing much of the essential physical equipment: copybooks, pencils, blackboards. Under the guise of child care, the Administration aided in the organization of nursery schools and kindergartens and special feeding programs for all children. Above all, however, it was the displaced persons themselves who organized schools for their children, who selected teachers from among themselves, and supervised and watched over their work. The occupation authorities had reserved 10 per cent of all German university vacancies for displaced persons, and UNRRA assisted students taking advantage of this opportunity, provided the government of the country of origin approved.<sup>71</sup> The displaced persons themselves organized a university at Munich which received UNRRA assistance until it was decided that it was an antirepatriation activity,<sup>72</sup> and another, the Baltic Study Center at Hamburg, which received approval and assistance from the United Kingdom authorities.<sup>73</sup>

In the field of vocational training the Administration could do and did more. It organized training centers in practically every camp and also special training centers to which individuals could come from all camps. The centers within the camps were generally of two sorts: one for those types of activities—shoemaking and repairing, tailoring, dressmaking and repairing, carpentry—which were suitable for apprentice training; and for those—mechanical work of one sort or another, cabinetmaking—which required more rigid training that often enough included book work as well as practical work. Here again the assistance—in materials, machines, and instructors—of the voluntary agen-

<sup>70</sup> *Congressional Record* (Washington, D.C.), XC, No. 52 (21 March 1944), 2845-2853.

<sup>71</sup> United States Zone, Team Bulletin 38, 6 October 1945; United States Zone, Team Bulletin 71, 6 December 1945; United States Zone, Relief Services Bulletin 1, 22 January 1946.

<sup>72</sup> Monograph, L. Doughty, "Camp Activities, Welfare and Employment," p. 61.

<sup>73</sup> Memo, Brigadier A. G. Kenchington (Chief, Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Division) to 8 Corps District Military Government, "Baltic Camp University," 19 December 1945.

cies was invaluable. The World ORT Union programs <sup>74</sup> in the Jewish camps were, perhaps, particularly notable and effective, but so indeed were the contributions made by many other organizations.

The first type of center was, under UNRRA supervision, largely organized by displaced persons themselves. Carpenters, for example, were selected to do essential work for the camp—repairing damaged buildings, making beds and cribs, chairs and tables. The older, experienced workers accepted young men as apprentices and trained them. The wood was often supplied by the military authorities, if it was to be used for unquestionably essential work. Tools were supplied by the military authorities, by UNRRA, by the voluntary agencies, even by the displaced persons; and they were found—never mind where or how. For the other type, formal classes were organized. Instructors were engaged, and materials and tools were acquired in the same fashion.

In addition to these activities in camps, the Administration organized a number of special training centers. There was, for example, the vocational training center located at Flensburg,<sup>75</sup> with which six separate camps housing over 5,500 Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, and Yugoslavs were associated but to which residents from other camps could come. There were three main programs: short- and long-term courses in fourteen trades such as truck driving and maintenance, tailoring, radio maintenance, shoemaking, special training for railroad workers, and courses in navigation and marine engineering.

The first group were for all displaced persons, whatever their origin. In April 1947 more than 480 students were enrolled in some 13 courses given by more than 20 instructors. The railroad workers' training was specifically for Poles. Two separate courses, each with 68 pupils, were given in cooperation with the German railroads. The great majority of the pupils returned to Poland on completion of their course and were immediately employed by the railroads. The navigation courses, conducted somewhat apart from the others by the Baltic Navigation and Marine Engineering School, were specifically for those from the Baltic countries. About 86 attended the first course.

Special agricultural schools were established in Schleswig-Holstein

<sup>74</sup> Monograph, "Work of ORT in the Displaced Persons Camps in Germany and Austria."

<sup>75</sup> Monograph, R. S. Uit den Bogaard, "History of Vocational Training."

and elsewhere. Various others were established, such as the mechanical trades school at Mannheim.

Similar, but not generally considered as part of the vocational training program, were the courses given by UNRRA doctors and nurses to train practical nurses and the refresher courses given for doctors and trained nurses. These aided immeasurably in the development of the health program for which there would not otherwise have been adequate personnel. Clinics—prenatal, child, and others—were maintained in most camps as also were small hospitals to handle emergency cases. Some camps developed complete and well-equipped hospitals (Hanau, for example, where the ruined officers' club was rebuilt by the displaced persons under the supervision of the UNRRA doctor into a modern, efficient, and well-equipped hospital—the equipment being found by one or another ingenious method). Special hospitals were also established—the Glyn Hughes Hospital at Belsen,<sup>76</sup> a hospital at Munich, as examples—to service several camps. Where such were not available, use was made of German hospitals. Every effort was made to use displaced persons to the fullest extent possible in these activities. Where they were not available, German doctors and nurses were used to supplement the UNRRA personnel, but only as a last resort. Training work was continued at all times in most camps to enable the displaced persons to take care of themselves. The remarkably high health levels of the displaced persons, in spite of inadequate food and accommodations, represent a real achievement of the military health authorities, the UNRRA doctors and nurses, and the displaced persons themselves. No epidemics caught hold; the infant mortality rate was low; the venereal disease rate was lower than that among the German population or the armies of occupation.<sup>77</sup>

The vocational training program was closely allied with the employment schemes and the recreational activities. Wherever there was real work to be done, the Administration encouraged work within the camp. This not only improved the condition of the camps but more readily permitted the displaced persons to use their own skills. The limitations were genuine work to be done and ability to pay, since only 7.5 per cent to 12.5 per cent (depending on the region and the time) of a camp population could be placed on the burgomaster's pay

<sup>76</sup> Monograph, Dr. L. Hahn, "The Glyn Hughes Hospital, Belsen."

<sup>77</sup> *Epidemiological Information Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 17, 15 September 1946, "Infectious Diseases Notified among Displaced Persons in Germany," pp. 715-718.

roll. In some camps, if the displaced persons approved, twice this number were in fact employed on half pay. Other forms of work inducements and rewards were developed, such as extra cigarette rations, the right to purchase or receive amenity supplies. Many camp activities were self-supporting. The tailors, for example, were permitted to charge for their work, usually at prices fixed by an appropriate camp committee. The proceeds either went to the general camp funds and the tailors were paid prevailing wages, or they were divided among the tailors. Very rarely—this was generally discouraged—did the proceeds go to the individual worker.

Artists and craftsmen—painters, sculptors, pottery-makers, wood carvers, lace- and embroidery-makers, toymakers—were encouraged, helped, and permitted to sell their products. Again the proceeds either went to the general camp funds and the workers were paid wages, or they were divided among the workers. Their products were often most useful in the camps and occasionally achieved a high artistic level.<sup>78</sup>

#### 11. RECREATION

The objective of the recreational program was, once again, basically similar: to encourage and help the displaced persons to do things themselves. Cinemas and theaters were constructed in most camps, and theater companies and orchestras were organized. Occasionally, an effort was made to concentrate artists of one sort in the same camp (Baltic handicraft workers and musicians at Blomberg). Arrangements were made with the military authorities to permit particularly good theater companies, orchestras, or string quartets to travel from one camp to another and to give public performances elsewhere.

Sports of all sorts were likewise encouraged: indoor sports, such as table tennis; outdoor sports, such as football (soccer), boxing, and swimming (with the Administration's assistance the residents constructed swimming pools at several camps, Leipheim for example). Contests with other camps were arranged, and football leagues were organized.

<sup>78</sup> The Administration made a cross-section collection of such products, including not only the beautiful (inlaid boxes, embroideries, etc.), but also the practical and simple (ladles and sieves made from old tin cans), which has been given to IRO, and which was put on exhibit in Washington, D.C., in February 1949 by the World Information Center.

Lectures, language (usually English and, in the Jewish camps, Hebrew) and other classes (current world affairs, economics) were arranged for adults. Parties, pageants, celebrations of one sort or another, were organized by the displaced persons.

In practically all camps the residents built and embellished churches and synagogues. In some of these the decoration reached a high artistic level (for example, a remarkable chandelier at Lyssenko and inlaid wood altarpieces and panels in the Byzantine tradition in several Polish-Ukrainian camps).

The Administration at all times encouraged and aided such enterprises and supplied leadership and guidance when necessary, always, however, striving to have the displaced persons take the lead.

#### 12. TRACING AND CHILD CARE

Two special functions performed by the Administration should be mentioned: tracing and child care. When plans were first being developed for the care of displaced persons,<sup>79</sup> the establishment of machinery for tracing missing persons was considered. It seemed logical to relate this work with that done in connection with displaced persons, since it was always supposed that the latter would be carefully registered, thus creating a list of names that would certainly be useful in tracing missing persons. After its formation UNRRA and its appropriate committees further considered the problem in conjunction with the interested sections of SHAEF. For reasons quite out of the Administration's control, it was decided that the work of tracing should not be entrusted to the International Red Cross, in spite of its experience in this field, but that it should be handled in each country by a national tracing bureau, and for United Nations individuals who might be supposed to be lost in Germany, by a central tracing bureau. The necessary plans for this bureau were developed by the Displaced Persons Branch of G-5, SHAEF, with which work UNRRA personnel were associated. This work was continued, after the dissolution of SHAEF, by the Combined Displaced Persons Executive. These plans, with minor amendments, were approved by the Coördinating Committee of the Control Commission for Germany in September 1945.<sup>80</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements, "Report of the Technical Advisory Committee on Displaced Populations," October 1943.

<sup>80</sup> Coördinating Committee (CORC/m) (45)8, minutes of meeting, 18 September 1945.

In October UNRRA was asked to assume responsibility for this work<sup>81</sup> and accepted in November.<sup>82</sup>

The tracing was handled through a Central Tracing Bureau and zonal bureaus. The Administration only tried to locate those individuals who would, in terms of Council resolutions, be eligible for UNRRA care. It searched only in Germany and Austria (and temporarily in Italy) since search elsewhere was considered a responsibility of national tracing bureaus.<sup>83</sup>

Child care was the application of normal care adjusted to the particular needs of a special group—unaccompanied children, that is, children under eighteen who were not attached to parents or other relatives. Separate camps were maintained for such children as well as special sections in normal camps. In addition, special attention, under the direction of trained specialists, was given to health and nutrition, education and vocational training. The same rules of eligibility were applied as for adult displaced persons. Every effort was made to reunite the children with their families. Where that was not possible—which was in the great majority of cases, of course—consent was always obtained from the official liaison officer of the country of origin in cases where decisions as to their future—marriage, resettlement, for example—were required.<sup>84</sup> It was the general policy of the Administration to encourage and aid the repatriation of these children, although they were consulted if old enough to have views. For those not old enough the Administration took the stand—as an international organization it could take no other—that they were wards of their country of origin and

TABLE 48

## UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN UNDER UNRRA SUPERVISION IN GERMANY

<i>Type of Assistance</i>	<i>Total Numbers Aided</i>
Given care	12,843
Repatriated	2,703
Resettled	1,889
Reunited with families	1,016

<sup>81</sup> Letter, Morgan to Personal Representative of the Director General, 19 October 1945.

<sup>82</sup> Letter, Morgan to Allied Control Commission, 16 November 1945.

<sup>83</sup> Material furnished by UNRRA to PCIRO, Document 117, "Note on UNRRA Responsibility with Respect to Tracing."

<sup>84</sup> Material furnished by UNRRA to PCIRO, Document 121, "Note on Unaccompanied Children."

should be placed under the care of that country. This sometimes led to the charge of "forced repatriation," but no other just solution was suggested. As part of this work, the Administration undertook a child search program to recover from German families and institutions the children of United Nations parents.

It should not be thought that the displaced persons operation as a whole was orderly and neat and that everywhere there was uniform development and progress. On the contrary, away from the camps, the operation always seemed to be confused, variable, and even somewhat muddled. The vital work—the development of free, independent, self-sufficient human beings—was carried forward in the camps. Even there the pattern was infinitely varied, and the results were not always good. *Wildflecken* with its hopeless employment situation, strongly entrenched reactionary Polish membership, and possibly weak UNRRA guidance must be considered a failure, but against it may be set many successes—*Hanau*, for instance, with its excellent workshops and vocational training schools, its well-equipped, self-created hospital, its extremely high employment level.

The UNRRA staff—the men and women in the camps, and even those at higher administrative levels—made a real contribution. The military authorities supplied the food and shelter. With them there was, inevitably, some friction, but in the total picture that was unimportant; it was the basic coöperation that was significant. UNRRA, with vital assistance from the voluntary agencies, supplied the leadership that permitted the re-emergence of the displaced persons as dignified human beings. This was work which the military authorities were, naturally enough, not equipped to perform. It was work which the voluntary agencies, with their limited resources and their national backgrounds, could not have performed without coördinating guidance. It was work that could be done only by an international organization; it was work that was done by UNRRA—and the displaced persons.