

VI. UNRRA'S RESPONSIBILITY AS AN INTERNATIONAL TRACING AGENT

When UNRRA accepted the invitation to place its tracing bureau at the disposal of the Allied Control Authority, there was no clear-out statement of UNRRA tracing policy except that discussed above (See III; IV: B.3). Following the acceptance of the Allied Control Authority Agreement, however, the European Regional Office turned its attention to the clarification of its policy. A technical representative from the London Office visited the Central Tracing Bureau and the United States Zonal Bureau during February 1946 to make a careful study of the tracing machinery <sup>1</sup>. In collaboration with Members of the staff of the Central Bureau a series of recommendations were made on the basis of which an official statement of policy was issued by the Administrative Council.

This statement, containing the following provisions, has given rise to a number of considerations of great importance to the future of international tracing services in general and to the question of UNRRA's participation in them.

1. U.N.R.R.A. can accept responsibility for tracing persons falling under the definitions of the Council Resolutions as eligible for U.N.R.R.A. care. This includes persons at present receiving care from U.N.R.R.A. in Germany, persons eligible for but not in receipt of such care but now dead.

2. U.N.R.R.A. cannot accept responsibility for tracing any Germans except victims of Nazi persecution.

3. Pending establishment of direct channels to appropriate agencies, U.N.R.R.A. can accept responsibility for routing enquiries regarding persons who may not be eligible.

4. The Chief of Operations in Germany is responsible for negotiations with the Allied Control Authority regarding U.N.R.R.A. functions for tracing and their relationship to the total activities for tracing in Germany.

5. The E.R.O. is responsible for coordinating U.N.R.R.A. policy with the policy of National Tracing Bureaux, in so far as it concerns those persons eligible for U.N.R.R.A. care <sup>2</sup>.

When U.S. National Training Service is placed in training pursuant to the agreement of the Allied Control Authority, there was no clear-cut statement of U.S. National Training Service policy except that discussed above (see U.S. N.T.S. following the acceptance of the Allied Control Authority agreement. However, the European Regional Office stated the attention to the classification of its policy, a separate memorandum from the London Office stated the U.S. National Training Service was to take a lead in the United States during the period of cooperation with the staff of the Central Intelligence Agency. The U.S. National Training Service was made on the basis of U.S. National Training Service of policy was issued by the U.S. National Training Service.

This statement, however, and following provisions, has given rise to a number of questions regarding U.S. National Training Service and the future of U.S. National Training Service in general and to the question of U.S. National Training Service in the U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service.

1. U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service persons falling under the U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service as eligible for U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service persons receiving such from U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service eligible for but not to receive U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service.

2. U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service for training any between except within U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service.

3. Training activities of U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service rate agencies, U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service training activities regarding persons who may be eligible.

4. The Chief of Operations in Germany is responsible for negotiations with the Allied Control Authority regarding U.S. N.T.S. functions for training and their relationship to the total activities for training in Germany.

5. The U.S. N.T.S. is responsible for coordinating U.S. N.T.S. policy with the policy of National Training Service, in so far as it concerns those persons eligible for U.S. N.T.S. and U.S. National Training Service.

FOOTNOTES:

1. The results of this study were embodied in two statements prepared by the representative of E.R.O. and members of the staff of the Central Tracing Bureau.  
"Factors in an U.N.R.R.A. Policy on the Central Tracing Bureau" (21st February 1946) is a general statement of Policy; "Central Tracing Bureau Operational Policies and Procedures" (27th February 1946) is a study of the implementation of policy.
2. The following statement was accepted on 22nd February, as being a correct interpretation of paragraph No. 5; "E.R.O. is responsible for the coordination of tracing policy throughout its sphere of influence, including Germany; in Germany it will discharge that responsibility through the Central Tracing Bureau. On tracing problems regarding Germany, the C.T.B. will deal directly with the N.T.B.'s under the policies established by E.R.O."

A. THE LIMITATION OF U.N.R.R.A.'s RESPONSIBILITY

The limitation of U.N.R.R.A.'s responsibility in tracing to those "eligible for U.N.R.R.A. care" as defined in paragraphs one and two of the policy statement raised but one serious problem<sup>1</sup>. From its inception, the SHAEF Tracing Unit as continued through the CDPX Central Tracing Bureau to the U.N.R.R.A. bureau had specifically included the tracing of German relatives of United Nations nationals within its programme. (SHAEF/G-5/DF/2816/3, 27th April 1945, Para. 1; GE-CDPX, 383.7, 24 July 1945, Para. 3b).

At no time, however, was the question of performing a tracing service for enquiries from German nationals ever contemplated<sup>2</sup>.

This difference was resolved in a statement issued by the Central Tracing Policy Board on 15th February 1946 listing by category the priority with which enquiries were to be dealt (DPOW/P(46)26, 15 February 1946, Para. 22). According to this analysis, categories four and seven, individual requests originating with nationals of the United Nations, neutral and ex-enemy countries or stateless persons concerning their German kin, were not to be accorded the search facilities of the central service, but should be transmitted to

<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, this category has been the source of considerable confusion. It also raised certain budgetary difficulties which have hampered U.N.R.R.A.'s adequate imple-



German tracing agencies. (DPOW/P(46)31, 28th February 1946, Para. 38). Since 1st February 1946 all such enquiries were so transmitted. (Monthly Report for February 1946, Central Tracing Bureau, IV, B, 1 c(1)). This procedure is clearly in accord with paragraph three of the London policy statement since the entire question of a German Tracing Agency has as yet (1st June 1946) not been finally clarified.

Although the immediate procedural difficulty was resolved, the implications of the limitation as it touches other aspects of the Allied Control Authority Agreement have never been clearly defined. The basic point at issue is the conflict between two conceptions of U.N.R.R.A.'s responsibility. The one, as clearly enunciated in the London policy statement, is that U.N.R.R.A. is the representative of displaced persons under its care or those technically eligible for such care either dead or alive. According to this point of view, U.N.R.R.A.'s tracing bureaux are simply agencies representing its interest in displaced persons in Germany and are only parts of the various services devised for their welfare. The other point of view is implied in the obligations which U.N.R.R.A. has assumed is that its responsibilities go beyond those of the German Operation in its narrowest sense to include a large place in the solution of an international problem of greatest magnitude. It should be pointed out, however, that the divergence between these points of view is not as great as appears on the surface for, in its last analysis, the problem as it concerns Germany is essentially one of displaced persons. The issue is one of emphasis. Put simply, it is whether U.N.R.R.A.'s efforts should be directed solely to the immediate problem in Germany or whether it should assist in the co-ordination of national and international agencies in the ultimate solution of the problem.

Nevertheless, this dicotomy has been the source of considerable confusion. It lies behind certain budgetary difficulties which have hampered U.N.R.R.A.'s adequate imple-

German trading agencies. (HOWARD) 1948 February 1963, Paris.  
 30) Since the February 1948 all such agencies were no longer  
 listed. (Monthly Report for February 1948, Central Trading  
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 with paragraph three of the London Policy Agreement since the  
 entire question of a German Trading Agency has not yet (Jan 1948)  
 1948) not been finally decided.

Although the immediate procedure of this kind was  
 required, the implementation of the policy in its broader other  
 aspects of the Allied Control Authority Agreement have never been  
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 between two conceptions of U.R.R.A.'s responsibility.  
 The one, as clearly stated in the London Policy Statement,  
 is that U.R.R.A. is the representative of displaced persons  
 under the care of those responsible within the war zone.  
 either dead or alive, according to the point of view.  
 U.R.R.A.'s trading bureau was simply agencies representing  
 the interests in displaced persons in Germany and are only  
 part of the various services desired for their welfare.  
 The other point of view is implied in the London Statement.  
 U.R.R.A. has assumed its full responsibility beyond  
 those of the German Operation in the movement of funds to finance  
 a large plan in the solution of an international problem of  
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 solution of the problem.

Nevertheless, this theory has been the source of  
 considerable confusion. It has defined certain budgetary  
 alternatives which have hampered U.R.R.A.'s adequate imple-

mentation of the programme; it is the basis for questioning the function of the Coordinating Committee of representatives of national tracing bureaux at the Central Tracing Bureau. Most important, it underlies two basic problems concerning the ultimate disposition of the tracing bureau and the selection of a terminal legatee to carry on the functions of the U.N.R.R.A. bureaux at its dissolution.

B. THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LIAISON AND COORDINATION.

The first of these problems is the extent to which U.N.R.R.A. is responsible for the maintenance of Liaison and for the coordination of tracing activities on an international level.

The position of the Allied Control Authority in regard to the responsibility for liaison and coordination within the service is stated in the Central Tracing Policy Board's confirmation of U.N.R.R.A.'s acceptance. It is clear that the responsibility for maintaining liaison between the Central Tracing Service, of which by agreement the U.N.R.R.A. Central Tracing Bureau had become a part, and any other organization in or outside of Germany is the province of the Central Tracing Policy Board. The agreement further specified that this responsibility should be discharged in close cooperation with the Director of the Central Tracing Bureau<sup>3</sup>.

Paragraph five of the London Policy statement, on the other hand, assigned that responsibility in so far as it concerns persons eligible for U.N.R.R.A. care to the European Regional Office of U.N.R.R.A.

Footnotes:

1. The question was first raised by the Director General of UNRRA by Cable (103 Frankfurt, Repeated London 10409) to the Director of the Central Tracing Bureau, in late January 1946.

2. The extension of the principle of forwarding to other agencies enquiries for those not eligible for UNRRA care to include both the enquirer and the enquiree has also been suggested. (Draft on Statement of Policy, Tracing of Missing Persons, UNRRA, European Regional Office, A, (3) ). This extension would completely undermine any tracing activity, for only rarely are both parties eligible for UNRRA care.



G. IBERA's Long Term Responsibilities

Within the limitation expressed, it cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the extent to which this responsibility touches upon the larger issue of the co-ordination of activities of the national bodies, their relation with each other, and the rights of calling international conferences dealing with tracing problems can be questioned as falling outside the limitations of the policy statement. At the best, it raises issues which must be clarified on the highest levels between the parties to the agreement.

... obligation is defined to be "to establish, stabilize and maintain the process of tracing missing persons and of collecting and distributing records concerning them within the limits of its agreement with the Allied Control Authority, and to insure the transfer of that process to a terminal legatee upon its dissolution" (Para A, 5.)

Footnote: Stabilization of the Tracing Process

3. A similar position between the Director of the Central Tracing Bureau and E.R.O. in regard to tracing problems in Germany is implied in the interpretation of Paragraph five of the London Statement. (See above VI, note 2).

There is some question, however, as to the extent to which the stabilization of that process should be interpreted to include a widespread reorganization of the service on the eve of its transfer to a terminal legatee. That procedure should be adjusted constantly to new situations and simplified as much as possible is beyond question, but any considerable reorganization of the system which would entail extensive re-negotiations should be viewed with respect until basic decisions as to the final disposition of the activity have been made. This is particularly true as it affects the position of the Central Tracing Bureau. A fundamental re-distribution of functions between it and the National and Local Bureaux would only disrupt the service unnecessarily.

Within the limitations expressed, it cannot be denied. Nevertheless, the extent to which this responsibility focuses upon the larger sense of the co-ordination of activities of the national bodies, their relation with each other, and the rights of calling international conferences dealing with trading goods, less can be questioned as falling outside the limitation of the policy statement. At the best, it is a matter which must be directed on the highest levels within the system to the agreement.

Conclusion

It is a matter of fact that the Government of the Central Trading Areas and I.C.A. in regard to trading policies in general is guided in the interpretation of paragraph five of the London Statement. (See also VI, para 1).

C. UNRRA's Long Term Responsibilities

The second of these problems deals specifically with the ultimate disposition of UNRRA's installations for tracing. In Factors in an UNRRA Policy on the Central Tracing Bureau (see above VI, note) it is clearly recognised that in view of its emergency and temporary character, UNRRA cannot discharge all of the extensive long-range ramifications of the tracing problem and should anticipate the transfer to a more permanent body of a residual load and a demonstrated experience (A, 2, 3). Specifically this obligation is defined to be "to establish, stabilize and maintain the process of tracing missing persons and of collecting and distributing records concerning them within the limits of its agreement with the Allied Control Authority, and to insure the transfer of that process to a terminal legatee upon its dissolution" (Para A, 6.)

1. The Stabilization of the Tracing Process

(a) Proposals for the Reorganisation of the Service.

There is no question of UNRRA's having discharged its responsibility to establish and maintain a tracing service. There is some question, however, as to the extent to which the stabilization of that process should be interpreted to include a widespread reorganisation of the service on the eve of its transfer to a terminal legatee. That procedures should be adjusted constantly to new situations and simplified as much as possible is beyond question, but any considerable reorganisation of the system which would entail extensive re-negotiations should be viewed with suspect until basic decisions as to the final disposition of the activity have been made. This is particularly true as it affects the position of the Central Tracing Bureau. A fundamental re-distribution of functions between it and the National and Zonal Bureaux would only disrupt the service unnecessarily

activities on a restricted basis, lack the wider outlook necessary for the efficient administration of an international system. Duplication of effort is bound to result, and with it



without obviating the necessity of fundamental re-negotiations at the time of its transfer.

(b) The Re-registration of Displaced Persons. One major task, which clearly falls within the responsibility of UNRRA to stabilize the tracing process before its transfer is the re-registration of displaced persons under its care. This problem is an extensive one touching on many aspects of UNRRA's activities, but it is one which is of greatest importance for tracing the whereabouts of displaced persons who will remain in Germany as the "hard core" of the non-repatriables. It is imperative that the task be completed before UNRRA transfers its responsibility to other agencies.

2. The Selection of Terminal Legatee.

A number of alternative solutions to the problem of selecting a terminal legatee to carry on UNRRA's function in tracing at its dissolution present themselves.

(a) The Abolition of the Central Tracing Bureau. The first is to eliminate the Central Tracing Bureau from the system, transferring its "clearing house" function to the National Bureaux and its direction of search activities to the Zonal Bureaux. The National and Zonal Bureau, then, would communicate directly with each other without a common channel. The effectiveness of such complete decentralization is to be questioned. The transfer of added responsibilities to the Zonal Bureaux, weakened as many of them are by reductions in personnel, is not likely to be welcomed on all sides, nor is the operation of a system without any measure of coordination viewed with pleasure by the National Bureaux most concerned.

The Zonal Bureaux, occupied largely with search activities on a restricted basis, lack the wider outlook necessary for the efficient administration of an international system. Duplication of effort is bound to result, and with it



increased inefficiency. Nor does such a scheme provide for the proper disposition of records concerning the Stateless and those of undetermined nationality or for the handling of enquiries which can not be despatched satisfactorily to a specific zonal bureau.

(b) A Central Tracing Bureau for those of Determined Nationality. A second solution would be to limit the functions of the central bureau to that of an agency dealing only with the Stateless and those of undetermined nationality. According to this system the central bureau would receive from the zonal bureaux records which cannot be disposed of otherwise and would limit its search to an exploitation of such records at its disposal. The central bureau would, therefore, operate on the same level as the zonal bureau and would deal only with enquiries which could not be answered by the other bureaux. This system, however, would not answer the objections to one operating without some measure of centralized control.

(c) A Combined Central Bureau under Military Government. A third solution is the transfer of the responsibility for tracing missing Allied nationals in Germany to the Internal Affairs & Communications Division of the Allied Control Authority where it would become a part of a merged tracing service for all persons missing in Germany. This solution recognises the problem as a German one and as such an internal problem to be solved by German agencies operating under the direction of Military Government. There is much to be said for this course of action. It would transfer the responsibility for solving the problem, where many believe it rightfully belongs, to the German people who created it. Much of the work could be performed by German labour, which is the most economical way, and given proper Allied supervision could be done effectively. On the other hand, it does not recognise the problem basically as an international one, and many fear

increased efficiency. For those with a system providing for the proper disposition of responsibilities of the States and those of undoubted authority or for the handling of matters which can not be described satisfactorily to a specific local board.

(b) A Central Training Bureau for State of

Determined Nationality. A second solution which is to limit the functions of the central board to the training of the States only with the States and their respective nationalities. According to this system, the States would receive from the local boards the material to be disposed of otherwise and with the States and their respective nationalities of such records as the States and their respective nationalities, therefore, reports on the States and their respective nationalities and would deal only with the States and their respective nationalities. The other reports, however, would not answer the objectives of the central board and would be a source of centralized control.

(c) A Central Training Bureau for State of

Government. A third solution is to limit the responsibility for training to the States and their respective nationalities. The Internal Affairs Commission of the States and their respective nationalities should be responsible for all personnel training. This solution recognizes the problem of the States and their respective nationalities as an internal problem to be solved by the States and their respective nationalities. The direction of Internal Affairs of the States and their respective nationalities is to be left for this source of control. It is believed that responsibility for solving the problem, where any believe it rightfully belongs, to the States and their respective nationalities. It is believed that the work could be performed by general labor, which is the most economical way, and given proper skilled supervision could be done effectively. On the other hand, it does not recognize the problem basically as an international one, and any fear

that the best interests of the nations most concerned would not be served. Moreover, it retains the entire service under quadripartite control, a feature which many believe should not be continued longer than is necessary.

(d) An International Tracing Service. Another alternative recognizes the problem basically as an international one and provides for the strengthened continuation of the coordinating and centralizing function under a strong international body. According to this proposal, the existing facilities for tracing on a zonal level would be maintained in Germany, but the larger aspects of the problem would be under the supervision of such a body as the International Refugee Organization or the United Nations Organization. In view of the long range aspects of the problem, such a solution merits careful consideration. It provides a large measure of coordination of effort, and within a single framework allows for the wide decentralization necessary for the operation of tracing on an international level.

that the best interests of the nation would be served, however, it is the duty of the citizen to be prepared to sacrifice if necessary. The Government should not be so timid as to allow itself to be intimidated.

(2) International Relations - Another

essential responsibility of the citizen is to be alert to the needs of the nation in its relations with other nations. The citizen should be prepared to sacrifice if necessary. The Government should not be so timid as to allow itself to be intimidated. In view of the fact that the interests of the nation are at stake, it is the duty of the citizen to be prepared to sacrifice if necessary. The Government should not be so timid as to allow itself to be intimidated.