

C. UNRRA's Long Term Responsibilities

The second of these problems deals specifically with the ultimate disposition of UNRRA's installations for tracing. In Factors in an UNRRA Policy on the Central Tracing Bureau (see above VI, note) it is clearly recognised that in view of its emergency and temporary character, UNRRA cannot discharge all of the extensive long-range ramifications of the tracing problem and should anticipate the transfer to a more permanent body of a residual load and a demonstrated experience (A, 2, 3). Specifically this obligation is defined to be "to establish, stabilize and maintain the process of tracing missing persons and of collecting and distributing records concerning them within the limits of its agreement with the Allied Control Authority, and to insure the transfer of that process to a terminal legatee upon its dissolution" (Para A, 6.)

1. The Stabilization of the Tracing Process

(a) Proposals for the Reorganisation of the Service.

There is no question of UNRRA's having discharged its responsibility to establish and maintain a tracing service. There is some question, however, as to the extent to which the stabilization of that process should be interpreted to include a widespread reorganisation of the service on the eve of its transfer to a terminal legatee. That procedures should be adjusted constantly to new situations and simplified as much as possible is beyond question, but any considerable reorganisation of the system which would entail extensive re-negotiations should be viewed with suspect until basic decisions as to the final disposition of the activity have been made. This is particularly true as it affects the position of the Central Tracing Bureau. A fundamental re-distribution of functions between it and the National and Zonal Bureaux would only disrupt the service unnecessarily activities on a restricted basis, lack the wider outlook necessary for the efficient administration of an international system. Duplication of effort is bound to result, and with it

1. THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSAL

The basis of the proposal is the fact that the present system of the disposal of the assets of the companies is not satisfactory. It is proposed to transfer to a new permanent body of a wider jurisdiction the assets of the companies and to maintain the process of liquidation of the companies and of collecting and distributing assets in accordance with the provisions of the agreement with the Allied Control Authority and to secure the transfer of the assets to a permanent body upon the dissolution of the companies.

2. THE PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSAL

(a) Provisions for the liquidation of the companies

There is no question of the assets being transferred to the companies to enable them to carry out their business. There is one question, however, as to the extent to which the liquidation of the companies should be entrusted to the companies or to a permanent body. It is proposed that the assets of the companies should be transferred to a permanent body and that the liquidation should be entrusted to the companies as far as possible in regard to the disposal of the assets. The liquidation of the companies should be entrusted to the companies as far as possible in regard to the disposal of the assets. This is particularly true in the case of the disposal of the assets of the companies. The liquidation of the companies should be entrusted to the companies as far as possible in regard to the disposal of the assets. This is particularly true in the case of the disposal of the assets of the companies.

without obviating the necessity of fundamental re-negotiations at the time of its transfer.

(b) The Re-registration of Displaced Persons. One major task, which clearly falls within the responsibility of UNRRA to stabilize the tracing process before its transfer is the re-registration of displaced persons under its care. This problem is an extensive one touching on many aspects of UNRRA's activities, but it is one which is of greatest importance for tracing the whereabouts of displaced persons who will remain in Germany as the "hard core" of the non-repatriables. It is imperative that the task be completed before UNRRA transfers its responsibility to other agencies.

2. The Selection of Terminal Legatee.

A number of alternative solutions to the problem of selecting a terminal legatee to carry on UNRRA's function in tracing at its dissolution present themselves.

(a) The Abolition of the Central Tracing Bureau. The first is to eliminate the Central Tracing Bureau from the system, transferring its "clearing house" function to the National Bureaux and its direction of search activities to the Zonal Bureaux. The National and Zonal Bureau, then, would communicate directly with each other without a common channel. The effectiveness of such complete decentralization is to be questioned. The transfer of added responsibilities to the Zonal Bureaux, weakened as many of them are by reductions in personnel, is not likely to be welcomed on all sides, nor is the operation of a system without any measure of coordination viewed with pleasure by the National Bureaux most concerned.

The Zonal Bureaux, occupied largely with search activities on a restricted basis, lack the wider outlook necessary for the efficient administration of an international system. Duplication of effort is bound to result, and with it

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increased inefficiency. Nor does such a scheme provide for the proper disposition of records concerning the Stateless and those of undetermined nationality or for the handling of enquiries which can not be despatched satisfactorily to a specific zonal bureau.

(b) A Central Tracing Bureau for those of Determined Nationality. A second solution would be to limit the functions of the central bureau to that of an agency dealing only with the Stateless and those of undetermined nationality. According to this system the central bureau would receive from the zonal bureaux records which cannot be disposed of otherwise and would limit its search to an exploitation of such records at its disposal. The central bureau would, therefore, operate on the same level as the zonal bureau and would deal only with enquiries which could not be answered by the other bureaux. This system, however, would not answer the objections to one operating without some measure of centralized control.

(c) A Combined Central Bureau under Military Government. A third solution is the transfer of the responsibility for tracing missing Allied nationals in Germany to the Internal Affairs & Communications Division of the Allied Control Authority where it would become a part of a merged tracing service for all persons missing in Germany. This solution recognises the problem as a German one and as such an internal problem to be solved by German agencies operating under the direction of Military Government. There is much to be said for this course of action. It would transfer the responsibility for solving the problem, where many believe it rightfully belongs, to the German people who created it. Much of the work could be performed by German labour, which is the most economical way, and given proper Allied supervision could be done effectively. On the other hand, it does not recognise the problem basically as an international one, and many fear

increased efficiency. For case with a scheme provide
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(b) A Central Treaty Power for those of

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nationality, therefore, operate as the States of undetermined
nationality and would deal only with the States of undetermined
nationality. The other powers, however, would not be
wielded and answer the objection to the central power of some
degree of centralized control.

(c) A Combined Central Treaty Power

Government. A third solution would be to give the responsi-
bility for treaty making alike to the States of undetermined
nationality and to the States of undetermined nationality. This
Central Authority would be established as a separate
treaty service for all purposes. This
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under the direction of the States of undetermined nationality. It
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rightfully belongs, to the States of undetermined nationality. Such
of the work could be performed by States of undetermined nationality, which is the
most economical way, and given proper Allied supervision could
be done effectively. On the other hand, it does not recognize
the problem basically as an international one, and may lead

that the best interests of the nations most concerned would not be served. Moreover, it retains the entire service under quadripartite control, a feature which many believe should not be continued longer than is necessary.

(d) An International Tracing Service. Another alternative recognizes the problem basically as an international one and provides for the strengthened continuation of the coordinating and centralizing function under a strong international body. According to this proposal, the existing facilities for tracing on a zonal level would be maintained in Germany, but the larger aspects of the problem would be under the supervision of such a body as the International Refugee Organization or the United Nations Organization. In view of the long range aspects of the problem, such a solution merits careful consideration. It provides a large measure of coordination of effort, and within a single framework allows for the wide decentralization necessary for the operation of tracing on an international level.

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be served. However, in making the selling service under
questionable control, a failure which may have should
not be continued longer than is necessary.

(2) International Trade Service Another

alternative approach to the problem is to establish an international
and to provide for the management and control of the
concerning and controlling interest under a strong inter-
national body. According to the present, the existing
facilities for trading in a local market is maintained in
Germany, but the larger volume of trade will be under
the supervision of such a body as the international bodies
Organization of the United Nations. In view of
the high trade volume of the world, with a national entity
control consideration, it is possible to have a single authority
supervision of efforts, and which would be responsible
for the high international trade volume for the operation of
trading on an international level.